

Transcript

00:00:00 Speaker 1

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome back to the middle.

00:00:03 Speaker 1

Centre.

00:00:04 Speaker 1

It's a pleasure to have you with us for the Friday of 4th.

00:00:09 Speaker 1

For all of you on the mfil or the MSC halfway through the term.

00:00:15

Halfway.

00:00:15 Speaker 1

Through the year, that is true. This is. Tonight marks the halfway point in the academic. Thank you, Michael.

00:00:22 Speaker 1

So what better way to mark the halfway point of the academic year than to hold this late Israeli public opinion war prospects?

00:00:32 Speaker 1

Peace in the company of Doctor Dahlia Shanglen Dalia is a political strategist and a public opinion researcher who's advised on 9 national campaigns in Israel. Edward on elections, referendums and public affairs.

00:00:47 Speaker 1

Campaigns in 15 other countries over the last 25 years is that number still up to date?

00:00:52 Speaker 2

That is, as of this moment.

00:00:53 Speaker 1

15 excellent. In addition to his room, she has regional expertise in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Cyprus.

00:01:04 Speaker 1

Dallia conducts extensive public opinion research for civil society organisations, including joint Israeli Palestinian surveys. She holds a PhD in political science from Tel Aviv and a master's degree from Harvard Divinity School.

00:01:21 Speaker 1

She's a regular columnist for Harrods English and a policy fellow at Century International.

00:01:28 Speaker 1

Her writing has appeared in all of your favourite publications, the New York Times, the Guardian, foreign affairs, foreign policy, the New York Review of Books, of course.

00:01:39 Speaker 1

And of course, the new stage, then she's Co hosted several podcasts, including the Tel Aviv Review and the Election Overdose Podcast.

00:01:41

If.

00:01:47

We sympathise, she.

00:01:49 Speaker 1

Appears regularly as a political commentator and global media outlets, including CNN, the BBC.

00:01:55 Speaker 1

Which I just learned she doesn't get actually watched from Israel, but nonetheless she.

00:02:00 Speaker 1

Eat from CBC France 24 NPR and is widely cited in global French media. Her book, The Crooked Chamber of Democracy in Israel, promised unfulfilled was published in September and named by foreign affairs as one of its best.

00:02:14 Speaker 1

Of 2024.

00:02:16 Speaker 1

All I would say to add to this is everyone that I spoke to asking who was the go to person. If you really wanted to take a deep dive into Israeli public opinion, were you not? There is only one person. If you can only get her to come.

00:02:32 Speaker 1

It's with such gratitude I welcome Dalia Shire because when?

00:02:35 Speaker 1

The humble e-mail saying.

00:02:36 Speaker 1

Might you possibly consider coming? Her positive answer has led to tonight. I give you Dalia the person you really want to hear from when it comes to Israeli public opinion. Please.

00:02:47 Speaker 1

It up to.

00:02:54 Speaker 2

And say thank you for the warm welcome, but that.

00:02:55 Speaker 2

Was a.

00:02:56 Speaker 2

Very warm welcome.

00:02:57 Speaker 1

Oh, come on.

00:02:59

And we know.

00:02:59

When you say.

00:03:00 Speaker 2

Like I'm the person you want to speak to.

00:03:01 Speaker 2

Haven't heard, but I have to say about it to the public opinion. But you'll be the judge. So first of all, thank you so much, Councillor Rogan, and also to Jenny Williams who.

00:03:09 Speaker 2

Not.

00:03:09 Speaker 2

But thank you for.

00:03:10 Speaker 2

Inviting me to in the police centre for hosting me.

00:03:14 Speaker 2

What I'm going to try to do is bring some empirical data to this extremely painful and sensitive time and you know, I think everybody has been following what's going on in the region, in Israel and Palestine all year and probably more than that.

00:03:29 Speaker 2

Think what we often don't. We don't often do is try to give some sort of empirical basis to what we know or think we know about the two societies. I will talk about the findings, right? What do we know about Israeli attitudes during the war, before the war, since the.

00:03:47 Speaker 2

And I'll explain the order. I'll also try to give you a little bit of my understanding of the value.

00:03:52 Speaker 2

Of public opinion. What is the role of public opinion? OK, so I'll draw those in and this is mostly focused on Israeli public opinion. But there are a few ways in which I think it's important to contextualise this by looking at the parallel trends among Palestinians. I do conduct Israeli and Palestinian polling in addition to my work just in Israel.

00:03:57

I.

00:04:12 Speaker 2

And I think that ultimately, you know, when I look at this region, I don't really think you can look at those two societies in isolation. That's my general understanding as a researcher.

00:04:22 Speaker 2

And so at points I will bring in some of the Palestinian data as well.

00:04:26 Speaker 2

Let me try to organise what I want to talk about today. I'll look at. I want to start. I thought it would be helpful and probably everybody's interested to know the very current attitudes what are on. What are Israelis thinking about the war since October 7th? You know, even more recent developments like the ceasefire.

00:04:43 Speaker 2

That we currently have theoretically in two arms, so we'll get into that and you can, you know, you can basically guide your thinking. You'll know what to look for because I've given you some of the findings right. War has led to very hardline attitudes, and we're going to map those out.

00:04:59 Speaker 2

I want to move into the in the second part of this talk to why how we got here. OK, what was the background? What were the trends in public opinion attitudes that led up to where we are now? And then?

00:05:13 Speaker 2

What I'm going to try to do, and I say this you know, is with some humility is look for opportunities. Now I am not a fan of, you know, trying to manipulate data to give responses that you want to.

00:05:24 Speaker 2

See. However, I think the data does show a picture that in some ways has surprised even me. Not with great and optimistic openings for peace, but with some openings for something. And so we'll walk through why I say that. What I base that on.

00:05:41 Speaker 2

For background, most of what I'm going to be showing you is taken from the joint Israeli Palestinian Survey project. We call it the Palestinian Israeli pulse survey. I'm the Israeli researcher, together with colleagues of mine from Tel Aviv University, the Palestinian researcher researches conducted.

00:05:57 Speaker 2

By Doctor Khalil shikaki of the Palestinian.

00:06:00 Speaker 2

For policy and survey research, so most of the data comes from that project and specifically from our last joint survey conducted in July of 2024, the project itself goes

back to the year 2000. So we have about 25 years of longitudinal data. Don't worry, I won't be.

00:06:18 Speaker 2

You all of that.

00:06:19 Speaker 2

However, just so you know there, here's the methodology and I feel like I have to say this. There's a lot of survey research running around out there. This is an unsolicited tip for anybody who's ever read a survey. If you don't see the methodology or if you don't have access to the methodology.

00:06:35 Speaker 2

It's not worth it. It's probably.

00:06:38 Speaker 2

A manipulated survey? Or you just don't know if research isn't transparent, it's not worth your time. Having said that, we don't have to go through all of the methodological data just to know that I'm focusing on the Israeli side here, but that's the Palestinian methodology as well. It's a representative sample of adult Israelis with over samples.

00:06:56 Speaker 2

Of two populations, Palestinian citizens of Israel, who I also refer to as Arabs.

00:07:01 Speaker 2

Citizens of Israel because when I go on this, their self definition breaks down in different ways and so I want to respect everybody's choice. So I use those terms interchangeably and we have an oversample of West Bank settlers, so we had enough to try to analyse.

00:07:16 Speaker 2

Trends among them as well.

00:07:18 Speaker 2

This poll.

00:07:18 Speaker 2

Was conducted in July of 2024.

00:07:21 Speaker 2

All.

00:07:23 Speaker 2

And the presentation comes from this survey. Unless I wrote otherwise. So there's some data that I took from other sources.

00:07:29 Speaker 2

Then I put that at the bottom.

00:07:30 Speaker 2

OK, let's look at where we are now. Why do I say that war drives hard line attitudes? First of all because.

00:07:37 Speaker 2

I've been doing public opinion research since 1999. It's almost 26 years and we have had no lack of phases of escalation and in each phase of escalation, what I see is increasing hardline attitudes among Israelis and among Palestinians. And here's I'm going to start out by giving you one of the mirror images, one of the parallel trends.

00:07:58 Speaker 2

In addition to various.

00:08:00 Speaker 2

Parallel trends, but this is a particularly valuable one from our recent from our.

00:08:04 Speaker 2

In July.

00:08:05 Speaker 2

We asked in the joint survey. We asked basically the same question to both sides, just adapted for Israelis or adapted for Palestinian. And this particular question we asked about justifications for each side's own.

00:08:17 Speaker 2

Military or aggressive actions. So for Palestinians, we asked, what do you sorry for his for Israel?

00:08:26 Speaker 2

Uh, for Israelis, we ask. Do you think what Hamas did on October seven justifies what Israel has done in the Gaza Strip since then? That and this is in July. So after many months.

00:08:35 Speaker 2

War for Palestinians? We asked. Do you think Palestinians suffering under the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip justifies what Hamas did on October 7th? What I'm showing you here?

00:08:45 Speaker 2

Are the findings for those who said it was justified our side? Each side was asked about their own actions.

00:08:52 Speaker 2

You can see that on the Israeli side on isolating Israeli Jews here because we asked for Arab citizens or Palestinian citizens, we asked particularly about Hamas actions. Here we have over 80%, OK, 84% in total. Who said that Israel's actions are justified?

00:09:09 Speaker 2

Since October 7th through July and you can see that nearly 3/4 of those said so with intensity. OK, so that was that their actions are definitely justified. So that is a very strong majority in survey research terms. It's basically a consensus.

00:09:25 Speaker 2

To the Palestinian side, I'll get back to.

00:09:27 Speaker 2

Arab citizens of Israel.

00:09:29 Speaker 2

Among the total Palestinians, you had also 80%, OK, so statistically very close. Remember the margin of error is, you know, 35 roughly 30, four, 5%. So to the base, the overall trend here is very similar. Palestinians said about October 7th are suffering up until now basically justifies what happened on October 7th.

00:09:50 Speaker 2

Also, with greater levels of intensity, people who said definitely rather than those who said probably about Palestinian citizens of.

00:10:00 Speaker 2

Israel.

00:10:01 Speaker 2

Middle bar. In this question they were asked about whether what Hamas did on October 7th was justified and just over 1/4 of them said yes. Broken down half and half for intensity. Well, a little bit less intensity actually for the definitely.

00:10:16 Speaker 2

And about half of them, so nearly twice as many said it was not justified. The rest said they don't know. And the reason I'm pointing it out is because this is the first of many data points you will see.

00:10:27 Speaker 2

In the course of research that in which Palestinian citizens of Israel are much less supportive of militant actions and much more supportive of.

00:10:39 Speaker 2

Political or peaceful actions and it just comes up again and again. So.

00:10:42 Speaker 2

You see.

00:10:43 Speaker 2

Right away in the first slide, just to give you one more example of some of the parallel questions we asked and similar trends. Even though the data is somewhat different here, we asked a question that had been asked by my colleagues at Tel Aviv University.

00:10:57 Speaker 2

In January 2024, we asked it again.

00:11:00 Speaker 2

In July, and that was a question about to what extent is the number of casualties on the other side, we ask each side about the other side, this time, justified or not justified. Here, I'm showing you the data for those who say it was justified. The number of casualties, and we did not specify in this question.

00:11:18 Speaker 2

Casualties among fighters, casualties among civilians. There's too much of A dispute over what counts as what. So we just asked it in a general way, which is also because we wanted to track attitudes.

00:11:29 Speaker 2

With relation to the question that was asked.

00:11:31 Speaker 2

January. OK. That's how they asked it in university. So we did the same thing here. You see that again, a very strong majority of Israeli Jews over 3/4 said that the number of casualties on the other side is justified.

00:11:44 Speaker 2

Much higher intensity. People who say it's completely justified 58% among among Palestinians the number is somewhat lower. OK, so about 55% in total, said the number of Israeli casualties is justified.

00:11:58 Speaker 2

But I would still point out that it's an absolute majority and you still have more people who say they're definitely justified or completely justified.

00:12:05 Speaker 2

Than those who say relatively note something you'll see. Again, I'm giving you sort of previews of some of the data you're going.

00:12:13 Speaker 2

See later on here.

00:12:15 Speaker 2

In January, when the Tel Aviv University Peace index asks the question, they had 87% in total.

00:12:21 Speaker 2

Of Israeli Jews who said it was justified. And So what we saw in July is a decline.

00:12:27 Speaker 2

To 78% I'm pointing it.

00:12:29 Speaker 2

Because.

00:12:30 Speaker 2

Consistent with some of the other trends we're going to see that as time goes on, some of the most extreme attitudes have declined somewhat.

00:12:39 Speaker 2

Among Palestinian citizens or Israeli Arabs, what you'll see is that, again, when they were asked about whether the number of Palestinian casualties is justified.

00:12:48 Speaker 2

Or whether they were asked about the number of Israeli casualties is justified, very few of.

00:12:53 Speaker 2

Supported either.

00:12:55 Speaker 2

Very few of them think any of the casualties are justified. Just a small portion around 1/5 or even less. And so that is again a typical kind of you know very unique position or a set of opinions among Palestinian citizens within Israel.

00:13:09 Speaker 2

I want to show you something a little more current. This is from July, just moving into some media surveys about the most recent event and I, you know, I wanted you to have this basic orientation, but when I said that some of the extreme attitudes have been moderated. That's not entirely the case all the time. So when we ask.

00:13:26 Speaker 2

About the most recent thing that happened, OK, President Donald Trump's plan, which we don't really know what the plan entails, but we know the headlines of the plan. And when it came out, I was, you know, satisfied that the question that was asked here, it's not my question. This is a question from a media survey which, you know, they're usually a little bit.

00:13:46 Speaker 2

You know, fast and dirty, right? They're usually quick, smaller samples. This is usually this sample wasn't published, but it, which means I normally don't. Wouldn't use it. But I do know the polling agency and I did reach out to the to the director of the agency to get the full.

00:13:59 Speaker 2

And and I know that his studies are usually credible, and I know the sample size was.

00:14:03 Speaker 2

About 500 people.

00:14:05 Speaker 2

So the question was in recent days, U.S. President Donald Trump presented his plan for exiling the residents of the Gaza Strip, and that is the word that was.

00:14:13 Speaker 2

Hebrew to other States and last night when this poll was taken, said that the US should take control over Gaza. Do you support or oppose the Trump plan?

00:14:22 Speaker 2

And this is a representative sample of the whole Israeli public, even though you can say it's a small sample. So here we have Jewish and Palestinian respondents who.

00:14:30 Speaker 2

And we see that 72% said they support the plan. It's a.

00:14:35 Speaker 2

Crude scale, right? There wasn't much of a graduation. We don't have much nuance in this question, but when you have 72%, that's a big enough majority.

00:14:45 Speaker 2

That even if you can critique exactly how the question was asked, or the scale, whatever you know, you're still looking at a majority of people. And if you can, because we know for so many years that the Jewish population has more hardline.

00:14:57 Speaker 2

Use which is 73% of the Israeli population. We know their number would have been much higher, and the Palestinian citizens in Israel would have had a much lower level of support for this kind of plan. So you can imagine the Jewish Israelis would have been even higher. Only 17% said that they oppose it.

00:15:15 Speaker 2

So in in making the case that there are hardline attitudes with relation to the war, there's an interesting one particular data point that I found recently about the about the currency.

00:15:28 Speaker 2

Gods on the hostage release, prisoner exchange. Prisoner release. Deal.

00:15:33 Speaker 2

And that reflects something that I feel in Israeli society.

00:15:36 Speaker 2

I'm gonna show it to you right now. You know, I always say when you look at numbers, right, we don't want to turn people into numbers. It's always good to augment your numbers with your understanding of society with qualitative input. This was an interesting question that said, whose interests were better served by the first stage of the agreement.

00:15:52 Speaker 2

In which about 1000 Palestinian prisoners will be released and 32 Israeli hostages if the deal continues, we have another hostage released tomorrow. This was a survey taken by the Israel Democracy Institute in late January, early February, after the first few hostages, hostages had already been released and Palestinian prisoners.

00:16:09 Speaker 2

And what we saw is that among the among Israelis, more people thought Hamas's interests are being.

00:16:15 Speaker 2

OK, significantly more about 20 points over 20 points more Israelis thought that Hamas is interests were being served, even among and this is their language, even among this is their graph they created. I just copied it, even among Arabs in Israel. Right. Those are citizens.

00:16:30 Speaker 2

More people thought Hamas's interests were being served, even among the Israeli left. OK. And they they're looking at the left and centre and right among the Jewish population here, more people thought Hamas's interests were being served even more so on the.

00:16:43 Speaker 2

I'm pointing this out because it stands by contrast to a much more.

00:16:47 Speaker 2

Consistent finding that we've had in all surveys throughout the war, which is that Israelis by a majority and sometimes a strong majority, support a hostage release deal that involves a ceasefire.

00:17:00 Speaker 2

And in recent weeks leading up to the current deal, and especially since the deal is implemented, that support has reached 70%.

00:17:06 Speaker 1

Yeah.

00:17:08 Speaker 2

Israelis are not euphoric and they're not happy and they don't feel like this is some tremendous victory there is, in addition to the hardline attitudes we see, there is also a sense of defeat and I think this is the only data point I've seen that really kind of brings out those parallel feelings going on in Israel right now.

00:17:28 Speaker 2

Now I want to go.

00:17:28 Speaker 2

Little bit deeper into.

00:17:30 Speaker 2

You know some sort of a psychology, but I almost hesitate to use the word psychology because I don't want to diminish the fact that people's attitudes are based on their experiences of reality. But if we go back to the July survey, we asked a question that we've asked in the past. OK, this is a question we've been asking since 2017.

00:17:48 Speaker 2

About what do you think are the aspirations of the other side? And so here we're asking Israeli Jews what you think the aspirations of Palestinians are. I'm going to go through this one pretty quickly because it should be no surprise that the majority of the majority, whether it's.

00:18:02 Speaker 2

6266% even before October.

00:18:05 Speaker 2

Seven thought that we gave them actually 4 choices, but the other two were more moderate, OK, and the most extreme choices were that, you know, I, let's say, as the respondent and Israeli Jew think that Palestinians want to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population. That's the most extreme response.

00:18:22 Speaker 2

That has.

00:18:23 Speaker 2

Most support throughout, but you can see that it got higher after the war began, 64% as opposed to 38%.

00:18:30 Speaker 2

In 2017 and the second most extreme response was that they want to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over all of pre 40 of 1948. Let's say Palestine and that also actually got, you know, lower because the number of people who chose the most extreme response.

00:18:46 Speaker 2

Got so high after October 7th that we now have over 3/4 of Israeli Jews who choose these two most extreme options. The other two options that aren't written here are more moderate. They just want to get control over the territories, countries in.

00:18:51 Speaker 3

Who?

00:19:00 Speaker 2

67 and secure their state etc. So obviously the war has driven extreme perceptions of what Palestinians want, but the next part of this is more striking, and we only have this data following the war because.

00:19:13 Speaker 2

A new question.

00:19:14 Speaker 2

And that is when we asked. We also gave them four choices, two of them very extreme about what you think Palestinians were trying to do.

00:19:21 Speaker 2

October 7th. OK, what were their aspirations on October 7th and in the current war 6660? Six 2/3 of Israeli Jews think that Palestinian.

00:19:30 Speaker 2

Was to commit genocide, and this is absolutely backed by what you hear in conversations in Israel all the time. Another 27% said that they want to conquer the land and expel all the people, and so you can see just a few remaining percentages broke down between.

00:19:46 Speaker 2

Moderate responses, which were basically they're trying to break the siege of Gaza, or they're trying to advance Palestinian statehood, things that are more moderate. This is another area where I think it's worth pointing out.

00:19:57 Speaker 2

There's a very strong parallel trend among Palestinians. OK, again, going back to 2017, you already had a very strong majority who thought that Israelis have extreme aspirations for that. So the extreme aspirations of Israelis and Palestinian perceptions, and this is what we asked.

00:20:16 Speaker 2

Are extending the borders of Israel to all of the area from the river to the sea.

00:20:20 Speaker 2

And expelling the Arab citizen, the Arab citizens, already in 2017, nearly 80% of Palestinians believe that that's what the Israelis want or Jewish Israelis want. Well, we said Israel, and the next most extreme option was annexation of the West Bank and denying political rights of Palestinian citizens. And a majority felt that way the entire time it all, it was so big.

00:20:40 Speaker 2

It almost didn't change after October.

00:20:42 Speaker 2

That's how strong.

00:20:42 Speaker 2

Majority was.

00:20:44 Speaker 2

But if you look at that other question about what Israel is trying to do in the current war, what are the aspirations of Israel in the current war in Gaza since October 7th, very similar responses, 61% believe that Israel is trying to commit genocide.

00:20:59 Speaker 2

Another 27% think Israel is trying to conquer the land and expel all the people, and only the remaining percentages breakdown between more moderate options like they're trying to secure their citizens and keep them safe, et cetera. So we have again sort of a parallel trends, almost a mirror image.

00:21:17 Speaker 2

Of how each side is looking at what the other side wants, which is clearly driving these attitudes. It's pretty extreme.

00:21:23 Speaker 2

I.

00:21:24 Speaker 2

And one more, I think illustrative data point about how the two sides see themselves and their position with relation to the other. So you know, we asked about the other side. We asked about our side. This is another question.

00:21:39 Speaker 2

Each side being asked to reflect on its own position.

00:21:42 Speaker 2

And here.

00:21:43 Speaker 2

Data is almost identical. We asked each side. I believe that the victimisation of ourselves each side was asked about themselves is the worst compared to other people that have suffered.

00:21:54 Speaker 2

From persecution and injustice.

00:21:56 Speaker 2

The findings speak for themselves. These are statistically a tie 85% among Israeli Jews, 83% among Palestinians who believe that they are not only the worst victims with relation to each other.

00:22:07 Speaker 2

With relation to anybody in the world.

00:22:10 Speaker 2

Now if this is how people feel at this moment during the war, and you can see that the hard line attitudes that we have been tracking over years became even more hardline after the war with relation to the conflict, I want to give you some more longer term background. How did we get here?

00:22:26 Speaker 2

OK. What are the trends that we've been seeing that led us to this point?

00:22:34 Speaker 2

In fact, we've been seeing a decline in attitudes supporting peace, supporting the.

00:22:40 Speaker 2

Most consensus kind of paradigms that were understood to be the basis for peace throughout the last 20 years, primarily the two state solution.

00:22:49 Speaker 2

And I will say that this project, the joint Israeli Palestinian Survey that I'm drawing on for much of this data, is oriented around the two states.

00:22:56 Speaker 2

Solution we ask, for example, a very general question, just to map people's orientation. Do they support or oppose the concept? We ask all of the items that would be included in the two state solution as they were negotiated in previous rounds of negotiations back when there were negotiations.

00:23:13 Speaker 2

We asked after they've heard all the items, do they support the package? Once they've heard all the items, I'm not going to go into every single thing because I want to spend more time talking about the trends. But just so you know, in the first question, that's general.

00:23:25 Speaker 2

I'm showing you that data, but we don't leave it at that. We also make sure they know every single detailed line item of the negotiations. If they were to happen again. But the first thing you need to realise, and this is I think really the most important map for understanding where attitudes have gone over the last.

00:23:39 Speaker 2

15 years, OK, back in the year 2010, which is roughly when we began using this formulation.

00:23:46 Speaker 2

We may forget now, but the concept of the two state solution, the term 2 state solution wasn't really in use before the year 2000 and the idea of asking it in this way in a joint survey took some time to come around. But at that time, even after the failure of the Camp David Accords in the year 2000.

00:24:04 Speaker 2

The second Intifada Israel's withdrawal of settlements from Gaza, the Palestinian elections that led to the rise of.

00:24:14 Speaker 2

Israel's closure over Hamas, the first war in Gaza which was in nineteen 2008 to 9 after all of that in the year 2010, you still had an absolute majority on both sides, all Israelis, all Palestinians.

00:24:28 Speaker 2

Who supported the basic concept of A2 state solution, except that from that time it began to consistently, incrementally and slowly decline with a little bit of, you know, ups and downs. But the overall trend has been downward throughout the course of the decade.

00:24:44 Speaker 2

It's worth noting.

00:24:46 Speaker 2

That both sides finally went completely below a majority here in 2018.

00:24:53 Speaker 2

OK. And you know it's only a small a marginal decline from the previous year, but there's always something symbolic about losing the majority and on both sides. And it makes sense in 2018, Donald Trump was in office.

00:25:05

He.

00:25:05 Speaker 2

Had recognised Israel as the capital of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. He had moved the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem, recognised Israel's.

00:25:15 Speaker 2

Excuse me and preparing the.

00:25:17 Speaker 2

Plan the deal of this entry that many knew were was basically going to give Israel more and more territory in the West Bank, and so both sides began to, you know, keep from their own perspectives. Israelis kind of thinking, why should we support something like this? We don't have to.

00:25:33 Speaker 2

Palestinians think it's never going to happen, and there are other reasons which will become more apparent from the data, but the trend has been downward pretty consistently among both sides. You can see that in July. Sorry. In 2018, it went down. You know, 27/20/18 went down below majority.

00:25:50 Speaker 2

Continued going downwards. In December 2022, we had the lowest point we had seen up until then and these numbers are basically as low as the early night. You know the early mid 1990s. So we were pretty surprised to get this these findings back already in December 2022.

00:26:08 Speaker 2

December 2022 was also when the new Israeli government was established after the last elections. That's the current government we have now. OK, these two data points come from the peace index surveys.

00:26:20 Speaker 2

But you can see that you know, September 23rd, 2020, 23, just before the war breaks out. Interestingly, there's a slight rise among Israelis. We can talk about it afterwards. I have some hypothesis about why, but still below a majority only no real change among Palestinians. And then October 7th, the war breaks out, and by January.

00:26:39 Speaker 2

Few months after the war begins.

00:26:40 Speaker 2

Both sides are almost equal about 1/3 of each, and then a slight rise among Palestinians, but a continued downward trend among Israel.

00:26:48 Speaker 2

By the way, I hope we'll have a discussion afterwards and I'm really looking forward to your questions, but if anything is technically not clear, if you're not sure what a slide means, feel free to just ask me, because I want to make sure that.

00:27:00 Speaker 2

Data is getting through.

00:27:02 Speaker 2

Let me give you a little bit of breakdowns within Israeli society and of course, because I'm focusing on Israeli society here, I'm giving you this. But there's we have all the parallel data on the Palestinian side for anybody.

00:27:12 Speaker 2

Interested afterwards.

00:27:16 Speaker 2

You know I.

00:27:17 Speaker 2

Hope I don't have to justify the breakdowns, but politically there is a reason for doing these breakdowns between Jewish Israelis and Arab or Palestinian citizens of Israel, but mostly at the analytic level. Look how different they.

00:27:29 Speaker 2

They're just so different.

00:27:31 Speaker 2

When you're looking at Israeli Jews, support was always lower, but still a majority. An absolute majority supported this support of the two state solution. It also went incrementally downward over time. Hey, getting down to that low point of just one third.

00:27:46 Speaker 2

In December 2022.

00:27:49 Speaker 2

And always Palestinian citizens of Israel bring up the average because they have such a consensus of support in these years over 80%.

00:27:58 Speaker 2

And then a huge drop in September 2020. That's the kind of drop that's so big that again, as pollsters, we public opinion researchers, we tend to say, well, maybe it's an anomaly.

00:28:12 Speaker 2

I would say don't look at one outlying data point you know, never look at the Iowa survey.

00:28:19 Speaker 2

Wait until you have more data to confirm it. Well, what we saw is that they never really went back. The Arab Palestinian citizens never really went back to.

00:28:27 Speaker 2

Over.

00:28:28 Speaker 2

Percent level, but they are still the most supportive of the Israeli public.

00:28:33 Speaker 2

The Israeli Jewish population kept going down and hit a low point. Here went a little bit back up as I showed you in the previous slide. Also in September 2023, just before October 7th and then a plunge of 17 points, which I don't think needs explaining, it's not an anomaly. It makes perfect. It's very consistent with hardline attitudes. We always see during escalation.

00:28:53 Speaker 2

Slight, slight, slight rise by the November 2024 Peace Index survey. So the September data and the November data are from my colleagues over at the university.

00:29:04 Speaker 2

The trend should be pretty clear. It's what I showed you before the war has led to more hardline attitudes and correspondingly a decline in support for peace related attitudes, even among Palestinian citizens. But they always show majority support.

00:29:20 Speaker 2

It's never gone below a majority, but they never really regained the main consensus of.

00:29:24 Speaker 2

Years. I'm.

00:29:25 Speaker 2

Going to show you some of the deeper internal and demographic divisions I have.

00:29:29 Speaker 2

Tonnes of this kind of data you're going to have to trust me that this is reflective of every question we ask that has to do with the conflict or peace. These are the demographic trends that.

00:29:39 Speaker 2

1st the biggest difference is always between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Obviously they're completely.

00:29:46 Speaker 2

A reverse mirror image of one another. So this is all from the July survey. Again, only 22% of Jews supported it in the July survey, 67% were against the general concept of the two state solution.

00:29:58 Speaker 2

The reverse and even more polarised among Palestinian citizens. Nearly three quarters support it, only 12% opposed, and then we have left, centre and right.

00:30:08 Speaker 2

OK, it's sometimes popular in Israel to say, oh, there's no real left centre and right anymore. It's all the same.

00:30:15 Speaker 2

I'm here to tell you it is not true. There are huge differences between self defined left centre and right. These labels matter more than pretty much any other political label in Israel because they're very predictive of people's attitudes. 81% of left wingers.

00:30:30 Speaker 2

Support A2 state solution 86% of right wingers reject it.

00:30:35 Speaker 2

The centre is split down the middle. That's a.

00:30:37 Speaker 2

Trend, by the way.

00:30:38 Speaker 2

For almost all of the years that I've been doing polling since roughly, you know, since the time 2 state solution became a paradigm, the Centre has supported it by about 2/3. OK, this is a big post war change.

00:30:51 Speaker 2

Or a decline in the incremental decline over time. But I've never seen centrist attitudes so evenly split.

00:30:58 Speaker 2

Now the other major demographic we had divide we had lately. Yeah, just.

00:31:01 Speaker 3

About the data and so does this mean that basically there's a lot more right wing and centrist people in Israel than there are left wing?

00:31:07 Speaker 2

That is the case, but that's. You wouldn't know that from this graph, but definitely. Oh yeah, because the average. That's right. Absolutely. Yeah. Yeah. I'm going to show you those numbers after the story. I have lots of data.

00:31:10 Speaker 3

Well, because.

00:31:12

You know.

00:31:18 Speaker 2

So among the Jewish populations, one of the most interesting trends we've seen in the last roughly 15 years is that there's a big stratification by age. By contrast, to many Western countries where young people are more liberal oriented or moderate or peace oriented in Israel.

00:31:34 Speaker 2

Young Jewish Israelis are much more hardline, 83% of them opposed the two state solution.

00:31:40 Speaker 2

In the Middle Year, 35 to 54 61% oppose it, but among the 55 and up you have look at the difference you.

00:31:47 Speaker 2

You have. I mean, yeah.

00:31:50 Speaker 2

Huge difference. I mean more than more than.

00:31:53 Speaker 2

Four times, but five times more. Yeah, almost five times as many support A2 state solution. Older population. And that's a very consistent breakdown. And the difference between 83% who oppose it, 58% who support it, who who oppose it among older people, this is a very common pattern we see.

00:32:10 Speaker 2

And the biggest what I call the iron law of Israeli public opinion among Jews.

00:32:16 Speaker 2

Is how religious you are is very predictive of your political attitudes, your political positions and yourself identification among secular, self defined, secular Jewish Israelis, 36% support A2 state solution, half are against it.

00:32:31 Speaker 2

That is completely reversed among people who self define as traditionalists over 3/4 oppose it, and over 90% of those who self define as religious or ultra Orthodox. OK, again, you can just.

00:32:45 Speaker 2

Superimpose that pattern onto everything with relation to the conflict.

00:32:47 Speaker 3

Yeah, sorry, just can you clarify what traditionalist means?

00:32:50 Speaker 2

OK, so these are self. These are categories of Israelis, Israeli Jews used to define themselves. Traditionalists are people who are who perform many of the religious practises, but they are a completely unrelated to the Ultra Orthodox because they are not isolationist, they are completely integrated to Israeli society.

00:33:09 Speaker 2

And they kind of decide for themselves what to do and what not to do in terms.

00:33:13 Speaker 2

Religious.

00:33:14 Speaker 2

They are less strict about their religious practise and they live in more integral communities in life.

00:33:20 Speaker 2

Styles, where is the religious who are still integrated into Israel's, you know, social and economic and cultural institutions. Unlike the Ultra Orthodox, they're much more rigid about their practise and they tend to try to live in communities.

00:33:33 Speaker 2

More like that. OK, thank you.

00:33:36 Speaker 2

Now one of the main reasons why support for the two state solution has declined so much and so significantly, is because people don't think it's feasible anymore. OK, again, I could show you very similar trends on the Palestinian side with somewhat different trajectory, somewhat different trends, but the same trajectory.

00:33:53 Speaker 2

When we were asking a question that basically said some people think A2 state solution TSS is 2 state solution.

00:34:00 Speaker 2

That you said solution which involves an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, is no longer possible, since political changes and developments on the ground, such as settlement expansion, make it impossible to implement. What do you think? Is it

viable? Or is it no longer viable? What we saw in 2017? Was it just a bare, bare plurality of the of Jewish Israelis?

00:34:19 Speaker 2

Thought it was still viable, but that was reversed already by 2017 and that there were. The two are kind of running neck and neck until we saw those hardening of attitudes already before this war.

00:34:30 Speaker 2

So by 2022, we already saw a clear plurality.

00:34:34 Speaker 2

Of Jewish Israelis who thought it was number longer viable, OK, you're seeing that here and only a third thought, it was still viable, of course, that went completely and, you know, consistent but much more extreme direction after the war began.

00:34:48 Speaker 2

To give you a.

00:34:48 Speaker 2

Of the background. Hang on one second.

00:34:52 Speaker 2

A bit of the other subpopulations we talked about.

00:34:56 Speaker 2

Among Palestinian citizens, again, they were the holdouts, right 3/4 still thought it was viable and a majority throughout this time, but by December 2022 everything was looking bad. Israel had just elected its most right wing government ever, and even they went down to 46.

00:35:11 Speaker 2

Thought it was still viable, but somewhat back up in July.

00:35:14 Speaker 2

This year.

00:35:15 Speaker 2

Among Israelis stratified by age, what we see again is that major difference among those who said it.

00:35:19 Speaker 2

Not viable.

00:35:21 Speaker 2

And this is for the July.

00:35:23 Speaker 2

The younger people 2/3 think it's not viable anymore. Among older people, only 48% and correspondingly you have the same opposite trend of those who think it is still viable, much lower among young people higher among older people.

00:35:37 Speaker 2

What does this mean for you know, people always say to me, well, if people don't believe in A2 state solution or.

00:35:41 Speaker 2

Support.

00:35:42 Speaker 2

What do they support? We asked about a couple of other options.

00:35:47 Speaker 2

The different frameworks that we asked and the wording is very long, so I didn't put it all on the slide, but we asked about the two state solution and then we also say for.

00:35:55 Speaker 2

We ask to what extent do you support the annexation full annexation of the West Bank and Palestinians? There would only have limited rights. We asked a similar question for Palestinians.

00:36:05 Speaker 2

Would you?

00:36:06 Speaker 2

Palestine owning all of historic Palestine and Jews would have limited rights there. OK, so we asked the parallel question.

00:36:13 Speaker 2

Then we also asked about one democratic state.

00:36:16 Speaker 2

One person, one vote. Everybody has equal rights. It never really works. People don't want it. What we see is that in 2020, the two state solution, the blue bar, was still the consensus, the parallel.

00:36:26

Thanks.

00:36:27 Speaker 2

A.

00:36:27 Speaker 2

Of course, but still the paradigm preferred by most people, so the support was declining, but still it was in first place and the two state solution.

00:36:37 Speaker 2

Seven point advantage. OK, I'm just looking.

00:36:39 Speaker 2

The gap between.

00:36:41 Speaker 2

Just looking at the gap between these two, by that really sort of watershed survey that we conducted in 2022 after Israel had elected its most right wing government in history, we saw the reverse for the first time in all of our years of polling these questions, the two state solution was at a disadvantage.

00:36:58 Speaker 2

Three points lower than annexing the West Bank and giving only limited rights for Palestinians that had never happened before. After the war, twice as many Israeli Jews support full Israeli control over the West Bank and only limited rights for Palestinians as those who support the traditional 2 state solution.

00:37:16

So.

00:37:16 Speaker 2

And once again, we see the impact of the war, but we also see that its continuity with trends that were well established before that and one last question on this before I move on. Well, a couple of last questions. We also support another alternative model, which is a version of two states in a confederated arrangement, which we've discussed a little bit.

00:37:36 Speaker 2

We asked it in different ways over time, so you know I've given you some of the different ways that we.

00:37:41 Speaker 2

To.

00:37:41 Speaker 2

The question, but what you saw here is that you know it kind of supports sort of tracks what happened.

00:37:47 Speaker 2

With the two state solution after the war because support went down like it did for everything, but it was gaining a little bit of traction just a little bit of probably mostly because of awareness over time, reaching up to about a third, but then continuing a decline moving into a decline like everything else. What's interesting is really the Israeli Jewish self defined left.

00:38:08 Speaker 2

Who really hadn't heard of it much in 2016 and we only gave them a.

00:38:11 Speaker 2

Of information, but.

00:38:12 Speaker 2

You see a very consistent rise throughout the years, going right up to 2/3 as legitimate as A2 state solution, and then everybody kind of has a crash.

00:38:22 Speaker 2

Around during the war and.

00:38:25 Speaker 2

Palestinian citizens of Israel show high support for any kind of peace related plan.

00:38:31 Speaker 2

74% in the beginning, you know, suffering a decline, but only one time ever dipping below the halfway mark. Again, typical pattern.

00:38:40 Speaker 2

Now one more thing that I want us to point out about how each side is viewed the other in recent years before this war, and it has to do with basic perceptions of trust.

00:38:48

We asked a.

00:38:49 Speaker 2

Simple question. Do you agree or disagree that it's possible to trust Palestinians? Again, we have the same data on the other side, on the Palestinians. I'm showing you here. Just this one indicator of.

00:39:00 Speaker 2

Findings of I agree with the statement that it's possible to trust the other side, and for Israeli Jews it was actually sort of higher in the, you know, in the few years before. But by 20/20 it was on the decline by 2022. You have both sides at what we saw as a historic low.

00:39:17

Since.

00:39:18 Speaker 2

These questions were first asked and the continuing downward trend during this war, but remember, why would we see a historic low at this point? Why such a crash from 34%? Who said it's possible to trust Palestinians?

00:39:29 Speaker 2

Through here? Well, we had another escalator.

00:39:32 Speaker 2

The war with Gaza in May 2021, which also led to for the first really for the.

00:39:37 Speaker 2

Time in its.

00:39:39 Speaker 2

History as an independent.

00:39:40 Speaker 2

Inter ethnic violence between Jewish and Palestinian citizens inside Israel? Everybody was shocked and it drove people's attitudes to a much more hardline direction. So Warren escalation leads to hardline directions. These are not new trends, there's continuity and there's some mirror image.

00:39:55 Speaker 3

Yet are these policies in Israel or?

00:39:57 Speaker 2

No, these are Palestinians from.

00:40:00 Speaker 2

Thank God. And E Jerusalem, that's the other reason why I sometimes use the term Arab, just to avoid confusion of Palestinians who are Palestinians in West Bank, Gaza, Easters.

00:40:09 Speaker 2

OK, now, given that these trends are not conducive to political breakthroughs to peaceful resolution, and they would clearly seem to be supporting more hardline attitudes, where are the openings? Are there openings to get back to something like A2 state solution? A negotiated solution?

00:40:29 Speaker 2

And here's where I have to say that there were trends that I personally didn't know if I was, I didn't expect them. I didn't. I wouldn't say I was surprised because I don't think.

00:40:38 Speaker 2

Of us.

00:40:38 Speaker 2

What to expect? Having been through a war that is in.

00:40:42 Speaker 2

Ways.

00:40:43 Speaker 2

Extreme than you know anything that's happened.

00:40:46 Speaker 2

In the region and with relation to Israelis and Palestinians, but.

00:40:50 Speaker 2

One interesting finding comes from the peace index, and this lasts of these questions. This is brought up to may, and they had these nice graphs up until May. There's there are continued trends, but basically when I saw this I thought hmm, what's going on South? I'm showing you the peace index project here.

00:40:54

I.

00:41:06 Speaker 2

This project goes back to the 1990s. This is from university and they have these. The questions are a little bit antiquated, you know, because we've been in this situation for a long time.

00:41:16 Speaker 2

But one of the questions is what's your position regarding negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority? This is only Israeli. OK, so when it says Arabs here, they mean Palestinian citizens of Israel and what you see, not surprisingly, is a drop major drop among Jews between.

00:41:32 Speaker 2

September.

00:41:32 Speaker 2

November 2020.

00:41:34 Speaker 2

Three, but then a.

00:41:34 Speaker 2

Of slow partial recovery from 48%.

00:41:39 Speaker 2

And then.

00:41:40 Speaker 2

Up to 38% in May of 20.

00:41:42 Speaker 2

Four, who say well.

00:41:44 Speaker 2

I support negotiations.

00:41:47 Speaker 2

Do you believe that negotiations between Israel the PA will lead to peace between Israel and Palestinians in coming years? Well, it was low already in no in September of 2023 among Jews and among Arabs.

00:42:00 Speaker 2

In an interesting trend, Arabs actually went up and we can try to. I think we have some explanations for that as well. But the Jewish population went right down and then again sort of.

00:42:09 Speaker 2

Back up.

00:42:10 Speaker 2

Statistically, very close to where it was before the war.

00:42:14 Speaker 2

So when I started seeing data like this, I began keeping my eye.

00:42:17 Speaker 2

What's changing? One of the things that's changing in Israel is fatigue. With the war. OK, it's. I'm not. I don't want to. I don't want to say that's the only causal relationship because the fatigue is we're seeing the data about fatigue later.

00:42:31 Speaker 2

Not from May.

00:42:32 Speaker 2

But I do think that it's worth noting.

00:42:35 Speaker 2

That these trends are pretty clear, the Institute for National Security has ongoing survey research. They've been doing excellent work, and I've just taken a few data points. They've been asking this question. Do you agree or disagree?

00:42:46 Speaker 2

For example, that the IDF will win in Gaza, what we saw in October 2023 was 92% of Israeli. This is the Jewish population, said that Israel will win in January 2025, only 61% still a majority, but a major decline. Those who said IDF will not win well in the beginning of the war. It's a rally around the flag effect. Only four people, 4% say.

00:43:07 Speaker 2

IDF won't win, but now 25% say that, so the trend is still majority who think IDF will win, whatever that means.

00:43:14 Speaker 2

The war aims will be achieved. You agree or disagree. In October 20, 2370 percent, you know, the significant majority agree fewer than half agree with that now. And that's partly because there has been so much analysis of the fact that the war aims as they've been defined by the Israeli Prime Minister and the government are either not clear.

00:43:35 Speaker 2

Have no end point or people don't think they can be achieved OK, including security experts and former politicians and political leaders, etcetera. And those who say they will not be achieved, the widens will not be achieved.

00:43:46 Speaker 2

21% in October 2023.

00:43:50 Speaker 2

And in their January survey, 47% more than double. So that's a pretty clear trend to that. There is scepticism about the war aims some fatigue with the war. We have a lot of anecdotal evidence about this as well. At the same time, we also have an interesting sort of legitimization on some level.

00:44:07 Speaker 2

For diplomatic agreements, which is a term that we use in Hebrew, it became a euphemism for peace. And we don't say peace very much anymore, but we do say diplomatic agreements, and this process was is striking to note in survey research around the Northern Front.

00:44:22 Speaker 2

With the front, with his ball.

00:44:25 Speaker 2

So on the eve of the ceasefire, as negotiations have been going on and on for a.

00:44:29 Speaker 2

Throughout the fall.

00:44:31 Speaker 2

There was a question that again, this is this is all coming from regular survey project that goes on through my Reeve newspaper. It's a.

00:44:37 Speaker 2

Weekly survey by credible pollster and these are different questions, so they can't be directly compared. But I do think it's illustrative. In September, the question said

something like the US and French Presidents are calling for a cease-fire. Do you support or oppose a cease-fire? This is between Israel and Hezbollah.

00:44:52 Speaker 2

66% of the total population.

00:44:55 Speaker 2

No way.

00:44:55 Speaker 2

Don't.

00:44:56 Speaker 2

Want a ceasefire now? Because I think Israelis started to feel like they're taking the initiative back. Israel had started to really ratchet up its war against with the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah already.

00:45:08 Speaker 2

In, I guess that was in September, losing the months August, September and then the beeper of pager attacks and then the ground operation. By the way, there was always divided opinion in Israel in surveys about the ground.

00:45:11

None.

00:45:22 Speaker 2

In Lebanon.

00:45:24 Speaker 2

There was high support for, you know, accelerated and much more serious military operation. But the ground operation.

00:45:30 Speaker 2

And surveys always had divided opinion almost half past.

00:45:35 Speaker 2

Then when you know when there's an emerging agreement between Israel and Hezbollah around this time, the question was do you support the emerging agreement or should Israel stay in the security or buffer zone? Whatever term you want to use in?

00:45:49 Speaker 2

It's.

00:45:49 Speaker 2

Same word in Hebrew. Here we have.

00:45:51 Speaker 2

5% who support the agreement.

00:45:53 Speaker 2

33% who said no Israel should stay in the buffer zone or in the security zone, and then in in late November.

00:45:59

Yeah.

00:46:00 Speaker 2

Agreement is already underway.

00:46:02 Speaker 2

Question was do you support efforts to reach an agreement with Lebanon Northern residents to return or expand the military operation across the border? 57% said they support that.

00:46:13 Speaker 2

Satisfaction with the implementation of the ceasefire, when it's finally agreed, when it's finally implemented, 57%. So you see a real reversal kind of a legitimization of this diplomatic arrangement is that euphemistic term that we use and that also is an opening for something beyond more military.

00:46:32 Speaker 2

Another area where we see pretty consistent legitimization.

00:46:36 Speaker 2

For not only political and diplomatic arrangements, as opposed to military force, but specifically that includes a Palestinian self determination or resolution of Palestinian, you know, need for.

00:46:49 Speaker 2

Determination through a.

00:46:51 Speaker 2

State is a question that we back in.

00:46:54 Speaker 2

And this is a question that's becoming increasingly popular in different forms because there's so much speculation about the regional dynamic, certainly with even even with the previous administration. But again, once again with the current American administration, we asked this question in the form of a choice. Most of the other questions will in surveys will just say there's a regional, you know, arrangement brewing if it includes.

00:47:15 Speaker 2

Element would you support it or not? We said. Here's the choice. The choice is between a regional war, and this is in July. So after the first Iranian exchange of fire before the 2nd, but before the full escalation in Lebanon.

00:47:28 Speaker 2

If the choice is.

00:47:29 Speaker 2

A regional war including Israel, the.

00:47:32 Speaker 2

Lebanon, Yemen and possibly Iran or a regional peace deal that includes a Palestinian Israeli agreement based on A2 state solution. So we said it explicitly. And Arab Israeli normalisation, which most Israelis translate in their heads as Saudi Arabia.

00:47:48 Speaker 2

What is your preference?

00:47:50 Speaker 2

And when faced with that choice, what we see again, I'm showing you both sides now, because I think it's too interesting as a.

00:47:55 Speaker 2

Is a parallel trend to pass up on both sides. You have almost the same amount, 65.

00:48:00 Speaker 2

Percent of Palestinians, 62% of Israelis.

00:48:04 Speaker 2

Who say they support the regional peace, which includes A2 state solution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, even among the Jewish population, an absolute majority supported it. Remember that barely 1/5 of Israeli Jews supported the two state solution in the beginning of the.

00:48:19 Speaker 2

OK, so you have a major.

00:48:21 Speaker 2

Here, and typically Palestinian citizens of Israel show consensus support for anything to do with peace and the Palestinian side. We have 65% who support regional peace.

00:48:31 Speaker 2

Very little difference between the West Bank and Gaza. That's also an unusual trend. There are huge differences between the West Bank and Gaza.

00:48:38 Speaker 2

On numerous indicators, OK, so we see some of the substance behind where there may be openings, regional openings as a basis for containing the Israeli, Palestinian future, 2 state solution, erosion of support for the war or confidence in the war aims, I should say, confidence.

00:48:56 Speaker 2

The war aims.

00:48:58 Speaker 2

And some reverting of attitudes where back to where they were before with relation to, you know, negotiations.

00:49:05 Speaker 2

The question of how many people define themselves as left, right or centre?

00:49:10 Speaker 2

I know this is a lot of data, but I'm just follow the lines. We're not going to go through every number. OK, I have this data going back to 1999, but I'm just showing you be thankful from July 2023, OK, so the month.

00:49:24 Speaker 2

The war.

00:49:26 Speaker 2

Now I do want to tell.

00:49:27 Speaker 2

That in November and December.

00:49:29 Speaker 2

2022 when the most right wing government won the elections.

00:49:34 Speaker 2

Self identification was about 60% right wing among the Jewish population, and here we have to isolate the Jewish population because Palestinian citizens of Israel mean completely different things when they.

00:49:45 Speaker 2

This question.

00:49:46 Speaker 2

And about 1/3 of them won't answer the question at all.

00:49:49 Speaker 2

So that's why I separated them out here. What you see is that throughout, you know pretty much, I mean, I didn't show you all the way back. But even though about 60% identified identified.

00:50:00 Speaker 2

Mind as right wing, when this Israeli Government was elected throughout the course of the year, that number went down and went a little bit up and down here and there, but basically it was down to close to 50% from 60%, just less than a year ago because people were angry at the government. They were angry at the government, primarily because of the judicial assault.

00:50:20 Speaker 2

The centre is always between 25 and 30%. It mostly stays the same among Israeli Jews, about 12 to 14% identified.

00:50:29 Speaker 2

That is left wing, but usually 12 to 14% for most of the last 10 years. What we saw is that it was creeping slowly upward throughout 2023 because people were so angry at the government and starting to get sceptical about what the right wing really represented. So we saw it go higher than I've seen in many years, 20%.

00:50:49 Speaker 2

In August.

00:50:50 Speaker 2

Or maybe this is actually September. Yeah, this is September right away, October 7th. We all know what to expect because you've seen my whole presentation. People become more hardline.

00:51:00 Speaker 2

Self identification as right wing goes right up to 57% and continues going up. Left wing self identification drops and stays low in other surveys depending on how you ask the question it went down below 10% but interestingly we saw it going up.

00:51:16 Speaker 2

Through about the spring of 2024.

00:51:18 Speaker 2

And then again, you have a kind of.

00:51:22 Speaker 2

Edging off a kind of stabilisation, a slight, slight, slight decline. You know, it's hard to know how much to make of this, but it is a slight decline.

00:51:29 Speaker 2

64% and the peak to 56% who identify as right.

00:51:34 Speaker 2

When Lebanon begins to escalate significantly, right wing goes back up and then edges just slightly back down again. The centre is almost always between 1/4 and 30%.

00:51:44 Speaker 2

Left wing goes a little bit up and down, but never really hits that low point again of where it was in November. Immediately after the war began.

00:51:54 Speaker 2

OK. And the last thing I would say is that there is, let's just say a bit of scepticism in the current Israeli leadership. So you saw that, right? I told you anecdotally about the changes in public opinion from the establishment of the Israeli Government in December 2022.

00:52:10 Speaker 2

Through September, before the war, and I'll illustrate this to you in surveys. These are this data that you see here is not percentages, it's parliamentary seats. We have 120 parliamentary seats in Israel, you need 61 to have a majority.

00:52:25 Speaker 2

The original governing coalition, the parties of under Netanyahu, had 60.

00:52:30 Speaker 2

Receipts. So I'm starting here at 64. This is not a poll, this is.

00:52:33 Speaker 2

Elections.

00:52:35 Speaker 2

And you can track where the polls were going. There was no grace period. Usually, newly elected governments have a grace period of about 100 days where they enjoy something like what they got in.

00:52:44 Speaker 2

Elections, maybe even more.

00:52:45 Speaker 2

Right.

00:52:46

Away.

00:52:46 Speaker 2

The Israeli polls were showing a decline and continue to decline, and instead of a rally around the flag effect, which you would expect to see in most countries after a war begins, especially with the devastating attack on your sovereign territory, instead of a rallying effect for the government, we see a plunge.

00:53:02 Speaker 2

And that plunge lasted really through January. And in fact, I didn't show you April, but really it only began to barely change in April, about six months of very low ratings. And the government has recovered somewhat. I mean, the parties of the original coalition have recovered somewhat, but notice they have never gotten back to where they were in the elections.

00:53:22 Speaker 2

Which means that if elections were held today, I would not expect the original coalition to be able to win.

00:53:29 Speaker 2

But I put yet because elections are not held today. If they were called today, they would be held in three months minimum. But right now the current Israeli coalition looks pretty strong. It might even go until late 2026. Nevertheless, this indicates some pretty long standing.

00:53:45 Speaker 2

Almost 2 year old disagreement, real disenchantment with this government, with its failures on multiple levels. So I'm sure you're all happy that there's no more.

00:53:54 Speaker 2

From this presentation.

00:53:56 Speaker 2

But I do want to try to summarise with stuff that's heard me say now throughout the course of the analysis, one war, an escalation brings out the most belligerent attitudes. There is a rallying for the war itself, and I didn't show you all the numbers of very high support, but you saw it towards the end.

00:54:13 Speaker 2

Very high support in the beginning, confidence in.

00:54:15 Speaker 2

War aims.

00:54:16 Speaker 2

Etc. But there's also a sense of defeatism. This is not a joyous time in any way. In Israel we see all sorts of indicators about people having pessimistic outlooks for the future of security and for democracy, et cetera. So there's also a defeatism.

00:54:32 Speaker 2

Alongside the rallying effect. But it's mostly we see belligerent attitudes whenever there's an escalation. But there's also a parallel trend, sometimes even a mirror image on both sides among Israelis and Palestinians, the data speaks for itself because they're almost sometimes they're so close, they're almost, they're almost statistically.

00:54:50 Speaker 2

The long term background has been a very long standing mutual decline and support for the two state solution for peace related attitudes. Trust in the other side and arise in support for hardline solutions.

00:55:02 Speaker 2

Before the war.

00:55:03 Speaker 2

So we did not see a reversal of attitudes because of October 7th and the war we saw continuing.

00:55:08 Speaker 2

And the groundwork was laid long before by the fact that there had been such a long term stalemate.

00:55:12 Speaker 2

Nation in anything to do with peace.

00:55:15 Speaker 2

Each round.

00:55:16 Speaker 2

Violence drives attitudes that are more.

00:55:18 Speaker 2

I said that.

00:55:18

Already.

00:55:20 Speaker 2

I will spend a little more time summarising the openings, the openings for something you know, some sort of.

00:55:25 Speaker 2

Way out of.

00:55:26 Speaker 2

War.

00:55:27 Speaker 2

For one thing, what you're seeing here are changes of attitudes over time, including during the war. You saw how attitudes were at their most extreme in the months.

00:55:34 Speaker 2

The war.

00:55:35 Speaker 2

They have changed slightly, but pretty consistently on the number of indicators at various points and pretty clearly in response to developments on the ground.

00:55:45 Speaker 2

And that's a long term finding too. If you look at the book that was written by Jalil Shikaki, who is the Pulser who has done the Palestinian Survey research here, together with an Israeli researcher, Jacob Shamir, they were doing the joint survey long before I was involved. They have a whole book summarising their findings between.

00:56:01 Speaker 2

The year 2000 and the year 2010 and one of their main findings is the public opinion is rational in the sense that it responds to events, empirical events on the ground. So this is also continuity from what we.

00:56:12 Speaker 2

In the past, there is somewhat of more fatigue, a reversion to pre war attitudes which were not exactly favourable, but we were not seeing the continuation of the continuation of the hardline trends that were expected after the.

00:56:26 Speaker 2

Which happened but.

00:56:27 Speaker 2

They didn't continue going in that direction so far.

00:56:30 Speaker 2

Everything is still in flux.

00:56:32 Speaker 2

I think what we see is also the shifting understanding of the geopolitics, the geopolitical trends in the Middle East that could lead to a different set of a different kind of constellation.

00:56:42 Speaker 2

Of diplomacy.

00:56:45 Speaker 2

Between Israel and neighbouring countries gives people a completely different perspective on Israeli Palestinian conflict resolution when it's in the context or the the risk that Israelis see is diluted by these other agreements that could theoretically materialise, and that's changing.

00:57:02 Speaker 2

Their understanding of the legitimacy of diplomacy.

00:57:06 Speaker 2

We see political trends that favour a change of leadership. For now, I have to qualify this because I'm not predicting what will happen in the next election, but that that's pretty consistent data that we've seen for the.

00:57:16 Speaker 2

Two years.

00:57:17 Speaker 2

And the last thing I'll say is about.

00:57:20 Speaker 2

Which is that, you know, I love public opinion.

00:57:22 Speaker 2

But I do.

00:57:24 Speaker 2

But I do think that we need to recognise that public opinion is it can be an obstacle, and there are lots of obstacles towards anything related.

00:57:32 Speaker 2

Peace making here.

00:57:33 Speaker 2

There may be some openings or opportunities, but it should not be mistaken for policymaking. It should not be used for policy making, and it is not a substitute for leadership.

00:57:43 Speaker 2

And when leadership takes the initiative to change the political situation, what we see is a public opinion then changes.

00:57:51 Speaker 2

And I've we've seen this many times over the course of Israel, Arab relations with neighbouring states, Israel, Palestinian relations, it's happened time and again. It's not easy, it's not complete. But leadership drives that kind of change. And so as much as I want us to, you know, delve into public opinion, I'm curious for your question.

00:58:10 Speaker 2

I would keep that in mind, the final fact.

00:58:12 Speaker 2

Is that?

00:58:12 Speaker 2

Know policymaking is not a matter of running after polls. There needs to be a dialogue between public and leadership, and leadership is needed to change the situation. But.

00:58:21 Speaker 2

I hope I've brought a little bit of the public.

00:58:25 Speaker 2

Preferences and experiences to the debate.

00:58:28

Thank you.

00:58:29

3.

00:58:36 Speaker 1

Dalia, you deliver in spades. And when it comes to talking about the ideas of the peoples involved in a conflict situation.

00:58:47 Speaker 1

We often speak from a kind of data free zone where often it's us projecting our own views and prejudices in the name of what people in the street think. So it really is adding something of great value.

00:59:01 Speaker 1

To our discussion about how we got here, where we are now and where we might be able to go.

00:59:06 Speaker 1

And it's particularly wonderful that in your work you have collaborated with Ali Shikaki that you're able to balance the way in which we view Israeli perspectives with those of Palestinians.

00:59:21 Speaker 1

And you know, I noted the dates of your interviews for the polls were within, you know, the same 3 or 4 days in July of 24, you know, so the the, the science with which you go about your work really gives us confidence in the balance of the results you're achieving.

00:59:25

Yes, very close.

00:59:27 Speaker 2

Yeah, we try to keep them very keep.

00:59:37 Speaker 1

In caption.

00:59:38 Speaker 1

The scene in constant motion, which also comes through that public opinion. OK, it's not a an alternative for leadership. It's also not a static. It seems to be something which can be radically changed by the course of events just tomorrow. So what we see now is not.

00:59:53 Speaker 1

We're always.

00:59:54 Speaker 1

To get, but even allowing for that a couple of questions to get us started that I promised to open up.

00:59:59 Speaker 1

I have this ongoing debate with my dear friend Abishle, who I glad to say is in the audience with us here. So whatever I say now is not behind his back.

01:00:08 Speaker 1

But Avi will tell you that the two state solution is dead. That is dead is a dodo. But if I look at the evidence that you shared with us.

01:00:12

Mm.

01:00:19 Speaker 1

If there's a casualty to possible outcomes, it's actually the one state solution which I think many, including Avi.

01:00:28 Speaker 1

Have said was now the only because the infrastructural impediments to achieving Palestinian statehood meant that that was now gone. But I was very interested to see how both among Palestinians and Israelis.

01:00:41 Speaker 1

You know the prospect for consensus around 1 by national state with equal rights is dead. Dead is a.

01:00:50 Speaker 1

And if anything, the one we.

01:00:51 Speaker 1

To be scared of.

01:00:53 Speaker 1

Is the essentially the continued occupation? I mean that it would be establishing Israeli control of the limited Palestinian rights, which is more or less the status quo, but I'd be curious to know what you think the trends are between two states.

01:01:08 Speaker 1

And actually living with the occupation, because clearly the occupation breeds the resistance that feeds the fears of Israelis for their future security. So what are we to make of those two alternatives?

01:01:19 Speaker 2

The alternatives of two of the current status quo 2 states.

01:01:20 Speaker 1

Two states.

01:01:23 Speaker 2

Status quo, which is basically something like the.

01:01:25 Speaker 2

Days, I mean.

01:01:26 Speaker 2

If the question is about the policy.

01:01:28 Speaker 2

Again, the policy that Israel has been implementing up until now has been perpetuated. I don't want to say perpetuation because that makes it sound static, right? What it's actually been has been an expansion of occupation, of settlements, of infrastructure. And I will say to this government credit.

01:01:45 Speaker 2

This government has been the most explicit and the most open about its intentions of any Israeli government since 1967. Why do I say that? Because they wrote it into their governing guidelines. You can all read it. It's published.

01:01:58 Speaker 2

They say one of the main aims of this government is to expand Israeli extended Raleigh sovereignty over all of Judea and Samaria, so they're very open about it, and so it's not, you know, calling it the status quo can be.

01:02:09 Speaker 2

Little misleading.

01:02:11 Speaker 2

And there's also no question that one of Netanyahu's lifelong projects has been to undermine.

01:02:18 Speaker 2

Any possibility of a Palestinian independent state in this region? So the combination of those things?

01:02:23 Speaker 2

Means that again, it's not, it's not static and it is certainly a, you know, policy and ideology and a government that has been seeking to prevent that option. I feel like, you know, this should be a factual observation. In other words, it's not a matter of whether you're on the left or the right or if you're Palestinian or Israeli. The government has said this is what it's what it wants to do.

01:02:41

And it was.

01:02:42 Speaker 2

Basically, putting a name to Israel's policies that have been in place more or less incrementally, you know, I would argue almost since the beginning, almost since 1967, but.

01:02:53 Speaker 2

With a lot of possibility for reversibility over those years, especially during the Oslo years, there was definitely reversibility on some level.

01:03:01 Speaker 2

The idea of A2 state solution being dead as a dodo. I mean it depends on how you define A2 state solution. Maybe this is the time to come clean that. I also think A2 state solution based on the partition contours that were negotiated 25 years ago at Camp David.

01:03:16 Speaker 2

Those conditions are no longer in place. The political conditions aren't there. They were barely there to begin with.

01:03:22 Speaker 2

The geopolitical conditions on the ground, the number of settlers, the location of settlements. Can we forget? It's not just how many people there are, it's where they're located in ways that break up the Palestinian land contiguity. So you would you have a Palestinian state that wouldn't be viable because it would be too cut off from itself.

01:03:39 Speaker 2

How can you have a functioning economy? The flow of goods and labour when everything is?

01:03:44 Speaker 2

Stuff.

01:03:44 Speaker 2

They don't have, you know, significant control over even their perimeters, because Israel always insisted on staying in the Jordan Valley. So all of those conditions have only gotten worse over time. And so I think that it's the material conditions on the ground that are no longer.

01:03:59 Speaker 2

Conducive or even? I think. I don't think they would even permit a partition based 2 state solution, but I do still think that both sides one thing has not changed and I said both sides desperately want national self determination and that's not going away. We're not in a post national reality. You know, I was coming of age.

01:04:16 Speaker 2

Cold War was.

01:04:17 Speaker 2

And we thought this is a great new era. People are going to give up on all this national tribe, nationalism, tribalism.

01:04:23 Speaker 2

Etc. Well, it didn't last long because you know, nationalist wars burst out right away in the former Soviet Union, and if there was any optimism in other parts of the world pretty quickly, I think we all realised we're not ready to give.

01:04:35 Speaker 2

On our tribalism.

01:04:36 Speaker 1

OK, but let me push back a little bit.

01:04:37 Speaker 2

OK so so I want to say that I do think that the one thing that has remained is the need for national self identification, self definition, self determination. There will be a geographic zone. But I do think that.

01:04:48 Speaker 2

A different type of two states in a relationship where they have more cooperative partnership based.

01:04:55 Speaker 2

Shared institutions where needed. Freedom of movement eventually subject to a different kind of security regime that is based on treating both sides as equals, identifying individual security threats, cooperating over the obvious shared needs to cooperate, for example.

01:05:11 Speaker 2

Economic policy. We essentially have one currency zone. Right now we have shared needs that are don't care about our politics like climate, public health.

01:05:21 Speaker 2

OK, we have. This is all being exacerbated by the war, both of those.

01:05:25 Speaker 2

They have to cooperate anyway. On all of those things, whether whether you like it politically or not. And so I think that there can be two states, but it has to be a different, a different kind of policy for implementation.

01:05:36 Speaker 1

The pushback I wanted to give you was just was there any bump in attitudes towards Palestinian statehood when?

01:05:43 Speaker 1

Uh, Spain. Ireland Slovenia recognised Palestinian statehood. I mean, are we seeing whether the actions of states people might impact on what is conceivable to public?

01:05:57 Speaker 1

Yeah.

01:05:58 Speaker 2

In the spirit of not having shown you every single vote of art, we actually have pretty interesting data from the July survey, which is something that really did.

01:06:05 Speaker 2

Take me by surprise. For one thing, you all. Maybe you notice that among the Palestinians in the in the in the graph showing the very general responses to the two state solution, do you support it or not? There was a rise in support for the two state solution among Palestinians after the war began.

01:06:20 Speaker 2

OK, by the way, we have similar trend among Palestinian citizens of Israel. So they're following the same way of thinking.

01:06:27 Speaker 2

There was also a rise in the percentage of people who thought there was a chance that a Palestinian state will be created in the next 5 years, and it wasn't only among Palestinians under occupation. It wasn't only among Palestinian citizens of Israel, it was among Israeli Jews too.

01:06:43 Speaker 2

Everybody showed a rise relative to.

01:06:45 Speaker 2

To 2022 and I think the reason is because all of a sudden the world remembered that.

01:06:51 Speaker 2

This conflict has to be solved that Palestinians still don't have self determination that a Palestinian state is still, for many people, the.

01:06:56 Speaker 2

Paradigm, you know or A2 state solution, although the terminology changed during the war became more focused on a Palestinian state rather than A2 state solution, recognising that there is no two state.

01:07:08 Speaker 2

But I think that all of that, the things that you mentioned and even in the beginning in the first few months you even heard the American administration talking about A2 state solution or to a Palestinian state.

01:07:17 Speaker 2

That seems to be what contributed to the rise in support among Palestinians because we know support is closely tied to viability.

01:07:24 Speaker 2

Feasibility and.

01:07:27 Speaker 2

And even among Israelis who a slight rise in the number of people who think that there might be a Palestinian state created in the next 5 years, probably because of those things.

01:07:35 Speaker 1

OK. And this is my last one, I promise to share with you guys. OK, but if a good idea like Palestinian statehood can when pronounced by the international community, can impact what people could imagine.

01:07:49 Speaker 1

Then can we look to the Trump plan as being a very destructive contribution because it's adding to the political imaginary ethnic cleansing like that? There could be a solution based around just taking all the inconvenient people away.

01:08:05 Speaker 1

Is that going to set change in motion just because?

01:08:07 Speaker 1

Idea has been announced.

01:08:09 Speaker 2

OK, so I think that let me see how I want to. I want to put this in the context of what I think of as you know, complete collapse of what were considered settled law in terms of international norms, right. So we have the international system that was built roughly in the second part of, you know, 20th century, although some of the values go back to the early.

01:08:27 Speaker 2

You know, 20th century and the basic idea was respecting sovereign territory, respecting sovereign viability and viability, not grabbing territory by.

01:08:36 Speaker 2

That has always been compromised, but it has been significantly, severely and accelerated the compromised. Certainly, you know, since Russia invaded Ukraine. I mean, if anybody's following also Rwanda's invasion into Congo, we should be, because that's part of it.

01:08:43

Video.

01:08:51 Speaker 2

But Israel has been a violator the whole time. It has helped. It has been one of the reasons why so many people in the world think that these are kind of nebulous norms to begin with. And of course.

01:09:00 Speaker 2

We're seeing new forms of Israeli expansion in the Middle East, right? We I mean, I don't know if it's expansionism yet, but Israel's certainly making it hard to deny, right. Staying in Lebanon. Still, despite the ceasefire moving into Syrian sovereign territory since the collapse of the regime. And, of course, having annexed the Golan, which was indisputably Syrian sovereign territory a long time ago.

01:09:20 Speaker 2

Recognised by the US under the first Trump administration, all of those things undermine what were considered some of the major prohibitions of this international system.

01:09:28 Speaker 2

Now, expelling people is one of those major prohibitions that should never have been legitimised. And So what Trump is proposing is certainly, first of all, a violation of international law. It is, it would, conceivably.

01:09:42 Speaker 2

A war crime.

01:09:43 Speaker 2

As as far as we can tell, because he's we understand it to be forced. In other words, there's a big debate over whether what he actually means is some sort of voluntary departure and.

01:09:55 Speaker 2

I don't know what he means, so I can't analyse that possibility. But to the extent that it is.

01:10:00 Speaker 2

Give the people have interpreted it as legitimising expulsion. It's part of the collapse of anything like international norms. I think it goes against basic human decency to expel people. And yes, it is also legitimising them in the context of this conflict. Obviously it wouldn't be the first time people have been expelled in the context of this conflict.

01:10:18 Speaker 1

Dalia, thank you so much.

01:10:19 Speaker 2

Thank you. Thank you for inviting me.

01:10:20 Speaker 2

Thanks.