1 00:00:08,820 --> 00:00:12,120 Well. Good evening, everyone, and welcome to this evening's event. 2 00:00:12,600 --> 00:00:18,120 Very pleased to have you here this evening. Those of you who've been coming quite regularly to the events at the Middle East 3 00:00:18,120 --> 00:00:23,880 Centre this time will know that Tuesdays we've been using to invite distinguished 4 00:00:23,970 --> 00:00:29,520 speakers and commentators on the Middle East and North African region to talk 5 00:00:29,520 --> 00:00:34,169 about some of the important new books that have been coming out in the region. 6 00:00:34,170 --> 00:00:36,870 We've been having authors in this evening. 7 00:00:37,080 --> 00:00:46,290 We have another very distinguished and very respected writer and commentator on Middle East and North African region, particularly North Africa. 8 00:00:46,800 --> 00:00:51,990 Hisham Allawi is a regular contributor to the media in Europe, the US and the Arab world, 9 00:00:52,470 --> 00:00:57,810 including the New York Times, the BBC, Le Monde, and most notably Le Monde Diplomatique. 10 00:00:57,810 --> 00:01:00,209 And in fact, just recently it was just this year, 11 00:01:00,210 --> 00:01:09,540 I think his contributions to the Le Monde Diplomatique were collated into a volume entitled 25 years 25 Ideas. 12 00:01:09,540 --> 00:01:14,370 I thoroughly recommend it having myself published in both English and French. 13 00:01:14,640 --> 00:01:25,320 His previous books include John Elgin, Prince Barney Diary of a Banished Prince, which recounted his upbringing and experiences as a militiaman. 14 00:01:25,320 --> 00:01:29,190 Abdallah Allawi in the royal household in Morocco. 15 00:01:30,210 --> 00:01:33,930 A graduate of Princeton and Stanford universities in the US. 16 00:01:34,260 --> 00:01:42,570 He went on to help found research institutes at both universities, the Institute for Trans Regional Study of a contemporary Middle East, 17 00:01:42,810 --> 00:01:50,430 North Africa and Central Asia at Princeton, and then the Arab Reform and Democracy Research Program at Stanford University. 18 00:01:50,880 --> 00:02:00,180 He also founded his own foundation, the Moody Hisham Foundation, to foster research in social sciences in the Maghreb and the Middle East. 19 00:02:00,690 --> 00:02:04,470 Now, when he decided to return to academia in 2014, 20 00:02:04,590 --> 00:02:10,710 we were particularly delighted that he chose to come to this university and this college to study his doctorate. 21 00:02:11,550 --> 00:02:22,440 For his thesis. He decided to focus away from his native Morocco and look at two other countries in North Africa, specifically Tunisia and Egypt, 22 00:02:23,100 --> 00:02:31,410 as the first two countries with experience with popular eruptions and upheavals would swiftly become known as the Arab Spring or the Arab uprisings. 23 00:02:32,190 --> 00:02:36,839 Egypt and Tunisia attracted particular attention, especially as trajectories. 24 00:02:36,840 --> 00:02:41,610 Their trajectories progressively diverged, with Tunisia consolidating. 25 00:02:41,730 --> 00:02:48,150 Certainly for a short while, a democratic system, while Egypt reverted back into dictatorship. 26 00:02:48,810 --> 00:02:54,270 Now quite a lot has been written about both countries experiences and even comparatively. 27 00:02:54,810 --> 00:03:02,310 But this divergence, Dr. Allawi adopted quite an insightful and novel approach to understanding what exactly had happened 28 00:03:02,310 --> 00:03:08,190 in both countries by applying a framework that was developed outside of the of the Arab world. 29 00:03:09,030 --> 00:03:19,019 The idea of proactive democracy has thus been used to explain and analyse democratic transitions and indeed democratic failures elsewhere, 30 00:03:19,020 --> 00:03:25,169 most prominently in Latin America, but really hadn't been applied to the Middle East and North Africa. 31 00:03:25,170 --> 00:03:31,170 And this changed with Dr. Allawi's doctoral thesis, his dphil thesis, 32 00:03:31,740 --> 00:03:38,730 and resulted the result was really quite enlightening and not only produced an excellent Ph.D., 33 00:03:39,210 --> 00:03:47,610 but also now a book published by St Anthony's Press in the Palgrave Macmillan series entitled Hacked Democracy in the Middle East, 34 00:03:47,910 --> 00:03:54,000 Tunisia and Egypt in Comparative Perspective. And we are therefore delighted to have Hisham Allawi with us here this evening. 35 00:03:54,240 --> 00:04:05,400 Thank you very much. Thank you, Professor Willis, for this very generous introduction. 36 00:04:06,000 --> 00:04:09,239 You were delighted to have me here. I was honoured to be here. 37 00:04:09,240 --> 00:04:16,410 And I'm extremely grateful to all the colleagues, the student body at St Anthony's and the community at large, 38 00:04:16,410 --> 00:04:22,380 as well as to many of the faculty who helped me and who guided me through this endeavour, 39 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:29,580 notably yourself and of course, Professor Rogan, whose presence here, whose advice was also very valuable to me. 40 00:04:30,210 --> 00:04:38,460 45 minutes we have. So I am going to walk you through at a brisk pace with the pace of the gunnery sergeant. 41 00:04:38,820 --> 00:04:42,600 We'll try to do within 45 minutes, because this is really very dense. 42 00:04:43,260 --> 00:04:51,690 So as you see, this is a copy, the cover of the book and ultimately over in terms of the substance of the debate 43 00:04:51,690 --> 00:04:56,850 is when the prospects of of democracy and in the Maghreb and in the region, 44 00:04:57,180 --> 00:05:05,549 regretfully, the democracy debate is strictly seen through the Islam democracy nexus in the West, 45 00:05:05,550 --> 00:05:12,390 and that's due to this Orientalism or Oriental trope which dominates the debate and 46 00:05:12,390 --> 00:05:18,930 which basically dampens all the other theses that can emerge on this discussion. 47 00:05:19,380 --> 00:05:24,120 And so briefly, I will not read every bullet point because they are up there. 48 00:05:24,120 --> 00:05:32,760 And for the purposes of saving time, I will just talk briefly about you and allow enough time for you to read through the the bullet points. 49 00:05:33,030 --> 00:05:37,440 So Islam and democracy debate is historically seen through two angles. 50 00:05:37,980 --> 00:05:50,969 The first are the sceptics and they are the example or the example by is Bernard Lewis that argues that Islam is allergic to secularism. 51 00:05:50,970 --> 00:05:57,810 In fact, completely averse to secularism and democratisation requires a separation of politics from religion. 52 00:05:58,110 --> 00:06:03,810 So as such, there cannot be any democracy until this issue is resolved. 53 00:06:03,930 --> 00:06:11,670 On the contrary, others, of course, in its in its more extreme view, this thesis will contend that, 54 00:06:12,120 --> 00:06:17,820 in fact, sometimes you need military intervention to get the region out of it backwardness. 55 00:06:18,150 --> 00:06:23,370 And it's not an accident that Bernard Lewis was, in fact, the the fulcrum, 56 00:06:23,370 --> 00:06:27,719 the intellectual fulcrum around which the intervention in Iraq happened in 2003, 57 00:06:27,720 --> 00:06:32,790 as he was then a and adviser to both the Pentagon and the White House. 58 00:06:33,030 --> 00:06:40,290 Now, on the other side of the spectrum, you have others that say this is reductionism and they are optimists at the core. 59 00:06:40,710 --> 00:06:45,930 And I just chose a name here, arbitrary name. But there are others that are that belong to the category. 60 00:06:46,260 --> 00:06:54,540 And as such, a DNA, for example, argues that we can reinterpret Islamic tradition and scripture to produce liberal outcomes. 61 00:06:55,560 --> 00:07:03,390 In a sense, what this school of thought or what this this category calls for is essentially going back to Scripture, 62 00:07:03,660 --> 00:07:09,210 looking at Scripture carefully, looking at the Hadith, giving more place and a more way to the Hadith, 63 00:07:09,540 --> 00:07:14,219 and looking also at the the prophetic example of the life of the Prophet, 64 00:07:14,220 --> 00:07:21,240 in which one can extract ethical and the whole dimension of ethics, which is absent from this debate. 65 00:07:22,080 --> 00:07:25,860 I'd like to clarify one important points about Islamic history, 66 00:07:26,310 --> 00:07:33,900 and that it is very hard to overlap who is very hard to to transpose the Western 67 00:07:33,900 --> 00:07:40,170 experience to the MENA region for the simple reason that secularism never emerged 68 00:07:40,170 --> 00:07:46,350 in the region until basically until the more direct contact to the protectorates 69 00:07:46,350 --> 00:07:50,580 and colonialism with the West and after the Western domination of the region, 70 00:07:51,360 --> 00:08:03,419 then we begin to see questions of secularism emerge for the simple reason that the state monopolised the role as sole interpreter of the religion, 71 00:08:03,420 --> 00:08:08,280 whereas before you had basically all of society, 72 00:08:08,580 --> 00:08:17,940 whether in where I'm in it, which is that aspect of life which deals with institutions and societal relations and the private sphere, 73 00:08:17,940 --> 00:08:23,160 which has to do with the worship, if you will, the transcendental link with God. 74 00:08:23,550 --> 00:08:29,400 These two dimensions were entirely up to the private person or to groups or to the state, 75 00:08:29,400 --> 00:08:39,570 provided that groups and individuals respected the precepts of Islam and hence it was up to the Ulama to regulate that space. 76 00:08:39,570 --> 00:08:43,350 It was not a state, it was a regulated state. 77 00:08:43,350 --> 00:08:51,630 And who could intervene on those two spectrum? And hence the problem of secularism or secularisation never posed itself in the same way in our region. 78 00:08:52,940 --> 00:09:03,980 So. As a result of that, I you know, I propose a new framework as as Professor Willis suggested, and that's bringing politics before it. 79 00:09:03,990 --> 00:09:05,490 Theology. That's my position. 80 00:09:06,420 --> 00:09:15,180 In other words, as president, you framed the Islam democracy nexus is a theological question and that may take generations to resolve. 81 00:09:15,390 --> 00:09:25,709 And theological contestations disputation is about whether Islam is compatible to democracy or not is a matter that can take literally, 82 00:09:25,710 --> 00:09:31,470 you know, centuries to resolve itself. And even then they may not these issues may not resolve themselves. 83 00:09:31,830 --> 00:09:39,299 So in the real world scenarios, regardless of interpretations about Islam, politics comes to the forefront. 84 00:09:39,300 --> 00:09:50,030 And if anything, the Arab Spring is another example by itself, because the Arab Spring erupted into into the political sphere unannounced. 85 00:09:50,400 --> 00:09:54,000 And basically it has to the problem politics is here. 86 00:09:54,450 --> 00:10:00,110 What do we do? Every time there is a demonstration or every time there's a lot to be enacted by a new parliament, 87 00:10:00,120 --> 00:10:02,780 we're going to go back into these debates, politics. 88 00:10:03,330 --> 00:10:12,090 The fluidity of politics cannot accommodate this reality which is present and which has forced itself upon the lives of people. 89 00:10:12,090 --> 00:10:15,240 Rather, people have forced it on the on society. 90 00:10:15,660 --> 00:10:19,620 So what is the basic element or the elements to our present? 91 00:10:20,430 --> 00:10:26,430 In the Arab Spring style revolutions, the austere regime suffers popular breakdown. 92 00:10:26,530 --> 00:10:33,930 We see that in Tunisia and we've seen that in Egypt. But these regimes, as we have learned, never go away. 93 00:10:34,530 --> 00:10:38,040 They stay in the background and they lurk in the background. 94 00:10:38,370 --> 00:10:47,339 In the case of Egypt, they've stayed very robustly in the form of state institutions and of state organisations. 95 00:10:47,340 --> 00:10:52,840 But in the case of Tunisia, they've known, you know, a kind of shock and awe experience. 96 00:10:52,840 --> 00:11:00,570 So they've kind of destabilised. But, you know, as soon as they're given the occasion, they come back to the forefront to play a role in politics. 97 00:11:01,440 --> 00:11:11,040 But in that interim, what this is my my major thesis and it's an assumption and I know some would challenge me on that is the following. 98 00:11:11,040 --> 00:11:13,229 In the MENA region, during such transitions, 99 00:11:13,230 --> 00:11:22,920 two political forces will compete for power and that Islamists and secularists and each has an incompatible vision for the political order. 100 00:11:23,580 --> 00:11:27,000 Secularists. No place for religion in the future. 101 00:11:27,000 --> 00:11:38,130 A new regime. While Islamists see that the Hakimi of God, that is God's sovereignty, must be the central axis around which politics organises. 102 00:11:38,820 --> 00:11:43,620 I contend that this is the salient cleavage in all these societies. 103 00:11:44,160 --> 00:11:49,170 This is the same cleavage that will rise to the surface no matter what happens. 104 00:11:49,530 --> 00:11:53,220 That's again, an assumption I have in the study. And of course, 105 00:11:53,340 --> 00:12:01,680 it can be challenged and we will we will discuss it and see its its its validity and we'll put it to the test as we go along in our discussion. 106 00:12:02,430 --> 00:12:09,890 So the for the process banana Tunisia and the and the post-Mubarak regime furnished to great studies. 107 00:12:09,900 --> 00:12:18,090 Why? Because they happened at the same time. One is a case that succeeded relatively, although now Tunisia is doing some backsliding by two. 108 00:12:18,390 --> 00:12:21,629 But I will briefly discuss why, for me, 109 00:12:21,630 --> 00:12:28,950 this does not invalidate the fact that it still succeeded as an electoral democracy, not a consolidated democracy. 110 00:12:29,250 --> 00:12:36,600 And on the other hand, is the post-Mubarak regime, which, as you all know, has known an interruption by the military. 111 00:12:36,600 --> 00:12:42,570 The military have ceased or have basically stepped in to put a halt to the experiment. 112 00:12:43,610 --> 00:12:48,140 So I begin by introducing this new term about that to democracy. 113 00:12:48,410 --> 00:12:57,920 And my acting or pets are essentially ways or refer to bargaining mode bargaining arrangements 114 00:12:57,920 --> 00:13:02,600 that have proliferated in the eighties and nineties in the third wave of democratisation. 115 00:13:02,990 --> 00:13:07,969 What Huntington, Samuel Huntington calls the third wave of democratisation in the eighties and nineties, 116 00:13:07,970 --> 00:13:11,930 essentially in Latin America and some places in Asia, 117 00:13:11,930 --> 00:13:21,680 a few countries like maybe South Korea and in the southern Mediterranean, talking essentially about Portugal, Greece and Italy, also Spain. 118 00:13:22,040 --> 00:13:30,079 And that negotiated bargaining or that way of approaching democratisation has been very prevailing during that time. 119 00:13:30,080 --> 00:13:34,820 And it refers to essentially bargains between ferocious rivals. 120 00:13:35,270 --> 00:13:40,220 And here I say to myself, and this is the big leap, this is the contribution of this book, 121 00:13:40,610 --> 00:13:46,310 that after all, this is not something we can apply only to the divide left and right. 122 00:13:46,520 --> 00:13:56,749 We can apply it to the divide, secularists and Islamists, even if if the terms of the debate are not about economics, but they are about ideas, 123 00:13:56,750 --> 00:14:04,459 norms that are deeply held by the actors, i.e. wanting religion outside of politics like for secularists, 124 00:14:04,460 --> 00:14:08,360 or wanting religion at the heart of politics like for Islamists. 125 00:14:08,750 --> 00:14:15,830 So I think maybe there's something to look at there. Maybe the fact that have worked in Latin American can apply to Islamists and secularists. 126 00:14:16,820 --> 00:14:22,490 And once these pacts start or kick in, then the whole idea, 127 00:14:22,490 --> 00:14:29,899 as I see in my last bullet point of institutions that come out and organisations that come out and the nature of the 128 00:14:29,900 --> 00:14:39,890 new regime that takes shape is in fact subsidiary to the pact which begins which inaugurates the political process. 129 00:14:40,400 --> 00:14:47,180 Note a very important term here and maybe that term is about is toleration. 130 00:14:47,870 --> 00:14:52,399 Now toleration refers to agreeing on laws. 131 00:14:52,400 --> 00:15:01,549 It's not tolerance. Tolerance is the acceptance of other the acceptance that there may be another point of view that 132 00:15:01,550 --> 00:15:07,610 can come afterwards toleration in accepting our rules that we're going to apply to all of us. 133 00:15:08,360 --> 00:15:11,900 So again, keep in mind for your own use, 134 00:15:12,230 --> 00:15:19,820 the distinction between between the two here are some very important historical that the democracies 135 00:15:19,820 --> 00:15:26,030 I only want to show three because I think they're emblematic of the eighties and the sixties. 136 00:15:26,630 --> 00:15:33,740 The what is the first on your left up above is the pact between Nelson Mandela and Frederik de Klerk. 137 00:15:33,740 --> 00:15:45,709 It's in 1994 and it is between a basically repressed population of blacks and the supremacist movement on the other side, 138 00:15:45,710 --> 00:15:49,340 which is basically exercise hegemony over the rest of society. 139 00:15:49,340 --> 00:15:53,960 But still behind that is still the distinction between left and right, 140 00:15:54,290 --> 00:15:59,900 because those holding most of the resources of the countries were then the white population. 141 00:16:00,140 --> 00:16:04,970 And the black population, of course, has known a lot of prejudice, economic prejudice. 142 00:16:06,080 --> 00:16:09,409 Then you have the Pinochet pact with the opposition. 143 00:16:09,410 --> 00:16:21,319 It happened in 1979. I use that for a simple reason because it is the only case I, I know of where it's not the pact, where it's a it's a referendum, 144 00:16:21,320 --> 00:16:31,040 the referendum of 1979 that inaugurated and the transition after the after Pinochet lost that referendum, which he thought he would win. 145 00:16:31,460 --> 00:16:35,390 Then they began bargaining for the future of the transition. 146 00:16:35,840 --> 00:16:44,420 And of course, you have the mother of all pacts here is in 1975, and you have Franco and Juan Carlos in the picture. 147 00:16:44,750 --> 00:16:49,160 That is a transition that has many comprising elements to it. 148 00:16:49,430 --> 00:16:57,770 One is left and right divide. One is also the heart of Europe is very important and also the restoration of the monarchy. 149 00:16:58,160 --> 00:17:06,110 This is not the monarchy conducting the pact, but in fact the monarchy coming resurrected from that is the case of restoration. 150 00:17:06,830 --> 00:17:09,650 There are others we could have gone for, but this is not about that. 151 00:17:09,740 --> 00:17:17,690 Very briefly, just to to remind those of you who know who know about this theory and just to introduce those who don't, 152 00:17:18,350 --> 00:17:29,450 the essential dynamics here is between the regime and the opposition and those that begin negotiations are essentially the left wing of the right, 153 00:17:29,780 --> 00:17:35,150 the left wing, because they are closer to the to the right wing of the opposition. 154 00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:43,040 And they are the soft liners on the regime that feel that that that regime has no future, that essentially it's important to see beyond. 155 00:17:43,090 --> 00:17:45,760 The regime is to negotiate and they want an exit out. 156 00:17:46,090 --> 00:17:55,390 And you have the moderates in the opposition who are not diehard militants and who would like to give certain guarantees and assurances 157 00:17:55,780 --> 00:18:03,910 to the regime so it can exit from the scene and and everybody can get started with the business of building the new the new order. 158 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:08,050 If this were to bring us back to the old slide before them. 159 00:18:08,770 --> 00:18:17,230 Frederik de Klerk there would be no place for Pik Botha in this scheme of things because he was simply just too radical in the same way. 160 00:18:17,650 --> 00:18:21,160 There would be a place for Walter Sisulu who had the place. 161 00:18:21,160 --> 00:18:29,170 But no matter how respected and how established maybe somebody like Stephen Biko was in the beginning of the pact in South Africa, 162 00:18:29,470 --> 00:18:34,300 he would maybe wouldn't have had a place in the at the table had you lived. 163 00:18:34,320 --> 00:18:40,330 You, of course, died in 1978, I think. So how do past work again? 164 00:18:41,290 --> 00:18:46,210 Remember it. We'll come back to this. The pacts are between Islamists and secularists. 165 00:18:46,600 --> 00:18:57,069 Now, we're now past the third wave where some would say we're still in the third wave, but we're not in the Latin American or African context. 166 00:18:57,070 --> 00:19:05,740 We're now 20 years ahead and we've resurrected with the exhumed respected theory framework, and we are now putting it to the test. 167 00:19:06,100 --> 00:19:11,440 So keep in mind, as the first bullet point says, Islamists and secularists are in the background. 168 00:19:11,740 --> 00:19:17,020 So how do these pact work? For that to succeed, you need three conditions. 169 00:19:17,680 --> 00:19:19,930 You need ideological polarisation. 170 00:19:20,350 --> 00:19:28,570 That is, you need to have two actors on on both sides and occupy diametrically opposed poles in the spectrum of ideology. 171 00:19:28,870 --> 00:19:33,820 And their conflict is intractable. They just cannot resolve this conflict. 172 00:19:34,240 --> 00:19:40,990 It's just they are too opposed. But again, ideological polarisation is got to be acute. 173 00:19:40,990 --> 00:19:47,709 It cannot be severe. If it's severe, then the situation is unresolved and it cannot be resolved. 174 00:19:47,710 --> 00:19:55,390 And it's the case of Algeria between the office and the military that led to the bloody decade or the decade of civil war. 175 00:19:55,690 --> 00:19:58,959 Another example is Guatemala, where simply they were. 176 00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:02,230 The polarisation was not only acute but severe. 177 00:20:02,710 --> 00:20:13,840 And then you have parity of power. The more the more equal footing these actors are on the basis of of power, the more there is, 178 00:20:14,230 --> 00:20:18,970 the more there's an encouragement, the more they are induced to begin the packing process. 179 00:20:19,330 --> 00:20:25,510 And then there's normative dissension. Normative dissension is a very difficult term, but I'll try to summarise. 180 00:20:26,050 --> 00:20:31,480 We may agree all that we want a democracy, but we may have disagreements. 181 00:20:32,230 --> 00:20:35,350 Shall we take federalism instead of a unitary state? 182 00:20:35,950 --> 00:20:41,380 Shall we adopt a proportional representation instead of a winner past the post? 183 00:20:42,070 --> 00:20:46,390 Shall we discuss, you know, decentralisation rather than decentralisation? 184 00:20:46,960 --> 00:20:52,060 These are examples of normative dissension, and they can be really nagging problems. 185 00:20:52,060 --> 00:20:59,260 They can be so, so powerful that they can that their shadow can loom heavily on a transition. 186 00:20:59,260 --> 00:21:04,540 And then you can you basically have a stalemate and that that induces people to negotiate. 187 00:21:04,840 --> 00:21:11,049 Paradoxically, the more present these three parameters are in combination or independently, 188 00:21:11,050 --> 00:21:17,770 the more encouraged you are, and the more the necessity to enter into a pattern, into a pact, a transition. 189 00:21:18,850 --> 00:21:22,489 So the theory goes, of course, these are conditions for fact. 190 00:21:22,490 --> 00:21:28,600 You know, beyond this and we'll talk about this, there's structural parameters that have to do with the country in particular. 191 00:21:29,050 --> 00:21:33,280 Does the country have high levels of education? Education? Is the economy low performing? 192 00:21:33,280 --> 00:21:37,750 Does it have distributive functions? And are there inequalities? 193 00:21:37,990 --> 00:21:41,290 Is the army in the barracks or is it present in public life? 194 00:21:41,560 --> 00:21:46,719 Those are all background conditions which facilitate the transition to a transition, 195 00:21:46,720 --> 00:21:50,200 but they are not the conditions for pact with the pact to begin with. 196 00:21:50,680 --> 00:21:56,559 These are the patterns. So the theory goes once you begin your pact, once you resolve this, 197 00:21:56,560 --> 00:22:05,530 then people after are habituated and start to negotiate to go about the business of conducting politics. 198 00:22:05,860 --> 00:22:09,370 You conduct politics in a normal day to day life, 199 00:22:09,370 --> 00:22:14,860 and you're habituated to the fact that every five years in the month of June or September, you need to have an election. 200 00:22:15,220 --> 00:22:19,240 If you're going to change something substantial about the constitution, you need a referendum. 201 00:22:19,270 --> 00:22:22,710 That's what I mean by habituation. So. 202 00:22:24,440 --> 00:22:27,470 The critical issue here about about parking conditions. 203 00:22:29,360 --> 00:22:35,150 Polarisation, apparently, and normative division are necessary to create the deadlock between Islamists and secularists. 204 00:22:35,450 --> 00:22:43,400 That's what I said before. And this is the critical juncture that forces and rivals to recognise the logic of that. 205 00:22:45,070 --> 00:22:49,720 No. When you read through this slide, I'd like you to begin with the second bullet point. 206 00:22:49,960 --> 00:22:57,670 So. You can ask, you can say, well, you know, if that thing if the texting trends anthology framework has ceased to exist, 207 00:22:57,670 --> 00:23:04,420 will not cease to exist, but has taken a backseat after the nineties, then where hasn't gone? 208 00:23:04,510 --> 00:23:07,209 Where has it gone? Why can't we not talk? 209 00:23:07,210 --> 00:23:15,600 Why can't we not apply the other frameworks of trans ontology like coloured revolution to this area of the world, to the region? 210 00:23:15,640 --> 00:23:21,060 Why do we have to go all the way back to back? Sure you're missing something here. 211 00:23:21,070 --> 00:23:29,050 And my and my replica to that is as follows colour coloured revolutions which have basically checkered, 212 00:23:29,140 --> 00:23:33,850 which have basically spread like wildfire through Eastern Europe. 213 00:23:34,450 --> 00:23:37,090 They had a logic and the logic was the following. 214 00:23:38,110 --> 00:23:45,550 Basically, the regime in place was a single party regime that got all its all its support from Moscow. 215 00:23:45,820 --> 00:23:51,399 And after the Soviet Union collapsed, essentially it was left orphaned with no with no help. 216 00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:57,370 So all these regimes, all of these simply found themselves bankrupt, both politically and economically. 217 00:23:57,730 --> 00:24:00,580 There was no reason to act because these regimes were bankrupt. 218 00:24:00,850 --> 00:24:07,809 They had basically to exit the scene and people came up en masse against them in the street. 219 00:24:07,810 --> 00:24:10,300 And that's what they called colour revolutions now. 220 00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:19,180 Many of these regimes of regime release did manage to organise themselves in another party called Renew. 221 00:24:19,220 --> 00:24:26,730 Or you could. They came up with fancy names, but they were all about old communist academies and organised themselves and decided 222 00:24:26,730 --> 00:24:32,520 to run the state in a different way using liberalised economies and so forth. 223 00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:37,770 But within the framework of another regime and they basically dominated politics. 224 00:24:38,040 --> 00:24:47,849 Now these regimes tried to dominate politics by creating a competitive authoritarian regime, that is, regimes that allow for elections to happen. 225 00:24:47,850 --> 00:24:59,700 But the playing field is so much slanted in favour of the dominating party that that party state of politics for maybe five parliamentary cycles, 226 00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:08,640 even three five cats, Romania, Bulgaria, all those countries of late or late comercio collapse of the communist regime. 227 00:25:09,150 --> 00:25:15,210 Competitive authoritarianism. And then, after comparative materialism, you have a democracy. 228 00:25:15,490 --> 00:25:25,170 Now, why is that not possible in the Arab world? I say it's not possible because regimes in the region are hegemonic. 229 00:25:25,830 --> 00:25:34,200 They will never allow and they do not allow for a critical mass of freedom in the society. 230 00:25:34,440 --> 00:25:38,099 Freedom is not democracy. You can have democracy. 231 00:25:38,100 --> 00:25:46,560 Either you have it or you don't. But you can have regimes that have on a spectrum have different shades of liberty, different indexes of liberty. 232 00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:53,490 And the more a country is free, the more you have the prospect of a competitive authoritarianism. 233 00:25:53,730 --> 00:25:57,720 So that leading to democracy is not the case of hegemonic autocracy. 234 00:25:58,110 --> 00:26:07,469 There is no genuine competition. No. That doesn't mean, theoretically, that these regimes are the one that we see now that are authoritarian, 235 00:26:07,470 --> 00:26:10,920 cannot take the competitive authoritarian route. 236 00:26:11,310 --> 00:26:14,430 It's just empirically they don't do it. 237 00:26:15,630 --> 00:26:17,610 Now, we can debate, you know, 238 00:26:17,610 --> 00:26:23,510 for a long time if it makes more sense or not to take that route of competitive authoritarianism, then to lose everything. 239 00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:26,700 The point is, is that empirically, statistically, they don't do it. 240 00:26:26,700 --> 00:26:34,710 And this is an empirical observation that I basically collected and registered and built upon my thesis. 241 00:26:35,740 --> 00:26:38,770 Why comparative authoritarianism. 242 00:26:38,770 --> 00:26:48,310 Here is the legacy of the Cold War. It's a legacy that has come about due to the collapse and the demise of the Communist Party. 243 00:26:49,210 --> 00:26:54,220 The hegemonic autocracies of the Middle East are legacies of the colonial era. 244 00:26:54,460 --> 00:27:04,450 They are legacies of the colonial struggle in which certain elites have won and have essentially shepherded the state after independence. 245 00:27:04,450 --> 00:27:13,940 And hence there are entrenched regimes. Many of these regimes feel that their resolve, that is to protect the state, to protect the independent state. 246 00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:20,980 They are the, if you will, the Praetorian Guard of the new regime, 247 00:27:21,700 --> 00:27:28,250 the Algerian military, the Egyptian in the Egyptian republic, the army and so forth. 248 00:27:28,270 --> 00:27:38,310 They are hegemonic actors. So here's my argument about these transitions in the Middle East. 249 00:27:39,120 --> 00:27:43,230 So we have a transition. First, you have a rupture. You have people on the street that demand change. 250 00:27:43,620 --> 00:27:46,740 Sooner or later, the regime cannot deal with that. Repression is not enough. 251 00:27:46,770 --> 00:27:51,390 You have a rupture after the political deadlock immediately after. 252 00:27:51,510 --> 00:27:56,640 You have mutual recognition of all the actors at the table and they begin to be bargaining. 253 00:27:57,390 --> 00:28:02,790 And then you have the democratic transition, which begins plug in Tunisia here. 254 00:28:02,790 --> 00:28:06,090 And you can see what happened after the deadlock immediately goes. 255 00:28:06,570 --> 00:28:12,330 Then you have actors at the table, another being the Islamists, the other components through the other elements. 256 00:28:12,630 --> 00:28:18,300 The other victors of the transition also sit around the table and start to discuss the democratic transition and issues. 257 00:28:18,300 --> 00:28:28,030 And then institutions become to to emerge. It's important to realise that after the democratic transition you can have a second round of tests. 258 00:28:28,300 --> 00:28:38,540 That is, you can hit an impasse after your first power sharing agreement and then be forced by political deadlock to again begin a pact. 259 00:28:38,560 --> 00:28:43,480 But the important thing is to realise that the more these paths go on, the more a transition is frozen. 260 00:28:44,120 --> 00:28:48,120 It's not a good sign to have more than two pacts within it to transition. 261 00:28:48,130 --> 00:28:53,620 That means that society is left behind and that the elites are basically finding ways 262 00:28:53,620 --> 00:28:58,299 to perpetuate their place in the shape so that that involves opposition forces, 263 00:28:58,300 --> 00:29:04,480 not the regime in the beginning. Then the regime comes in like immediate tourists or like in Egypt. 264 00:29:04,540 --> 00:29:10,090 This is a big difference in Latin America. The military was negotiating to leave. 265 00:29:10,120 --> 00:29:16,930 It was an education. They negotiated with the opposition to leave power and to leave power with guarantees. 266 00:29:17,350 --> 00:29:23,110 Here, the negotiations between opposition and the regime members is to stay in power. 267 00:29:23,470 --> 00:29:32,260 Possibility to stay in power. So it's very hard to explain this without going into much detail. 268 00:29:32,270 --> 00:29:35,530 But you will see this playing out as it takes. 269 00:29:35,730 --> 00:29:39,100 It takes form in the next slide. So this is the case of Tunisia. 270 00:29:39,130 --> 00:29:44,650 Remember Tunisia? Ben Ali exits the scene and you have the opposition emerging. 271 00:29:44,920 --> 00:29:49,210 Nahda, which is the Islamist group. Lulu, she comes back from exile. 272 00:29:49,930 --> 00:29:55,839 The networks reconstitute around him and you have two others CPR and intercut with these are the 273 00:29:55,840 --> 00:30:01,660 secular trends and that is equivalent to the initial starting point of the Jasmine Revolution. 274 00:30:03,040 --> 00:30:07,210 Then you have another the Islamists in CPR backing. 275 00:30:07,720 --> 00:30:13,660 And after backing, the regime starts to build its own its own institution. 276 00:30:13,930 --> 00:30:25,900 Then you have the second part that comes along a CPR are basically voted out and that Tunis, which rallies around Beji Caid Essebsi, 277 00:30:26,110 --> 00:30:37,240 who is basically a figure of the Bourguiba regime, who stayed clean and who basically was able to rally around him, the old regime elements. 278 00:30:37,270 --> 00:30:41,200 So you see how the old regime comes. It's not about extrication. 279 00:30:42,010 --> 00:30:49,270 These are not like Pinochet or actors, you know, and the the cleric who basically backed to exit the scene. 280 00:30:50,220 --> 00:30:54,760 That happens between Islamists and secularists on the nature of institutions. 281 00:30:54,880 --> 00:31:01,280 But the old regime always comes back to the forefront, using sometimes another disguise. 282 00:31:01,300 --> 00:31:08,530 So I will take some time to briefly explain here what happened in 2011. 283 00:31:08,530 --> 00:31:12,100 When you have your you have been in leaves in January. 284 00:31:12,820 --> 00:31:16,710 As soon as you read all of these political actors, we see there is no path. 285 00:31:16,720 --> 00:31:21,010 They all called these together. In the beginning, there's no back because all of them cooperate. 286 00:31:21,070 --> 00:31:25,719 Is thought about power sharing. Always cooperate why? They cooperate for a simple reason. 287 00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:28,870 They want to make sure the old regime does not come back. 288 00:31:29,230 --> 00:31:38,980 They want to make sure security services don't come out of their police stations, start beating up people and beat any comes back from Saudi Arabia. 289 00:31:39,040 --> 00:31:46,260 So they all coolies. They create this this est of the divide out there. 290 00:31:46,420 --> 00:31:49,420 I will show what is actually good or evil to show. 291 00:31:49,750 --> 00:31:55,720 And then basically they establish a roadmap on how to go for the future. 292 00:31:56,080 --> 00:32:03,790 So the road map is creating a national constituent assembly in which that constituent assembly is going to have an 293 00:32:03,790 --> 00:32:13,870 election and and the parties will occupy seats proportionally to the electoral gains of that electoral exercise. 294 00:32:14,320 --> 00:32:15,340 That's what happens. 295 00:32:15,490 --> 00:32:25,840 Beginning 1211, these elections are held for the National Constitution Constitutive Assembly, I believe, in October or November of 2011. 296 00:32:26,080 --> 00:32:31,570 So we're just at the bottom of that arrow where the where the sphere of the arrow is situated. 297 00:32:32,080 --> 00:32:44,350 And Islamists, when the lines you know, the lines portion of that body immediately as soon as that happens, we have we have a problem. 298 00:32:44,350 --> 00:32:53,719 Why? Because. The that I of an Islamist party is to make sure that Sharia remains in the constitution and that religion 299 00:32:53,720 --> 00:32:59,810 stays in the public space and that religion stays at the heart of political life and public life. 300 00:33:00,770 --> 00:33:06,110 So very early just here, I'm here, I'm here. 301 00:33:06,110 --> 00:33:09,220 And that line over there takes us to the euro. 302 00:33:09,230 --> 00:33:14,540 And you have the secularists on the other side represented by C.P.R., and it's a cartoon. 303 00:33:15,050 --> 00:33:22,280 And they say, no, this is normal. We're talking about we want a a state development in civil state. 304 00:33:23,660 --> 00:33:28,280 2012 is punctuated by three different conflicts. 305 00:33:28,280 --> 00:33:31,400 One is the conflict of the place of Sharia in the Constitution. 306 00:33:31,700 --> 00:33:39,020 Two, the role of women. And thirdly, which is a which is an extension of the first. 307 00:33:39,260 --> 00:33:42,810 It's about blasphemy. Now. 308 00:33:44,360 --> 00:33:54,229 Strangely enough. And this is this was the point at which I realised that eureka, my thesis in it was all coming together. 309 00:33:54,230 --> 00:34:02,370 I realised that I made the right bit. At that moment that precise moment that the end of 2012. 310 00:34:03,180 --> 00:34:09,510 Another. Basically relinquishes every single demand. 311 00:34:10,660 --> 00:34:18,370 It abandons the place of Sharia in the Constitution. It abandons, in fact, all reference to Sharia in the Constitution. 312 00:34:19,240 --> 00:34:27,400 It also abandons the idea of complementary roles for women and men, for the role of women in society in abundance. 313 00:34:27,640 --> 00:34:33,970 And it abandons that lesson. So I ask you rhetorically the question why would a political actor. 314 00:34:35,060 --> 00:34:44,930 Why would a political actor who just won a major political victory relinquish it and retreat on the basic tenets of his platform? 315 00:34:45,620 --> 00:34:49,909 Why would he retreat? And the reason why he retreats is this. 316 00:34:49,910 --> 00:34:56,480 And I go back to it. It's this acute ideological polarisation. 317 00:34:56,930 --> 00:35:04,129 It's unwinnable. Neither realises that it cannot win, that this is a battle, that it's not winnable. 318 00:35:04,130 --> 00:35:10,280 And at the end of the day, if you persist in demanding and keeping those demands on the agenda, 319 00:35:10,520 --> 00:35:17,020 basically that all political actors, both political actors risk self any relation. 320 00:35:17,840 --> 00:35:20,940 So it's. Hard core realist thinking. 321 00:35:20,960 --> 00:35:29,570 It's not about religion. It's about survival. And as you see, religion comes after, or rather, politics comes before. 322 00:35:32,700 --> 00:35:42,150 So he concedes that the crisis for the movement at that time, end of 2012, it subsides a little bit. 323 00:35:42,750 --> 00:35:52,409 Come 2013 and the crisis ignites again because there's so much doubt and scepticism on the 324 00:35:52,410 --> 00:35:57,540 part of the of the country that this is tragic cynicism on the part of the Islamists. 325 00:35:57,930 --> 00:36:04,140 They want to pull the rug under our feet later. And 2013, you have two events, 326 00:36:04,740 --> 00:36:13,680 which is the death of two or the assassination of two of two political figures who are in the secular ESCAP Shukri Belaid and have a brother. 327 00:36:14,310 --> 00:36:25,530 And you have also something which is very important. You have these literally floods of jihadis going from Tunisia to fight with Daesh. 328 00:36:26,310 --> 00:36:29,670 So you have this happening in the Tunisian context. 329 00:36:29,670 --> 00:36:37,860 And again, polarisation ignites and we're asking out of in rather more concessions. 330 00:36:38,010 --> 00:36:46,500 But what more can another do? Enter the quartette the quartette enters at in March 2013. 331 00:36:46,740 --> 00:36:50,720 It enters into the political scene and organises. 332 00:36:51,720 --> 00:36:55,650 In fact, it's an auxiliary mechanism of the passing itself. 333 00:36:57,020 --> 00:37:01,980 Backing is taking place. But here you have a structured platform for a four pack. 334 00:37:02,000 --> 00:37:07,909 In my view. Before 2013, when I came to the realisation that another retreat, 335 00:37:07,910 --> 00:37:16,760 that the victor retreat basically and gave away has been one of the findings that I found, and I got this from from the president. 336 00:37:16,760 --> 00:37:21,530 MARZOUKI in an interview. He told me, yes, well, you call this pecking order. 337 00:37:21,530 --> 00:37:26,780 This is interesting. Packaging comes from London. I didn't know that, but we negotiated. 338 00:37:27,440 --> 00:37:34,639 And I said how? I said it was every Friday I brought people into the presidential palace and we negotiated different things. 339 00:37:34,640 --> 00:37:42,380 And we we basically agreed on things. And then Tuesday have everybody think for the weekend, during the weekend and absorb this during the weekend. 340 00:37:42,530 --> 00:37:44,930 And Tuesday, we had the secretarial office, 341 00:37:45,140 --> 00:37:52,280 our rapporteur that would see would verify that all that we agreed on was basically put into motion and implemented. 342 00:37:52,520 --> 00:37:59,660 So there you go. The pact is there. Because, by the way, ladies and gentlemen, attacks are either secret or they're open. 343 00:38:00,020 --> 00:38:04,550 In the case of Spain, they were open. They were detached in a Mingora, and it was open. 344 00:38:04,880 --> 00:38:07,910 In the case of other in other places, there were secret. 345 00:38:08,180 --> 00:38:14,570 They were like like Oslo, done in in a in a hallway someplace, but their text nonetheless. 346 00:38:15,080 --> 00:38:18,950 So I was seeing it, in fact, function. So 2013. 347 00:38:19,220 --> 00:38:25,400 Fast forward again, big crisis emerges and then Mr. VENNOCHI does something else. 348 00:38:26,360 --> 00:38:31,730 He disbands the Salafis to Salafi groups disband. 349 00:38:32,180 --> 00:38:41,060 So why would he disband two groups which could have constituted for him a reservoir of political support? 350 00:38:41,780 --> 00:38:44,960 It's not his ideology. Salafism is not his thing. 351 00:38:45,140 --> 00:38:53,180 He's far away from it. But still, he would be antagonising his own cadres, his own rank and file by saying This is not enough. 352 00:38:53,240 --> 00:38:56,330 Yet he did it. Why would he have done something like that? 353 00:38:57,620 --> 00:39:01,970 Then he does something even more in the same year of 2000. 354 00:39:02,420 --> 00:39:07,960 He says, I am going to accept me that Tunis, the old Banat is a Congress. 355 00:39:07,970 --> 00:39:11,270 I'm going to allow them to run or else, you know, opposition that they run into. 356 00:39:11,270 --> 00:39:17,420 They run for parliament, that they have political force, of course, except for those who have blood on their hands and who have committed crimes. 357 00:39:17,780 --> 00:39:22,130 And it creates even an uproar for the secularists. Why would he do something like that? 358 00:39:22,340 --> 00:39:26,060 The reason, again, polarisation. He wants to reassure. 359 00:39:26,240 --> 00:39:29,870 He doesn't want mutual demise of the two. 360 00:39:30,020 --> 00:39:34,190 Plus, there was something else Tunisia was winning on the international scene. 361 00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:42,530 Tunisia was recognised as the only bright spot in the Arab world and it was getting help on the part of the internet from the international community. 362 00:39:42,620 --> 00:39:47,840 Not enough, if you ask me, but this is one of the reasons why he did it. 363 00:39:49,100 --> 00:39:53,240 Then he got something even more, and that's an example of acting. 364 00:39:53,390 --> 00:39:57,830 He abandons the idea of premiership parliamentary system. 365 00:39:58,310 --> 00:40:02,150 The secularists want presidential in the Islamists, always in the region. 366 00:40:02,160 --> 00:40:10,190 Remember this do not like presidential parties because they know fielding a candidate in the context of the presidential election, 367 00:40:10,190 --> 00:40:13,940 they will always lose because it's too it's too scary. 368 00:40:14,210 --> 00:40:20,570 It's too divisive. So he abandons parliamentary and he goes for a semi presidential system. 369 00:40:21,320 --> 00:40:28,760 So that's a major concession to. Constitution is finished in 2014. 370 00:40:29,690 --> 00:40:36,470 Yup. So I want you to pay attention to this one 2014 that wins the election. 371 00:40:37,520 --> 00:40:45,770 What does to do after really having gone on a campaign of denigration against. 372 00:40:47,650 --> 00:40:57,130 He wins the election. He literally gets up, gets up, gives his hand or extends his hand on the other side of the aisle on this ideological aisle, 373 00:40:57,520 --> 00:41:02,860 and calls him and Nucci for his government and says, I want you to participate in the government. 374 00:41:02,950 --> 00:41:06,490 We will build the coalition together and you will stay with us in government. 375 00:41:07,150 --> 00:41:10,660 You're not the opposition we are. You are part of the government. What did he do? 376 00:41:10,660 --> 00:41:14,320 Why did he do that? Same reason. 377 00:41:14,710 --> 00:41:21,970 He sees that he does not want to take the risk of actually going into the opposition and 378 00:41:21,970 --> 00:41:28,600 the Islamists going into the opposition and basically risking mutual self-destruction. 379 00:41:28,900 --> 00:41:35,320 Now, I want you to keep in mind, I know we're in the Middle Eastern Centre, but my group is more than Russia. 380 00:41:35,320 --> 00:41:49,330 He's few. This is that the Algerian civil war has had an extraordinary influence on all Tunisians, Moroccans, Libyans and and those and everywhere. 381 00:41:49,330 --> 00:41:56,560 The spectre of the civil war is very powerful in the in the collective memory or in the psyche of Maghreb citizens. 382 00:41:57,280 --> 00:42:03,280 And even if the Army could not return to cannot come to power for structural reasons, 383 00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:07,660 because it was it was marginalised and it wasn't just never had a role in society. 384 00:42:07,990 --> 00:42:15,460 He wouldn't. All the actors had this picture in mind and for her Nucci, there was no way to risk. 385 00:42:15,920 --> 00:42:20,300 So the army wasn't going to step in, but the security services were going to say, We're going to step in anyway. 386 00:42:20,410 --> 00:42:28,090 We don't want this. Having lived in Algeria and then in London, he also saw how Islamism could be adapted and so forth. 387 00:42:28,480 --> 00:42:32,590 For Beji, Caid Essebsi was a seasoned politician, also very experienced. 388 00:42:33,100 --> 00:42:41,950 He knew that there was that spectre and he did not want another radicalised and he wanted the process to be more inclusive. 389 00:42:43,180 --> 00:42:48,220 So that is an example of a path of transition that has worked. 390 00:42:48,370 --> 00:42:55,690 We will come back very quickly to talk about backsliding regarding the Tunisian case now. 391 00:42:57,810 --> 00:43:05,100 This is very briefly, I've explained to you, I've talked evoked all these points in great detail without showing you bullet points. 392 00:43:05,100 --> 00:43:10,830 So basically it's all the steps that we talked about of the different patterning and 393 00:43:10,860 --> 00:43:17,100 of the different basically the unfolding and the trajectory of the binary regime. 394 00:43:18,940 --> 00:43:23,890 Here. I talk about the same thing. I have a picture here which is very dear to me. 395 00:43:23,920 --> 00:43:28,270 I'll say why? Because in March of 2013, 396 00:43:28,600 --> 00:43:37,390 it was a conference that we sponsored in Tunis that you the first handshake between unlucky 397 00:43:37,720 --> 00:43:46,810 and veggie after the assassination of the first premier of Turkey by Shook Beneath. 398 00:43:47,080 --> 00:43:53,770 Thank you in March. So it was the first time where we had participated in the acting. 399 00:43:54,580 --> 00:44:00,700 You know, the quartette came in and end of that year, we the Stanford Energy Program was before. 400 00:44:01,150 --> 00:44:05,500 The only difference is that, you know, the quartette got a Nobel Prize. 401 00:44:05,500 --> 00:44:13,569 I was kicked out of the country. But but but it's a very it's a very important it's a very important moment for me personally. 402 00:44:13,570 --> 00:44:15,130 And I, I really cherish it. 403 00:44:16,330 --> 00:44:24,370 So now we're going to talk a little bit about what's happening in Tunisia, as you all know, being the smart people you are at the embassy. 404 00:44:24,640 --> 00:44:28,840 From electoral democracy, we have backsliding and we have backsliding into populism. 405 00:44:29,470 --> 00:44:34,620 And I think the archetype example of populism is Viktor Orban. 406 00:44:34,660 --> 00:44:40,330 That's why his photo there, if someone exemplifies this, it's it's his populism, essentially. 407 00:44:40,810 --> 00:44:43,990 I'll tell you a few points about it while you read through the slides. 408 00:44:44,410 --> 00:44:48,360 Populism, essentially, it's about. It's about direct democracy. 409 00:44:48,370 --> 00:44:52,630 It's not about representative democracy. It's about direct democracy. 410 00:44:52,640 --> 00:45:00,700 It's. A ballistic leader who comes to power and who says the problem is with the elite is not with the people. 411 00:45:00,700 --> 00:45:08,980 The people is virtuous. It's the elites which are corrupt. And this in this case, I say, came to power and said, look, Tunisians are virtuous, 412 00:45:09,370 --> 00:45:12,820 but the real problem lies with the elites, Islamists and secularists alike. 413 00:45:13,390 --> 00:45:16,510 And he basically sanctifies that. 414 00:45:16,810 --> 00:45:24,100 We're basically gets the mandate from a direct exercise, a direct consultation, which is a referendum. 415 00:45:24,580 --> 00:45:33,670 And. He cooks up this Internet exercise and whatever you can call it, you know, cyber exercise of elections. 416 00:45:34,030 --> 00:45:40,330 And also says, look what the populace look up to say we're going to close up the press. 417 00:45:40,810 --> 00:45:47,770 We're going to purge the administration from all elements that resist this noble enterprise. 418 00:45:48,010 --> 00:45:52,850 And we're going to reshuffle the judiciary so that our laws passed. 419 00:45:52,870 --> 00:46:01,470 The populists in general go through a very well, regimented and very well studied, you know, a script. 420 00:46:01,480 --> 00:46:05,600 We're not going to go through it now. But basically it says. You know, 421 00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:11,899 this is a case of direct exercise in democracy and basically does away with all of the 422 00:46:11,900 --> 00:46:17,060 safeguards of democracy that have to do with separation of powers and oversight mechanisms. 423 00:46:17,570 --> 00:46:26,150 The problem with the Tunisian democracy and I state with them, it's not that the transition did not work. 424 00:46:26,330 --> 00:46:30,890 The transition worked and Tunisia became an electoral democracy. 425 00:46:31,160 --> 00:46:41,090 The problem is the consolidation is sinking the roots of that democracy so that no other player contests it. 426 00:46:41,090 --> 00:46:45,910 So there's it becomes the only game in town. That's what consolidation works. 427 00:46:46,310 --> 00:46:50,450 And here there's been a failure of consolidation and not of transition. 428 00:46:50,840 --> 00:46:58,790 That is something I had to add in the book because I was comforted by that, because, of course, this backsliding came after just after COVID. 429 00:46:59,240 --> 00:47:04,490 Now we go to Egypt. I'm going to take 5 minutes to go through this because it's a simpler case. 430 00:47:04,790 --> 00:47:11,360 The regime, Mubarak, basically is overthrown by a massive street mobilisation. 431 00:47:11,630 --> 00:47:16,670 And what emerges is basically Muslim Brotherhood and the secular civil groups. 432 00:47:17,090 --> 00:47:20,210 And on the one side is the Egyptian military. 433 00:47:21,140 --> 00:47:25,360 So I struggle a lot with that. How can there be polarisation? 434 00:47:25,370 --> 00:47:29,540 How can there be all these all these conditions when you have a third player here, 435 00:47:29,990 --> 00:47:36,850 which is basically foreign or alien to this Puerto relations spectrum, the military. 436 00:47:37,250 --> 00:47:47,570 And the way I resolved that by saying, look, when there was pressure one, there was pressure to break the legacy of the old regime, the military. 437 00:47:48,020 --> 00:47:52,290 It wasn't in its role as the relay of the old regime. 438 00:47:52,310 --> 00:47:58,630 It was simply. The guarantor of peace and social peace and stability. 439 00:47:59,410 --> 00:48:08,660 But. What emerged to the surface with this faultline was this fracture between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secularists counterparts. 440 00:48:09,610 --> 00:48:16,620 And in fact, it's a fracture that, Steve, the military never would have wanted to relinquish power. 441 00:48:16,900 --> 00:48:20,379 It would have probably found any good excuse to come back to power. 442 00:48:20,380 --> 00:48:24,730 But the point is, it was there was push back in the beginning. 443 00:48:24,730 --> 00:48:30,760 It was in retreat. All these actors gave it the possibility to come back to the scene. 444 00:48:32,110 --> 00:48:39,910 Let me go very fast through this transition, through the as chemists we see the stoichiometry, the chemical reaction of the trajectory. 445 00:48:40,060 --> 00:48:47,440 So the Muslim Brotherhood, on the one hand, and civil society advocates begin to discuss, you know, in the future transition. 446 00:48:47,440 --> 00:48:57,190 I'll remind you that in all of these transitions, it was the street, it was the youth calling for establishment of universal values that won the day. 447 00:48:57,190 --> 00:49:02,019 But they didn't they didn't preserve the tradition, the transition for themselves. 448 00:49:02,020 --> 00:49:05,310 They just retreated into the roles of observation. 449 00:49:05,320 --> 00:49:11,800 That's a digression. It's also digression. It's an important point, which which you got to keep in mind all the time. 450 00:49:12,130 --> 00:49:14,770 So what happens in 2011, 2011? 451 00:49:15,070 --> 00:49:24,010 But just like in the Tunisian case, all of the actors coalesced together because they want to make sure the old regime does not come back. 452 00:49:24,490 --> 00:49:31,479 They want to make sure that Mubarak stays in Sharm el-Sheikh or wherever he was and that the old regime does not come back. 453 00:49:31,480 --> 00:49:35,559 So there's a glow to revolutions when it happens in Tunis. 454 00:49:35,560 --> 00:49:39,460 Everybody everybody's happy, everybody's uplifted, everybody's elated. 455 00:49:39,850 --> 00:49:43,810 That's something that's characteristics until the hard problems settling. 456 00:49:44,530 --> 00:49:50,270 Then you have immediately after you have the beginning of the political process that begins, 457 00:49:51,460 --> 00:49:55,300 the Muslim Brotherhood turns to the military and tries to accommodate the military. 458 00:49:56,390 --> 00:50:02,870 And basically the military tell the Muslim Brotherhood to agree with the Muslim Brotherhood to ram through a constitution, 459 00:50:02,870 --> 00:50:08,630 to impose a constitution while the civil state advocates wanted a Tunisian type transition. 460 00:50:08,810 --> 00:50:12,620 And that this got us thinking we need time, we need consensus politics. 461 00:50:12,890 --> 00:50:18,650 We need to deliberate on these things. There's no need rushing. The Muslim Brotherhood ran a constitution through. 462 00:50:18,830 --> 00:50:26,300 And with this this constitution, essentially, it keeps the causes of Sharia on the cause, which are identity politics. 463 00:50:26,510 --> 00:50:29,659 So it does the contrary of what the Tunisian authorities do. 464 00:50:29,660 --> 00:50:37,170 So you have no backing there. It's a clear case and it satisfies the military, but basically giving it all the, you know, 465 00:50:37,340 --> 00:50:43,460 enclaves of military sovereignty, concerning budgets, concerning its role in the protection of the nation and so forth. 466 00:50:44,030 --> 00:50:51,280 So. That's the moment. The thing that has been missed and it's a tragic moment. 467 00:50:51,430 --> 00:50:56,290 That was the moment, really the moment where everything went off the rails. 468 00:50:58,070 --> 00:51:07,580 Then we come to elections at the end of that year, at the end of 2011, had, if you remember, elections that were played out in several tours. 469 00:51:07,580 --> 00:51:12,230 It was a very complicated scheme, a very complicated institutional design. 470 00:51:12,260 --> 00:51:18,650 Anyways, by 2012, January 2012, the Islamists had won a major victory. 471 00:51:18,890 --> 00:51:27,290 In fact, they had won proportionally more than the Tunisians had won in their national assembly. 472 00:51:27,950 --> 00:51:32,810 So in January 2012, the Islamists were at that point, it was bound to happen. 473 00:51:33,290 --> 00:51:38,540 The military started seeing that, you know, this was a threatening actor. 474 00:51:39,590 --> 00:51:46,790 So failure of acting in the first instance, in the first occasion created two things downstream. 475 00:51:47,090 --> 00:51:52,819 One, it alienated the civil advocates, which were which could have helped the Muslim Brotherhood. 476 00:51:52,820 --> 00:52:00,980 And it also basically sow doubt in the in the Egyptian military, which did not want to see they were not going to let, 477 00:52:01,340 --> 00:52:11,600 you know, Mubarak come and to see these Islamists come to power, even if there it was a imperfect but democratic election. 478 00:52:12,710 --> 00:52:21,050 I am going in brushstrokes because you have to understand, as in every transition context here, there is a lot of a lot of events. 479 00:52:21,050 --> 00:52:28,500 It's very fluid. There are a lot of movements and counter movements and everything has to do about identity politics, about economics and so forth. 480 00:52:28,520 --> 00:52:31,940 You can you imagine you people know what a transition is all about. 481 00:52:32,300 --> 00:52:36,350 So I'm proceeding with large brush strokes. Then in June 2012. 482 00:52:38,080 --> 00:52:41,950 Morsi run for is in for the election. I think it was, yeah. 483 00:52:41,950 --> 00:52:46,400 June 12 as well. Morsi runs and wins. 484 00:52:46,420 --> 00:52:53,050 Here's another error which Egypt should have never run for the election because it was his pledge for the Islamist would never run. 485 00:52:53,350 --> 00:52:59,559 Yet they ran for election and they won by immediately after. 486 00:52:59,560 --> 00:53:04,000 Within weeks the military could not wait anymore and it basically forced the 487 00:53:04,000 --> 00:53:10,300 judiciary into coming out with a decree that the old parliament would be dissolved, 488 00:53:10,420 --> 00:53:14,940 the parliament in which the Islamists had won. Then we enter. 489 00:53:16,490 --> 00:53:23,270 This is the second case of failed back when the Islamists won the election. 490 00:53:23,300 --> 00:53:28,879 They should have halted and say, wait a minute, we're not going to field a new runner for the elections. 491 00:53:28,880 --> 00:53:33,330 We're just going to wait and see and we're going to sit all down together and see what they did. 492 00:53:33,380 --> 00:53:41,570 They ignored everything and they continue and they put the the army against them, openly against them and the seculars against them. 493 00:53:41,870 --> 00:53:49,160 So what, he wins the election. The judiciary comes up with a decision basically to annul the parliament that was already in place and so forth. 494 00:53:49,610 --> 00:53:59,630 How does Morsi react? Morsi reacts by basically coming out with a decree that says, my decisions, presidential decisions, trump everything else. 495 00:54:00,020 --> 00:54:00,470 Period. 496 00:54:00,860 --> 00:54:10,850 Presidential decrees, no matter what they are, take precedence over any other juridical or legal documents emanating from under any other institution. 497 00:54:11,120 --> 00:54:14,840 By that time, everybody's screaming foul play. 498 00:54:15,170 --> 00:54:21,140 The civil state advocates basically are begging the military to intervene. 499 00:54:21,440 --> 00:54:29,719 It took from 2012 that situation festered until the coup came along, basically one year afterwards. 500 00:54:29,720 --> 00:54:32,810 And one year is nothing. Two things happened very fast. 501 00:54:33,440 --> 00:54:44,480 Morsi could not govern because the deep state was sabotaging everything, whether in labour unions, whether in demonstrations, whether in gas supply. 502 00:54:44,990 --> 00:54:48,710 There was the debacle around the his trip to Iran. 503 00:54:49,850 --> 00:54:55,250 Then you had another variable coming in, which basically was a geopolitical element. 504 00:54:55,280 --> 00:55:01,580 You had Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, who wanted to derail this experiment at all costs. 505 00:55:02,370 --> 00:55:09,670 So two cases of failed packing. And coming back to the structural reality here. 506 00:55:10,660 --> 00:55:17,800 Someone you know who knows these two countries would say, well, wait a minute, you're comparing oranges and apples. 507 00:55:18,760 --> 00:55:25,630 You're comparing the Egyptian case where there's an Egyptian military and where there's structural 508 00:55:25,750 --> 00:55:32,139 parameters basically are stacked against the success of the transition with a case which is rather, 509 00:55:32,140 --> 00:55:38,230 you know, which is much more encouraging than Tunisia has a potential from the beginning of leading to a transition. 510 00:55:38,770 --> 00:55:44,710 And I say yes, but it proves my my argument about what a transition succeeds under. 511 00:55:45,160 --> 00:55:51,820 And furthermore, had the Muslim Brotherhood really battered with the civilians really badly, 512 00:55:51,970 --> 00:56:01,990 it would have been impossible for the military to overthrow that that regime in the way the regime needed a pretext, needed more than a pretext. 513 00:56:01,990 --> 00:56:09,340 It needed an alibi for the safeguard of the nation. And the Islamists gave it that alibi by not acting. 514 00:56:10,480 --> 00:56:14,170 So that's how I worked around this. And again, with another case, 515 00:56:14,800 --> 00:56:24,190 these two these two cases of the deterrence that the that the pact could have constituted vis a vis the Egyptian military and how one, 516 00:56:24,760 --> 00:56:29,830 you know, would factor in would place the military in this broader framework. 517 00:56:29,950 --> 00:56:33,340 These are two instances where, again, I said Eureka. 518 00:56:33,730 --> 00:56:36,020 And by that time I went to see Michael Anderson. 519 00:56:36,040 --> 00:56:45,669 Michael, if you got everything and it was for we always, you know the video because it was it was it was Latin it's neutral here in Oxford. 520 00:56:45,670 --> 00:56:48,700 Say Viva on revival. 521 00:56:48,710 --> 00:56:52,330 So so there we go. It was a viva and it was the key. 522 00:56:52,340 --> 00:57:00,220 So let me wrap up now, because you have learned I've read you through all basically, I walk you through it. 523 00:57:00,640 --> 00:57:04,660 I think you would more helpful than than than reading through the bullet points. 524 00:57:04,660 --> 00:57:06,730 This is what happened in a nutshell. 525 00:57:07,240 --> 00:57:15,790 As for the Tunisian case, I am I'm outlining here the details of the Egyptian transition or lack thereof, and the second failed coup. 526 00:57:16,330 --> 00:57:19,480 So I'm going to end with this slide. 527 00:57:20,200 --> 00:57:30,580 These are the contributions. This book makes a modest but a concrete and palpable contribution, I would say, without being immodest. 528 00:57:31,000 --> 00:57:37,510 First, I assume I excavate like an archaeologist, these theories of patting. 529 00:57:37,750 --> 00:57:45,730 And I say, look, they can be applied to not only the fracture of of left versus right, but Islamist versus not Islamists. 530 00:57:46,300 --> 00:57:50,910 And this is what's happening in the country. So this is how it works. 531 00:57:50,920 --> 00:57:59,650 New power sharing. Okay. Contrarily, contrary to other instances or backing, this is the but not about the regime exiting. 532 00:58:00,070 --> 00:58:04,300 This is about regime wanting to perpetuate, to stay in the game. 533 00:58:04,540 --> 00:58:09,530 And it's about the other actors recognising that the regime wants to stay in the initiative, 534 00:58:09,700 --> 00:58:15,700 nab problems, the regime want to stay in the game and they have the power to stay in the game. 535 00:58:15,700 --> 00:58:21,490 Well, your idea should well, let's see how long we can stay and and who wins in the end. 536 00:58:21,940 --> 00:58:27,880 But after the risk of self demise passive for reasons in the past. 537 00:58:27,910 --> 00:58:32,410 No, this is the last slide. Yeah. Revolutionary dynamics. 538 00:58:32,410 --> 00:58:37,600 I talk about it about this and then the determines to successful pact. 539 00:58:38,020 --> 00:58:46,120 It's nothing to do with prior secular an Islamic tradition or culture, but it has to do about the conditions, about the institutions we create. 540 00:58:46,450 --> 00:58:50,709 It's about the bargains we strike. As we've seen in the Tunisian case. 541 00:58:50,710 --> 00:58:53,440 It's about a new Shia saying, look, 542 00:58:54,100 --> 00:59:03,879 I am going to abandon certain direct references to Sharia and I'm going to we're going to keep the first clause of the Constitution, 543 00:59:03,880 --> 00:59:15,160 which talks about the religion of Tunisia, a state being Islamic, and the religion and its religion is Islam and its ambiguity. 544 00:59:15,160 --> 00:59:19,150 What are we talking about? Religion of state or are we talking about the religion of nation? 545 00:59:19,450 --> 00:59:20,920 Fall back on that. That's a part. 546 00:59:21,220 --> 00:59:29,230 So that's what it's about is the institution conditions which Islamist insecure is engage one another as relative as relative equals. 547 00:59:29,650 --> 00:59:38,650 So there it is. And I'm pretty much sure that there will be a second time around for the Arab Spring. 548 00:59:38,800 --> 00:59:45,100 It's a question of debate whether the Arab Spring is finished or not or whether there'll be a new wave, call it a new wave, a new Arab Spring. 549 00:59:45,430 --> 00:59:51,700 But essentially the problems are still there and regimes are not performing and people have realised that they 550 00:59:51,700 --> 00:59:57,069 have power and that they have a say in the process and sooner or later they will take to the streets again. 551 00:59:57,070 --> 01:00:05,320 And I think given the constellation of forces and given the parity between forces, I think something a framework like this can be helpful. 552 01:00:05,350 --> 01:00:14,900 Thank. Thank you so much for for a wonderful lecture. 553 01:00:15,260 --> 01:00:18,860 And it actually is an element of nostalgia thing. 554 01:00:18,860 --> 01:00:25,850 This is it remembers the discussions we had. And you remember that I was a little bit sceptical of some elements of that. 555 01:00:26,450 --> 01:00:31,759 And you convinced me at the time and you further convinced me again, 556 01:00:31,760 --> 01:00:36,200 and it actually added even more to the arguments I remember from that time and also 557 01:00:36,200 --> 01:00:40,279 given us a perspective on the future and particularly what's going on in Tunisia, 558 01:00:40,280 --> 01:00:42,859 which makes a lot of sense given what what you've said here, 559 01:00:42,860 --> 01:00:51,680 which actually the power of your explanation goes beyond even when into what has happened in Tunisia since 2021. 560 01:00:51,980 --> 01:00:56,240 But thank you very much for that. Thank you all very much for coming. And thank you, Jim Galloway.