[Auto-generated transcript. Edits may have been applied for clarity.] Welcome to, uh, some companies. My name is Chris Cavanaugh. I'm the current agricultural professor in the study of the Arab world.
Um. Uh, I'm very happy. Delighted to see you all here.
Uh, tonight. I'm even happier to welcome, uh, doctor and a handful to, uh, to the centre and to San Francisco.
Thanks very much for being here. Uh, you're back to one of your multiple homes.
Uh, you you, uh, did your PhD here, but not something this college, uh, after.
And you also hold a limb. What is it? It's a masters in law field in, um, Harvard Law School.
Um, and you're currently at Harvard. You're a research fellow at the Belfer in the Belfer Centre.
Uh, the Middle East initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School.
And you were also, uh, prior to this, uh, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group.
And you were teaching at NYU of the, um, uh, University of Exeter.
It's a pleasure to be here with you tonight. It's a pleasure to have you here.
Um, you're going to talk about your book, uh, which you'll find copies of, uh, the out of this, uh, session right outside the door.
And I, um, I hear that you're going to sound some of it. Happy to.
Uh, so the book is called the Abraham Accords.
The Gulf States, Israel, and the Limits of Normalisation. Uh, I started reading it yesterday night, and it's awesome.
Thank you very much for being here. Please join me in giving out a moment of your.
Okay, let me make sure you have. Can you hear me?
All right, so first of all, thank you so much to Beasley Centre and the organisers for having me here today, especially Hogan.
Um, I'm just so happy to be back in Oxford, where I did my film some years ago.
And it's a great pleasure to be invited back here.
Um, let us know a little bit about my choice of topic and how and why I wrote this book before getting into specifics.
Um, as Pascoe noted, the title is, um, The Deborah Accords The Gulf States, Israel, and the Limits of Normalisation.
Um, I began writing this in the summer of 2020. We were in the fourth or fifth month of the pandemic.
Um, I was teaching at NYU at the time.
I was working at, uh, the Transfer Crisis Group as well, and most things moved online.
It was the kind of time where we everybody was locked up in this pandemic.
And out of nowhere, this tweet came out, um, by President Trump.
Um, not huge announcements, immediate capital letters, peace between our two great capitalist friends, Israel and the UAE.
And this came as a massive surprise only because we were in the middle of this pandemic, but because, um,
I think no observer or academic of the region could have predicted, uh, these agreements at the time.
It was widely understood that there were covert ties between some Gulf states and Israel,
but almost no indication that they were on the cusp of a public, um, normalisation agreements.
Um, two months later, agreements were signed um, between behind the UAE,
the states and Israel in Washington, D.C. the text of the agreements also said very good.
So there are about 3 to 4 pages long. They talked about a new culture of peace.
They talked about a new culture, but a new a new time with prosperity and trade.
Um, but for those of you who have studied, uh, the peace agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan,
those were full of detail and annexes on ending the conflict between the two sides on border issues, land issues, water issues.
But because these countries had not been in an active space conflict, there was none of that to talk about.
Um, and so just an outline of kind of your ambitions, uh, on this new chapter.
Um, over the next few months, I began to carry out more fieldwork and interviews to understand the significance of these agreements,
and then spent, um, three years writing the book. It's Exeter University after leaving their organisation.
Um, the new focus of the book is not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is now back into focus after October 7th,
but more so on Arab-Israeli normalisation in the years leading up to to the war and its implications for the conflict.
So what I'll do is begin, um, with some history.
Not too much, uh, to tell the story of Israel's relationship with the Gulf states and why it matters now.
So if you go back to 1948, this was the year that Israel was founded, um, out of the first Arab-Israeli War.
Um, as part of this, the mass expulsion of Palestinians resulted in 750,000 Palestinians had to leave their homes,
450 towns were emptied, and roughly 45,000 Zionists were also killed in this conflict.
But this was basically a victory, uh, for the Zionist movement because it led to the founding of the State of Israel.
For the purpose of the Gulf states in normalisation. The next significant moment of the timeline is 1967, the third after the war.
This is when Israel increased its land mass by 3 to 4 times by occupying the Golan Heights from Syria, the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt,
as well as the West Bank and Gaza, which had been earmarked under the UN partition plan for the future Palestinian states.
Um, now the Gulf states for the first time participated indirectly in this conflict in several ways.
That's your which inside of the UAE, who would go on to found the UAE and the United States into a single country,
um, sends humanitarian aid support to the Arab states that were fighting in Israel.
And the conflict holds itself. So it's a contingent of troops that participated directly in the war under Egyptian command after the conflict.
Um, the U.N. Security Council issued resolution 242, which became the basis of international law on the conflict.
And it stressed two things.
The first is Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, but also the rights of every state in the region to exist in peace.
And this was meant to create the foundation for a settlement, um, for agreed peace through this exchange of land for peace.
And it becomes the position that the Arab states take collectively meant to be a collective position, um, land for peace.
In 1973, we have the fourth Arab-Israeli war, and the Gulf States participates in an Arab oil embargo.
They stop selling oil to the U.S. and other states that supports Israel.
And therefore. And the role becomes pretty significant at this juncture as a source of economic pressure on the US and on Western states.
Supporting. After 1973, there's the beginning of a period of U.S. led diplomacy to resolve the conflict.
And it's interesting that I think this is born partly out of the Arab oil embargo.
Um,
Kissinger and others in the United States began to see how the conflict can actually directly impact U.S. oil prices and U.S. interests in the region.
And so it drives a real interest in resolving the conflicts.
Um, in 1979, there's the first breakthrough with Egypt and Israel.
Egypt, um, Israel withdraws from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace with Egypt.
Um, this is under President Carter and then in Jordan in 1994.
Later on, uh, there's a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, um, which also is based partly on land for peace,
in the sense that the border areas between the two states are also finalised.
Um, I just a. By the mid 1990s.
There's the Oslo process.
Um, and it's, it looks like as a result of this diplomatic process that a Palestinian state may be on the horizon in the mid 90s.
And this is where we see, um, what I call in the book, the first wave of realisation with Israel.
Several Gulf states begin to open their doors to Israel. But this is done on the basis that a kind of Syrian state is in the works.
So a couple hundred or more on both sets of preliminary trade offs to trade with Israel.
Meanwhile, the UAE also begins to engage Israeli officials and diplomats behind the scenes in
Washington at a time when it's looking to acquire F-16 fighter jets from the United States.
And its engages in this kind of backchannel diplomacy with Israelis,
asking them not to block the sale of F-16s, um, in Washington and for the UAE and the Gulf states generally.
This really reflects the view that Israel is a useful interlocutor in Washington and a useful route to gaining more access and power in Washington.
But what happens is, um, the Oslo peace process collapses.
There's not there's no Palestinian state that's born out of this. And instead there's a second wave emerges, which is a fascinating uprising.
And as a result, both Gulf states gathered in Amman close their offices.
Um, and this is partly also result of pressure from Saudi Arabia and Iran at the time, uh, and this first wave of organisation totally collapses.
In 2001. Next is the Arab Peace Initiative. This is a Saudi led initiative that proposes normalisation from 22 members of the Arab Arab League,
um, in exchange for an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Other conditions include the rights of return of Palestinian refugees, but no Israeli either accept such terms.
Um, and consistently until this point, I think even when the first wave of customisation,
which we can see as votes normalisation, is linked to Palestinian statehood, that that may be the case.
Things change. I think very clearly in the year 2006, and there are four kind of events that bring the two sides into closer convergence.
Um, the first kind of reasons for this, um, is on the basis of, again, two regional events.
So what happens in 2006? It's the year that Iran announces the strength of its nuclear program.
It's announces that it has enriched uranium for the very first time.
Uh, as well, Hezbollah is assumed to be victorious in its conflict with Israel in Lebanon.
And these two, um, these two events really do ring alarm bells in Saudi Arabia and the UAE and Bahrain.
Um, the Gulf states began to take even more seriously their competition with Iran.
And what they see is an expanding Iranian influence in the region, which also was 3003 invasion of Iraq.
Um, that's the first kind of factor is, is these these events where you want to seem to be ascendant.
The second event that triggers a new convergence with Israel is the rise to power of a new generation of leaders.
So I spoke about the founder of the UAE, who passed away in 2004, but he had been an ardent supporter of the Palestinians.
Um, he had donated for the construction of a massive housing complex, massive housing complex in Gaza City,
and had provided much aid to the Palestinian leadership and underwent over the years.
Um, he's replaced by a younger leader who is less committed to the Palestinians and, and eventually, um, uh, against that later, uh,
the other change is in power also passes away a few years later or third year and is replaced, um, by a younger, uh, king and then crown prince.
And these two figures are less committed to principles of Arab unity and Arab rationalism.
They're just preoccupied by seeing the question of Palestine as central to the future of the Arab world.
They are instead much more concerned by the regional rise of Iran, and they feel far more threatened by that.
Um, but especially at the time, wants to be closer to the US.
And that's a function of its very pro-Western conference with U.S educated, um,
and who personally sees the deepening of the U.S security and pressure as crucial to behind survival.
Um, in 2009, he writes an Op-Ed in The Washington Post saying that there should be a dividend for states that are willing to take risks for peace.
He describes the main fight in the Mideast as one second place between extremists and between moderates who wouldn't have a problem with Israel.
And this actually mirrors much of Israeli discourse, uh, of the conflict, because it takes occupation out of the question.
And it's framed as a religious conflict between two religions.
And, uh, following the publication of this, although there's quite a bit of outrage in behind, um, over it.
Um, so that's actor number two, the rise to power of these new leaders who are really less committed to the cause.
Uh, the third factor down the line is the Arab Spring.
Um, what we see initially out of the Arab Spring was the first year.
Looks like the rise of governments and places like Egypt, um, there are emboldened populist democratic movements.
And the Gulf states also begin to fear a loss of influence to these two currents that appear to be empowered across the region.
And they feel that a change in regional order might also threaten their long term survival.
Uh, this, of course, this view of kind of being sceptical of these movements and social movements, um, is shared by this in Yahoo,
the prime minister of Israel at the time, who compares the Arab Spring to the Iranian revolution of 1979.
So this shared good perception is really the third factor that brings them closer together.
The fourth and final factor, um, is the signing of the JCPoA or the Iran nuclear deal in 2015?
Both, um, those features and obviously the features from three states, especially three Saudi Arabia,
the UAE and Bahrain, those three together, um, express their frustration that they haven't been included in these talks,
that the talks or the agreements in its final form does not cover Iran's missile program,
which they see as even more threatening that Iran's nuclear program.
Um, for Netanyahu, it's that these talks don't go far enough in preventing you from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
He travels, of course, um, to the Congress and to the U.N. to make the case that this agreement is just not good enough.
Um, but this event also creates, I would say, the last factor for a strategic convergence between the two sides,
Iran's shared good perception and a desire to influence U.S. policy towards the region.
Um, let's talk a little bit about Netanyahu and his approach.
Um, so for him, purity, uh, he he's made the case that the disappearing does not go far enough in eliminating Iran's nuclear program.
Netanyahu had come to power in 2009, uh, being very opposed to a two state solution.
He did not want to deal with the Palestinians at all. Um, wanting to avoid that kind of diplomacy that might lead to a two state solution.
Instead, what he preferred was an outside an approach, uh,
what is called peace for peace based on this idea that if Israel strengthens itself economically and militarily,
the Arab states will want peace for its own sake, without any settlement for the Palestinians.
Um, under his watch, unsurprisingly, the number of settlements, uh, reached 750,000 settlements by the year 2019,
whereas there had been the last 100,000 settlers, uh, during the peace process of the 1990s.
So there's an explosion of settlers in the West Bank which effectively create the conditions, uh, or remove the conditions for statehood,
because it becomes increasingly impossible to consider those things out of a lack of land for spacious.
Um, under Netanyahu, Israeli Israel's occupation becomes a permanent, permanent occupation that is effectively entrenched.
Um, he also uses Helen's visa as a pretext to stop talks with the Palestinian Authority.
Um, understanding was, well, you know, Qatar is allowed to to send money to Gaza,
which is just enough to keep Hamas in power and maintain this kind of a quick equilibrium between the two sides.
Um, one of the Prime Minister's now been heavier, um, back when he was, uh,
just a number of Knesset is known for making the statement that when it comes to a two state solution,
the Palestinian Authority is a liability, but Hamas is an asset.
So this is what Israel looks like under the crown. Um.
Uh, talk about the the Hoover Corporation that picks up in the year 2006, which I identify as, like the beginning of this convergence in 2007,
the year after that, um, UAE begins to acquire Israeli technology for an internal traffic management system.
Uh, that senior it's cooperates with an Israeli firm to procure satellite data on Iran's nuclear program.
This is done through two satellite systems. Um, in 2010, the UAE starts pitching to host the headquarters of Iryna,
the International renewable energy Agency, which is a multilateral agency, um, on renewable energy.
And it's it again engages in conversations with Israeli officials and confirms to them
that they will be allowed to attend events in the UAE as long as they don't block.
Uh, the UAE use case for obtaining, uh, the mandate to host them in the UAE.
So again, this is a perception that, uh, you know, the UAE can get along with Washington or even internationally with Israeli support.
Um, at the same time,
the UAE also asks Israeli officials for assistance in making the case for the UAE to acquire civilian nuclear technology from the United States.
And this is another key points of engagement between the two sides. Around the 2000 and.
Um, prior to Obama's signing of the Iran nuclear deal.
Uh, the UAE engages in joint lobbying with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and Israel to
convince Obama's officials to take a stance on Iran and its nuclear program.
Um, and this is documented pretty extensively in Wikileaks, actually, um, uh,
some prior to this period and really trying to push Obama to take a tougher stance.
All of this happens in the lead up to the Trump administration.
Sorry if I might have a little bit of sort of anticipating all of this.
Um, if all of this happens in the lead up to the Trump administration, when Trump is elected to power for the first term.
Uh, his, his administration really do enable and accelerate this convergence between the two sides.
And I think much of that happens out of the advisers that Trump surrounds himself with.
It's not really that, in my view, Trump is necessarily committed to Israel, but his advisors certainly were committed to Israel.
Um, one of them is David Friedman. Um, Friedman was formerly Trump's lawyer.
Early on, he becomes Trump's adviser in the campaign, and he shoots the Republican Party platform on Israel and Palestine.
He throws out previous language endorsing a two state solution and a points of bipartisan consensus.
Instead, he replaces that with language criticising underdog for being anti-Semitic.
He himself is heavily pro-Israel. He's the head of an organisation that does fundraise for illegal settlements.
Um, and he becomes, uh, ambassador to Israel Jared Kushner as well as is, uh,
somebody that we push as pro-Israel policies in the Trump administration.
Uh, his family are long term friends of Prime Minister Netanyahu.
There's a story in his biography about him being evicted from his bedroom as a teenager,
in order to make room for Netanyahu to come and stay over the summer.
Um, Mike Pompeo, as well is appointed secretary of state.
He becomes the first secretary of state to visit a settlements in Israel.
Um, I mean, having read perhaps within a year to, um, what's interesting from Pompeo and Friedman,
particularly in Friedman's biography, is their use of divine language to justify Trump's, uh, presence as as the president.
Um, both speak about Trump being sent, possibly from God, to protect the states of Israel.
And they really see themselves as on this kind of divine mission, uh, to do God's work.
Um, very early on in the administration, Trump's advisers tell him that the Palestinians don't want peace,
that they're the beneficiaries of much international aid,
and they don't want to change the status quo, and they really shouldn't be dealt with at all.
Uh, instead, they push the president to adopt very pro-Israel policies and a series of them.
These include when he gets into Jerusalem, they include walking back on the unsealed memorandum,
which is a U.S. position that, uh, that settlements already go.
Um, so he rolls this back, um, in consultation with a team of Israeli lawyers.
That's our friends. And I said, you know, he cuts aid to under, um, um, supposed to be the refugee agency, which is a longtime goal of this.
And Yahoo was and all of this together leads to a boycott from the Palestinians.
Um, nonetheless, Kushner is interested in developing a legacy, um, and wants to be,
you know, sort of the person who resolves the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
So he puts together, along with other advisors, a plan for resolving the conflict.
Um, and this gets delivered several junctures, partly because Netanyahu is running for re-election,
and it's just not the right time to release this kind of gun.
Um, but eventually it does get released into components, uh, as an economic peace plan and a political peace plan.
And from the beginning, the Palestinians decline to participate and say this administration is heavily against us,
and we don't want to have anything to do with this plan.
Um, so what happens is, is that rather than bring the two sides together, it's the Gulf states that get drawn into this process.
When the economic components of the Pistons release, it's it's releases in Bahrain, actually during a kind of a hot summer evening.
Um, and drawing the Gulf States into this marks a change from the past.
Um, and and partly if I, if I go through some of the components, um, when the political component does eventually get released.
This is the second part of this. It's enables Israel to annexe one third of the West Bank and proposes landforms for the
Palestinian sensitive territory in the West Bank when they're offered a land in the Sinai desert.
Um, and the Gulf states are identified as some of the main parties,
along with various hedge funds that are going to fund some of this, including heights, high speed rails connecting Sinai in the west.
And, um, in exchange for this, the Palestinians don't get a state, but they get a freeze on settlement construction for a few years,
during which they can decide whether they want to continue talks or not.
Um, so this is rejected, of course, by the Palestinians.
But at the same time, uh, as these plans are being unrolled, in fact, the deal of the political components is unrolled.
Netanyahu announces a plan to annexe the West Bank. And there's a frustration from the Trump administration.
Again, not not that their plan doesn't include annexation, but this annexation is larger, um, than the one proposed by the Trump administration,
takes up more land to annexe um, takes place outside any kind of settlements or any framework for the settlements.
As Netanyahu is threatening to annexe. And I mean, this causes the Trump administration's pretty split on this.
I think figures like Kushner are unhappy with it. Friedman is, of course, happy to go along with pretty much anything.
So as this is kind of unravelling, um, the UAE steps, um,
and the MRC ambassador to Washington publishes an editorial in London's European newspapers, uh, and he says annexation is not acceptable.
But he also dangles the possibility of peace by saying countries like the UAE, Ian Israel, have more in common than they have differences.
Um, and as the pandemic is kind of going on in Syria, who's threatening to annexe and,
and this part partly comes out of his this pandering to very rightwing settlement groups, which he needs in order to win the election.
And he and, and Kushner travel to Israel at that point to convince him not to go ahead.
Um, but the scenario was pretty determined, at least in his rhetoric to us.
And that's what they begin to think of an alternative scheme. Um, they call it a latte, but and say, what about normalisation?
What about normalisation between Israel and the UAE in exchange for that same Yahoo stopping annexation or forgoing annexation.
And this becomes the basis of the agreements? Um, the idea didn't come out of nowhere.
And I had previously mentioned to Kushner that the UAE wouldn't be interested in normalising.
But I think this becomes a very convenient vehicle, um, for it to take place.
And that's exactly what happens, um, and actually gets published.
Um, that's the beginning. Um, I want to talk about what these agreements have accomplished.
There's been a lot in the way of trade ties. So trade between the UAE and Israel, especially, um,
reached 1 billion in their first year and 2 billion in their second year in the first year of free trade agreements signed between the two sides,
um, removing tariffs on 2% of trade of goods, um, much of trade is in is in diamonds, um, and all kinds of goods that can be re-exported.
But much of the trade is also centred on delivering Israeli tech to the UAE.
Uh, this in particular is driven by massive investments by the UAE and Israeli technology companies.
So, uh, some of the biggest and lot of the sovereign wealth funds started pouring in a lot of money into Israeli firms.
Um, and that becomes a bulk of the trade between the two sides.
Um, for trade value, um, it takes more than a year for the security aspects of these agreements and the lights on the first year,
a year and a half, there's really not so much talk of security or defence.
And I think it's I mean, that's really basically comes out of your desire to de-escalate with Iran.
Uh, at the time, UAE is also interested in not antagonising Iran, uh, and escalating hostilities.
And so it downplays any security cooperation with Israel. The rhetoric is really about peace, prosperity and tolerance.
Um, but in January 22nd, you were hit by several missile attacks, uh, suspected terrorist groups in Yemen.
And that's the moment when the defence aspect of the relationship really comes to the surface.
Um, as a result of that attack, the Union fires two missile defence systems from Israel, including the dock system.
They had asked for Iron Dome, but Iron Dome was not, uh, was not, uh, approved.
Um, but it does receive these these, uh, missile defences.
I think from a heart especially, there's been a reputational aspect to the Abraham Accords,
which has been useful since the Arab Spring but has been accused in Washington of sectarianism for the prediction.
It's been really fighting to show that it's not sectarian or doesn't have these policies.
The courts have been very useful because behind has effectively conflated normalisation with tolerance towards the Jewish people,
and really use that to improve its image in Washington.
Um, so there's been that reputational benefits, I think, particularly from behind, um, in the United States,
there's been a bipartisan push to deepen cooperation between the normalising states and Israel.
And I'm speaking to a colleague earlier who was making the point that, you know, a year or two after normalisation,
everything in the U.S., every conversation you have would have to have an element about the Abraham Accords or normalisation.
And I agree, I think I think that's still partly true. Um, the US is there's a bipartisan excitement around this.
Um, and I think a goal to draw, uh, these two states is Sunni Arab Gulf states into Israel, with Israel into a new regional security architecture.
Um, and there have be concrete steps to make this happen.
So one of them was moving Israel from the European zone of command, um, into Centcom, uh, which encompasses all the Arab states.
Um, and this has enabled Israel to advance its security cooperation, not only with normalising states,
but with those that don't have relations with it's under the umbrella of Sansome.
Um, Biden very much continued on the path set out by Trump.
He made normalisation with Saudi Arabia a key pillar of Middle East policy.
Um, and we heard nothing from him about resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
which was totally, uh, recognised as a relevance, um, within the Gulf itself.
I would say there was some trepidation towards normalisation. If you look at popular polls and data on the topic.
I think initially the moments after the Accords were signed, there was some optimism, certainly, that maybe this this can get some more positive.
But the 2020, 2021 Israel, uh, Gaza attacks, that brief period of hostilities, uh, kind of pushed the numbers down.
And of course, October 7th pushed them even further down to to a very, really low numbers.
Um, we can see this in tourism as well.
So in the first two years, um, of relations, 450,000 Israeli tourists in the UAE, which is massive, half a million out of a population of 7 million.
Um, by comparison, the numbers of people last season behind these visiting Israel is much lower.
It was, according to Israel's Ministry of Tourism, 3600 losses in the first two years, and the numbers of attendees were too small to mention.
Um, uh, so the the that's a more, uh, sober seventh I think has chilled, but not the normalisation.
There's been massive public outrage towards, um, Israel's actions after the war, some protests.
But I think where you can really see opposition is in the boycott movement that is taking place across the Gulf.
Um, when asked, 71% of Saudi citizens, uh, said that they were engaged or supportive of this boycott,
96% believed that the Arab states or Arab states should cut ties with Israel in response to the war.
It's it's a huge number. Um. I'll just wrap up because of time.
But I think if you can think about several kind of themes or confusions, I talked about the limits of normalisation in the book,
and what I mean by that is that these agreements have not addressed, um,
or did little to kind of lead to the resolution of the core conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
In fact, the entire logic, it's our premise of the ethical accords is based on the sidelining of the conflict and built on a fatigue of diplomacy,
you know, not only in the Arab states and in Israel, but also in the US.
Where are you? The goal of expanding normalisation has effectively replaced the resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the main focus of U.S. policy towards the region.
The consequence of this is the entrenchment of the conditions that gave rise to the October 7th attacks, uh, and Israel's reprisal.
Um, there's also the the democracy angle, the idea that normalisation rests on a lack of democracy in the Arab world.
These are unpopular agreements, and they're only sustained because citizens don't have a choice.
I think they also show us a lot about the fracturing of the old Arab order, the decline of Arab nationalism.
Um, and they also shatter this. I mean, I think what we've seen now is with without seventh,
an end to this myth that Israel can maintain its occupation without consequences for its own security.
But it's also shattered the myth that the region can just forget about this conflict and move on and move forward.
Um, we're seeing the cost of that way of thinking today.
Um, what's needed is the right kind of diplomacy not oriented towards expansion of normalisation, but diplomacy to resolve the conflict sometimes.
Um, and in a final way and holistically, um, that serves the interests of justice, um, for both sides.
Thank you very much for the talk. Um. Uh, so I'm going to start with with a couple questions.
Um, I guess the one question I had when opening the book was, I mean, it's a silly question, but is why why the Abraham Accords?
Who are the perverse idea to call these the Abraham Accords?
Yeah, it's a great question, actually. And it's mentioned, um, in one of their biographies, I think Kushner's biography.
Um, they were sitting down right before the announcement was made by a day or two, I'm thinking about what to call them.
And then a general came and, like, walked in through the door and they posed the question to him, and he said, how about the Abraham Accords?
Because those involved are all of the Abrahamic faith.
And this brings together, um, you know, two of the major Abrahamic faiths.
And then they thought that was a brilliant idea and went with it.
So, like a lot. But like much of what happens, I think reading these biographies of Trump's officials, so much of it is spur of the moment.
So much of it is, you know, just a personal kind of thing that's happened.
Someone has an idea, someone else has something, and it's executed.
And so that's exactly what happened. All right. Who do we have the name of that I can get?
I know, um, my other question is, um, I mean, you mentioned that the those both at the, at the end of your talk and I was, you know, uh,
listening to you, I was thinking about domestic politics in, in countries and, and also of how much of a difference there is between,
you know, the 1973, uh, embargo and, and the fact that King Faisal was, was really not only out of his own convictions,
uh, but also responding to to what he perceived was was a very strong current in Saudi public opinion.
So, so moving forward, 50 years later, right before, uh, October 7th, there's there's it's a massive shift.
Right. So how do you I guess there are several, you know, letters to that question, right?
I mean, um, what? Yeah. What what do you think is happening right now in terms of public opinions in the Gulf that basically, like, emboldens, uh,
Gulf rulers and Gulf leaders to, to to side with, with with with with Israel,
uh, or to and I'm talking about again like before and before October 7th.
Yeah. And and then, you know, the other layer is, uh, I think it's in the book that you and you talked about it a little bit in the talk,
uh, the, the Israel washing of authoritarianism.
Right. Um, and how, uh, you may, uh, kill you, but then, you know, if you play nice with, with the potential idea of one day, uh,
speaking to Israeli officials and it it might you might think that it's it's going to be forgotten at the very same time when,
when, uh, gulf regimes have been using Israeli, uh, tools to actually enhance their repression and,
um, and surveillance of, uh, and I'm thinking of the UAE, you know, using all these, all these.
All these digital tools to to to to to surveil.
And so yeah, I mean I know it's not a very clear question, but it's really about internal politics.
Like what can you tell us more about what's going on in the various countries and especially in Saudi Arabia?
Yeah, sure. So so the internal dynamics, I think are fairly straightforward, um, although it may not have appeared.
So I think by 2019, I think the, the Gulf states were just had Iran on the top of their list and I think.
Uh, as I mentioned in the talk, you know, all of the kind of convergence that took place,
the relations that took place behind the scenes in the lead up to this.
Much of this was centred around, you know, dealing with Iran, like joint lobbying against Iran or acquiring technology in order to Syria, Iran.
And then there's the domestic element, too, which is the spyware sales that we know about,
which were intended to sort of as a as a domestic, uh, for domestic and domestic security, um, uh, concerns.
Um, and so I think that the, the driver of this really was kind of this fear of Iran when it comes to the populations.
Um, I think there was a sense of any kind of upset from the populations could be managed.
It could be managed in two ways. It could be managed by selling this as something positive and selling.
This is something that was in the interest of the Palestinians, which is sort of what happened with the UAE, at least for this brief moment.
This idea of we're doing this for the Palestinians and to stop annexation.
I think that was a key point that was, you know, made early on, um, as a way of selling this agreement.
But the other way to sustain it was to simply just. You know, be aware that you could repress any protest that took place.
And then behind that is what's happened. There's an element of repression, too.
I mean, it's, uh, it was Covid. I think, conveniently enough, it was Covid.
And so you couldn't have that many protests. But I think there was very much an understanding that if this got too much out of hand,
it could be repressed the same way the Arab Spring movements were successfully repressed.
And so the I think there's a two part, uh. Thinking around that.
Um. I think you asked me about Saudi Arabia.
I don't know if you could be more specific. Like. Is it about, uh, the cost of normalisation now or.
I mean, I guess I'm struck by the, you know, there are there are parallelism,
right between between, uh, between the Saudi situation, especially since 2015.
Right. And, um, what happens between Israel and Palestine and Israel?
Palestine. Right.
I mean, you're the, uh, maybe maybe, you know, I'm imagining too much here, but, um, yeah, the war in Yemen has been really striking us all as.
Yes, as as as a moment.
Right. Or, uh, yeah. A moment of militarisation, of unleashing, you know, uh, violence against against, uh, thy neighbour.
Yes. Uh, uh, almost a little more populist than you.
I mean, there's there's that whole demographic dynamics between between Saudi Arabia and Yemen that, that fear of.
So I don't know. No, I understand, I think I think, I guess what you're trying to go to, um, Saudi Arabia at that in those years is kind of post.
And as the war in Yemen unfolded, got a lot of heat in Washington, I think Saudi Arabia became very isolated in Washington, I think.
Whereas if you think of its previous stature, it was, um, pretty powerful actor in DC.
Um, there became an I think the culmination of this was Biden's vow to isolate, um, conference Mohammed bin Salman and make him a pariah.
I mean, I think that really showed how how, uh, Saudi Arabia had lost ground in DC, um, by kind of entering this kind of pathway to normalisation.
You can see how Saudi Arabia totally turned it around. Um, it became the renewed focus of the Biden administration.
I mean, I think up until October 7th, its main priority was bringing Saudi Arabia into the accords.
You had Blinken and others sent there regularly to try and engage in these talks and a massive turnaround, I think Saudi Arabia.
It's interesting to kind of note that it hasn't changed anything, really,
but by entering this conversation, it managed to completely change its reputation in Washington.
You don't hear anything about Saudi Arabia being isolated anymore.
Um, I think even with it's interesting to see, like even with Germany has done so.
Germany temporarily suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia after and because of the war in Yemen,
and they resumed arms sales, um, I think around a year ago, citing its, uh, favourable attitude towards normalisation.
So even towards places like Germany, Saudi Arabia has gained a lot by merely entertaining these talks and no more.
Yeah, thanks. Thanks very much for.