

Transcript

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My name's Walter Anderson. Fellows in Middle East centre. I'm standing in for my colleague, Laura Mignon, our speaker. Tonight is Richard Ball drop. He's a visiting senior fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre. And he's the author of *Darfur and the international community. The challenges of conflict resolution in Sudan.*

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As published by Mikey Exploris in 2013, and he was a visiting fellow at Durham University in 2015 and has a DPhil from Oxford from the Department of International Relations. So he's posted many times.

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Is Richard lectured tonight focuses on the civil war that's been raging in a Sudan since April 2023. The conflict is an outcome of military coup in 2021, and the coup ousted a joint military civilian government.

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Which took power when a popular uprising removed President Omar Bashir.

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And Bashir had ruled since.

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Taking power in Kuwait 1989 since 2023, two factions from the military been in conflicts on is the rapid support forces.

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I tried General Hamid Hamdan ah hello, otherwise known as Hamet T and RSF is the successor of a militia called the Janjaweed, which committed ethnic cleansing in Sudan in the Darfur province in 2013.

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It.

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And the other faction, essentially the government, is led by General Abu dafkur him.

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Richard approaches this conflict as a specialist on mediation, peace processes and peace building and international approaches to conflicts, developments and peace, focusing on the Middle East and Africa.

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Since 2001, he's worked for the United Nations Development Programme in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen and regionally, and then reflective.

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Least and he's also worked for the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Political mission in Yemen.

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His research generally focuses on international approaches to peacemaking and why peace processes fail or succeed again, with particular focus on Yemen, Sudan and South Sudan, as well as other cases.

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Title of this lecture tonight is Sudan's current war longer view, peace making and prospect. Please join me in welcoming Richard Baltra to Middle East Centre.

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Thanks very much also for the introduction and thank you very much to the audience to all of you for coming to this talk.

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I'm going to speak for around 45 minutes and then there should be a substantial period for questions and discussion after that.

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In April, Sudan will enter the third year of a war that has forced enormous harm to lives, has been ruinous for the country, and shows no sign of ending.

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The war was unexpected. It's different from previous wars in Sudan's conflict ridden modern history, and it's occurring at a time when international politics is not favourable for concerted external and multilateral.

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Action to bring about and support peace for Sudanese and outsiders an immediate priority of how.

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Lives can be protected and suffering minimised. That's a subject mainly for aid and humanitarian policy in action.

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Beyond it, a fundamental question is peace. How can the war be ended and a lasting peace be established?

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In this seminar, I'm going to explore what lessons should be drawn from the longer history of peace making in Sudan and from the experience and outcomes of peace making efforts in other civil wars in recent times.

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From this three main recommendations emerge for Sudanese and external actors.

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The recommendations concern firstly, the need in the immediate and near term for external actors to push for a ceasefire and to accept the relative benefit of the Sudanese armed forces having some ascendancy in the war.

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Secondly, the need to take a long term approach to peace, process and peace building, and thirdly, the need to prioritise and support the development of Sudanese vision for an ownership of the peace process.

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So the current war, this will be the first part of what I'm going to talk about, the current war and its impact.

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From its start through to now, the war has continued unabated. The country has been violently divided between the army, the Sudanese armed forces.

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And the paramilitary forces, the rapid support forces the toll and casualties and uprooted lives, has been catastrophic. And it continues to grow.

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Fighting has occurred in and continues in multiple separate zones. As this map suggests as it indicates.

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Zones extended from Darfur and locations in the West through to the wider Khartoum area and states east of there from last May in 2024, the RSF has laid siege to Al Fasha, the capital of North Darfur.

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And the last major town or city in Darfur under Army control.

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It's intermittently probed the army's control of El Abade, the capital of North Kordofan.

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The Army's defended our fashion with extensive support from Allied Darfuri armed groups, and it's carried out air strikes elsewhere in Darfur.

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Aerial bombardment by the armed forces has repeatedly caused civilian casualties, and evidence has frequently emerged of RSF atrocities against civilians.

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This month, around about a week ago, around 70 people were reported killed in an attack on the Saudi hospital in Al Fasher. For example, in June last year, at least 100 civilians were killed by RSF fighters during an attack on.

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A village in Al Jazeera state.

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The course of the war has included several shifts during the past year in the middle of last year, the RSF clashed with the Army and Allied forces in Sena, with the RSF capturing the state capital Sinjar.

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In August, the RSF launched military attacks into Blue Nile state, and it intensified its attacks on suburbs of Elfasia.

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But despite the seeming strong position of the RSF.

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The city of Fascia held out, although civilians have been hit hard, not least the population in Zamzan camp.

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In September, the Army launched an offensive aiming to recapture ground.

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And in the last months of the year began move to recapture territory in Al Jazeera state. And this month the Army recaptured Wad Medali and then significantly very recently it gained more ground in the capital.

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Breaking the RSF siege on the Army general headquarters in Khartoum.

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The human and economic impact of war has been enormous. As of now, the number of people displaced by the war stands at around 11,000,000. A few nearly 3,000,000 have fled to neighbouring countries.

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Detailed figures for the total number of casualties aren't available.

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But in November, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine published research that estimated that around 26,000 people had been killed by violence in cartoon state in the 1st 15 months.

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Of the.

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War.

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Combined with reports and estimates for casualties in some other parts of the country, especially Darfur, this suggests that the total number of people killed by violence.

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I'd like to reach the mid to high 10s of thousands or more by the end of last year.

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Beyond that toll is the toll of increased morbidity caused by displacement and deteriorated living conditions.

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Food shortages have affected millions. The well regarded international system for assessing food insecurity, the integrated food security phase Classification IFC has issued reports warning about the severity of conditions.

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In September, the IFC.

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Estimated that around 3/4 of a million people were facing catastrophic food insecurity, or in short, were living in famine conditions.

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In the middle of last year, UN organisations estimated that 19,000,000 children were out of school.

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In September last year, AUN, fact finding mission reported to the UN Human Rights Council on the extent of human rights violations.

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The war.

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Which have included extensive sexual violence and gender based violence.

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Aid organisations for appeal to donor states to increase their financial contributions for humanitarian aid. They've also repeatedly lobbied the army and government to ease restrictions on the movement of convoys of lorries carrying.

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Humanitarian aid.

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Particularly from Chad and to Darfur, but also to ease restrictions on movement of aid materials and personnel within the country.

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Last April.

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International donor states pledged \$2 billion at a conference in Paris for humanitarian aid in Sudan for this year. For 2025, UN aid agencies and their partners are appealing for just over \$4 billion in aid, which is the largest.

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Single country aid appeal worldwide.

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Away from the parts of the country caught up in fighting conditions are difficult, of course, for civilians, services and communities are stretched by the challenges of accommodating the influx of millions of people displaced from other parts of the country.

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Even if people also bring energy and skills the currency, the Sudanese pound has depreciated rapidly. Even the RSF has begun to circulate technically invalid bank notes seized from the Central bank headquarters in Khartoum.

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What about the impact on politics and international responses?

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Inside the country, across the board, domestic politics has been subordinated to military leaders and military priorities, with civilian leaders and politicians divided by the question.

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Of whether to collaborate with the Army or the RSF or to form their own alliances, or to try to stand on their own. The army leader and chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council.

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General Abdul Fattah Al Wuhan has retained his status as de facto president, regardless of Sudanese descent. About this and international criticism.

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A new emergency government promised by Wuhan last August to tackle the crisis facing the country hasn't materialised. 1 indication of the difficulties he has faced in the international diplomatic.

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Is that Wuhan twice replaced his foreign minister during the last year.

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In July, Wuhan survived what the army claimed, but others disputed was an assassination attempt on him during a military parade in Red Sea State.

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Which was allegedly targeted by two drones.

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Meanwhile, the leader of the RSF, Lieutenant General Mohammed Hamdan dagalo, known as Zimeti, continues to issue sporadic statements, having made a short.

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Regional overseas tour at the end of 2023, Dagalaw has since appeared to remain inside Sudan and made few public appearances. In contrast with Borah.

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Although that's afforded him a degree of protection, it's also a sign of vulnerability to internal tensions in the RSF with relatives of dagalos occupying several leadership positions and the RSF lacking.

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The relatively robust military structures of the army, meanwhile, the RSF has offered little by way of an alternative to the national government in Port Sudan. In March, it did announce the formation of its own civilian administration.

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The Jazeera state alone, but that didn't mean its rule was suddenly locally acceptable. Welcome.

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In August, clashes reportedly occurred in Melit in North Darfur between two tribal groups that were locally prominent in the RSF.

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What a civilian alliances and civilian politics.

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Take take up them properly to give it its proper title. The coordination body for democratic and civil forces.

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One prominent civil civilian political organisation.

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In March, the Government committee in Port Sudan filed charges against seventeen members of Turkudam, including its leader, former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamblong.

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Together, just disparaged the charges as an attempt by political Islamists to block talks between Tikaddum and the army, and said that they wouldn't be deterred from pursuing dialogue.

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Despite good intentions to cut in the struggle with perceptions that it's too favourable has been too favourable to the RFF.

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Its limited presence on the ground inside Sudan has also posed a challenge to its credibility and prospects.

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In April last April, to cut them's leadership met in Addis Ababa and issued what they described as a comprehensive vision for ending a war and rebuilding the country to cater vision. Rejected participation by the former ruling National Congress party.

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But it indicated openness to past the patient by political forces and individuals who supported the aims of the 20/18/19 revolution. The Sudanese Polish.

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In May last May, to cut them held a founding conference in Addis Ababa and in December held another conference in Uganda which hesitantly rejected a proposal to form a civilian government in exile.

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To note, pockets of the country remain outside both army and RSF control. Examples include areas in central Darfur and the Nuba mountains controlled by factions of long present local armed groups.

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Respectively, the Darfuri Sudan Liberation movement and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement north.

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Peacemaking efforts so far.

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Have been ineffective.

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The war and its destructive impact certainly merit constructive international attention, but diplomatic fatigue?

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Weakened international multilateralism and regional rivalries in the Middle East and all of Africa.

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Have besides or on top of that, the competing pressures of other wars internationally, elsewhere, Ukraine, Gaza, all those factors have narrowed the space for effective international diplomacy to.

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Address the.

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Disunity and ineffectiveness have been the story so far of international peace making efforts.

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In July last year.

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We saw in a way an example of the how disjointed the international response to the war has been. In that month alone, 3 separate events to support peace efforts in Sudan were held. Egypt hosted A1 day conference of Sudanese political and civil.

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Which included the army aligned Democratic block and included.

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In Addis Ababa the same month, AU African Union convened a preparatory meeting for Inter Sudanese political dialogue, and in Geneva, the UN convened proximity talks between the RSF and the Army.

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Results were wanting.

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In August, Saudi Arabia and the US convened in Switzerland A2 week meeting on civilian protection in Sudan, which was attended by representatives of the of the of the RSS. Sorry.

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The army.

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The meeting ended with a group of international participants under the cumbersome, awkward name aligned for advancing lifesaving, and Thais in Sudan Group, presenting a proposal to the RSF in the Army to improve their compliance.

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With the 2023 Jeddah Declaration and with international humanitarian and human rights law.

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In January last year, Saudi Arabia and the US convened talks in Bahrain between deputies of Burhan and Himeti, but to little avail. An envoy of the UN Secretary general has tried to shuffle between the Sudanese parties and external actors.

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Looking to mediate?

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In December.

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There were signs of Turkey exploring whether it could mediate in some way. The previous year 2023, the first year of the war, saw a similar picture of regional and international disunity over ending a war.

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With some countries leaning towards the Army and others having a record of undeclared support for the RSS, a situation which has has.

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That year, soon after the war began, Saudi Arabia and the US repeatedly convened talks in Jeddah, and in July, 2023 neighbouring countries held a summit in Cairo in September of that year, 2023, the head of the UN political mission in Sudan.

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Resigned a month after the government declared him persona non grata, and in the early months of 2024, the ill fated UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission.

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Was closed.

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East African Intergovernmental Authority on development and the African Union have tried to engage that. They've been hampered by members, positions and views about the RSF and the legitimacy of Wuhan.

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The AU suspended Sudan as a member in October 2021 in reaction to the coup, which ended the 2019 Constitutional Declaration framework in Sudan for military to civilian transition.

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And then January 2024, Wuhan and the government that he leads announced they were suspending Sudan's membership of EGAD in protest at its invitation of HIMMETI to an, I guess summit in Entebbe.

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Back in early January 2024, the US and the EU have announced new sanctions on Members or associates of the Army and the RSF, and on armed importing companies.

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Sanctions have added peripherally.

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To the diplomatic isolation of the army and the RSF. But they've had no real impact on the war.

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However, a significant factor in the scare of the war is the ongoing supply of weapons to both sides, with some regional countries arming and backing opposing sides, but denying doing so.

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The Army's relative legitimacy has meant that its armed imports are less criticised internationally than the RSS, according to strong evidence presented by UN panel of experts.

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During sanctions on dark on.

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And research by journalists, the UAE has continued to supply arms to the RSF, although Emirati officials denied this. Within Sudan, it's likely that some weapons end up being transferred between the army and the Rsfs.

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Through diversion or seizure in January this year, the US announced sanctions on Wuhan, adding to those that had previously announced on Himmat.

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And on 7th the 7th of January, the US State Department announced its determination, a judgement that members of the RSS and allied militias have committed genocide in Sudan.

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Let's note here just briefly as a remind. As a reminder, what were and are the causes of this war.

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At Ruch, it was the breakdown of the uneasy trust and cooperation that had operated between the army and the RSS from 2019, and even from before that.

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Recall the path from the 2018 nineteen revolution through to the August 2019 constitutional document or declaration agreement which led to the Transitional Sovereign Council.

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Civilian military power sharing government.

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With a president and a vice president and a civilian cabinet.

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And recall, apart from there through the October 21 coup, 2021 coup, as many regarded it which disrupted.

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Or suspended the scheduled or planned shift from military to civilian leadership of the transition.

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Spark for the wall.

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But then came in the efforts at the end of 2022 and the start of 2023 to advance a framework agreement as it was called, that had been brokered by the AU IGAD and the UN.

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But underlying.

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Underlying this, the underlying cause for the war was the unresolved rivalry between the President and the head of the Army, Wuhan, between the president, sorry, between the president and head of the Army, Wuhan and his ambitious deputy.

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The leader of the RSF in that.

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The competition between the two men and between the.

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The Army and the RSS.

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Led to rupture in the start of the war and has now been compounded by two years of bitter fighting.

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What about lessons from the past and lessons from elsewhere?

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Sudan's had a long history of civil war and peacemaking efforts. What are the lessons from this past?

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For peace making now and in the future, the coming years.

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Past peacemaking in Sudan includes many agreements and processes.

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Few seen as very successful.

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The one that most often is seen as.

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Relatively or significantly successful is the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement.

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What was that?

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It was the result of negotiations mediated by IGAD with.

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Charismatic or particularly effective chief mediator, Kenyan general Natarison Baywo and it was mediated with international support for IGAD, the so-called and.

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These negotiations negotiations also built on earlier products or progress. In 1994, I gad mediated declaration of principles. They benefited to from.

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A helpful, helpful domestic economic conditions in Sudan, namely oil growth and the oil factor in those negotiations and they benefited too from helpful international conditions, aspects of the post 911.

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Context in US engagement.

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The strength of the CPA, the Compensatory peace agreement from 2005 were assessed that it was relatively successful and implemented. It led to a period of.

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Or peace that did lead to the formal end of the the war that had run from 1983 to 2005.

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The weaknesses of the CPA.

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What were they? They were, as some Sudanese said at the time, that it was a two party deal, a sarka.

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The weaknesses included that its provisions skewed towards using a NS framework to end the Civil war, which at the time of entering its third decade, it's skewed towards using that north-south framework to neglect.

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Of the national the wider aspects of that second civil war.

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Those wider aspects of one of the national aspects of the war were evidenced in the.

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The front of that war, the conflict in Blue Nile, S Quarterfin Abia and from 2003.

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And briefly before in the 1990s, conflict in Darfur.

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But in Sudan S past other peace agreements and processes shouldn't be ignored.

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Thought we shouldn't assume they're not worth checking for any lessons just because they were less consequential or effective.

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What are some examples of past other other peace agreements? 1 is the October 2020 Juba peace agreement or the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan to give it its correct title, which was between the.

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Transitional government in Khartoum and the Sudan Revolutionary Front coalition.

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That was a 240 page document. The result of South Sudanese mediation and UN technical assistance wrapping together a number of agreements reached over the preceding year, which has begun with a cessation of hostilities agreement in October 2019.

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The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan was helped by the change in the context in Sudan, the ousting of Bashir.

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The.

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Conclusion. In August 2019 of the constitutional document.

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A weakness of it was as.

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Salute, care and Joshua Craze described it in a in a recent report was that it was in ways yet another power sharing agreement for elite commanders, bringing signatories under the influence of the government and the military.

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Another peace agreement from Sudan's past to look to check for lessons is the was the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

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Again, a big document, 110 pages, the result of Qatar mediation, aided by the presence of UNAMID, the United Nations joint peacekeeping mission in Sudan that substituted that agreement in 2011, substituted for the fail 2006.

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Darfur Peace agreement signed in Abuja, which itself was an example of deadline diplomacy as Laurie Nathan, one of them technical.

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Support on that negotiation described.

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And it suffered from.

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X and it's an example is an example of how excessive external pressure can lead to an agreement which is dead on arrival.

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A major weakness of the Doha document for peace in Darfur was what it lacked in credibility and buy in from Darfuri political forces.

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And from public opinion.

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There were other peace agreements initiated and initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s, generally unsuccessful.

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Though sometimes delivering benefits, one older and one different, agreement should be noted.

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And that was the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement between the Sudan Government and the South Sudan Liberation movement at the time.

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Just 13 pages, mediated by the World Council of Churches in a comparatively short process.

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It ended the first civil war that had run from 1955 to 72 and was successful in a significant way.

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Yielding some 11 years of peace that, although it was undone by 1983.

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So there are many agreements.

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And and many peace talks and initiatives, many examples of mediation and agreements in Sudan's modern history, the Edinburgh based Peace Research Initiative, Peace Rep has a peace agreement database which lists no less than 126 agreements. If you search on that.

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Term between 1992 and 2023 for Sudan alone, 126 up to.

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Be relatively unsuccessful. May 2023 or very unsuccessful May 2023, Jeddah agreement on a short term ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements in Sudan.

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And the lifts on piece Rep that list of 126 isn't isn't totally complete, and of course merely counting isn't a fair summary, but it does suggest a lot of ineffective agreements, and it brings to mind the title.

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Of Abu alias 1990 book Southern Sudan, too many too many agreements dishonoured.

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Can lessons be learnt or drawn from this past that are useful for Sudan now and in the future? Certainly.

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This past shows that.

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Ceasefires can be achieved in different forms and they can deliver benefits.

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That the past also shows that some things very likely need to be different in peace. Taking in Sudan in the future if the outcomes are to be better.

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And noting how peace making for Sudan in the past has tended to strengthen military forces hasn't led to demobilisation or disarmament, and how it's how they have tended to marginalised civilian politics.

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Another lesson from the past from this history of peace making.

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Is probably the future processes need to facilitate Sudanese their dialogue and peacemaking more.

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So for.

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Section. Now my talk. I'm going to turn away from Sudan to ask, explore briefly what lessons there are from peace making and other wars.

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Before I talk about South Sudan, I'll just pause.

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And note or address the question of what if we think about peace making in general, what observations are there to that might be relevant from the international picture or the global picture about peace making?

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I often free observations and three observations that I think are pertinent. Firstly, the period of liberal or concerted multilateral peace making has definitively ended or ebbed away.

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It was a short lived period, the 1990s to the 2010's at most.

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And we can hope or some of us can hope that cooperative multilateralism may increase at some point in the years ahead.

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2nd observation to make from the global picture about peace making.

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Is that this is a smaller observation, more technical, that the academic liberal peace critique and arguments.

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During the 2000s and the 20 tens in some some good academic literature.

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That liberal peace critique and arguments advocating a local turn or hybrid peace making.

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They have some merits, but they also have weaknesses and they didn't cut through to policymakers and practitioners and they didn't suggest very practical ways to improve action during during that time.

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And the third and final observation I draw from the international or global picture of peace, making the global situation.

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Is about international organisations and structures and guidelines for mediation and peace making.

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Those have developed extensively over the past 30 years. They've been systematised and institutionalised more.

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Some of those organisations and institutions and and the people working in them, and researchers who leave universities like this and go to work in those organisations. Some are trying to reflect on why the results of peacemaking efforts internationally.

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In civil wars have been poor.

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But the observation I make is that.

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The organisations and the structures aren't adept at learning and adjusting, they are hindered by.

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Institutions or other learning, learning and changing is hindered by the institutions favour of generalist expertise.

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By knowledge hierarchies in international national interactions and by organisational inertia. So.

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Turning now to some instructive examples.

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Watch examples from particular countries may be instructive for peace making efforts in and for Sudan over the coming years.

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I'm going to look at 2 failures and two successes briefly. Firstly, South Sudan from 2014 to 2018.

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In South Sudan, being Sudan's neighbour with which it is very closely tied, peace making in South Sudan in response, international efforts in support of peace making in South Sudan began following the start of the Civil War in South Sudan at the end of 2013.

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The main peace making international peacemaking effort was led by IGAD, the East African Regional Bloc and partners.

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The mediation, aimed first at a ceasefire and then at a comprehensive agreement.

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It resulted in the 2015 agreement on the resolution of conflict in South Sudan, which is the the left of these two.

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Pictures of the covers of the front pages of two documents. That agreement, the first one. I can't remember how many pages. I said 100 odd pages collapsed and war resumed in 2016.

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I get them launched an initiative to revitalise that agreement and that produced the agreement on the the right, the revitalised agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, the mediation and agreements these two agreements, what did they, what did they do? They aim to put back in together.

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Power 2 military leaders note this Sudan, who had repeatedly before fallen out violently in 1991 and in 2013 and then in 2016, the resulting agreement.

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Ments exemplified.

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An unreflective external application of a model for a peace agreement. They had quite a template, chapter 1 power sharing, Chapter 2, security arrangements, Chapter 3, aid and reconstruction chapter for economic management.

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Analogous to wealth sharing and the CPA chapter 5, transitional Justice, Accountability, and Reconciliation, a template which was replicated in other agreements in Sudan to some extent.

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What was absurd and questionable in these agreements for South Sudan wasn't questioned or really seen by the external mediators and the drafters. It was more questioned by the ordinary person.

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South Sudanese in the.

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Who asked, reacted with would react with surprise to the proposals.

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Or to what these agreements brought, which included expanding the Presidency from one President and two vice presidents to one president and five vice presidents, expanding a parliament from 332 to 400, and then again from 400 to 550.

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Percentage allocations and then the implementation of these agreements has also resulted in a somewhat absurd situation. Repeated extensions of a notional.

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Position and postponement postponement of elections I.

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Like 3 extensions so far, but the weight of perceived international investment in the agreements and the assumed wisdom of the mediators and drafters, meant that doubts and objections were pushed aside.

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Potential S Sudanese alternatives were pushed aside two and two actual mediation and peacemaking initiatives by South Sudan, Sudanese by the South Sudan Council of Churches and the South Sudan National Dialogue.

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In 20/17/2020, which was simultaneous, we're also pushed aside and discounted.

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Neither of those were perfect, but they had more potential to deliver positive change than the 2015 and 2018 agreements that were mediated by IGAD and international mediation.

00:40:40

A bit of evidence of that are some of the words from the national dialogue final report, and sorry to have put a lot of words on the screen there.

00:40:49

But.

00:40:51

There they resonate those words, which were published in the final report of the national dialogue in 2020. They proposed something they recommended something very strong, and that came. That was a S Sudanese voice. It was what? The South. What S Sudanese who took part in the dialogue recommended.

00:41:11

But this whole process had no opportunity to contribute because the internationally mediated agree process had already produced an agreement that.

00:41:23

Excluded this for Sudan.

00:41:27

What's what are the lessons from South Sudan's experience? It's surely don't let something similar be repeated. Don't let external mediators lead and direct the peace process in ways that mean they formulate and apply.

00:41:44

Their vision and framework for a peace agreement, especially if it involves applying a set of peace agreement templates and, for example, power sharing form.

00:41:53

Those are therefore disagree with and caution about some of the recommendations in the otherwise good Crisis Group report published this January about Sudan's crisis and situation that report.

00:42:09

In what it says about talks to reach a ceasefire, what it recommends about talks in for Sudan to reach a ceasefire, the report says successful likely prove elusive and less mediators international mediators.

00:42:23

An offer at least a broad, stroke's vision of the post war political.

00:42:28

Order and about requirements for a post war government, the Crisis Group report several times talks of mediators putting forward a vision. These kinds of recommendations.

00:42:40

Are.

00:42:41

Over determined.

00:42:43

A second example of unsuccessful peace making.

00:42:48

Which can be cautioned for Sudan and has some parallels with Sudan's war. Sudan's war situation is Yemen.

00:42:58

From over the past decade, peace making in Yemen over this decade has.

00:43:03

Mainly, the UN led tied to a UN Security Council resolution and an associated framework and vision for a peace process.

00:43:13

In truth, the international vision and framework that framework really didn't fit with realities in the country they fitted, rather with the political preferences of external actors and the internationally recognised government of of Yemen.

00:43:31

Just as a reminder of relevance of Yemen to Sudan.

00:43:35

These two maps show.

00:43:37

The division of Yemen and the Zones of Control, the one on the left, the map on the left, is from about 2015 and one on the right is from 2022. Very little change. Blue is the area 50 controlled or controlled by Ansar Alta.

00:43:52

And and the rest. What they don't control, which is normally under or actually under the control of the internationally recognised government. Little change over nearly a decade and up to now, the vision and framework for.

00:44:08

Yemen the international vision and framework.

00:44:11

What was its effect?

00:44:14

It involved the.

00:44:16

Drafting and production of the game externally lead and externally drafted would be agreements. Unlike in South Sudan's case, there would be agreement didn't get signed by the parties there.

00:44:32

Were.

00:44:33

Next to know face to face talks, except for one small agreement here, the others such as the top 2 pages, that's a table of contents from a draught comprehensive transitional agreement for Yemen, prepared entirely outside the country.

00:44:50

And never saw the light of the day day with with the parties.

00:44:55

In short, the vision, the international vision and framework for Yemen had the consequence of constraining the space for more effective peace, making so for Sudan, what lesson could be drawn from Yemen's experience?

00:45:08

The lesson I'd say is to beware the risk that external actors pursue a vision and framework for ending Sudan's war. That primarily they think is right or suitable and other actors go along with but which doesn't accord well with the reality on the ground.

00:45:25

And it isn't locally on action yet.

00:45:28

Like these kinds of papers, the situation in Yemen of a broken country and eight years of peace efforts just to reach a temporary truce, which was a breakthrough in April 2022, is also a sobering example.

00:45:42

To take note of thinking about Sudan, what briefly about examples of more successful and different peace, more successful peace making, and different peacemaking to note.

00:45:54

I'll mention two examples which are interesting because they didn't follow the template or norms of peacemate, the kind of peacemaking in international mediation that we've seen in the country that I've talked about South Africa 1991 to 1994.

00:46:12

A peace process started by the 1991 National Peace accord.

00:46:17

Implemented over the following years.

00:46:19

That was a domestically led peace process, completely shaped and led by S Africans by opposing and rival political forces, South African businesses, churches and civil society. There were external and international inputs.

00:46:35

And that support played a limited but beneficial role and certainly outstanding individuals and leadership in South Africa played major roles Mandela, FW declare.

00:46:49

As the late Archbishop Desmond Tutu said in a foreword to a book about the peace process by Liz Carmichael, it was a piece that was.

00:46:59

Quote facilitated by churches and business negotiated by politicians and supported by the international community that the people accomplished it.

00:47:10

That's not a description which could be applied to peace agreements and associated periods of peace in Sudan and South Sudan. In the past 25 years.

00:47:20

Then another last example, positive example, Northern Ireland, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement before and since that agreement.

00:47:31

Was also largely led from within by the parties with external support playing only an auxiliary role.

00:47:39

The final agreement was short 32 pages and it wasn't like the normative agreements we've seen for Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, the structure of the agreement, and the ordering of its sections spoke to the priorities of Northern Ireland.

00:47:55

The people, democracy and human rights, rather than following a generic template.

00:48:00

The agreement provided for devolution of powers. It required that it be endorsed by popular referendums. It involved decommissioning a term you don't see elsewhere. Instead of disarmament DDR, it avoided the the templates or the norms.

00:48:18

The formulas.

00:48:20

It was a peace process that benefited all so.

00:48:23

It benefited strongly from community based initiatives which preceded the Good Friday Agreement and continued after.

00:48:31

Factors of course, to bear in mind, looking at an example like that was the conflicts in Northern Ireland was small by standards. The agreement had the advantage of a favourable regional and international neighbourhood Democratic wealthy states, so we can acknowledge that.

00:48:46

That fully that examples like South Africa and Northern Ireland were very different situations in context from Sudan today.

00:48:54

But if there's a lesson that can be drawn from Sudan as much As for other conflicts elsewhere in the world, it might be that some of the most successful peace processes are domestically led an externally supported, not the.

00:49:09

Way around.

00:49:11

And they don't follow templates and norms. Time to wrap up.

00:49:16

Prospects for Sudan.

00:49:18

Attempting a detailed forecast isn't needed here, and detailed forecasts usually prove inaccurate, but some broad statements about the prospects.

00:49:28

The war.

00:49:29

Peace making and the situation in Sudan are reasonable.

00:49:34

I offer these.

00:49:36

Civil wars usually go on for longer than expected, and I think the data shows that the average duration is growing.

00:49:46

Situations of state fragmentation or collapse. Also, you usually go on for longer than expected.

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Note Somalia, Yemen, Libya, a note that Sudan's fragmentation has been severe.

00:50:03

Thirdly, regional and international politics are not set to become suddenly much more effective and benign for peacemaking and peace processes.

00:50:15

But some external peacemaking initiatives will happen, for better, for worse, or with no effect.

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So in the light of what should be seen or taken as lessons from the past, from past peacemaking in Sudan, from the experience and outcomes elsewhere.

00:50:34

That's good.

00:50:36

And in light of what the prospects are, what should be recommended?

00:50:42

What I've presented here supports 3 main observations or three main recommendations to external actors and to Sudanese.

00:50:52

Firstly, ceasefire.

00:50:56

There is a need and the immediate and near term for external actors and Sudanese to push for a ceasefire and to accept the relative benefits of the Sudanese armed forces having some ascendancy.

00:51:08

In the war.

00:51:10

International support for.

00:51:13

Ceasefire efforts can be beneficial and significant. It's morally right and it is in a wider picture, even constructively. Self interested serves can serve the interests both of the country and of the external actor.

00:51:29

Working for a sixfire means.

00:51:32

Advocating firmly and pressing for a ceasefire or technical variations of that cessation of hostilities agreement, truce, the escalation, it means encouraging and facilitating incremental but beneficial steps.

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Such as temporary and local human or local humanitarian ceasefires. It means working for a ceasefire means supporting ceasefire, monitoring arrangements to potentially.

00:52:00

For example 5 an international or hybrid observer mission or monitoring body.

00:52:08

The second recommendation I meant is for a long term approach. The need to take a long term approach to peace, process and peace.

00:52:18

This requires external actors and Sudanese to understand and anticipate that an effective peace process, an effective peace building will almost certainly take long.

00:52:32

Expect this and use the time to again encourage and facilitate incremental but beneficial steps.

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Such as declarations of principles, measures to protect civilians and the economy, and a long term approach, or to also use the time, for example, to of, of anticipating a long term approach, and use the time to work to reduce.

00:52:57

The irresponsible supply of arms.

00:52:59

The third recommendation, my last one, is about vision and ownership. There's a need to prioritise and support the development of Sudanese, vision for and ownership of a peace process to Sudan that requires.

00:53:15

External actors to give more attention to ownership and vision. It requires international organisations, Arab League, AU, European, UN and regional and Western states to be careful of or avoid using templates.

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And technocratic normative peacemaking approaches.

00:53:35

It requires mediating States and organisations to be careful of or simply avoid.

00:53:41

Over determining, for example, by tabling, putting on the table what isn't essential at this point and what is better developed by Sudanese, even if that almost certainly takes time.

00:53:55

And it requires.

00:53:58

Sudanese and external actors to take as a starting point that it should be Sudanese who own and shape the longer peace process in implementation. Sudanese need to leave. External actors can usefully facilitate Sudanese dialogue and forums, and support the work of constructed Sudanese organisations.

00:54:19

Their approach? The external actors should be to facilitate and support, not direct or orchestrate.

00:54:28

Thank you.

00:54:35

Thank you, Richard.

00:54:38

Accidentally well informed human patient and I want to ask you a couple of questions to begin with.

00:54:44

You said at the very beginning.

00:54:47

You viewed the current conflict as being a different than the previous conflict, and for Sudan has had many conflicts for quite a long time.

00:54:57

But I couldn't quite put my finger on what the difference was between the current conflicts and the.

00:55:04

Under running conflict.

00:55:08

It may it.

00:55:09

Seem like the answer is entirely on process and I can't quite get a grasp on what.

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The underlying causes of the conflict are whether it's, you know, their ethnic cleavages or their.

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An ideological conflict, or whether it's the foreign powers, and if so, what is it that the foreign actors are hoping to get from the conflict?

00:55:35

I couldn't get a sense of whether you know the two sides had different visions for the future of what Sudan is as a nation state.

00:55:45

Or if it really just boils down to a conflict between two generals who want to control the country for their own purposes.

00:55:54

And maybe this is just my own naivete and and lack of understanding how mediation works. Maybe it's just a case of once a conflict gets to a certain point then.

00:56:06

It really is the conflict that you have to pay attention to and the underlying causes become somehow secondary. I don't know. So. So that's one question and then the other question is, what about the civilians, you know, the current conflict began.

00:56:20

With the civilian movement overthrowing a government in power for a very long time, what happened to that movement? Are they irrelevant to the, to the process of of solving this conflict now? Is there something left from that movement?

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Used to to enter conflict.

00:56:42

Thanks, Walter.

00:56:44

Respond briefly on those points or yeah, yeah.

00:56:46

Yeah, and then I'll open the floor.

00:56:49

On on your first question, what what is different between this current conflict and past conflicts?

00:56:56

It's a mix. There are some things that are different and other things that are not that might sound trite, but.

00:57:04

I think it's right.

00:57:08

Most of all it.

00:57:09

Why has this conflict happened? It's a power struggle. It's a power struggle.

00:57:15

Overlaying that.

00:57:18

Our our other agendas, but at the routers that power struggle, the rivalry between two leaders and there the the the armed forces that they lead.

00:57:32

That cause of a that that should be the cause of such a major national civil war is a.

00:57:38

Bit new.

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Compared with previous major wars in in Sudan, which have been where identity has been more factor.

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Or significant factor.

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And then another way in which this conflict has.

00:57:56

Is different from previous conflicts. Is just in the the the the physical structuring or the geographic map of the conflict that this conflict has exploded at the in the capital. It's been from the from inside out, not from the proofs, not from.

00:58:14

Only beginning in the peripheries and moving towards the capital that's been started at in Khartoum and then also escalated rapidly enough and so it's a mix and the the.

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Trips of the stair of the conflict is that different from previous ones, and that different ways of measuring it.

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Then that's it.

00:58:35

Should be seen as that or or and also they're similar. What about civilians? What's happened to the civilian movement that was so influential in 20/18/19?

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Fragmented is the word that comes to mind.

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Obviously.

00:58:57

I've I've talked about some of the the civilian political forces that are have been visible and.

00:59:07

Externally or being focused on externally, such as one alliance that's cut down group, but there are other organised political forces and there are civilian forces.

00:59:21

Such as the that have been active for emergency response, the emergency response rooms for humanitarian aid and material aid.

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Assistance within the country and but yeah, in a in a world what's happened is fragmented. But but what's important to note, they're still there.

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Sudanese civil society and capabilities for and I say that because they're the ones with the capabilities for vision and influence to influence.

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Vision future vision for for a peace process.

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Please join me in thanking our speaker for.

01:00:04

I.