1 00:00:00,800 --> 00:00:03,890 [Auto-generated transcript. Edits may have been applied for clarity.] So I'm sorry I haven't bought copies of the book with me. I've been travelling. 2 00:00:04,160 --> 00:00:10,370 Um, but the good news is the book is available for free online if you don't mind reading soft copy. 3 00:00:10,380 --> 00:00:15,920 So there's an Arabic version as well. For those who prefer to read the original, not the original, the translated Arabic. 4 00:00:16,520 --> 00:00:21,290 And I've been told there's a Farsi version that's been published a few months ago in Iran as well. 5 00:00:21,890 --> 00:00:26,209 Um, but it is an easy read, uh, 100 and something pages, not very long. 6 00:00:26,210 --> 00:00:34,160 And, um, I welcome all feedback. So hopefully those of you who, uh, have not had a chance yet to read the book will do so and find it useful. 7 00:00:35,240 --> 00:00:42,649 So. I'll give you a little bit background of why I wanted to publish, um, a book on Alice's side. 8 00:00:42,650 --> 00:00:46,700 And first off, I, I actually can't find a book about him in English. 9 00:00:47,150 --> 00:00:48,380 It doesn't exist so far. 10 00:00:48,530 --> 00:01:02,030 Um, and I, I wanted to write because I have collected things over the years, uh, about him, about his background, about his influence in Iraq. 11 00:01:02,030 --> 00:01:06,709 But I thought I would like to to share it with other people concerned with how Iraqi 12 00:01:06,710 --> 00:01:13,010 politics works and what the role of a 94 year old man in Najaf who hardly leaves his house, 13 00:01:13,690 --> 00:01:20,480 uh, is because it does come up frequently when I talk to ambassadors who've just arrived in Baghdad, for example, 14 00:01:20,870 --> 00:01:28,910 when I'm asked to talk about Shia politics, people always tell me, you know what Sistani's role, you know, why is he important and why is he relevant? 15 00:01:28,940 --> 00:01:33,379 How do we reach in order to connect with him? And so I could save myself some time. 16 00:01:33,380 --> 00:01:37,580 If I write a book, then hopefully that deals with 50% of these questions at least. 17 00:01:38,390 --> 00:01:42,200 But in the, um, in the book itself, I make a central assertion. 18 00:01:42,980 --> 00:01:46,040 Uh, they call that a hypothesis, if you want. 19 00:01:46,040 --> 00:01:49,669 And, uh, and in academia, I guess that's, you know, what's relevant. 20 00:01:49,670 --> 00:01:53,690 But the assertion that I make is that Sistani is the most influential. 21 00:01:54,810 --> 00:02:06,780 Shia religious authority figure over the last four centuries, and I base that on the fact that he is not just a religious figure. 22 00:02:07,380 --> 00:02:12,290 He's also a political actor. So that's a maybe a sub assertion there. 23 00:02:12,650 --> 00:02:16,700 And people find that, um, quite difficult to grasp. 24 00:02:16,700 --> 00:02:20,510 How can you be a political figure but you don't get involved in politics? 25 00:02:21,200 --> 00:02:24,530 He doesn't have a party. He doesn't have an official position. 26 00:02:25,040 --> 00:02:29,059 He does not have a state the way that, for example, the pope, uh, is recognised. 27 00:02:29,060 --> 00:02:35,480 So how how is it that you can claim that he is a political act? And so the book sets out to make this clear, his influence on politics. 28 00:02:36,170 --> 00:02:47,540 And, uh, we use this sort of a framework, very, uh, basic framework of, um, Webers, uh, views on capital and authority and then also, 29 00:02:47,570 --> 00:02:56,000 uh, Bordeaux's views of, you know, the type of, um, authority that somebody like Sistani could play. 30 00:02:56,000 --> 00:03:00,140 So in those kind of frameworks, I'm able to assess, is he a political player? 31 00:03:00,440 --> 00:03:03,500 How does he exert his political capital and political authority? 32 00:03:03,830 --> 00:03:08,120 Can I say he is a religious figure with informal political authority? 33 00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:10,669 So that's the assertion that I was testing out in the book. 34 00:03:10,670 --> 00:03:16,280 And I'd like to think, um, because it made a, you know, a good effort of, uh, backing up this assertion with some evidence on that. 35 00:03:17,870 --> 00:03:22,550 The book starts off with the question of authority in Islam. 36 00:03:23,360 --> 00:03:28,370 Does God does Islam prescribe a method of government? 37 00:03:29,240 --> 00:03:38,300 Does it say we need to have an Islamic government? Does it say we need to have a monarchy or we need to have democracy, or we to have a theocracy? 38 00:03:38,990 --> 00:03:41,660 And I don't take too much time in the book to explain that. 39 00:03:41,660 --> 00:03:49,399 But I say there is an argument and a lot of people from the Najafi school, from, from Iraq, from that tradition say, 40 00:03:49,400 --> 00:03:57,320 actually, God wants us to have a just society, but how do we achieve that is left to people themselves? 41 00:03:58,310 --> 00:04:04,070 You can do that through a monarchy, the just monarch, very rare, but theoretically possible. 42 00:04:04,370 --> 00:04:09,740 You can do that through democracy. You can do that through autocracy as long as you achieve justice. 43 00:04:10,250 --> 00:04:14,299 That's the goal here. The method is up to people to choose. So that's an argument. 44 00:04:14,300 --> 00:04:18,710 That is one stream of thought that I, uh, and I outline that in the book. 45 00:04:19,580 --> 00:04:25,129 But of course, the revolutionary strand within Shia Islam at least this is actually. 46 00:04:25,130 --> 00:04:30,590 No, you cannot just depend on any system to try to achieve justice. 47 00:04:31,220 --> 00:04:33,680 And in fact, we have been prescribed with a method. 48 00:04:34,010 --> 00:04:42,500 And the method is to rely on people who understand Islam the most, to be able to achieve that justice and to have an Islamic system. 49 00:04:43,250 --> 00:04:46,070 That's why Prophet's Watson, and that's why we have the imams, 50 00:04:46,580 --> 00:04:54,110 because they're the ones who are trying to teach society how to organise themselves in the most just manner, which in their view, is through Islam. 51 00:04:56,360 --> 00:05:03,590 And that revolutionary strand also has evidence and also makes arguments that are convincing about how to achieve, 52 00:05:04,010 --> 00:05:09,680 uh, this method of Islamic government. And then who is going to head this type of government? 53 00:05:10,840 --> 00:05:19,840 So the first line of thoughts as well, people should decide they can have laymen, they can have a, uh, expert in politics. 54 00:05:19,840 --> 00:05:24,129 They can have, if needs be, a cleric and Islamic cleric if they want to. 55 00:05:24,130 --> 00:05:31,510 But it's people's choice. And the second line of thought says, well, no, no, the experts in Islam are the ones who should head the government as well. 56 00:05:32,230 --> 00:05:35,980 So they explain to us how a government operates, but then they actually do the running of the government. 57 00:05:36,610 --> 00:05:38,920 And of course, that's the School of Hawaii, 58 00:05:39,730 --> 00:05:45,010 which says that the most capable people of running an Islamic government are the ones who understand some the most. 59 00:05:45,670 --> 00:05:47,920 We shouldn't trust anybody to run the government. 60 00:05:47,920 --> 00:05:54,730 We should trust the clerics, the ones who dedicated their lives to studying this stuff, to apply Islam in the best manner possible. 61 00:05:55,240 --> 00:05:58,810 So you can see immediately there's going to be friction between these two schools of thought. 62 00:05:59,350 --> 00:06:04,140 If they ever managed to get to power, how are they going to conduct political affairs? 63 00:06:04,150 --> 00:06:08,710 One is going to say, well, actually, we're not really going to get involved too much because we're concerned with outcomes. 64 00:06:09,550 --> 00:06:16,629 And the other one is to say, no, no, we want to get power. We want to prescribe to people how to, uh, conduct their affairs. 65 00:06:16,630 --> 00:06:23,320 And then we're going to run those affairs for them as well. And that is on the back of, um, sort of an older argument about divine authority. 66 00:06:24,310 --> 00:06:29,170 We have the prophets had the imams. They're not with us right now. 67 00:06:29,170 --> 00:06:33,430 So who is God's representative on earth? 68 00:06:34,450 --> 00:06:38,350 The revolutionary school believes that God's representative is the cleric. 69 00:06:39,620 --> 00:06:43,280 He is now in place of the Imam. He has the authority of the prophet. 70 00:06:43,760 --> 00:06:51,150 His job is to act as courts representative enough and so it is a divine requirement. 71 00:06:51,170 --> 00:06:55,549 It is an obligation for the cleric to behave as if the imams were here, 72 00:06:55,550 --> 00:06:59,300 as if the prophet was to run in the central government to run an Islamic state. 73 00:06:59,450 --> 00:07:04,990 If they have the opportunity to do so. And of course, that conflicts with the other school for that says, well, prophet is not here. 74 00:07:05,000 --> 00:07:09,470 The Imam is not here right now. It's not really our job to do anything more than guide in place. 75 00:07:10,580 --> 00:07:16,010 So you can see one side is already going to use divine authority to back up its vision and its actions, 76 00:07:16,460 --> 00:07:20,690 whereas the other is much more fearful of trying to use divine authority in that way. 77 00:07:21,560 --> 00:07:27,049 And that's what we have in terms of friction with regard to the, uh, you know, 78 00:07:27,050 --> 00:07:34,520 the jurists having this authority to act as a guardian for all people versus the much more limited one which says, 79 00:07:34,520 --> 00:07:40,879 well, only in religious affairs, only when people come to us and ask us about Islamic rulings do we have authority. 80 00:07:40,880 --> 00:07:44,690 Apart from that, we don't really have the authority to extend all the way into people's daily lives. 81 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:52,220 So you can see already how much more challenging that situation can be between the two, uh, schools of thought. 82 00:07:52,790 --> 00:08:00,230 So that's the beginning of the book. That's the background to why I've looked at this subject, because it is a thorny issue. 83 00:08:00,620 --> 00:08:09,110 And of course, we have, uh, Iraq and Iran in these last 3 or 4 decades of being, uh, the centre of what has happened in the Middle East. 84 00:08:09,230 --> 00:08:14,570 Islamic Revolution, 1979, a war between Iraq and Iran next to 82, 88. 85 00:08:15,080 --> 00:08:17,640 Let's go for the second. Go for rights of life. 86 00:08:18,230 --> 00:08:22,590 You know, so many things have occurred in these two countries and probably still will in the next few years. 87 00:08:22,630 --> 00:08:31,970 So I thought a study of one of the key figures in this period of time would contribute something on the subject of not just Shia political thought, 88 00:08:31,970 --> 00:08:39,020 but of general, uh, political approaches in Iraq and Iran, at least in these past two decades. 89 00:08:40,460 --> 00:08:49,190 So then I move on to a study of Sistani sistani's, a biography of his upbringing, his background. 90 00:08:49,820 --> 00:08:57,380 Uh, the formative years, how he was sheets in terms of his views and what were the major influences. 91 00:08:58,190 --> 00:09:06,710 What is it that he experienced in his younger years in the 40s and 50s into the 60s, that then prepared him, 92 00:09:07,010 --> 00:09:14,090 if they did at all, prepared for him to be this most important and relevant figure in Iraq and in the Middle East. 93 00:09:15,020 --> 00:09:21,130 And part of that is his experience in home when he studied for still two years of form under. 94 00:09:21,490 --> 00:09:32,540 Uh, one of the great achievements of the time I seen for Georgie, and he was in competition with the Shah at the time for influence and authority, 95 00:09:33,260 --> 00:09:36,950 and yet managed to protect the House of Commons, strengthen it, 96 00:09:36,950 --> 00:09:43,490 despite the fact that the Shah himself was becoming increasingly hostile to to took on itself. 97 00:09:44,030 --> 00:09:50,210 I think that left a mark on Sistani. It also meant that he had something to fall back on when he went through a similar experience. 98 00:09:50,870 --> 00:09:56,029 Uh, especially during the 90s when Saddam was in power and trying to limit, uh, 99 00:09:56,030 --> 00:10:04,370 the influence of the how the Sistani had an experience to fall back on something that shaped his his way of dealing with with the regime in Iraq, 100 00:10:05,930 --> 00:10:11,149 but also highlighting the bitter experience that he had, particularly the 80s and 90s seeing colleagues, 101 00:10:11,150 --> 00:10:18,470 friends, persecuted, exiled, executed, seeing the House as shrink in size to 10% of its original size. 102 00:10:18,860 --> 00:10:22,310 Thousands of clerics would be forced into exile or leave the house, 103 00:10:23,390 --> 00:10:30,350 and got to a point where there was maybe 6 or 7, 800 clerics, down from all over 10,000, 104 00:10:30,560 --> 00:10:37,040 to a point where people think it is the houses that actually survive and in people's lives in Iraq, 105 00:10:37,610 --> 00:10:41,120 the house, it became less and less relevant, right? 106 00:10:41,300 --> 00:10:45,260 People were so afraid of the regime, so afraid of regime spies. 107 00:10:45,950 --> 00:10:52,970 There was no Friday prayers. There was no statements issued by any of the of the religious authorities you could even struggle to visit. 108 00:10:53,600 --> 00:11:02,780 It's very difficult to access, um, clerics in particular, in those dark days, in 93, 94, 95, it became very difficult for people. 109 00:11:03,110 --> 00:11:06,170 And so the question was, will this system ever survive? 110 00:11:06,960 --> 00:11:12,290 It is a thousand year old institution, but the best regime has got it in the chokehold. 111 00:11:13,370 --> 00:11:20,449 And yet it was significantly changed with 2003 suddenly a system that not many people 112 00:11:20,450 --> 00:11:25,729 outside of Iraq or familiar with was going to play a significant role in Iraq, 113 00:11:25,730 --> 00:11:30,290 which people did not expect. And I don't think at one anyone point in time. 114 00:11:31,640 --> 00:11:38,090 President at the time, Bush was told that we need to consider what I from the society thinks about the post 2003 order. 115 00:11:38,660 --> 00:11:48,380 I don't think it. It was never issued, and he was never issued with any instructions or information, or even knew the name Sistani before April 2003. 116 00:11:49,340 --> 00:11:52,910 And I would say this is also the same for even Iraqi political figures. 117 00:11:53,480 --> 00:12:01,580 I don't think they ever considered what would be the importance of Sistani was his views on how Iraq should be reorganised post 2003. 118 00:12:01,880 --> 00:12:09,800 So it came as a huge shock to them when suddenly people inside Iraq, but also this old man in Najaf, 119 00:12:09,800 --> 00:12:13,700 started to issue statements and encouraged people to have views on the post 2003. 120 00:12:13,790 --> 00:12:19,189 It was a massive shock and the people listened to him and people were willing to protest on the street and willing, 121 00:12:19,190 --> 00:12:24,049 and politicians were suddenly afraid to agree with America if they did not consult textbooks 122 00:12:24,050 --> 00:12:28,550 this time and explain why that happened and how he managed to get into that position, 123 00:12:28,910 --> 00:12:33,110 and why he suddenly went from being a very quiet, very reserved, 124 00:12:33,560 --> 00:12:39,170 classical religious figure to suddenly somebody who was able to write a letter to the UN 125 00:12:39,170 --> 00:12:45,979 Security Council and defy George W Bush and ask people to protest against programmer's wishes, 126 00:12:45,980 --> 00:12:47,930 to write the Constitution essentially himself. 127 00:12:48,770 --> 00:12:55,339 So that transformation, I documented detail how he managed to do that in the space of, you know, a few months, 128 00:12:55,340 --> 00:13:01,940 essentially going from somebody who many people had never heard of to suddenly somebody whose future was dependent on. 129 00:13:04,330 --> 00:13:11,320 And obviously his his actions, what he did, but also what he did not do. 130 00:13:12,250 --> 00:13:16,090 Why did he support a particular party or group? 131 00:13:16,870 --> 00:13:20,530 Why did he not tell us what to do? People always criticised him for that. 132 00:13:21,160 --> 00:13:25,070 Okay, yeah, he was influential. But why didn't he tell us what to do? What should we have done right then and there? 133 00:13:25,840 --> 00:13:29,740 So there were always times where son did something by not doing something. 134 00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:33,940 Refusing to praise or condemn or prescribe a particular thing. 135 00:13:34,480 --> 00:13:36,640 Not getting involved at certain points in time. 136 00:13:37,270 --> 00:13:45,460 And one of those, I think is less how important was points in 2006 where we could have had a a massive civil war? 137 00:13:46,630 --> 00:13:53,410 The events of February 2006, there was, uh, the attack against the shrine in Samarra, 138 00:13:54,100 --> 00:14:02,860 and suddenly there were essentially recommendations from gangs and militias who were threatening entire neighbourhoods, 139 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:09,700 uh, to the north of Iraq, blowing to the south. Um, the death rate went up by 100. 140 00:14:10,300 --> 00:14:17,740 They would be headless bodies, bodies with bullet holes lying everywhere throughout residential areas and Baghdad and elsewhere. 141 00:14:18,460 --> 00:14:27,140 And at that point in time, Sistani could have pushed for the creation of militias or forces that were going to defend the shrines. 142 00:14:27,160 --> 00:14:33,790 He could have issued a fatwa saying Shia muslims have been talking about targeting to, you know, defend themselves and push back. 143 00:14:34,390 --> 00:14:40,210 He could have essentially asked that his community take a stranglehold over the country. 144 00:14:42,620 --> 00:14:47,990 The community that he represents, that he has authority over who make up physically the majority of Iraq. 145 00:14:48,410 --> 00:14:50,510 He could have made that step, but he chose not. 146 00:14:50,780 --> 00:14:56,850 And instead he actually started referring people to the fact that we need to avoid losing control of rule of law. 147 00:14:56,870 --> 00:14:59,990 State must control arms. We should not have militias. 148 00:15:00,260 --> 00:15:05,300 We need to treat other sects as our brothers and as a equals. 149 00:15:05,570 --> 00:15:10,750 This Iraq has to be multi-faith. So sometimes it was things that he did not do. 150 00:15:10,760 --> 00:15:15,650 But I think also important that I make an effort of highlighting those instances. 151 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:24,290 But then also I think where his ambition met with disappointment, what he wanted for Iraq post 2003. 152 00:15:25,430 --> 00:15:32,480 What he wanted to achieve, having the Shia being in control in Iraq for the first time in in forever, 153 00:15:33,680 --> 00:15:40,250 and then being able to rule and govern in a way that would be a beacon for other communities. 154 00:15:40,790 --> 00:15:48,470 The Shia majority in Bahrain this year, a majority in Iran this year, a majority, not a majority, but a couple large numbers in Lebanon and elsewhere. 155 00:15:48,830 --> 00:15:51,960 They may achieve political power. How would they govern themselves? 156 00:15:52,070 --> 00:15:58,130 How would they come into those territories and those countries? And I think he hoped that Iraq would be an example of best practice. 157 00:15:59,420 --> 00:16:02,960 But he was disappointed with the performance of the politicians. 158 00:16:03,770 --> 00:16:11,660 He refused to be involved in formal politics, refused to have a role for himself, and also for people who were connected to clerics. 159 00:16:12,050 --> 00:16:14,480 We're not supposed to be in political office. 160 00:16:14,750 --> 00:16:21,950 He stated that multiple times, and so people thought, you know, him or people connected to him are the most people most trustworthy. 161 00:16:22,250 --> 00:16:26,960 But they were removing themselves from the situation. So we'd have to go with the regular laymen, the politicians. 162 00:16:27,620 --> 00:16:29,900 And he had hope that they would perform better. 163 00:16:30,980 --> 00:16:39,830 But unfortunately they got sucked up with corruption, with self-interests, using sectarianism to try to one up each other. 164 00:16:40,940 --> 00:16:48,260 And when they got to positions of power, despite his frequent criticisms, instructions, pressure, 165 00:16:48,830 --> 00:16:55,150 they were not prepared to do any better than politicians they would had on the previous regime. 166 00:16:55,160 --> 00:17:05,990 That's it. And so Sistani became increasingly disheartened that actually this political elite is not going to be able to reform. 167 00:17:07,460 --> 00:17:12,950 And he got to a point where he believed his words were no longer having an effect, and he was losing his capital in that. 168 00:17:13,910 --> 00:17:22,670 And so he decided to go into what I describe as semi-retirement to stop commenting on political affairs, refused to meet with Iraqi politicians, 169 00:17:23,420 --> 00:17:29,240 and generally just retreated in order to preserve some of the capital that he had amongst the public, 170 00:17:29,660 --> 00:17:35,210 but also in order in order to say, well, people chose these politicians, I didn't ask them to vote for them. 171 00:17:36,230 --> 00:17:39,380 I've repeatedly said we should vote for reformers. 172 00:17:39,470 --> 00:17:43,730 I've given out instructions that people need to vote responsibly. 173 00:17:44,660 --> 00:17:49,400 I mean, Iraqi society doesn't seem mature enough yet. They're still voting along ethno sectarian lines. 174 00:17:50,300 --> 00:17:53,450 They still consider identity more important than policy. 175 00:17:54,260 --> 00:18:01,190 And the parties themselves are not very mature either. They all control weapons and money and territory, and they're in it for power. 176 00:18:01,200 --> 00:18:04,550 They're not really interested in governing, per se. They're interested in holding power. 177 00:18:05,540 --> 00:18:10,790 And so I think Sistani's massive disappointment with the Iraqi political leadership has 178 00:18:10,790 --> 00:18:15,930 meant that we've missed out on a lot that we could have had from him in terms of a vision, 179 00:18:16,130 --> 00:18:20,600 more on his vision, uh, more guidance, um, 180 00:18:21,260 --> 00:18:25,610 something that we could then hold on to for the next 50 to 100 years to say, well, 181 00:18:25,850 --> 00:18:34,700 here's a version of Shia Islam that is different from Iran that also has a role in politics, but that is not going to be involved in the same way. 182 00:18:34,700 --> 00:18:36,260 And it works and it's respectful. 183 00:18:37,370 --> 00:18:44,750 But we unfortunately don't get to see that because of the way the Iraqi political leaders behave themselves after 2003. 184 00:18:46,190 --> 00:18:51,440 And so we've reached a point where I just thought, he is 94 heading into his 95th year. 185 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:58,550 And, you know, people describe these years as sort of legacy mode. You know, he wants to preserve a legacy. 186 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:03,980 He wants to leave something behind in order for future generations to be able to build on. 187 00:19:04,610 --> 00:19:08,090 And I'd say that Sistani has been very successful in this regard. 188 00:19:08,600 --> 00:19:20,690 House of the 90s, that had six, 700 dogs and students, now has almost 20,000 houses that was dependent on people's arms and charity in the 60s, 189 00:19:20,730 --> 00:19:26,810 70s and 80s now has massive institutions that are able to funding the House of the, 190 00:19:27,380 --> 00:19:33,680 uh, was wary of being infiltrated by the state and could not protect its own members. 191 00:19:33,770 --> 00:19:41,209 Now has a very respectable, very, um, very recognised position within the country. 192 00:19:41,210 --> 00:19:46,070 That means it's it's on the outlook to be even stronger going forward. 193 00:19:47,120 --> 00:19:52,250 But what I say, Sistani's most important achievement in that regard is the Sistani paradigm, 194 00:19:53,090 --> 00:19:57,410 which I describe as this playbook that he's left for future ayatollahs in Iraq. 195 00:19:58,100 --> 00:20:05,330 Whoever follows him in the next decades now has a way in which he needs to behave. 196 00:20:06,560 --> 00:20:10,460 Don't get too involved in politics, but also don't completely ignore. 197 00:20:11,420 --> 00:20:15,650 Be prepared to guide. Be prepared to intervene when the need arises. 198 00:20:15,890 --> 00:20:21,440 For example, in 2014, the price of lysis or in other occasions way in 2019, for example, 199 00:20:21,500 --> 00:20:26,330 asking the Prime Minister to resign because of protest and how you do that. 200 00:20:27,080 --> 00:20:30,830 Avoid allowing yourself with any political party, right. 201 00:20:31,250 --> 00:20:40,100 Preserve your political capital. Uh, this there is, uh, a whole set of examples that I give that make up this standard paradigm. 202 00:20:40,100 --> 00:20:47,090 And I think that is going to be very useful for future ayatollahs in Iraq to say, well, this is the way she started. 203 00:20:47,390 --> 00:20:50,510 This is how we dealt with these challenges. This is the way we should also be. 204 00:20:50,510 --> 00:20:54,110 And I think it's not just the guidebook. I think it's going to be a rulebook. 205 00:20:54,800 --> 00:21:02,300 Any ayatollah who does not follow the Sistani way of doing things is not going to get a chance to become a grand ayatollah in Iran, 206 00:21:02,420 --> 00:21:10,010 because he will be excluded from succession, because he does not follow the way that Sistani is laid down for, for future marriage. 207 00:21:12,380 --> 00:21:17,540 People will ask frequently about the period after Sistani when he's gone, what happens? 208 00:21:17,990 --> 00:21:21,380 How is it not on the terms? And it's not like in the Vatican, where there's a voting process. 209 00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:25,999 How does it work and who's likely to be successful? What will Iran do? 210 00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:36,710 What they choose to influence the process and, uh, maybe find somebody who is very pro Iran to be in, in that, um, in that succession process. 211 00:21:37,310 --> 00:21:46,219 Um, what happens if the Iraqi state changes becomes a more authoritarian system or, uh, the Shia lose their political power in Iraq? 212 00:21:46,220 --> 00:21:47,810 What happens to to the house of that? 213 00:21:48,530 --> 00:21:58,130 Uh, the questions that I think are relevant, but institutionally, the house of knowledge of the school of Najaf, I think is is very strong now. 214 00:21:59,000 --> 00:22:04,340 It has financial capability. It has a tried and tested political experience. 215 00:22:05,330 --> 00:22:10,610 It has a way of differentiating itself from the system in Iran that is well respected. 216 00:22:11,660 --> 00:22:16,010 It has, I think, uh, numerous names for potential successors. 217 00:22:16,370 --> 00:22:23,720 So it is in the period of the 90s where we saw very few accidents or people that could become successors through the previous acts locally. 218 00:22:24,380 --> 00:22:30,680 I think now there are many more potential successors, but also I think it is it is in a healthy position. 219 00:22:31,610 --> 00:22:37,010 It is established a niche for itself, that it is not going to be challenged in any way. 220 00:22:37,550 --> 00:22:43,100 It is not involved in politics formally. So the state can set up to ban or push out or defeat the House. 221 00:22:43,100 --> 00:22:49,790 In that sense, it doesn't need any money from any, but it has enough membership to produce future generations. 222 00:22:50,600 --> 00:22:53,810 Uh, it has control of important institutions like the shrines. 223 00:22:54,800 --> 00:22:58,520 And more importantly, it has respect for people, particularly the Iraqi people they respect. 224 00:22:58,520 --> 00:23:02,750 I say they respect the House. They look to it for guidance even today. 225 00:23:03,710 --> 00:23:07,670 And I think, you know, some of you have seen the Pope's visit in 2021 to, uh, 226 00:23:07,670 --> 00:23:12,320 for example, the pope went out of his way to to visit Sistani in his house. 227 00:23:13,670 --> 00:23:24,680 And I think that was a a significant moment of not just respect, but a recognition of this ascetic, pious old man has done something remarkable. 228 00:23:25,040 --> 00:23:28,250 He was able to exert influence without seeking power for himself, 229 00:23:29,060 --> 00:23:36,890 and has actually bettered his people in his community without having the usual, uh, you know, disadvantage of that of power. 230 00:23:38,000 --> 00:23:44,300 And I think that was a moment that reflected the status not just of Sistani, but of nature itself. 231 00:23:45,200 --> 00:23:53,000 And so from that position, I'm quite positive that even though we will lose, I still see somebody who is significant, hugely significant. 232 00:23:53,540 --> 00:23:56,930 But I'm actually hopeful of what is left always going to leave behind. 233 00:23:57,770 --> 00:24:05,150 So the book doesn't sort of pinpoint exactly who who, um, the, you know, the details of the process of succession. 234 00:24:05,690 --> 00:24:09,770 More importantly, I focus on the fact that succession should be not one of crisis. 235 00:24:10,160 --> 00:24:15,260 It is likely to be a healthy succession. So I will probably wrap up here. 236 00:24:15,260 --> 00:24:20,450 Um, maybe I made assumptions that, um, I'm familiar with the terms I learned much. 237 00:24:20,540 --> 00:24:24,709 Um, I met Jeff in housing, but, um, I look forward to the discussion. 238 00:24:24,710 --> 00:24:27,950 I do hope, uh, you'll get a chance to to read the book. 239 00:24:28,010 --> 00:24:32,239 Um, and I, I'm very pleasantly surprised. 240 00:24:32,240 --> 00:24:39,110 It was interesting, um, that, uh, you have read it, and people do want to hear a little bit more about it and, uh, engaging with you. 241 00:24:39,200 --> 00:24:39,590 Thank you.