Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome back to the Middle East Centre for the second in our seminar series on Contemporary Islamic Studies.
Tonight I'm delighted to be welcoming Professor Asma Saladin from the University of Kentucky, from Indiana, University of Bloomington.
Asma is Professor of Middle Eastern Languages and Cultures and Class of 1950.
Hermann Hermann de Wells Endowed Professor in the Hamilton Lugard School of Global and International Studies at Indiana University.
A title long enough to force me to read that verbatim from the bio notes that I have in front of her.
She received a doctorate in Arabic and Islamic studies from Johns Hopkins and previously taught at Harvard and at Notre Dame.
Her research interests span like religious and political thought, both modern and pre-modern and Islamic intellectual history.
She is author of most recently Jihad What Everyone Needs to Know, published by our own Hometown University Press,
as well as contemporary issues in Islam with Edinburgh University Press in 2015.
Striving in the path of God, Jihad and martyrdom in Islamic fight with Oxford again in 2013.
Recently translated into Indonesia, which won the World Book Award in Islamic studies from the Iranian government in 2015.
And I have to tell you, there aren't that many people teaching in American universities winning prizes from Iran.
Professor After Dean is currently a member of the Academic Council of the Prince Alwaleed Centre for Muslim-Christian
Understanding at Georgetown University and a past member of the Board of Directors at the American Academy of Religion.
She has taught on virtually every element of contemporary Islamic studies, from the textual traditions to their implications for the policy world.
She brings that knowledge to bear on her topic tonight as she takes us through resurrecting the Caliphate,
the creative Abraham and ISIS's hermeneutics of power.
Will you please join me in getting the very warmest welcome to Professor some of the.
Okay. Well, good afternoon, everyone. And let me begin by actually thanking my very gracious host, Professor Eugene Rogan, the director of the centre,
who issued this invitation to me to be part of this lecture series on modern Islam.
I also want to recognise Miss Carolyn Davis.
She's here in the audience or not, but she took a very good care and efficient care of all the logistical issues that came up.
I also want to thank all of you for taking the time out of your busy schedules to be here this afternoon.
Friday afternoon,
as I was just telling Professor Rogan that I'm not the popular most popular time in the U.S. is in American universities to hold lectures.
We barely get any students. So I would like to express my appreciation to all of you for doing exactly that.
It's always so nice to visit Oxford and bring you all the friendships and collegial relations and just a wonderful
opportunity to soak up the kind of the unique atmosphere in this wonderful medieval town and this great university.
So in my presentation today, I'm focusing on the contemporary militant group referred to as ISIS and its views on the caliphate.
And as I'm sure it's known to most of you, if not every one of you, the acronym ISIS stands for the Islamic State in far off Iraq and Syria.
Sometimes this group is also referred to as ISIL, short for the Islamic State in of Iraq and the Levant and by the Arabic acronym Daesh,
which is short for the Arabic name a don't understand me of an act of worship.
I will refer to them as ISIS throughout my presentation. As this group sees it,
their so-called Islamic State represents the resurrection of the historical
office of the Caliphate after its abolition in 1924 by the Republican Turks.
To many, the term caliphate confers a certain aura of legitimacy on their radical Islamic State and creates an assumed link with the
historical caliphate established in Medina in the seventh century after the Prophet Muhammad's death in 1632 of the Common Era.
The nature of this historical caliphate is, however, contested among Muslims.
Different schools of thought and political factions within the Muslim community have debated each other and continue to do so.
On the question of whether the caliphate is a religious institution ordained by God and therefore an essential feature of Islamic governance,
or a historically contingent and practical institution that arose to serve the worldly political
needs of Muslims after the death of the Prophet and has no further religious significance.
In the first part of this talk, I will offer an account of ISIS's views on the Caliphate as drawn from the first issue of Darwin,
the glossy magazine published by ISIS between 2014 through 2016.
The issue is titled The Return of the Caliphate Out of the Uniform.
In it, the anonymous authors and I'm actually assuming that there's more than one sovereign referred to them in the plural.
They offer three main arguments that establish the necessity of their caliphate.
First, the Koran, according to them, mandates the caliphate because of his praise for and endorsement of the concept of Millat Ibrahim,
which can be translated as the creed or religion or community of Abraham in their minds.
This concept has political implications. Second, this Islamic State is required so as to carry out military campaigns in the name of jihad,
to spread Islamic rule everywhere on the globe, and ultimately to win everyone over to Islam.
Finally, the establishment of such an Islamic State would allow other Muslims seeking a similar political utopia
to seek refuge within it and contribute to ISIS's goals after their emigration to such a state.
After discussing these points as presented in the magazine,
I will then proceed to an analysis of ISIS's views on the caliphate and offer a critique
of the group's pronouncements on this institution and its necessity in the modern period.
Since ISIS's considers itself as representing the best interests of beleaguered Sunni Muslims today, as is their view.
I am considering only Sunni perspectives.
Let me now proceed to a discussion of ISIS's conception of the concept of Ibrahim and his political implications for an Islamic caliphate.
The return of HeLa form discusses how the concept of Imam is from the build up of Ibrahim.
The authors establish this link between the two concepts through the interpretation of Koran two
124 which states as translated by the authors in the English version of the magazine Pudding.
And remember when Ibrahim was tried by His Lord with certain words at his commands, and he fulfilled them?
A love said, Indeed, I will make you a leader for mankind.
Ibrahim pleaded, and also leaders for my offspring. Alas, my covenant does not include the wrongdoers.
And of course, the authors interpret this verse as follows and again, I'm quoting directly from them.
So the reward he that is Ibrahim received from Allah for fulfilling the commands he was tried with was that
he was granted the position of Imam and was favoured by law and honoured by him through this position.
Moreover, the Imam I mentioned in the above verse is simply referring to Imama in religious affairs as many would wish to interpret.
Rather, it's inclusive of imam in political affairs,
which many religious people have shunned and avoided on account of the hardship it
entails itself and on account of the hardship entailed in working to establish it.
Furthermore, the people today have failed to understand that Imam on religious affairs cannot be properly established
unless the people of truth first achieve comprehensive political imam all over the lands and the people.
And of course,
and I should note here that I have not edited actually the frequently clumsy and ungrammatical English that's used by the authors in the magazine.
And in most cases, I reproduce the language verbatim when I'm directly quoting from it.
The authors then proceed to cite another verse Koran two 130, chapter two, verse 130, which in their understanding,
firmly ties the imam or leadership of the Muslim community to the religion of Abraham and establishes the legitimacy of the Islamic State.
The verse states as translated by the authors and who would turn away from the religion of Abraham in that Ibrahim,
except one who makes a fool of himself. Truly, we chose him in this world, and indeed in India.
Hereafter he will be among the righteous and. The author's interpretation of this verse is worth quoting in full,
since it clearly demonstrates the scriptural hermeneutics that allows them to derive
overt political meanings from specific verses in the Court of the Authors State Court.
So you can see from the context of these verses that Imama is from the middle of Ibrahim al Islam,
and then whoever turns away from it is turning away from things.
That's a part of this great memo. The Minbar is the path that is followed in its entirety and that path that a large chose for Ibrahim on Islam
and his progeny thereafter is the path of him in both religious and political as much as they're able to do.
And upon every scholar who calls to or writes about the obligation to follow the minda of Ibrahim on the
system is to not detest the Imam of the Islamic State today and to not seek to undermine it or destroy it.
And upon them is to understand that the Islamic State, on account of what Allah has listed with of victory,
consolidation and establishing the religion, is regarded as an unquestionable imam.
As such, anyone who rebels against his authority inside his territory is considered a renegade
and it is permissible to fight him after establishing the Hajar against him.
That is, clarifying his error to him with proof.
And of course, the author's worldview,
the religious and political dimension of the current Islamic State is geologically linked with the middle
of Ibrahim Abraham and represents the modern fulfilment of a primordial covenant between God and humans.
This brings me to my second point. According to the Dabiq authors,
once this divinely required religio political authority as they conceive of it has been recognised as essential by right thinking.
Muslims everywhere an Islamic state must be established that will carry out military campaigns in the name of jihad,
to spread Islamic rule everywhere around the globe and ultimately convert everyone to Islam.
The proof text that is marshalled by the authors to legitimise this mandate is Koran 839,
which is translated by them as and fight them until there is no fitna and until the religion.
All of it is for unknown. And of course.
In this context, the author cite Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who served as the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq until his death in 2006.
The court invariably in the following way, again,
this is a direct quote learning from the lessons here that is Abu Musab gained from Afghanistan and elsewhere.
He knew that he left could not be established except through a Jamaa or a community that gathered
upon the kidnapped scripture and Sunnah with the understanding of the son of its reference,
as you know, to the pious ancestors from the earliest community of Muslims free from the extremities.
This is exactly how the render it. I think they meant extremism of the more Shia, referring to an earlier,
now defunct school of theology and the college, another early school of thought considered extremist.
The authors then continue the JUMAANE would use the absent obligation of jihad as its fundamental means for change implementing
on the command and here this site per on 839 such a jihad they proclaim again now quoting directly would be based upon hijra,
which is a reference to emigration to a devout society from a community of non-believers are pledging allegiance to a pious leader.
Some are listening to obedience and added training, leading to revolt, base of fortification and critical finding.
Then the establishment of the Caliphate or Shahada pledge to demonstrate true belief in pious action.
And of course, interestingly enough, unsurprisingly, the authors leave out the last part of Koran 839, which continues by saying,
but it is seized their hostilities, that indeed God sees what they do and offer no interpretation of it.
It is clear that reading a Quran 839 in its truncated form allows the authors to develop their idea of a
never ending religious war that should be waged by Muslims against non-Muslims until the latter capitulated.
Abandon their erring ways and embrace. The third point that ICES makes is the necessity of emigrating to the Islamic State after its establishment.
The authors emphasise the necessity of all perfection seeking Muslims to emigrate to the Islamic State once it has been established.
This emigration, which they call the hedgerow,
is supposed to hark back to the emigration of the early Muslims with the Prophet Mohammed in 622 of the common era from Mecca to Medina,
seeking safe haven in the latter city from persecution by hostile methods for ISIS ideologues.
The Prophet's action prompted by Divine Command, has created a mimetic precedent for all Muslims today who must similarly emigrate
to the Islamic State under their control and joined the righteous camp.
In this context, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the Islamic State, is quoted as saying The state is a state for all Muslims.
The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims, all Muslims, everywhere.
Whoever is capable of performing hijrah to the Islamic State, then let him do so because his church to the land of Islam is obligatory,
and the textual evidence for this assumed religious duty in the contemporary period is provided by two Hadiths quoted in the essay.
The first one states Hedgerow will not seize as long as there is jihad,
recorded by the well-known Hadith scholar Ahmed David Hamburg, who died in 1855 of the Common Era.
The second states petro will not seize as long as the unbelievers are fought.
Recorded by another well-known compiler of Hadith, a Nasiri, who died in 915 of the common era for the Dabiq authors.
These Hadiths, in addition to the Quranic verses that they cite,
create the imperative for contemporary Muslims to recognise the legitimacy of their Islamic State
and rush to join its ranks from wherever they are in order to support its universal mission,
to supplant all other religions and creeds with their true version of Islam.
So let me now proceed to my analysis and critique of the perspectives that are articulated in this issue of David.
As we can infer from the interpretations of certain Koranic verses, the Dabiq offers,
assume an intrinsic connection between the religion of Abraham and the caliphate,
also called the Imamate, which is configured as both a religious and political institution.
Their position is presented as the consensual point of view among Sunni Muslims,
regarding which there was apparently no dissension among the earliest members of the Muslim community.
These earliest Muslims are referred to in the literature as pious forebears of the community known in Arabic as a son of a Salah son for short.
The Salafi include the companions of the Prophet, the successors,
those who came after the generation of the companions and the successors to the successors, the third generation of Muslims.
And so that would comprise time span between roughly 713 to 855 of the common era because
of their personal righteousness and due to the proximity of their time to Muhammad.
The reported opinions and practices of the self are considered by Sunni Muslims to be authoritative and worthy of respect and emulation.
It is no surprise, therefore,
the the authors claim that their highly politicised understanding of key verses in the Koran derive from that of the self themselves.
However, the authors do not provide any references to specific members of the Senate who had endorsed such a perspective.
The authors anchored this belief in their assumption of an intrinsic link between political authority and the military.
Ibrahim and the role of Abraham as an imam, as referenced in the Koran, such a deeply held assumption that is merely asserted, invites scrutiny.
So I respond to this invitation by undertaking a survey of the exegesis of the verses cited by the authors,
mainly for unto 124 and to 130, but for commentators ranging from the eighth to the early 20th century of the Common Era.
This Dark Chronicles survey of a number of pre-modern and modern,
authoritative exegetical works will help us determine if such highly politicised
understandings of these Koranic verses can be credibly attributed to the Sun,
and therefore determined to be genuinely part of the early Islamic milieu as claimed by the authors.
So the first point that Ibrahim means political implications.
The first issue of David Ensor is the Koran to 124 and to 130.
Must be interpreted to mean that God has decreed for Muslims that they must set up an Islamic state to properly govern the world and most importantly,
carry out the military jihad in order to establish Muslim rule in all corners of the globe.
The question that needs to be asked here is whether early expertise in particular who are themselves
part of the sun up or close to the time of the sun did in fact subscribe to such an interpretation.
The declining survey of a range of Quran commentaries yields the following results.
The per arm commentary of the eighth century scholar reportedly consumed by men who died in 767 who was therefore himself one of the successors,
is one of the earliest exegetical works available to us today in published form.
With regard to the part of Granta 124 which states I am setting you up as a leader or imam for the people.
MacArthur, in his commentary,
says that this statement means that God set up Abraham as a leader in regard to religion 15 so that people would follow his example.
As for Granta, 130, MacArthur glosses that Ibrahim is referring to Islam.
He says that those who make a fool of themselves by turning away from the religion of Abraham are factions from among the people of the book,
referring to Jews and Christians primarily.
As for that part of the verse, which states we have indeed chosen him in this world and he will be among the righteous in the next world.
McArdle comments that this is a reference to Abraham and it means, and I'm quoting directly from Carter's commentary,
we have chosen him to be the recipient of Profiter and of this divine message in this world.
And, of course, the celebrated executed of the late ninth century Muhammad, even Gilead Atterbury, who died in 1923.
In his famous commentary, helpfully preserves for us the views of earlier commentators, unquote, on to on 24.
He notes that a number of early authorities had understood the words in Arabic KELLEY Math described as
constituting a trial for Abraham in the verse to be related to his appointment as a leader for humankind.
This leadership, however, had only to do with this knowledge and completion of the rights of the pilgrimage.
Monastic Hajj, among the companions and the successors who subscribe to this position were given copies of The Sun,
even to Rage, Mujahedeen, Jabour and others.
The overall intent of Abraham's appointment as imam or leader, says Abdul-Mahdi,
was to set an example for all humanity so that all people of faith who came after him would follow his path and accept his guidance.
Among those who subscribed to this understanding was the famous successor, Rabia, even under this, who died in 1756.
In his explanation of Koran two 130 A story again cites Rabia, even Younis as one of the early authorities who equated Millet Ibrahim as Islam.
Those who turned away from the religion of Abraham continues of W are the ignorant ones who forfeited their lot in the next world,
as was asserted by another successor. Even Zaid died 798.
As for the description of Abraham as one chosen by God in this world, Thornbury says, it means now again, I'm quoting directly from him.
It means that we choose and should preference for him by granting him closeness to God and made him a leader for those who came after him and leader.
Using the Arabic word imam. And offering. And the late 12th century.
Another well known execute, Father Dino Rossi, who died in 1210 comments.
The discerning people and the pig are agreed.
The imam in this verse refers to a prophet.
The most obvious reason for this understanding is that the imam in his verse is described as a leader for all humankind,
such as status is reserved only for a messenger from God who comes to promulgate a new revealed law.
If that were not so, and you followed the law of a different prophet,
then you would not be described as an imam, but rather as mob rule one who is led.
I'm hoping that most of you know some Arabic and you follow along.
And though I wish I may, I should have done Arabic words maybe in a handout.
But I think you're dealing with disturbance from Islamic currents that are probably finding resonance in the audience.
Well, that's what I thought, that if all of you already have a B.A. in Islamic studies,
I should not insult her intelligence, but telling you what an imam really is.
You know that already. So I Rise acknowledges that caliphs jurists and prayer leaders are also called imams,
but they're not intended in this verse, since a specific wording can only indicate a prophet here,
since prophets always occupy the highest echelons of leadership arising in fact explicitly dismisses the
arguments of those who drew a parallel between Qur'an to 124 and Koran to throw the Koran to 30 states.
I will place a Vice Durant or Khalifa on Earth.
And thereby attempted to argue when they conflated the meanings of these two verses and critiquing that and thereby attempting
to argue that these verses indicate that a possibly political leader should be designated through appointment by going.
A razzi considers this position to be weak and ill fund because Karanja on 24 purely has to do with Prophet Hood and Nebula.
And therefore, he concludes, it may not be considered to have any implications for political leadership.
Like his predecessors, Arastoo understands Milad Ibrahim in reference to one thing to be identical to Islam,
especially in regard to the foundational principles of monotheism, of the hate, justice and other noble human qualities.
Myocardium will unlock and resurrection after death.
Alma As for the divine selection of Abraham in this world mentioned in the verse,
he says it is a reference to his status as a messenger of God, from whom only the foolish who embrace falsehood turned away.
The 14th century executed even Hosea, who died in 1373 and who in recent times has enjoyed a resurgence in popularity, particularly among Islamists.
Record similar exegesis of these two verses.
He goes as a leader for humankind as a reference to Abraham,
who should be followed by posterity for his profession of monotheism and for upholding the divine commands and proscriptions.
This description of Abraham, he says, draws attention to his status as the friend of God whose example should be adopted by the righteous.
As for Granta 130 even Kathy says it constitutes a divine rebuke of the polytheists
who violated the tenets within the religion of Abraham by worshipping multiple gods.
In contrast, Abraham was the leader of the pure multitudes Imam, and for Navid, who was unwavering in his worship of the true God,
forsaking all the other deities of his own people and repudiating the ways of His own father.
Those who choose to turn their backs on Abraham, divinely chosen in this world to offer guidance to humanity,
have embarked upon what he describes as the paths of error and falsehood.
This broad survey of some of the most important Koran commentaries allows me to draw the following conclusions.
ISIS's position the middle of the Ibrahim religion of Abraham, should be understood to contain both a religious and political mandate,
and that this represents the conventional understanding of Muslim scholars through time is not tenable.
Not a single one of the influential pre-modern executes for my disgust.
Attach any kind of political meaning to the phrase millet Ibrahim.
Nor do they understand Abraham himself to have exercised any kind of political power.
The Burning Man, as used in Koran to 124, refers only to a religious leader in their understanding and is applied to Abraham alone for only.
He is described in the Koran as the Dubai, the appointed religious leader for all humankind.
His appointment was on account of his exemplary adherence to monotheism and rejection of idolatry.
His closest to God and his fulfilment of the rights of pilgrimage authority specifically mentions the names of prominent early figures
from the first and second generations of Muslims and therefore from among the Senate who emphasise Abraham's high religious standing.
On the basis of these verses. Significantly, none of these are new.
Moses is cited as having extrapolated any command from within these verses to set up any kind of a politically organised movement or entity.
There is, in fact not a whiff of political authority attached to Abraham's exalted rank,
even by even considered an exigent frequently invoked by today's Islamists as providing valuable
corroboration for their highly politicised interpretations of specific Koranic verses.
An assumed consensus on this point on the part of the son of the symbol presented as fact, where the authors,
without providing any corroborating evidence and asserted as an essential doctrine
that must be followed and implemented by Muslims at all times and in all places.
It is obvious why they make this hermeneutical move their bold certitude,
based on a mythical consensus of the summer that the historical caliphate was based on religious dogma.
Allows them to advocate its resurrection in the contemporary period as an urgent duty connected
to the salvation of Muslims and their understanding of the Koran itself and properly understood,
provides a specific blueprint for a legitimate Islamic state that must be established and supported by Muslims at all times and in all places.
It is, however, not possible to find any verse in the Koran that explicitly calls for the establishment of any political entity.
Koranic terms like Khalifa and Hoc, which are understood in a political sense today,
do not have any overt political signification in their original Koranic context.
Scholarly studies have shown that the Koranic true political was understood by early stages from the first two centuries of Islam
as referring to the human in his or her basic function as a cultivator of the Earth and a general custodian of his resources.
The term helpful in its Koranic context also cannot be understood in a political sense and was not in fact so understood by the earliest executes,
as I have discussed in a previous study. For example, Islam itself inside to verses 544 through 45,
chapter five verses 44 through 45 as proof text to establish the notion of divine political sovereignty in Islam.
Read in the original Koranic context, however, it is clear that these verses were addressed to Jews,
exhorting them to uphold the laws of the Torah and to judge by them the occurrence
of the Arabic verb Jacobi in Koran 545 clearly means to judge rather than to rule.
This is the reference is to the life. Lex Talen is the law of retaliation in the Bible.
Early commentators of the Koran understood understand how common is derivatives to refer primarily to God's moral judgement,
Arabic cadre of human beings in this world and the next when the term is used in relation to humans.
It also refers to legal judgement and conveys no political connotation.
Most Islamists, however, tend to impute anachronistically the meaning of two rule to this, for which is not deployed in this sense in the court.
And it has been similarly shown that the Koranic General Amer, those who possess authority and this is derived from crime for 59,
was devoid of political signification in the early centuries of Islam,
although it progressively acquired such a meaning by roughly the third century of Islam,
of the ninth century of the common era, when the next AMR came to signify a political authority, among other meanings,
the attempts of moderate Islamist to read political authority into the term AMR as occurs in specific verse verses,
are highly tendentious and anachronistic, even sort of gone.
And this may come as a surprise to you. It did when I first came across this explanation,
even certain the term used later in extra Koranic literature for the political ruler
himself refers in the Koran mainly to an irrefutable proof or a justification.
There are a number of verses that use sometime in the sense Koran 23, 45, 27, 21, six, 81 and others or two physical power or might,
for example, Koran 5533 but never to any human who exercises any kind of power, especially political power in general.
It can be argued that the more utilitarian concept of the public good must the rather than in the assumed religious mandate,
often determined political conduct and the creation of administrative policies in real time.
Now on to the second point. As I mentioned earlier,
one of the avowed purposes of the Islamic State of ISIS is to carry out military jihad in order to fulfil the will of God as they perceive it,
to vanquish all other ways of living and worshipping so that their version of Islam will prevail in the world.
The Dabiq authors deploy Qur'an 839 which states and fight them until there is no fitna.
I'm not translating the show for obvious reasons, and as we become apparent, and until the religion,
all of it is far enough to establish this broad mandate, which for them remains in effect until the end of time.
A quick survey of foreign commentaries on this verse shows that a majority of executed from the eighth century onwards understand the word fitna,
which is actually left untranslated in the Dabiq text in Koran 839 to refer
specifically to being polytheism or Shia that existed in the seventh century.
But if this sees the continuation of current 839 that is not included by the topic authors is consequently
then understood to refer to the pagan Arabs of Mecca who are expected to abandon polytheism.
This, for example, is a tolerance understanding and is comprehensive listing of various interpretations of this verse, but not very, however,
indicates that some earlier commentators from the generation of the summer, from the generations of the salon, had held markedly different views.
Those, according to the successor, Alhassan Abbas, who died in 728.
The critical term fitna refers to tribulations, trials and tribulations.
Albania So the fighting is thereby understood to be undertaken to put an end to persecution and strife, not to uproot polytheism.
But Thornbury also refers to a group of unnamed executes who are of the view that the phrase if they cease,
refers to pagan Arabs who desist from finding not from polytheism, a position with which he himself, however, disagrees.
In the late 12th century, arising in his commentaries, cites the views of another success or wave.
The surveyor who died circa 730 who interpreted Fitna in this verse to refer to the trials and persecution faced by the early Muslims in Mecca,
which aimed to lure them away from God's religion.
And of course, this is an enduring quote from Otherwise You Arise.
He comments that after the emigration to Medina, Muslims were given the divine command to fight the public is because their
persecuting lists and obstructing them from the free practice of their religion.
And he recourse the views of Otaiba, who had commented that the phrase so the religion may be entirely foregone,
expresses the purpose of this sanctioned fighting,
which is to ensure the free and unfettered practice by Muslims of their religion in Mecca in the absence of persecution.
The views of the successors Alhassan Abbas three, and Ottawa, four, among the pious forebears from among the Senate,
as recorded in the classical commentaries,
therefore provide an important corrective to the prevalent view among militants and a mass of traditionalists.
Also, the current 839 creates a mandate for Muslims to carry out military jihad for the purpose of spreading Islam.
It should be noted that a number of modern, influential Muslim scholars largely agree with Alhassan Abbas's and always interpretations of Quran.
839 For example, Mohammed Abdou in the late 19th century emphasised that this verse has to do specifically with the circumstances during the
Prophet's time when he and his companions were subjected to much hardship and persecution on account of their public profession,
of their faith fighting commanded, and it was intended to put an end to this persecution and those to ensure freedom of religion.
These are the exact words of Abdu so that no one may be coerced into abandoning his or her religion and or face persecution on account of it.
This position, he comments, is in full conformity with Koran 2 to 56, which states that there is no compulsion in religion.
Abdullah Godwin others in the early centuries of Islam,
those in firs no broader mandate in this verse to continue to wage war so that Islam eventually supplants all other religions.
Abdul also compares Koran 839, the Koran to 193, since both versions are very similar in wording Koran to 193 states.
So that religion may be for God for are of the. This statement is compared to the statement so that religion all of it may be for god.
We are proud of deen coulibaly in Koran A39.
Reading this two verses together leads to the interpretation that the religion or religiosity of each
individual should be sincerely for the sake of God and not motivated by the fear of any human being.
The faithful furthermore, have the right not to be enticed away from their religion,
nor to be persecuted on account of it, or cajoled and flattered into renouncing it.
Once again, the historical context must be kept in mind.
Stresses to make the time of the revelation of the Koran was the stronghold of polytheism and the Kaaba was the house of idols.
While the polytheists was free and unencumbered. In his belief, the monotheistic believer was in a state of subjugation and oppression.
If the polytheists were to desist from fighting and violence,
then hostility against him also ceases because aggression against him is carried out
only to make him renounces violent and aggressive ways and for no other reason,
he stresses. During her time.
Okay. All right. I will just keep going back to the propensity of militants to be in general, to quote scripture selectively.
And the decontextualised way is well-known. The topic authors are no different.
I'll just contextualise and cross referential. Reading of relevant verses allows him to unveil more cogent,
multi-layered meanings of Koran a39 that are also in accord with the interpretations of many among the Sultan,
such as Alhassan of Basra and all Ravens avail of this reading strategy effectively undermines the virulently militant meetings
attributed to pour une through nine by the Gothic authors through their ahistorical and atomistic reading of this critical verse.
And now the final third point regarding the necessity of emigrating to the Islamic State after the establishment of the Islamic State.
The Dabiq authors assert that, all right, thinking Muslims must emigrate to such a polity,
failure to do so constitutes a grave, mortal sin on their part and jeopardises their well-being in the hereafter.
In support of this position, the Dabiq authors refer to two Hadiths, recorded by even a handbook and an essay in their habit collections.
As I previously noted, this headings carry weight.
Both even Hannibal and NSA are held in great esteem as headed scholars by Sunni Muslims.
An essay is headed collection in particular is important since it is included among the six Hadith compilations deemed to be authoritative by Sunnis.
However, notably absent in the author's discussion is mention of a better known Hadith that is found in the more
prestigious collection of the famous headed scholar overhype that contradicts the content of these two headings.
And Buhari's report is narrated by the well-known companion, even Abbas, who states there is no more emigration or hijrah after the fall of Mecca.
But Jihad, with the proper intention, will continue. And of course.
And you've not come as a surprise to us that this lady's is regarded as sound safe by al-Wuhayshi, dismissing in this magazine.
This is taken literally. Its text would undermine ISIS's dogmatic position on the necessity of emigrating to their Islamic State,
compared to necessarily an even handed Sunni Muslims regard Buhari's Hadith compilation.
Second, authoritative in only to the Koran.
This is a view that, although contested, still holds largely true for the vast majority of Muslims in the modern period.
The reason for this prevalent near doctrinal position among them is that each Hadith recorded by Buhari is assumed to have been subjected
by him to a rigorous method of scholarly investigation into its reliability before he could earn the coveted status of sound or silence.
Habits recorded by even a not certain do not consistently meet this high standard of reliability.
Nor do they claim to. As a result of some Hadith occurring.
Occurring on Buhari's collection must necessarily take precedence over those contained in other less rigorously compiled reports,
especially when the contents are at variance, as was the case here.
It is noteworthy that ISIS's views on the necessity of Hijrah as a as a religious obligation correspond to those of the hydrogens.
The militant faction from the first century of Islam that is universally regarded as extremist by Muslims of all stripes.
The heritage emerged in the last half of the seventh century, during the time of Allah even knew the last of the writer caliphs.
The Fiery Giants are on record as having encouraged their supporters to emigrate from non-priority territory to territory under their control.
They even referred to their own land, Islam, Hijrah or the abode of emigration,
and called themselves al-Muhajir to the emigrants in conscious imitation of the Mexican immigrants during the time of Mohammed.
One of the richest ironies of contemporary Islamist discourses is that their roots, especially in extremist forms,
is that their roots can be traced to heretic doctrine and therefore proven
to be outside the mainstream Muslim tradition as it evolved through history.
Like the photo giants. Ice is also beauties and violence against all those who are opposed to the ideology,
including, if not especially mainstream Muslims who consider them deviant.
Although the sound has incited above, there is no more migration after the fall of Mecca.
But Jihad, with the proper intention to continue, may be understood to contain prophetic endorsement for military activity after his death.
It should be pointed out that the term jihad is as used in the Koran is not to be reduced.
You are conflated with finding the Koran actually uses a different term picked out to specifically indicate fighting.
So here due has to be understood in a much broader sense of struggling on many different levels and spheres in life,
particularly to uphold the foundational,
moral and ethical imperative within Islam to uphold or promote or enjoin what is right and to prevent or forbid what is wrong.
It should be noted that many among the the Sunnah for actually on record as having opposed
the idea of continued military activity in the name of jihad after the death of Mohammed.
This critical debate can be reconstructed when we look at the first Koran, 2 to 1 six.
Chapter two, verse 216. And its various interpretations through time.
Koran 2 to 1, six states fighting has been prescribed for you, even though you dislike it.
This verse instigated a robust discussion among the judges as to who exactly
was be addressed and the not for nominal suffix plural you call in Arabic.
Once again, Atterbury provides valuable documentation that early Muslims,
like the successors, thought even argued over who died in 733 and even to age died in 1767,
had firmly maintained that the duty of fighting had been imposed on the companions alone against Americans who had attacked them.
Another earlier Medina and scholar of gun not even almost died.
693 The son of the second Caliph, Honourable Hawthorne, is also said to have subscribed to this position as late as the 11th century.
The well-known Koran executed a lady who died in 1076 continued to endorse the early position.
The fighting as a religiously prescribed duty applied only to the companions, and he cited specifically after even arguing over as his authority.
There is therefore substantial documentation in our sources to allow us to state categorically
that some of the most influential scholars of the first and second centuries of Islam,
those we referred to as the son of subscribed to the view the Koran,
2 to 1 six commanded fighting only for the prophet and his companions against the American aggressors of their time.
And that that's and that this verse had no further applicability beyond the first generation
of us since later scholars like the court of extended to be in the late 13th century,
however, would assert that the verse is to be understood as imposing the duty of fighting on
both those who were present at the time of its revelation and those who came later.
One may assume that the concern among them is part to establish fighting as a continuing individual duty on the basis of this verse is
prompted by the precarious situation in which Muslims and those found themselves in the face of the Spanish Reconquista in the 13th century.
By the time we get to the Mamluk period, 1250 through 1517,
characterised by attacks by the Crusaders and then the Mongols were on 2 to 1 six became widely
understood to require Muslims to militarily defend themselves against the new aggressors of their time.
There's a Syrian scholar, Ibn Nas, who died in 1411 and who composed a treatise on the merits of the military jihadi,
a rather prolific genre in the late medieval period known as the Father along Jihad or the Excellences or Merits of the Jihad,
cites this verse, among others,
to establish the necessity of fighting against the crusaders who were besieging the Syrian and Egyptian coastal areas in the late 14th century.
So in conclusion, it has become a truism to state that in Islam,
religion and politics are inextricably bound together, and this feature is one of his distinctive hallmarks.
ISIS ideologues certainly subscribe to this position.
My critique of their position leads me to the conclusion that the concept of the Islamic State as
conceived by militant ideologues and their claim that it conforms to fundamental Koranic directives,
particularly concerning the creed or religion of Abraham Millet. Ibrahim cannot withstand critical scrutiny.
Their assertion that such a concept harks back to the time of the sun and is in need of revival,
cannot be substantiated by any early religious or historical text.
And I have looked at my survey instead establishes that their political project
represents a signal departure from key positions attributed to the pious forebears,
as recorded in the very sources generally deemed authoritative by Sunni Muslims.
Their perspectives on the topic of political governance based on an assumed fusion between religion and
politics harking back to the time of Abraham is not only not grounded in earlier classical sources,
but completely at odds with their content, a fact that is very likely not known to them since they are clearly not consulted on any of these words.
Thank you very much. This. Well, thank you so much, Senator.
Truly an enlightening dissection of the kind of tracks that ISIS has put out to try and
give a semblance of religious legitimacy to their claims for advancing a violent agenda.
There's something very reassuring to hear the ways in which we can take apart their claims that they
represent what might be a textually authentic Islamic politics and say that they're getting involved.
So my question for you is, beyond that obvious good for those who are scholars of contemporary Islam or indeed for policymakers.
Where do we go with that? Because clearly.
The author in BELVIQ is not so concerned about the sources.
It doesn't seem they bothered consulting them.
And there seems to be some other purpose in the way in which this framing of ISIS's mission is is put forward.
It sounds in keeping with the kind of invented symbols that ISIS constructed to give
a loss of deep rooted Islamic legitimacy to a man they named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
evoking at one time one of the Rashi dude and one of the seeds of pilaf whose way of dressing
looked like something that a Hollywood designer might have conceived of for an atomic bombing.
And where they're spouting a kind of language that's clearly targeting a different audience than you.
So perhaps what they're saying is they're as right to make it exegesis on Koranic verses as any of the sources you're looking at.
And this is the one that's valid for their times and the way that coverage was told for the 10th century or whatever.
So I'm just wondering where we can take it in terms of the analysis of the project
of ISIS and the way you're trying to legitimated itself through this gloss.
Well, first and foremost, I would say for its own audience, it's a very compelling discourse, is absolutely no doubt they hit all the right buttons.
Right there are dredging up terms and concepts that have deep resonance within
the Islamic lexicon and within the Islamic historical and religious tradition.
I guess I'm approaching it as someone who wants to verify their claims that they're basing
their views on this subject and if that can actually be verified by going back to the sources.
So that was my principle project. And I, I have no intention of doubting that others who are not doing a similar work of exhumation,
if you like, this kind of forensic inquiry, are not bothered by that at all.
Right. But if they're going to make the claim that it goes back to the I, I would like to know who exactly are the pinning these views on.
They actually don't. They just leave that out as a kind of a general claim out on the table.
Take it or leave it right there.
Exactly. Engage with academic, shall we say, or those who want those footnotes.
Right. The ones whose documentation. So they they are happy with this particular hermeneutical approach where they feel like,
as you said, they can impose their own exegesis based on their own contemporary circumstances.
But I think there there is a larger Muslim community that have not bought into this discourse.
And they are you know, there's a certain percentage to this day that remains a minority.
But I think the large mainstream body of Muslims are still very sceptical of their demands and a number of them can read the sources for themselves.
There's also a broad religious illiteracy, though, that can prove to be perhaps fertile ground for new recruits, as it has been.
But I don't see a wholesale moving away from some of the classical positions towards their extreme, intolerant and violent agendas.
Now, words like killer, frankly, continue to resonate among, I would say, a broad cross-section of Muslim populations everywhere.
Right. This is part of their hallowed history. There are political Islamists who are not extremists, who are not driven by a violent militant agenda.
And they would also like to see an Islamic state established, but not along their lines.
They don't conceive of a never ending military campaign in the name of jihad to try to uproot all other religions and ways of life.
They don't respond to that kind of extremist rhetoric.
You're, frankly speaking, the only parallel that we can find in Islamic histories is that of the terror giants who are, you know,
definitely determined that as part of their explicit agenda, that if you are not one of them,
then you definitely have to be fought against and killed for your weakness.
Right, because there is only one right way to approach the tradition and you have to.
And it was a religious obligation to establish in an Islamic state or in some kind of a political entity where, you know,
again, right, thinking Muslims like themselves can reside and establish the political utopia that they are pursuing.
But certainly that's good Sunni company, right? If you in the company of the large, you're not in good company.
Yeah. If there's one rule for them. Yes. Oh, they resist that label.
You know, if you really want to get into their skin, call them the whole.
And they will really resist that because, again, that's a name that inspires dread and contempt.
Right. So that's definitely.
You don't want to be. Yeah. But if you do compare some of their terminologies and their worldview, it's comes very close to that mindset.
And again, they're they're labelling this immigration to their ideal Islamic state as a hijra, consciously, again,
evoking one of the most hallowed terms in Islamic history, calling themselves the Muhajir and the Hydrogens are you did that in the seventh century.
And so they are borrowing from the lexicon. Now, I don't know if they're reading Hold Your Stuff or not.
It's kind of eerie that in some ways they replicate that kind of rhetoric and that worldview.
But I don't know, they're consciously consulting these sources that might be something worth pursuing and getting lumped in with,
sort of the Hurricane Botany, you know, I mean, the heritage of one of the earliest groups that you grew up with, that kind of thing.
So in terms of when you start with the bottom, you know, they're also resorting to like esoteric readings and scripture here.
I know there is an element of that as well. Yeah.
And also kind of apocalyptic readings of the end times and so forth,
which if you're trying to create the good Islamic order around the world, is certainly not the foundations that have the appeal of that.
You're going to fight those until it doesn't. Yeah, that's right.
I mean, like my question was so long and convoluted that it didn't really get to the point.
I guess what I'm trying to say is, rather than the the use of text that you would demonstrate to us, it's not true.
But you've made easy work of dismantling their theology. Mm hmm.
I was wondering whether what really we take away from this is a study of the work of their propaganda.
Mm hmm. And that is in understanding how they propagandise their mission.
Reach out to people who hear the language of Islam,
but don't have the information with the knowledge to go deeper in it to see why it is shallow or flawed.
And so what we really have and what you studied here is a very thorough understanding of the workings of their propaganda machine.
Would that be fair? Yes, I think you characterised that very astutely.
That's exactly what I was trying to get at.
You did ask the question about foreign policy implications that I find a little bit more difficult to address.
I have spoken at a number of events that were hosted by this, the U.S. State Department.
And, you know, there was a whole series on political Islam.
And, you know, I've represented I've spoken about a number of my own research projects and that of others where we questioned is this, you know,
the political agenda of contemporary Islam is and then more militant groups and then
presenting that as always having been part of a historically of Islamic thought.
So I don't know how much good that has done.
I think one way influential foreign policy makers could use this kind of information,
and if they want to delegitimize such claims and claiming to represent mainstream
Muslims is to use some of this information to undermine their arguments.
I don't know if that's something the State Department would want to do or foreign policy makers,
but one of my favourite beefs is Please don't use and everyone does it.
I sometimes laugh. Some don't refer to these groups as jihadist groups.
We could start with that. This terminology is so important, right? I think it matters the way we use language.
And one, you know, even some of the most hawkish jurists that I've seen that I've studied over time.
One thing they held firm on is that a legitimate military jihad, you can target non-combatants, civilians.
And this is something that the militants go out of the way. ISIS wrote a manual and is called A Manual of Savagery.
I forget what the original Arabic is and what actually the the English title is, where they go out of their way to say,
you must spread terror to bring about this political utopia and actually to bring people into this political utopia,
you must resort to terror and savagery until they just capitulate.
So instead of jihadis, Jacobins and hierarchies yesterday, I think that we got the guillotine.
Yes, we can we can use that term in Western languages,
but really the carrying out head up and in the the medieval jurist had a specific term for those people who come in,
for example, highway robbery and simply resort to spreading terror among the civilian population.
There's already a very good legal term to characterise their actions, and it completely falls outside the legitimate parameters of a military jihad.
So you reject the whole language of Salafi jihadism and all of that.
I mean, how does one talk about a movement like ISIS in just layman's terms?
I just call them militant groups. That's what they are. You can call them terrorist groups.
That's exactly their purpose, to join to spread terror.
But I think we cede a certain moral ground to them when we actually call their violent campaigns jihadi campaigns.
I refused to do it myself, and it's fallen on deaf ears every chance I get, especially when I'm talking to government officials,
I try to convince the please abandon this terminology, but it's just become really well embedded because that's who they label themselves as.
And so if you're reporting on their discourse, you kind of fall into, you know, sort of you just automatically adopt their own language.
So I can see why it's happening. But I'm going to maintain my own stance until the bitter entrenched is with you.
But I think a lot of your audience in Washington. Yes. Thinks are insulting the movement, what they call the jihad.
They can't understand why you think that's just the opposite. They want to do it.
So that might have caused some of the confusion. Professor Asma, one of the.