1 00:00:00,180 --> 00:00:05,730 Welcome to another session of the Friday seminar series at the Middle East Centre at St Anthony's. 2 00:00:06,420 --> 00:00:12,000 It is my great pleasure to introduce our guest tonight. 3 00:00:12,330 --> 00:00:20,129 Dr. In our hand off. We just met today, but that's a mistake I want to make up for as soon as possible, 4 00:00:20,130 --> 00:00:24,150 because we basically work on the same thing a few hundred kilometres apart. 5 00:00:24,690 --> 00:00:36,000 Militia is an informal grassroots armed activity and in formations within formations that have at least foot, if not more, in the local state. 6 00:00:36,930 --> 00:00:44,129 So Dr. Rudolf is a senior research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 7 00:00:44,130 --> 00:00:49,500 also a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Divided Societies at King's College, 8 00:00:49,500 --> 00:00:57,390 London. She is also working with Accept, which stands for Cross Border Conflict, Evidence, Policy and Trends. 9 00:00:58,050 --> 00:01:06,720 And there she analyses the implications of identity politics and the mobilisation of violent memories in conflict affected Borderlands. 10 00:01:07,650 --> 00:01:14,639 She is also a partner at the Candide Foundation, which is an independent Berlin based think tank working on political, 11 00:01:14,640 --> 00:01:21,750 social and cultural challenges facing Muslim communities in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and beyond. 12 00:01:22,380 --> 00:01:29,970 So very limited impact. As you can see, she has done really amazing field work, I believe, 13 00:01:29,970 --> 00:01:36,810 mostly in Iraq and as like a cluster of data that she's doing wonderful work based on. 14 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:40,410 So without further ado, please join me in welcoming her. 15 00:01:46,670 --> 00:01:47,510 Thank you so much. 16 00:01:47,510 --> 00:01:58,280 And it's a real pleasure to be able to share my research findings in such a distinguished circle from Maryam and I already started brainstorming 17 00:01:58,280 --> 00:02:08,840 about potential synergies and what we can learn from each other by having studied this array of auxiliary or regime aligned actors. 18 00:02:09,800 --> 00:02:14,959 Unfortunately, in the field of security studies, of defence studies of political science, 19 00:02:14,960 --> 00:02:22,110 you always have this bias or this emphasis on studying the non-state actor or the irregular actor, 20 00:02:22,110 --> 00:02:31,460 and looks like there has been less emphasis put on those who work as an additional pillar of the state's defence infrastructure. 21 00:02:32,180 --> 00:02:41,810 And that's why I found it very fascinating to conduct this research on the PMI, which I started conducting in 2017. 22 00:02:42,470 --> 00:02:48,790 The PMI for those who are less familiar with the topic are a paramilitary umbrella, 23 00:02:48,860 --> 00:02:56,860 the Popular Mobilisation Forces, or the popular mobilisation units known in Arabic as a cash to shabby. 24 00:02:57,620 --> 00:03:05,990 And what I found most interesting about this research is to study how they created a popular brand. 25 00:03:06,350 --> 00:03:09,290 So everything like that goes beyond this. 26 00:03:09,740 --> 00:03:19,190 A bit simplistic, but quite popular analytical prism of just looking at them as an Iranian Trojan horse or an Iranian proxy. 27 00:03:20,000 --> 00:03:26,540 So that's why also my field was very much focussed on understanding their externally productive self-perception. 28 00:03:26,960 --> 00:03:29,480 What did they think about their role within the state, 29 00:03:29,480 --> 00:03:38,600 but also what do they think about engaging in the transnational religious sphere and also how they can translate religious capital obtained in this 30 00:03:38,600 --> 00:03:47,390 transnational religious field into institutional power and also into governmental leverage within the realms of the context of the Iraqi state. 31 00:03:49,220 --> 00:03:55,730 So this would be a bit the structure of today's presentation, as we are focusing today, 32 00:03:55,730 --> 00:04:02,360 primarily on their ascent to power, on their role within the political fields. 33 00:04:03,020 --> 00:04:14,239 The focus will be very much on their participation or contestation on the Iraqi elections and everything like that followed after that period, 34 00:04:14,240 --> 00:04:23,840 including like one of the most recent developments where they were officially awarded the privilege of having their own state owned company. 35 00:04:24,620 --> 00:04:28,700 So we will get into the nitty gritty when we discuss the political fields. 36 00:04:29,210 --> 00:04:37,010 But for all the students presence here, I would also like to share a bit about my own model or like my decision how to approach this topic. 37 00:04:37,460 --> 00:04:44,660 And this includes also looking into the dynamics of the religious and of the civic or the social field. 38 00:04:45,200 --> 00:04:50,959 So basically to understand how they tried to establish themselves as a legitimate voice, 39 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:59,300 as a legitimate actor within the Iraqi state, which is not a homogeneous entity and cannot be analysed as such. 40 00:04:59,750 --> 00:05:05,959 I decided to borrow from the board's toolkit of Fields theory and to look at their 41 00:05:05,960 --> 00:05:11,480 behaviour and lift practices within also the religious and the civic fields, 42 00:05:11,480 --> 00:05:15,770 and to analyse the translation of different forms of capital. 43 00:05:16,370 --> 00:05:22,699 And I would be happy also to discuss the limitations of the research because this is very important. 44 00:05:22,700 --> 00:05:31,670 Also when we advertise our work to know that we should be able to speak about our own data and water, 45 00:05:31,970 --> 00:05:35,420 which are also the boundaries of the empirical data that we have. 46 00:05:35,420 --> 00:05:45,020 And this research is very much drawing on elite interviews with commanders, with the upper ranks of the Iraqi security establishment. 47 00:05:45,590 --> 00:05:52,380 So it's an analysis what they regard as legitimate and not an impact measurement of how legitimate they are, 48 00:05:52,400 --> 00:05:56,750 let's say, in the eyes of community, somewhere in the minimal province or in Basra. 49 00:05:57,050 --> 00:06:04,190 So like, this would be a completely different topic or perhaps like one of you can undertake drawing on these findings. 50 00:06:04,190 --> 00:06:12,500 And then I am very looking forward to the discussion that we can have about the implications also like for the nature of Iraqi statehood. 51 00:06:14,090 --> 00:06:21,610 So the guiding questions of my research have always been like how they have sought to establish themselves as a legitimate actor, 52 00:06:21,620 --> 00:06:25,790 like how they have generated legitimacy in these different fields, 53 00:06:25,790 --> 00:06:29,030 but also how they have pursued symbolic power, 54 00:06:29,390 --> 00:06:38,540 how influential they were to shape certain norms and values through their practices for ceremonies, through their open communication. 55 00:06:38,840 --> 00:06:45,020 Maryam and I were also previously discussing that they have not just focussed. 56 00:06:45,180 --> 00:06:50,879 On communicating their role as a member of the security sector, 57 00:06:50,880 --> 00:07:02,520 but have also recently created their own think tank and are publishing their own peer review magazine with affiliated or a hazard friendly 58 00:07:02,790 --> 00:07:12,900 researchers where issues are being discussed in a way that emphasise or highlight their added value to the Iraqi security sector. 59 00:07:13,530 --> 00:07:20,519 And another very important research question for me was how they capitalised, 60 00:07:20,520 --> 00:07:26,489 like how they benefited from the legality that was bestowed onto them by the Iraqi state, 61 00:07:26,490 --> 00:07:35,520 by consecutive Iraqi governments, because already in 2006 they were recognised as the Iraqi security forces, 62 00:07:35,520 --> 00:07:39,960 but still independent from the Ministry of Interior and from the Ministry of Defence, 63 00:07:40,380 --> 00:07:46,530 which of course offers them a lot of leeway and provides them with undeniable 64 00:07:46,860 --> 00:07:53,430 plausible deniability and also allows them to engage in a lot of illicit, 65 00:07:54,300 --> 00:08:01,620 illicit activities, illicit economic enterprises, without necessarily being held accountable for those. 66 00:08:04,530 --> 00:08:09,200 This is my list of the logical toolkits. 67 00:08:09,540 --> 00:08:16,979 A lot of the data comes from first hand testimonies by commanders from the Iraqi resistance, 68 00:08:16,980 --> 00:08:24,330 the so-called Iran aligned brigades, but also brigades associated with the holy shrines, 69 00:08:24,330 --> 00:08:29,250 or about those perceived as loyal to Sistani Sadrist brigades, 70 00:08:29,250 --> 00:08:35,250 but also statements by clerics, by members of the Iraqi security forces, Iraqi politicians. 71 00:08:35,760 --> 00:08:37,980 So in all of these conversations, 72 00:08:38,340 --> 00:08:45,720 focus group interviews like the topic was like how the hotspots are like this popular phenomenon was perceived from different angles. 73 00:08:46,890 --> 00:08:55,920 Even those and this is an important anecdote from the field, even those who are very critical of the controversial footprint of some brigades, 74 00:08:55,920 --> 00:09:03,600 or especially like their involvement in human rights violations, were very careful of how they frame this criticism. 75 00:09:03,600 --> 00:09:11,010 So like they would prefer not to talk about like the hassle itself and to tarnish the brand name, 76 00:09:11,020 --> 00:09:19,230 specifically the name of the brigades or like the name of the brigades leader when they were expressing more critical voices. 77 00:09:20,010 --> 00:09:29,160 Um, and I would like to provide a bit of context how the Hashid actually came into being, how the hashtag was formed. 78 00:09:29,670 --> 00:09:35,940 Of course, the official story starts with the fall of Mosul in 2014. 79 00:09:36,450 --> 00:09:41,939 But even though that's the more popular view that they came as or emerged as a reaction 80 00:09:41,940 --> 00:09:47,909 to the US invasion and were kind of like just the product of a grassroots mobilisation, 81 00:09:47,910 --> 00:09:57,270 the veterans, the vanguards and the architects of this phenomenon were by no means new comers to the Iraqi social political scene. 82 00:09:57,840 --> 00:10:04,620 I have prepared a couple of slides illustrating some of the most influential profiles those who 83 00:10:04,620 --> 00:10:10,200 actually like shaved the dominant narrative before the Hajj in chaos when the hushed stands for. 84 00:10:10,530 --> 00:10:14,549 Some of them have been around already, like during the Iran-Iraq war. 85 00:10:14,550 --> 00:10:21,300 Some of them were very prominent resistance figures and have fought against British and American coalition forces, 86 00:10:21,900 --> 00:10:25,500 and some of them are also very active in the war in Syria. 87 00:10:25,500 --> 00:10:36,210 So without very much speaking about this experiences because like they preferred to be seen as members of the as like the leaders of the Hashid, 88 00:10:36,720 --> 00:10:45,840 they would sometimes share appeasers like from the historical learnings and frame them in hindsight, it's something that is there to contribute, 89 00:10:45,840 --> 00:10:49,200 to equip them to be better servants, like for Iraq, 90 00:10:49,200 --> 00:10:56,549 like for the Iraqi people and for the Iraqis to make what was a huge and remains a huge source of 91 00:10:56,550 --> 00:11:02,610 legitimacy and a very important currency for the hashes remains the fatwa by France Ayatollah al-Sistani. 92 00:11:04,740 --> 00:11:11,670 Misleadingly, the fatwa did not endorse the formation of a paramilitary body. 93 00:11:11,670 --> 00:11:16,319 It was first addressed like an old battle, 94 00:11:16,320 --> 00:11:23,430 a better equipped or better able Iraqis to enlist within the Iraqi security forces 95 00:11:23,940 --> 00:11:30,329 and to try to support the formal security forces in their fight against ISIS. 96 00:11:30,330 --> 00:11:39,920 But because of the collapse of the Iraqi security infrastructure, we witnessed this phenomenon where different centres were formed, 97 00:11:39,930 --> 00:11:44,730 like different recruitment centres, like a lot of them administered and led by the. 98 00:11:45,120 --> 00:11:52,109 Rules of the resistance, like where they started enlisting volunteers, offering military training, 99 00:11:52,110 --> 00:12:04,409 but also redistributing different different weapons and military equipment that was distributed or offered to them by by Iran, 100 00:12:04,410 --> 00:12:13,800 which still being regarded as crucial to the positive outcome of the war against ISIS. 101 00:12:14,940 --> 00:12:25,739 So in interviews with Iraqi clerics, you still feel this hesitation of not talking about the hashes as an institution, 102 00:12:25,740 --> 00:12:31,980 but they prefer to address the fact that this volunteers as highly volunteers because they're also like very, 103 00:12:34,500 --> 00:12:42,110 very aware of what kind of legitimacy they can bestow to some more controversial actors they 104 00:12:42,480 --> 00:12:47,850 which want to exploit the religious legitimacy for their own personal and political interest. 105 00:12:48,920 --> 00:12:57,719 What would follow, what contributed to their political legitimacy was the 2016 law where they were 106 00:12:57,720 --> 00:13:04,140 recognised as members of the Iraqi security forces but still was an independent element. 107 00:13:04,140 --> 00:13:08,640 And one of the most controversial issues that remains when discussing the character 108 00:13:08,640 --> 00:13:13,020 of the Hajj is that the boundaries of this independence were never discussed. 109 00:13:13,090 --> 00:13:17,520 Like it was never in favour of where this independence begins, where it ends. 110 00:13:19,080 --> 00:13:23,280 To which extent they are allowed to engage within the political sphere, 111 00:13:23,280 --> 00:13:28,140 in which form, if they provide services like who is their like to regular this, 112 00:13:29,040 --> 00:13:38,490 who is there also to supervise the flow of certain financial donations and how they're being redistributed and how they're being used. 113 00:13:39,300 --> 00:13:48,480 So a lot of the problems that we witnessed today stemmed from the legal ambiguities that are enshrined like in the 2006 law. 114 00:13:48,840 --> 00:13:54,600 And there have been different legislative attempts to delineate the mandate of the Hashid. 115 00:13:54,600 --> 00:13:59,340 Some of them came during the time of former Prime Minister Abadi, 116 00:14:00,300 --> 00:14:08,730 who came up with a decree basically granting them the same rights and privileges as all members, 117 00:14:08,730 --> 00:14:17,040 formal members of the Iraqi security forces, something that was welcomed with a lot of enthusiasm by by the commanders. 118 00:14:17,520 --> 00:14:22,919 But the moment you got more controversial, like the moment the debate starts, 119 00:14:22,920 --> 00:14:27,899 it's like leading to a discussion about the potential integration of the Hajj within the 120 00:14:27,900 --> 00:14:32,460 Ministry of Defence from minister of Interior that was met with a lot of resistance. 121 00:14:32,880 --> 00:14:38,430 Of course, the argument there was why should we integrate under the structures of the Ministry 122 00:14:38,430 --> 00:14:44,969 of Defence and become as corrupt or as demotivated or disengaged as the Iraqi army, 123 00:14:44,970 --> 00:14:53,370 and I'm quoting here, because if we have then another black swan event as the ISIS invasion, who would be there to protect the country? 124 00:14:53,730 --> 00:15:03,000 So in a way they perceive life, their role outside of the official chain of command as an obligation to the state. 125 00:15:03,240 --> 00:15:09,959 You have to be outside of the realms of the state or of the state security institutions to 126 00:15:09,960 --> 00:15:18,240 be able to defend them in case of an unforeseeable terrorist threat for their own hands, 127 00:15:18,240 --> 00:15:25,650 followed under former Prime minister Adel Abdul Latif, which, as I mentioned earlier, 128 00:15:26,100 --> 00:15:32,070 are in stark contrast with what was approved by the current government of Sudan. 129 00:15:32,280 --> 00:15:41,309 The decree by Abdullah was very clear that all political and economic officers somehow, indirectly or directly affiliated with the PMF, 130 00:15:41,310 --> 00:15:47,560 should be closed, that there should be a very clear mechanism of how military rank should be distributed. 131 00:15:47,940 --> 00:15:56,070 And this, again, brings a lot of unclear or controversial questions about policies, military promotion. 132 00:15:56,580 --> 00:16:05,820 How do you decide who gets as far as military reign if he hasn't gone through the official education system of the military college in Baghdad? 133 00:16:06,280 --> 00:16:16,050 Like, how do you kind of like try to translate the lived combat experience of someone who has fought in guerrilla war into an official military rank? 134 00:16:17,130 --> 00:16:23,940 A lot of a lot of the focus of I did Abu Mattis administration was on the 135 00:16:23,940 --> 00:16:29,850 professionalisation of the Hashid and but then the former the late chief of staff, 136 00:16:30,150 --> 00:16:39,870 Abu Mahdi Al-muhandis, was very much involved. He was also the one that I had the opportunity to interview and where I would 137 00:16:39,870 --> 00:16:44,550 argue that he had a very clear idea or a very clear vision of where this. 138 00:16:45,710 --> 00:16:56,960 Heather. But this vision, as we are witnessing today, is very difficult to implement under the current leadership structure. 139 00:16:58,880 --> 00:17:04,580 I define the PMU as a state sanctioned paramilitary umbrella organisation. 140 00:17:04,970 --> 00:17:21,440 It consists currently of some 40 or 45, predominantly, but not exclusively Shia formations and comprises around 150,000 or 160,000 active volunteers. 141 00:17:22,190 --> 00:17:32,780 Nevertheless, as we were also discussing earlier, the official names of those volunteers have never been published for security reasons. 142 00:17:33,470 --> 00:17:44,690 And it also became a controversial issue when the former Iraqi elections were being discussed 143 00:17:44,690 --> 00:17:50,900 and whether hotshot personnel was to be allowed to go and vote in the special military vote. 144 00:17:51,860 --> 00:17:57,710 They declined to provide the names or to provide information about who is actually on the payroll. 145 00:17:58,520 --> 00:18:03,139 So as we can see, it's very difficult to determine who is actually involved. 146 00:18:03,140 --> 00:18:09,380 And this makes it easier for them to keep one foot within the state framework and one foot outside of the state. 147 00:18:09,830 --> 00:18:20,460 I'd like to interchangeably argue with which identity they're conducting, which practice, and the structure is a very flexible one. 148 00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:23,600 I would rather speak of a network structure than we have. 149 00:18:23,960 --> 00:18:32,990 The one formal body is the Commission on the Popular Mobilisation Forces, but informally we have different currents, different ideological currents. 150 00:18:33,500 --> 00:18:40,520 The most popular view on classifying or clustering the hashes is viewing. 151 00:18:40,520 --> 00:18:51,980 And as a conglomerate of these three different ideological teams or camps, those aligned with Iran, also known as the black Hashid, 152 00:18:53,150 --> 00:19:01,280 those affiliated towards the movement of Muqtada al-Sadr and his Salam Brigades and the so-called shrine brigades, 153 00:19:01,280 --> 00:19:10,340 which I mentioned earlier, that are affiliated with the holy shrines and perceive themselves as loyal to Sistani. 154 00:19:10,610 --> 00:19:16,399 In addition to that, we have a tribal Hashid, also known as a Sunni faction. 155 00:19:16,400 --> 00:19:23,720 But to speak frankly with very different limits of access to resources, 156 00:19:24,140 --> 00:19:33,410 to military equipments and also like different rights when it comes to getting or profiting from certain privileges. 157 00:19:33,950 --> 00:19:39,500 And then the last grounds are so-called mobilised minorities. 158 00:19:39,980 --> 00:19:46,670 The PMF loves to advertise their inclusivity and especially the participation of Yazidi. 159 00:19:46,670 --> 00:19:55,010 A fairly Kurds of even Christian brigades within the has to shy away because they want to create like this popular brand of an 160 00:19:55,010 --> 00:20:02,630 inclusive National Guard of a grassroots mobilisation that's open for everyone and that is also there to benefit everyone. 161 00:20:04,160 --> 00:20:11,060 We see here the current structure or the structure that was approved under Adel Abdul. 162 00:20:11,420 --> 00:20:23,930 It was an attempt to make the appearances are like the cosmetics of the PMF, closer to those of the Ministry of the Ministry of Defence. 163 00:20:25,550 --> 00:20:32,990 What's what's important here was also like the renaming of the position of Abu Mahdi. 164 00:20:32,990 --> 00:20:37,330 Al-muhandis used to be referred to the vice chairman of the PMF. 165 00:20:37,330 --> 00:20:42,260 When he got the more military title. Like him, he got known as the Chief of Staff. 166 00:20:42,860 --> 00:20:51,799 As the chief of staff. He got the privilege of right lamenting and dominating the five most important direct roles, 167 00:20:51,800 --> 00:20:58,190 including those on religious indoctrination and also religious education. 168 00:20:58,910 --> 00:21:05,240 What is the what is kind of like the religious doctrine of the Hashid and how this should be communicated, 169 00:21:05,280 --> 00:21:08,750 like to outsiders and to different segments of Iraqi society? 170 00:21:10,290 --> 00:21:23,370 Here. I would love to scheme through some of the most prominent members of the drama line because like they are constantly being covered by the media. 171 00:21:24,300 --> 00:21:33,750 Just to illustrate the complexity of this actor and also to highlight the difficulty to analyse it as a homogenous 172 00:21:33,840 --> 00:21:42,430 structure or as one that's being able to kind of unify of all forces with a unified voice and a unified agenda. 173 00:21:42,810 --> 00:21:47,520 So members of the around the line camp are the Badr Brigades, a part of Hezbollah, 174 00:21:47,660 --> 00:21:52,920 a parallel hub we can see here in the picture Ihsan Husaini, their leader. 175 00:21:53,520 --> 00:21:58,440 And later in the discussion, we can catch more about his own profile, 176 00:21:59,790 --> 00:22:11,970 because one of the problems of the current scholarly debate on the PMF is really resorting to these camps, this kind of monolithic currents. 177 00:22:12,390 --> 00:22:15,510 And there are a lot of nuances even within the so-called Iran. 178 00:22:15,510 --> 00:22:19,800 The lines are like that. They're being underestimated by spoilers. 179 00:22:20,280 --> 00:22:30,870 For example, even though a cyber hub is still being regarded as very closely aligned with Iran or like the Iran led Transnational Resistance Alliance, 180 00:22:31,350 --> 00:22:41,190 they come historically from a very different direction because Assad has largely had studied himself under the father of Moqtada Sadr. 181 00:22:41,490 --> 00:22:46,020 And if one goes to their official website and reads about their political project, 182 00:22:46,290 --> 00:22:55,529 you would witness a lot of almost Marxist elements of Islamic justice of of the role of the redistribution of resources, 183 00:22:55,530 --> 00:23:03,980 the role of the state, and also like the rights and privileges of of the disenfranchised population. 184 00:23:04,000 --> 00:23:09,240 So I just wanted to highlight this feature maybe for potential discussion later on. 185 00:23:09,750 --> 00:23:20,940 A similar profile is also he used to fight alongside the judicial mafia and was later on supported by the Iranians in a kind 186 00:23:20,940 --> 00:23:29,129 of divide and rule strategy to encourage him to emancipate himself from the Sadrist moment and create his own franchise. 187 00:23:29,130 --> 00:23:35,640 It's Khattab is al Qaeda is another splinter group from Qatar of Hezbollah. 188 00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:39,440 I always find it fascinating to look at their sons and lovers. 189 00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:48,089 And ah, and another very important element of the analysis is to see when they use this specific logo of of their own 190 00:23:48,090 --> 00:23:54,120 militia and when they would prefer to go and advertise their efforts or their services or their endeavours. 191 00:23:54,120 --> 00:24:01,769 Would the official hashtag flower, depending if they want to be perceived now as a state actor or as a member of the resistance who does not have 192 00:24:01,770 --> 00:24:08,400 to abide by the principles of the state or by whatever their actors have been issued by the commander in chief. 193 00:24:09,990 --> 00:24:19,860 Here we see like the Sadrist Brigades, and they have a very hybrid role within the whole PMF conglomerate because they retain, 194 00:24:19,860 --> 00:24:23,040 like their rights to have fighters within the PMA. 195 00:24:23,220 --> 00:24:26,790 Also, like for those fighters to be paid through the PMF Commission. 196 00:24:27,300 --> 00:24:30,450 But also Sadr, like for his own political purposes, 197 00:24:30,450 --> 00:24:38,040 has on many occasions raised the scenario of demobilising the PMF and reintegrating 198 00:24:38,040 --> 00:24:42,659 them or merging them within the structures of the Ministry of Defence, 199 00:24:42,660 --> 00:24:51,270 Ministry of Interior. And we can see here also they are on use of the enclave of Sadr City, 200 00:24:51,270 --> 00:24:58,470 the use of symbolism and how those posters, those images also contribute to their own dominant narrative. 201 00:24:58,800 --> 00:25:08,130 Why are they allowed the most entitled one to shape the nature of the Iraqi state of Iraqi statehood and also like to participate in elections? 202 00:25:09,960 --> 00:25:15,170 And this is the third current that I mentioned previously in the hashtag. 203 00:25:15,180 --> 00:25:19,470 As the mother of the hashtag March, the hashtag connects us with the holy shrines. 204 00:25:20,160 --> 00:25:30,090 They are themselves being regarded as the most patriotic, the less involved in political or economic affairs. 205 00:25:30,690 --> 00:25:39,179 And they were the first one who tried to integrate officially forces within the Ministry of Defence, 206 00:25:39,180 --> 00:25:48,090 within the Iraqi army after the assassination of Abu Muhandis and the change in the leadership structure, 207 00:25:48,390 --> 00:25:55,320 they started voicing their criticism about the way the Commission is being administered and is being managed, 208 00:25:55,830 --> 00:26:08,480 and they have tried to pursue a more independent path and to, uh, to be directly seen as responding to the Commander in Chief and. 209 00:26:08,910 --> 00:26:16,080 It's to be guided by whatever the current chief of staff of the commission regards as legitimate or most urgent. 210 00:26:17,340 --> 00:26:23,370 We hear answer like my my mother or like the way I have tried to look at the hashes and the first few of them. 211 00:26:23,370 --> 00:26:29,700 Maybe one of the most important fields of contestation is the political field. 212 00:26:30,810 --> 00:26:37,580 And here they have tried to embrace two practices or to claim ownership of two guiding roles. 213 00:26:37,590 --> 00:26:45,450 One is that the protector of the state parties or the entrepreneur, the one who gets to determine the rules of the game, 214 00:26:45,450 --> 00:26:57,780 the one who gets engaged by by getting engaged and by creating precedent also gets to change the decision making procedures and the logic of the game. 215 00:26:58,290 --> 00:27:05,849 One of the examples is that according to the official electoral law in Iraq, 216 00:27:05,850 --> 00:27:13,500 all members of the security forces are prohibited from participating in elections or from getting directly engaged in politics. 217 00:27:14,310 --> 00:27:23,129 So the way they try to circumvent this or to reframe this was to change their military attire with formal suits and to say, 218 00:27:23,130 --> 00:27:26,490 I am hereby officially disengaged from the PMF. 219 00:27:26,490 --> 00:27:32,819 And I now have my legitimate right as a citizen of Iraq to go and participate in the elections, 220 00:27:32,820 --> 00:27:37,680 because I regard that my political project has something to contribute or an added value. 221 00:27:38,250 --> 00:27:47,100 And whenever one would try to race in interviews or in meetings, how they try to reconcile this military identity with the political identity. 222 00:27:47,490 --> 00:27:53,250 This is one of the most popular arguments saying like, No, 223 00:27:53,250 --> 00:28:00,420 we have the hardship of the military institution and I have my own right as a citizen to go and get engaged in politics, 224 00:28:00,420 --> 00:28:07,230 to form my own political party and even like to get engage in economic enterprise or. 225 00:28:09,330 --> 00:28:17,330 How did comedy was one of those most famous individuals who had this narrative. 226 00:28:17,350 --> 00:28:26,799 When I ask him how he legitimises or justifies the fun of himself, his participation in politics, 227 00:28:26,800 --> 00:28:34,000 and what he thinks of the threats of harshly fighting or militia fighting the political field in Iraq, 228 00:28:34,480 --> 00:28:43,440 he said Like that he has always been regarding himself as a politician, as one who has been working within the halls of parliament, 229 00:28:43,480 --> 00:28:53,320 that when the ISIS threat came, he had this patriotic obligation to leave his office and go on the battlefield. 230 00:28:53,320 --> 00:28:56,379 So by participating in the elections, 231 00:28:56,380 --> 00:29:05,580 he was merely returning from politics where he had taken a sabbatical to defend his own country on the battlefield in 2008. 232 00:29:05,970 --> 00:29:11,090 In comparison to the current election, this strategy works very well. 233 00:29:11,110 --> 00:29:17,920 I would say that there's political communication and social political outreach was superb. 234 00:29:18,700 --> 00:29:23,380 And they even with the name FATA, which means conquest, 235 00:29:23,440 --> 00:29:31,270 they succeeded in translating the capital that they had generated within the security field into political capital, 236 00:29:31,780 --> 00:29:42,009 and also to get a lot of their loyal cadres or proteges dominating important ministerial portfolios. 237 00:29:42,010 --> 00:29:52,330 And the discussions within the Iraqi parliament on the slides here, as you can see, 15 of the seats were allocated so outside Hello Hub, 238 00:29:52,840 --> 00:30:02,260 which makes things also very difficult for Iraq's international partners, especially as a side is also under US sanctions. 239 00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:10,299 So even today you have a lot of discussions if Western politicians, if Western diplomats are to meet with those forces. 240 00:30:10,300 --> 00:30:16,180 And that was a controversial thread actually yesterday when I was preparing for the talk, 241 00:30:16,210 --> 00:30:20,140 the Australian ambassador had personally visited the office of Kasimpasa. 242 00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:29,199 And what followed was a very strong backlash of whether she is granting or bestowing legitimacy onto his 243 00:30:29,200 --> 00:30:36,850 persona by speaking to him and like by publicly engaging in discussion with also about her members. 244 00:30:38,110 --> 00:30:42,189 But the counter argument from the Australian side was, listen, 245 00:30:42,190 --> 00:30:49,210 those people are currently dominating the Iraqi political scene and we have no choice but to engage in a discussion with them. 246 00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:56,260 So it's our responsibility as Iraq partners to know like what are their priorities, how they view of things, 247 00:30:56,260 --> 00:31:06,210 to be able also to contain their influence, or at least like to explore some sort of a middle ground in that? 248 00:31:06,250 --> 00:31:16,780 After the election in 2018, we witnessed a very, very difficult period to try to determine like who is the largest parliamentary bloc. 249 00:31:17,290 --> 00:31:22,419 And this has a lot to do with ambiguities within the Iraqi constitution. 250 00:31:22,420 --> 00:31:33,070 How do you actually determine who has who has the privilege to claim to be the largest parliamentary block and also like to name the prime minister? 251 00:31:34,300 --> 00:31:42,520 And this was resolved in 2008, like when the figure of Adel Abdul Mahdi, who became this compromise candidate. 252 00:31:43,150 --> 00:31:52,540 And this contributed to further marking the waters of the PM phenomenon because he had no powerful political party behind him. 253 00:31:52,540 --> 00:31:59,860 And it led to a lot of different actors, either directly or indirectly affiliated with the PMF, 254 00:32:00,880 --> 00:32:09,550 to exert influence onto the office of the Prime Minister and also like to push for more beneficial policies to increase their sway onto the state, 255 00:32:09,550 --> 00:32:20,200 also like to enable them to get more involved into the business of post-conflict reconstruction and to continue this constant game 256 00:32:20,200 --> 00:32:30,100 of playing between the state and its role and kind of like picking their different hats for the different battles that they choose. 257 00:32:31,570 --> 00:32:42,070 We come here to the religious field, and this was this was my response to the current debate on proxy warfare. 258 00:32:42,400 --> 00:32:50,620 In most of the studies that we read about this forces the Russians engagement with Iran, 259 00:32:50,980 --> 00:32:59,500 has its relations with Quds forces or even like their presence on the battlefield in Syria, 260 00:32:59,500 --> 00:33:07,990 has been very much viewed through the prism of having a disciplined proxy actor that. 261 00:33:08,650 --> 00:33:13,730 Responding to or even implementing direct the Iranian agendas. 262 00:33:14,210 --> 00:33:20,770 And my approach was to try to study their own rationale of doing this. 263 00:33:21,370 --> 00:33:27,339 And I divided I divided the religious field into two different practices. 264 00:33:27,340 --> 00:33:30,970 The first was the holy warrior or the Hashid over this. 265 00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:40,390 This is a very prominent role where they claim legitimacy within the religious field by arguing that everything that they do, 266 00:33:40,840 --> 00:33:51,520 every battle that they lead, is serving some kind of a sacred agenda by by serving, but by also responding to the fatwa of Sistani. 267 00:33:51,880 --> 00:33:59,730 And even their presence in Syria was legitimised through the of this process and not necessarily through the resistance. 268 00:34:00,640 --> 00:34:06,580 When you look at empirical data, the original empirical data, for example, 269 00:34:06,580 --> 00:34:13,120 posters of Pashtun martyrs who have been killed in Syria, you will always see this argument or narrative. 270 00:34:13,120 --> 00:34:17,319 He has been killed defending the shrine of ZAYNAB, So he has been killed, 271 00:34:17,320 --> 00:34:22,000 not defending the Assad regime because he's a father of the Islamic Republic. 272 00:34:22,000 --> 00:34:30,100 But he has been killed in battle because he is defending those our suppressed and shared brethren who are in danger. 273 00:34:30,610 --> 00:34:37,330 And then the resistance for us or their self promotion as a resistance force as well. 274 00:34:37,450 --> 00:34:45,250 Calling for me here, it was interesting to analyse why did they regard this practice or this identity as a resistance force, 275 00:34:45,640 --> 00:34:55,270 as a source of legitimacy in the religious field? And here we also have different interpretation depending on who gets to frame, 276 00:34:55,270 --> 00:35:01,870 who gets to shape the narrative of what it means to practice the resistance within the Iraqi field. 277 00:35:02,500 --> 00:35:06,430 How legitimate is to resist on Iraqi soil? 278 00:35:06,430 --> 00:35:17,110 How legitimate is to conduct airstrikes on the US Embassy or how legitimate is also to express support for the cause of the Houthi rebels in Yemen? 279 00:35:17,710 --> 00:35:27,250 And you see within this practice that their focus has been more local in mind us more domestic than what 280 00:35:27,250 --> 00:35:34,719 we tend of thinking when we when we focus predominantly on the Iran Transnational Resistance Alliance. 281 00:35:34,720 --> 00:35:39,850 So they would they would try to frame their engagement in such operations as 282 00:35:39,850 --> 00:35:44,590 something serving the Iraqi state or being in the best interest of the Iraqi state, 283 00:35:45,100 --> 00:35:48,670 even when Abu Musab Rouhani is the leader. 284 00:35:49,030 --> 00:35:57,639 And Muhandis was interrogated in some interviews about his connections or his friendship with the late cousin Soleimani. 285 00:35:57,640 --> 00:36:05,950 He would always like point out that that was a decision that serves the Iraq the interests of the Iraqi state. 286 00:36:05,950 --> 00:36:09,730 But like through his own interpretation of the interests of the Iraqi state. 287 00:36:10,210 --> 00:36:16,900 And I think that's a crucial point to understand, like how they think of themselves and also like how they frame their as value. 288 00:36:18,400 --> 00:36:29,890 We see also like how ceremonies, different religious spaces like have been used to claim legitimacy to generate legitimacy. 289 00:36:30,310 --> 00:36:33,580 These pictures are from from the holy shrine in Karbala. 290 00:36:33,580 --> 00:36:36,850 And here I found this particularly interesting. 291 00:36:37,240 --> 00:36:40,240 It takes place every year. 292 00:36:40,240 --> 00:36:45,490 It's the Moqtada al-Sadr, the martyr, them Spring Festival. 293 00:36:45,490 --> 00:36:51,610 And here you can see kids get to sit together and to learn about the sacrifices, 294 00:36:51,610 --> 00:36:58,239 about the victimhood of the fallen martyrs and like it not to be directly indoctrinated like 295 00:36:58,240 --> 00:37:04,750 then at least like to perceive of themselves as a benevolent servant of the Iraqi people, 296 00:37:04,750 --> 00:37:15,100 of the Iraqi State of God, and of of shared pride from all across the world, and of course, 297 00:37:15,940 --> 00:37:25,749 through the US assassination of Martin Muhandis and Cousin Soleimani, we witness a bit an identity, 298 00:37:25,750 --> 00:37:31,479 a period of identity crisis within the PMF, because like the main architect, 299 00:37:31,480 --> 00:37:37,780 the main visionary was gong, and this opened the door to a lot of internal power struggles, 300 00:37:37,780 --> 00:37:43,120 to a lot of competition, which is the part that, like the PMU should be pursuing. 301 00:37:43,600 --> 00:37:49,450 And interestingly, no Abu father played very much tries to implement the same vision, 302 00:37:49,840 --> 00:37:58,600 and he's currently like struggling to reconcile the interests and the extracurricular activities of members of the 303 00:37:58,600 --> 00:38:07,500 resistance with his own obligation or his task to protect the brand of the PMF at something like logistically. 304 00:38:08,160 --> 00:38:14,010 State sanctions that can always offer legal cover, but also moral cover. 305 00:38:14,010 --> 00:38:18,870 Life for all those members of the resistance. Pretend like whenever things get political, 306 00:38:18,870 --> 00:38:24,750 to claim legitimacy by advertising themselves as a member of the ownership and not member of the resistance. 307 00:38:25,290 --> 00:38:37,769 So one example that Miriam and I were discussing earlier, when an arrest happens under the administration of Mustafa Al-kadhimi, 308 00:38:37,770 --> 00:38:44,879 there was enough evidence that members of Hezbollah had indeed participated in an attack on the US embassy, 309 00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:47,940 and 12 individuals from Khattab Hezbollah were arrested. 310 00:38:48,240 --> 00:38:53,670 There was, of course, no public information whether those were on the official PMI payroll. 311 00:38:54,120 --> 00:39:05,309 But the overall argument by hushed up officials was that those are not active members of the PMF, but that they are members of the Iraqi resistance, 312 00:39:05,310 --> 00:39:14,010 that they are no more ASA or state servants, and that they should not abide by the same principles as members of the Iraqi security forces. 313 00:39:14,460 --> 00:39:22,110 Contrary, when an attack on weapon depots affiliated with Hezbollah along the Syrian border 314 00:39:22,500 --> 00:39:29,190 would happen and might say US strikes would attack those sensitive military locations, 315 00:39:29,610 --> 00:39:35,489 then you will again witness public demonstrations in the Green Zone in Baghdad by saying, 316 00:39:35,490 --> 00:39:42,569 Now we have to demand the expelling of U.S. forces because they have attacked Iraqi national 317 00:39:42,570 --> 00:39:49,170 security forces and they have they have disrespected the Iraqi national sovereignty. 318 00:39:49,440 --> 00:39:53,519 So we constantly see the use of this to hide. 319 00:39:53,520 --> 00:40:00,660 And there has been very little resistance or like very limited political will to limit this game. 320 00:40:01,950 --> 00:40:10,680 A lot of it has to do with the role or the domination of the society or the so-called resistance factions like this, veterans of the resistance, 321 00:40:11,070 --> 00:40:24,270 who are still the most powerful currents within the PMF and their role is still being justified by the fact that after the collapse of the Iraqi army, 322 00:40:24,270 --> 00:40:34,049 after the collapse of the Iraqi security forces, those factions or battle hardened who had gathered enough experience by fighting coalition forces, 323 00:40:34,050 --> 00:40:42,510 by fighting in Syria were the ones to and I'm here quoting from an interview to donate cadres to the PMF, 324 00:40:42,510 --> 00:40:50,550 to make the PMF stronger, and also to improve the combat morale of these young volunteers who have no experience on the battlefield. 325 00:40:52,410 --> 00:40:56,639 And last but not least, we come to the civic fields. 326 00:40:56,640 --> 00:41:03,090 And I think this is probably like next to the name of the PMF is the popular mobilisation, 327 00:41:03,090 --> 00:41:07,680 one of the most important pillars of their legitimacy claims here. 328 00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:12,960 They have tried to claim for themselves two different roles one of the inclusive National Guard, 329 00:41:13,440 --> 00:41:18,989 the guard that is there to employ each and every segment of the Iraqi society. 330 00:41:18,990 --> 00:41:29,670 So here we see all of this promotion or advertising of faily Kurds fighting with the Hashid, of Yazidis fighting with the Hashid. 331 00:41:29,670 --> 00:41:34,559 They're very diligent in their political communication. On Twitter, for example, 332 00:41:34,560 --> 00:41:42,510 you would see a lot of interviews conducted with tribal sheiks who then praise the PMF and say like that even the 333 00:41:42,510 --> 00:41:49,830 Shia brigades of the PMF are more reliable than their Sunni politicians were in Baghdad and have fled the country. 334 00:41:50,190 --> 00:41:56,730 So you have a lot of strategic communications really to deliver a convincing message on that front. 335 00:41:57,120 --> 00:42:01,070 And the last one is the role of a service provider. 336 00:42:01,080 --> 00:42:09,090 So not only the mobilisation made by the people, but also the mobilisation serving the people here. 337 00:42:09,390 --> 00:42:15,540 On the slides, you can see a picture where they are supplying communities with water, 338 00:42:15,540 --> 00:42:19,110 but this is just like one part of the services that they have been offering. 339 00:42:19,950 --> 00:42:22,290 Specifically during the COVID pandemic. 340 00:42:22,290 --> 00:42:33,750 I was paying attention to the way they were framing their services and the way they were trying to present themselves as indispensable for the state. 341 00:42:34,320 --> 00:42:36,059 So just to give you an example, 342 00:42:36,060 --> 00:42:46,469 they had posted that they would provide all of the field hospitals of the Hashid at the disposal of the Iraqi Health Ministry, 343 00:42:46,470 --> 00:42:53,370 which is completely overwhelmed. So through this kind of messaging, you are not just presenting yourself as serving the state, 344 00:42:53,370 --> 00:42:57,240 but you are also implying that the state is not capable to do it without you. 345 00:42:57,750 --> 00:43:07,430 And this is also a very logical step because if we go back to the beginning of the presentation about like the context of emergence, the PMF had. 346 00:43:07,970 --> 00:43:15,410 Like in a context of crisis and with at least the territorial defeat of the Islamic State. 347 00:43:16,430 --> 00:43:24,830 Voices arguing for the dissolution of the PMF are getting louder, so they need different layers to add to this. 348 00:43:25,970 --> 00:43:28,760 Security or military legitimacy. 349 00:43:28,760 --> 00:43:38,150 Like they need different forces on their part and in some cases even different enemies of the states that they are fighting against. 350 00:43:38,180 --> 00:43:48,130 So during the history process, you had a lot of the hush of channels communicating in a very antagonising manner about the presence of Daniel Pearl 351 00:43:48,200 --> 00:43:58,729 or framing Iraqi protesters as jokers who have been funded by your mind as Western forces to destabilise the country. 352 00:43:58,730 --> 00:44:03,170 But Hassan was there to protect the state and to protect the established order. 353 00:44:03,650 --> 00:44:13,940 And as you can see, like they are currently very anxious not to not to witness theirs through its legitimacy, 354 00:44:14,270 --> 00:44:23,000 diminishing especially like with not that many terrorist threats being in the consciousness of Iraqi people. 355 00:44:23,300 --> 00:44:31,190 Another curious fact was that they have now started advertising their efforts in combating organised crime. 356 00:44:31,730 --> 00:44:38,389 So even though on the one hand you have so many controversial reports of certain PMF affiliated 357 00:44:38,390 --> 00:44:45,980 brigades engaged directly or indirectly in smuggling networks on their own official channel, 358 00:44:45,980 --> 00:44:53,059 like they would post a picture of the seizure of Captagon pills and how like their commute contributing to the 359 00:44:53,060 --> 00:44:59,389 combating of drug trafficking and like basically how indispensable they are to have a stable and secure it. 360 00:44:59,390 --> 00:45:04,880 You want to say there are a lot of open questions that we can touch up. 361 00:45:05,090 --> 00:45:12,350 I have just witnessed a couple of them. One remains the question of reintegration scenarios. 362 00:45:12,860 --> 00:45:14,990 What would be their institutional path? 363 00:45:15,710 --> 00:45:23,870 During interviews, I have offered them different options, like to pick from as what they would like to identify themselves. 364 00:45:24,290 --> 00:45:29,330 Of course, I have asked the question about the IRGC or about Hezbollah. 365 00:45:29,600 --> 00:45:38,300 Interestingly, in a in an interview with one member of the Resistance, he identified the hashtag as having similarities to the Italian Carabinieri. 366 00:45:38,500 --> 00:45:46,159 And he said, like, we want to be like the Carabinieri, like we are there for the people because we have such an intimate connection to the people. 367 00:45:46,160 --> 00:45:53,060 We are like the psychologists of the cross, so we can react like much better than conventional members of the police department. 368 00:45:54,650 --> 00:46:04,490 Also, another aspect of like this recent Russian scenario we can talk here about Egypt, like Egypt was also given as an example. 369 00:46:04,490 --> 00:46:08,450 Why shouldn't the military be engaged like in the production of certain utilities? 370 00:46:08,450 --> 00:46:12,710 Like why, for example, hashish should not start like and produce refrigerators. 371 00:46:13,010 --> 00:46:19,640 Now they have their own state owned company. So we are going to see in which direction that trading company has. 372 00:46:20,000 --> 00:46:27,229 But as you can see, like the path of reintegration necessarily like would make things more difficult for them. 373 00:46:27,230 --> 00:46:30,080 And what they want to preserve is this flexibility. 374 00:46:30,590 --> 00:46:39,710 And of course, like to benefit from the different parts and like to explore or different identities depending on the target audience and of course, 375 00:46:39,860 --> 00:46:45,770 depending on the political context and on who is dominating the halls of parliament. 376 00:46:46,910 --> 00:47:00,830 Another scenario that is also being discussed recently, especially in the course of contemporary Iraqi discussions of amending the Iraqi constitution. 377 00:47:00,830 --> 00:47:06,080 One of the scenario was also whether the Hashid could play a role as a National Guard, 378 00:47:06,080 --> 00:47:12,409 but also the border guards as being like an ancillary force working together with Peshmerga forces, 379 00:47:12,410 --> 00:47:21,300 which is the forces of protecting the borders, not just between the provinces, but also in in the north of Iraq. 380 00:47:21,320 --> 00:47:32,840 Of course, this is seen as a very controversial and intimidating scenario, especially by different minority groups in Manilla and by Iraqi Kurds. 381 00:47:34,010 --> 00:47:41,480 Another open question remains the status of the Iraqi security sector reform. 382 00:47:42,080 --> 00:47:51,500 Unfortunately, in all of my interviews with practitioners or even foreign advisors in the security sector reform, there isn't enough clarity. 383 00:47:51,500 --> 00:47:55,129 And there is also no consensus on the status of the PMF. 384 00:47:55,130 --> 00:48:07,550 So, for example, if you were to provide military assistance to Iraq or military equipment, then military equipments on paper would be at the disposal. 385 00:48:07,870 --> 00:48:13,959 Of all members of the Iraqi forces. So this would make it very difficult for you to go and process, for example, 386 00:48:13,960 --> 00:48:18,640 why certain Hezbollah fighters would be posing with American tanks on Twitter. 387 00:48:20,140 --> 00:48:26,920 Another another controversial aspect is, of course, the maximum pressure approach. 388 00:48:26,920 --> 00:48:34,540 And there are arguments that Iraq shouldn't be involved in this conflict, 389 00:48:34,540 --> 00:48:41,920 that Iraq should be spared the fate of becoming or remaining a battle ground for these two forces. 390 00:48:42,370 --> 00:48:50,320 I like the last one, as we see is this separation of the financial schemes of individual commanders and also life of the informal affiliates. 391 00:48:50,930 --> 00:48:59,550 And how can you actually engage in formal supervision or financial oversight when there are so many ambiguities on the ground, 392 00:48:59,590 --> 00:49:05,260 when there are so many ways to claim plausible deniability by, for example, 393 00:49:06,370 --> 00:49:11,379 having a sway within a certain commentary about reconstruction, 394 00:49:11,380 --> 00:49:17,890 you can manipulate the vote and you can make sure that a friend of yours can be awarded the very lucrative reconstruction contract, 395 00:49:18,340 --> 00:49:24,069 and that he, on the other hand, can use this to create more patronage networks for would be, let's say, 396 00:49:24,070 --> 00:49:32,229 more open to your to your pitch or lie to your rhetoric, to your narrative and would maybe like roll more friendly, 397 00:49:32,230 --> 00:49:44,139 like to the idea of having the hashes is a permanent phenomenon and as eternal people's militia or a paramilitary like there for the people, 398 00:49:44,140 --> 00:49:51,280 by the people, for God, for the state, and for everyone who is in danger and needs. 399 00:49:52,300 --> 00:49:57,520 Here are three questions that I would also like to throw back to the audience. 400 00:49:58,000 --> 00:50:02,500 One is, in your perception or in your reading of popular media, 401 00:50:02,500 --> 00:50:10,270 how do you think have the assassinations of Abu Mazen Muhandis and his cousin Soleimani affected? 402 00:50:10,270 --> 00:50:11,450 Maybe not just the fashion, 403 00:50:11,470 --> 00:50:21,820 but also like the whole nature of sponsored Iran sponsored or auxiliary forces in the region to which extends after hearing this presentation, 404 00:50:21,820 --> 00:50:25,450 do you think they can still somehow be referred to as a proxy actor? 405 00:50:26,110 --> 00:50:27,700 And the last one, 406 00:50:27,700 --> 00:50:36,339 what's what's your impression of how do you think this involvement in politics and this political Assad has impacted the nature of the Iraqi state, 407 00:50:36,340 --> 00:50:46,290 but also the debate about Iraqi statehood in the eyes of Iraqi citizens, but also in the eyes of us as scholars, as part of Iraq. 408 00:50:46,310 --> 00:50:56,910 And thank you very much. Thank you so much. 409 00:50:56,960 --> 00:51:00,180 You know, I feel like a kid at a candy store. 410 00:51:00,180 --> 00:51:09,790 I don't know where to start and what to pick. I'll try to start with issues that I think may be more direct and smaller and then 411 00:51:09,790 --> 00:51:16,320 go to much broader theoretical questions that a presentation brought to my mind. 412 00:51:16,770 --> 00:51:28,589 So one which I think relates to your last two questions about whether the hijab can still be considered a proxy actor and how 413 00:51:28,590 --> 00:51:39,750 it affects the future of the state is the question of how clearly do you see traces of not just Iran's political influence, 414 00:51:39,930 --> 00:51:47,549 but a conscious attempt to copy what happened in Iran, like sort of a voluntary organisation? 415 00:51:47,550 --> 00:51:55,620 All eyes are more present, if you will, like this and attempts to create the institution in the image of the Iranian counterpart, 416 00:51:55,620 --> 00:52:00,780 which is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij, the organisation forces behind it. 417 00:52:01,710 --> 00:52:09,720 Did you see that your evidence is on that? And it relates to your last question about how it affects the nature of the state. 418 00:52:10,110 --> 00:52:14,400 While the Iranian state looks very different with the Supreme Leader on top and 419 00:52:15,630 --> 00:52:20,580 pseudo democratically elected presidents like running a different part of the state. 420 00:52:21,720 --> 00:52:31,950 There is no such thing in the Iraqi state. So if they are attempting to replicate that institutional arrangement, how are they doing it? 421 00:52:32,490 --> 00:52:38,069 Who are they reporting to? Basically within the state when they want to be state actors? 422 00:52:38,070 --> 00:52:43,770 And who are they defying when they prefer to put on a different hat and be independent? 423 00:52:44,700 --> 00:52:54,180 So that was the smallest place. The other one, which is quite related, I think, is that I would like to know what you think about this, 424 00:52:54,390 --> 00:53:02,590 that it's not just about putting on different hats and sort of segregating the institution, saying, yeah, this part is the more official part. 425 00:53:02,600 --> 00:53:12,230 This this section is like the kind of more fluid resistance movement part of it or the same unit introducing themselves at one time. 426 00:53:12,280 --> 00:53:17,970 I like independent resistance movement at another time as an arm of the state. 427 00:53:19,230 --> 00:53:25,590 So it's not just about that perhaps, but also about a new type of, again, 428 00:53:25,590 --> 00:53:35,010 organisational and institutional setup that enables such an arrangement, such flexibility to move to either part. 429 00:53:35,310 --> 00:53:42,120 So for like conventional armies, militaries, militias, events, national guards of some sort, 430 00:53:42,630 --> 00:53:51,390 something that comes with direct and transparent state control is professionalisation, as you were mentioning, the Iraqi state. 431 00:53:51,630 --> 00:53:55,620 Was it part of a dynasty that wanted to pursue? 432 00:53:58,560 --> 00:54:08,070 If that happens, if the force becomes like a sort of progressive, advanced type of a an armed entity, 433 00:54:08,250 --> 00:54:15,090 then it becomes hard to have independence state, to be flexible, to put on a different hat and say, oh, no, we're just a resistance movement. 434 00:54:15,270 --> 00:54:22,800 So you have to like have a cap for the institutional complexity for for that arrangement to work. 435 00:54:23,100 --> 00:54:32,799 So did you have any come across, any evidence showing a sort of a liminal institutional structure between a grassroots, 436 00:54:32,800 --> 00:54:41,850 but completely but the short term entity and a and advanced state sponsored professional military? 437 00:54:42,480 --> 00:54:47,860 I'll stop here. I'll use my privileges as a moderator to come in again. 438 00:54:47,970 --> 00:54:51,750 So, yeah, I mean, thank you very much for these questions. 439 00:54:51,750 --> 00:55:01,229 And I think the most critical aspect is whether the PMU is currently being integrated within the state or whether this, 440 00:55:01,230 --> 00:55:07,860 like, very fragile concept of a state is being integrated within the PMU cosmology. 441 00:55:08,820 --> 00:55:18,600 And it very much depends on who constitutes the state or who is currently seen as dominating Iraqi statehood. 442 00:55:19,230 --> 00:55:28,590 What might appear in our eyes as a cognitive dissonance is a very logical argument in their eyes. 443 00:55:28,590 --> 00:55:39,510 I have heard on multiple occasions commanders from the resistance with presence in the PMF, but also with brigades outside the structure of the PMF, 444 00:55:39,510 --> 00:55:47,940 arguing that they have to kind of sustain these forces like so no matter how the PMF develops, 445 00:55:47,940 --> 00:55:53,040 like, as you said, whether it becomes like this completely professional, state sponsored. 446 00:55:54,210 --> 00:56:00,240 Whether it becomes an Iraqi IRGC or an Iraqi Hezbollah or an Iraqi Carabinieri that they need, 447 00:56:00,240 --> 00:56:08,970 like this additional artillery forces to be able to protect their idea of the state, even if that means directly attacking the government. 448 00:56:09,330 --> 00:56:19,709 So this, like in our eyes, like coming from a more like Westphalian mentality, like you would naturally confront the commander and ask like, 449 00:56:19,710 --> 00:56:29,760 what's your legitimacy, like to attack or to go against the commandments of the Iraqi prime minister or the Iraqi government? 450 00:56:30,150 --> 00:56:34,260 If they are just the manifestation of the state, but they don't see it like that. 451 00:56:34,830 --> 00:56:43,319 And this has revealed for me the fragility of of of statehood, of who gets to claim like that. 452 00:56:43,320 --> 00:56:49,470 He represents the state that he speaks for, the state that he stands for, for the state. 453 00:56:50,010 --> 00:57:01,020 And at the end, it's very much a transformation process like different phenomenon would be called in a different way or would get by different labels, 454 00:57:01,170 --> 00:57:04,560 depending on on which side of the barricades you are. 455 00:57:04,980 --> 00:57:14,670 So, for example, if you are engaging in armed operations and you are in sync with the state or like I wouldn't speak of the say, 456 00:57:14,670 --> 00:57:25,590 I would speak of ruling elites, like if your agendas or like your enemies are similar or overlapping with those of these ruling elites, 457 00:57:26,130 --> 00:57:30,030 like then your coercive capital would be legitimate, 458 00:57:30,420 --> 00:57:40,230 like your engagement in armed operations like would be part of a security or law enforcement engagement of the state. 459 00:57:40,710 --> 00:57:48,210 If you're on the other side of the barricades. And this would have become, I think, analytically speaking, very interesting. 460 00:57:48,210 --> 00:57:54,600 Like if the Sadrists would have formed the government, then we would have seen like a different constellation. 461 00:57:55,020 --> 00:57:56,310 But so far, 462 00:57:56,400 --> 00:58:05,940 we have a major overlap between the forces that are affiliated with the PMF and like those who like to dominate the government's decision making. 463 00:58:06,330 --> 00:58:09,390 So that's why as long as they are on the same side of the barricade, 464 00:58:09,400 --> 00:58:16,410 like their behaviour or like even their involvement in illicit economic activities and 465 00:58:16,410 --> 00:58:23,069 some corrupt practices would mostly fall under the term of state sponsored corruption. 466 00:58:23,070 --> 00:58:32,430 As I was discussing here, Rosa, with another friend expert on organised crime and less of organised crime, but maybe like under Assad, his government, 467 00:58:32,430 --> 00:58:39,180 that would not have been that benevolent to this, to this paramilitary umbrella or like to its outgrowth, 468 00:58:39,780 --> 00:58:43,740 then we would have had like different labels and maybe also different approaches. 469 00:58:44,220 --> 00:58:47,400 So I think like currently we have an overlap. 470 00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:51,290 We have a shared interest in protecting the status quo as it is. 471 00:58:51,900 --> 00:59:05,340 And this is one of the most important reasons or factors that have led us to rally around the flag effect rather than to having, 472 00:59:06,360 --> 00:59:13,290 let's say, more controversial, like more destructive engagement, even like the scenarios of having an interest civil war, 473 00:59:13,290 --> 00:59:20,040 because so far, like the stakes are so high and also the incentives to somehow, like, keep it together while of course, 474 00:59:20,040 --> 00:59:28,509 pursuing different independent economic, political and social spiritual agendas like those incentives. 475 00:59:28,510 --> 00:59:31,920 For higher on your question on IRGC. 476 00:59:33,150 --> 00:59:39,030 The most candid answer I've heard during interviews is that it's a wishful thinking. 477 00:59:39,540 --> 00:59:46,680 So if we aspire to implement this model right now, it's in the realm of wishful thinking. 478 00:59:47,070 --> 00:59:53,370 It would be controversial, it would backfire. We have a different demographic set up in Iraq. 479 00:59:53,370 --> 01:00:01,019 We have a very cherished religious establishment in Najaf And Tola al-Sistani, 480 01:00:01,020 --> 01:00:06,089 who is very much against the replication of this model, is far too popular. 481 01:00:06,090 --> 01:00:11,729 So us going against this would cost us dearly and we might lose like this pillar of the 482 01:00:11,730 --> 01:00:17,940 religious legitimacy on our affiliation or like our identity as like the executors, 483 01:00:17,940 --> 01:00:19,590 like the carriers of the fatwa. 484 01:00:20,100 --> 01:00:30,450 But I must also say, like this answer was in 2019, I don't know, like how this exact person would answer the question today. 485 01:00:30,900 --> 01:00:35,580 And I think one step that goes closer to the IRGC, 486 01:00:35,670 --> 01:00:44,700 although is the official government approved month for the creation of a state owned company that's under their own disposal with no economic risk, 487 01:00:44,700 --> 01:00:47,759 because, of course, in case of financial losses and speculations, 488 01:00:47,760 --> 01:00:53,299 the state is there to compensate you and you can decide like what to do with this revenues and how to you. 489 01:00:53,300 --> 01:01:05,270 Use them to increase your patronage networks beyond, let's say, more conventional recipient communities like from within Shia majority provinces. 490 01:01:06,350 --> 01:01:11,570 Just a very quick follow up on that question before we open it up to the audience. 491 01:01:11,930 --> 01:01:19,940 What I meant I should have been more clear was to replicate the steps that the IRGC itself took. 492 01:01:19,940 --> 01:01:28,700 It is safe for the first decade of its existence to rise from or not even rise to the prominence it has today, 493 01:01:28,910 --> 01:01:34,160 but to just like survive on the ground when it was engaged in a civil conflict and 494 01:01:34,160 --> 01:01:40,700 then the Iran-Iraq war and then after the war somewhat organised exactly that. 495 01:01:40,820 --> 01:01:48,230 QUESTION you were asking that when this is an irregular force like fighting on the ground, how do you translate into official military ranks? 496 01:01:48,470 --> 01:01:52,130 The answer it came to my mind was like, Look how the IRGC did it. 497 01:01:52,550 --> 01:01:58,459 They did exactly the same thing. So I was wondering if there is any like decisions in order to make. 498 01:01:58,460 --> 01:02:03,470 Well, we have a successful model there. Do we want to, like follow this? 499 01:02:04,310 --> 01:02:07,800 Not not just deliberation, but actually concrete steps? 500 01:02:07,820 --> 01:02:12,590 There was a draft law that then was in my hands like that didn't come into being, 501 01:02:13,070 --> 01:02:22,640 but there were concrete recommendations, concrete like amendments on how to conduct military promotion within the Hashid, 502 01:02:23,150 --> 01:02:32,860 like how to kind of like calculate what rank three years of fighting in an irregular warfare would equal compare 503 01:02:32,900 --> 01:02:39,830 to someone who has served in the military or life who has gone through the course of the military college. 504 01:02:40,370 --> 01:02:50,929 And there were initial programs like 400 staff like to go on courses within the military college and to also obtain a military decree. 505 01:02:50,930 --> 01:02:57,230 And then for this military decree to be translated in a specific like military rank within the Hashid. 506 01:02:57,260 --> 01:03:03,110 And the other component of the law was discussing like policies of retirement. 507 01:03:03,800 --> 01:03:09,379 But this is still a very controversial topic because the retirement scheme, 508 01:03:09,380 --> 01:03:14,840 so-called like the harshest retirement schemes, are currently being covered by so many different stakeholders. 509 01:03:15,200 --> 01:03:24,340 But everyone is claiming like to be paying something into this fund without like really having a clear oversight on who is covering Qom. 510 01:03:24,740 --> 01:03:28,399 There is also the huge controversial topic of go soldiers. 511 01:03:28,400 --> 01:03:38,840 And as long as, you know, like the existence of security considerations are there, it would be very difficult to push really for having a clear list, 512 01:03:38,840 --> 01:03:45,080 like to know exactly who is on the payroll to digitalise like the whole portfolio. 513 01:03:45,920 --> 01:03:55,220 There have been some accomplishments. For example, the introduction of the key card to have digital salaries transferred to fighters, 514 01:03:55,730 --> 01:04:02,360 and this was one of the approaches to try to pursue some form of consolidation, 515 01:04:02,360 --> 01:04:06,950 you know, like to limit the individual leverage of commanders to decide, okay, 516 01:04:06,950 --> 01:04:14,509 like I have this amount of money being transferred to my account and then like, depending on loyalties or sympathies, 517 01:04:14,510 --> 01:04:21,710 I can transfer that amount to these soldiers, but I can keep an amount for myself and like some part of it can go like to those fighting in Syria. 518 01:04:21,890 --> 01:04:27,770 So that was a bit the rationale there. But there is still a lot of homework to be done. 519 01:04:28,250 --> 01:04:33,950 Thankfully, I am not in the capacity of advising the PMF on consolidation and professionalisation, 520 01:04:34,370 --> 01:04:39,830 but by conducting this research you get quite a lot of ideas of what what can be done. 521 01:04:40,370 --> 01:04:47,810 And to be fair, like there are people like within this, how should network would think about those questions? 522 01:04:48,560 --> 01:04:51,890 Abu Mahdi Al-muhandis was one of those. 523 01:04:52,250 --> 01:05:01,420 A campaign that he had started in March was also to start closing down and raiding our fake offices of the Hashid. 524 01:05:01,430 --> 01:05:11,180 So basically a lot of headquarters were being closed because, like they had claimed legitimacy with the PMF flag and saying, 525 01:05:11,180 --> 01:05:14,840 okay, like they engage them in controversial economic operations. 526 01:05:15,290 --> 01:05:21,019 So practically like this damages our brand and our efforts like to create a clean brand. 527 01:05:21,020 --> 01:05:27,260 So let's close them down. But I haven't seen like more of that coming in in recent years. 528 01:05:27,500 --> 01:05:31,430 Thank you so much. This is more than enough to think about. 529 01:05:31,850 --> 01:05:39,430 Thank you so much. You know, with that, you join me in thanking you, Naruto, for an amazing presentation and expression.