

Contemporary Islamist Opposition in Morocco: Resisting Inclusion and Moderation

Transcript

Michael Willis

Welcome everybody and welcome to the Tuesday Middle East Center series of talks. As most of you have gone in previous weeks, we often focus in on Tuesdays in looking at new and exciting books and new publications on the region. And this week I'm absolutely delighted to have Alfonso Kassani come and talk about his new book. Alfonso is Assistant Professor at the Complutensia University in Madrid, where he teaches in the Department of Political Science and is it International Relations as well or Public Administration? Public Administration. Alfonso is an old friend of the centre. He was here as a visiting researcher in 2019, wasn't it? So we were absolutely delighted when I saw his book come out. to invite him back. Alfonso is becoming one of the leading authorities on the politics of Maghreb in Spain at the moment. He's written on political parties, he's looked at alliances between political parties, he's wrote on foreign policy and a whole range of different issues. But the work he's most known for and he's done most on is on Morocco's Islamist movement. Now those of you who know a little bit about Morocco will think, yes, Islamist movement. We know the Islamist movement. It's the PJD, the Party of Justice and Development, that was in power for nearly 10, or in government, I should say, rather than power for 10 years. But actually, those of you know Morocco a little bit better will know that the PJD is not Morocco's only Islamist party and movement. And in fact, it's actually not even the biggest. The movement that is the largest and most significant in Morocco and has been for several decades, is an organisation called Alad al-Walissan, the Justice and Spirituality Movement, as they call it, which is much larger and much more significant in many ways than the PJD. Very little is written about it. There are bits and pieces here and there. Even I've had a stab at writing a bits of it over the years and looking at it. And what was really needed and has been needed for decades is a really decent, full study of the movement and its engagement with politics. And therefore, I was absolutely delighted. Well, Alfonso did his work from his PhD work was on Alad Ouilisan and has now developed that into an updated book, which is really an authoritative history of the movement and its engagement in Moroccan politics. As well, I don't want to steal too much from what Alfonso's going to say, but it is a really fabulous study. I've read it. really is accessible, really explains things. And what is interesting is we'll see, Al-Adul-Isan is a quite unusual Islamist movement. It's not what you'd expect. It doesn't follow the same

pattern as most of the other Islamist movements. that we're familiar and study with. And I think therefore having a study like this is absolutely vital. Across the region, if we look Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, you could sort of see that Islamism more generally has been in decline. It's not the force it was in terms of all its various formations. The one possible exception to that is the Al-Adel Al-Isan movement in Morocco. And it has a presence, a continuing political engagement, and something that has actually begun to increase. But I'm already saying too much about Alfonso's wonderful book. But I would want to introduce you to Alfonso, Contemporary Islamist Opposition in Morocco, Revising Inclusion and Moderation. Alfonso.

Alfonso Casani

Good evening, everyone. Thank you very much, Michael, for the presentation, which was very generous. I wanted to begin, before entering into the book, I wanted to begin, first of all, by thanking the St. Anthony's College and the Middle East Centre especially, and above all, by thanking you for the invitation. It's really a pleasure to be here. As Michael was saying, I was a visiting scholar here in 2019, in the summer of 2019, after finishing my PhD. At that time, I was preparing some papers that, I don't know, follow some of the lines that had kept unfinished with the book, with the PhD. So being able to come with the fully formed book, which is based on my PhD, it sort of feels as a sort of full circle. So it's very, very nice. What I'm presenting here, it's a formulation, I would say, of my PhD thesis. It's at least vaguely based on it, it's changed quite a lot, quite a lot of things as well. So I don't think it's fair to say that it's only an adaptation of the PhD for a book. And in that sense, a sort of note aside, I've got a friend that once told me that if you visited some work that you had published six years ago and you were absolutely like... happy with the result. You had not learned anything in the meanwhile. And I think it's what represents it's a very nice experience as well to be able to go back and change things. So I've mainly strengthened the theoretical contribution. The book's quite embedded on this idea of inclusion moderation theory, which is something that I would be talking about. I've updated it as well now. Goes up to almost 20 twenty-five. No, it finishes in 20 twenty-four, so, in that sense, I managed to update it quite a lot. No, it's based on more than 60 interviews that I've carried on several on several visits to Morocco, mainly on opposition actors, and let's say... somewhat loosely, a couple of hundreds of statements and paper is published by or justice and spirituality in English. I'll use them interchangeable. I think it's might be easier to say justice and spirituality actually. So once again, before entering into the content of the book, I wanted to begin with two ideas that I think that have shaped the book and broadly they've shaped the research that I've been carried out, which is one idea on political Islam and the reason why I find it interesting, the second idea on position dynamics, and once again, the reason why I find it interesting, especially when we focus in Morocco. No, so the first idea I wanted to begin with a quote of John Waterbury. John Waterbury was this a comparative politics scholar from Princeton University. In 1970, he published a book

which is *The Commander of the Faithful*, which is, it was a book that really shaped all of my all of my PhD, I have to say. No, so Waterbury writes it in 1970. In 1970, there were no Islamist movements yet in Morocco. Now, the first one was beginning to take shape in 1969, so it doesn't really focus on Islamist actors. And he does, like he writes it at a time where the parliament is closed, no, it's like this sort of a full prime moment of dictatorship under King Hassan the Second, you know, this idea of the years of the years of lead. And he reflects on the dynamics existing between the different political elites in Morocco. And as part of this idea of the political elites, he reflects on the on the challenges posed by the opposition, which at the time were posed by the left, no, it was by left, left-wing political parties. And his idea, just as you know, just somewhat not as side as you know, Morocco is one executive, the king reigns but also governs, which means that the king holds an executive power. More than that, the king doesn't only hold an executive power, but the government is subordinated to the king. So he exerts the prime executive power. And at the same time, he's the commander of the faithful, which is this idea of the religious authority that he has in the country. So what Waterbury says is that the king's religious authority and resources allow him to overcome political threats by relying on a symbolic dimension to which political opposition parties do not have access. So it's the idea of no matter how strong the left is, they will be able to pose a challenge as an opposition actor in the political reality, in the political dimension. But the king will always have the symbolic religious dimension which is above. So everyone in the end will be like sort of subordinated to this religious I mentioned. And I found it very interesting because it begs to ask the question of what happens then with Islamist actors, with Islamist parties or Islamist movements, because they use the same religious resources and the same symbolic resources. So the question was, do they manage to jump and overcome this sort of political dimension and challenge the king also, not in the political, but also in the symbolic religious dimension as well. Like this is what Ribuish quote is still relevant, or do they manage to overcome this? And that's something that has shaped all of my interest on political Islam in Morocco. The second idea that I wanted to bring forward, it's actually a line that I wrote. I had the chance of presenting this book a couple of weeks ago at the University Complutense in Madrid, now where I work. And I wanted to present, like summarize the book in just one line for me to do like this sort of diffusion to the people in my department. So, I wrote a *Foxing in Morocco*, the book reflects on the strategies of inclusion and domestication directed at anti-establishment actors, which would be this anti-establishment or anti-system actors, would be Islamist, would be the Islamist opposition. Well, then I looked at the sentence and I felt that it's so many things could be so many concepts could be nuanced by the in that sentence, and that's part of the interesting thing I think about the opposition dynamics and special opposition dynamics in non-democratic. regimes, because first you have to address what an anti-establishment actor is, what an anti-system actor is, because if we look at it, like generally it's been looked at in democratic regimes, now we have like this sort of a... like

a German Sartori's work on anti-establishment political parties. And anti-establishment political parties, what they do is that they disrupt the democratic game because they don't believe in the principles of said game. They don't believe in the democracy of the game. But then you think about anti-establishment actors in like in non-democratic regimes, and that doesn't apply, you know, because Like, what did you not believe? No, like what they're actually doing is questioning the status quo, but that doesn't answer, no. They're questioning the status quo because they are anti-regime, because they are anti-authoritarian, because they are pro-democratic or not pro-democratic. What's the alternative that they're presenting? So I think that there's quite a lot of ideas to grasp there once you want to enter into it. And it's part of the... like this constant dilemma and debate on Islamist factors and Islamist parties, do they really defend democracy or not? So we have an opposition actor here that, as we will see, is going to collaborate with other pro-democratic actors, but what are they really defending through this collaboration? And then the second concept that I wanted to know a little bit was this idea of the inclusion and domestication. And it sort of It takes us to the concept of moderation, in the title, resisting inclusion and moderation, and what is moderation? So traditionally, moderation has been defined. I think there are three main definitions. The first one has to do with the rejection of violence. You moderate because you reject violence. And in that sense, you sort of tend to play by the political rules. The second one is this democratic commitment that I was mentioning. And then the third one, very linked to the first idea, it's the idea of, okay, because you have rejected violence, are you really willing to play by the rules, which are non-democratic in a non-democratic regime? No, that's interesting. So in the end, moderation becomes a sort of domestication. dynamic, it's a taming dynamic. You are introduced into the non-democratic ready me and in that sense you sort of legitimize the non-democratic system in which you're in which you're participating. And I think it's interesting and I think it's one of the main key elements that this Islamist association or justice and spirituality has refused to do. So about the book specifically, I could say very generally that the book examines Islamist actors in Morocco in relation to the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion promoted by the regime. And it does so by looking at the political arena, but also what the religious arena, which is something that I will stress quite a lot through my presentation, this idea that we have to look at the religious dimension as well at the religious sphere. No, so specifically, and it's true that the book touches upon all of the different Islamist actors that you can find in Morocco, but it specifically focuses on one which is justice and spirituality. In that sense, it sort of traces the evolution of justice and spirituality. Since the 80s or even the 70s, the association will be created in 1981 although there are some prior organizations and initiatives in the 1970s. And as I was saying, it reached up to 2024, so it pretty much comprises like this 50 years of evolution of justice and spirituality. And during this evolution, what we see is a movement that begins attempting to be an umbrella of all of the different Islamist actors in the country that will be its first idea in the 1980s, I want

to sort of gather up all of the different Islamist actors and you will end up being a quite a political political actor, sort of separated from the religious arena and working in the political one. So the whole idea of the book is that throughout these 50 years, just and mainly in the 21st century, which is like the time span that I focus on the most, it experiences a process of politicization. I welcome back to the last of the premises afterwards. So a couple of notes on justice and spirituality, just in case that you don't know it. As I was saying, The movement was created in 1981. It was never legalized, and it was illegalized in 1989. It was never legalized because it refuses to recognize the religious authority of the king. So it challenges the king, both from the political perspective, and it's going to be quite critical with both the political system under Hassan II and Mohammed VI. But especially, it challenges this idea of the commander of the faithful, not only from a scholar perspective in what a risk term, but directly. So the leader, like just some spirituality, has been led or was led until 2012 or when he desist by Shaykh Abdeslam Yassin. He gained notoriety in 1974. In 1974, he wrote an open letter, which was called Islam or the Flood, which was a direct challenge to Hassan II. He sent it, like it was a letter copied and sent to like the main political figures to the whole of the population. So it was quite a shocking thing to do at the time. And it was very interesting, not only because he did not recognize Hassan II's title as commander of the faithful, but because he used the same religious resources to challenge him. So he recognized himself as a serif, just as Hassan's second is. He recognized himself as having Baraka, just as Hassan's second did. And also, so you can see Muhammad Dadawi calls that rituals of power, you know, like this sort of symbolic power that is instrumentalized by the regime. And like he resorted exactly to the same, to these same resources to challenge it. he spent the next three years both in prison and in a psychiatry. He would be freed in the 1980s, but entered into prison once again, under home arrest in the 1990s. So up to 1999, he spent most of his trajectory in prison. In 1999, with the change in Kings, with the enthronement of Mohammed VI, there was like this sort of a small period of opening, and he was freed. And that's interesting because that would activate quite a lot the movement. So I that's one of the reasons by which I focus quite a lot in the 21st century. It will become quite, quite active. Importantly, just some spirituality is guided by what they call the three nose principles, this idea of no to violence or the rejection of violence, the rejection of clandestine activity, no, to working underground and no to foreign funding or support, which explains this, the later explains why they've been able to survive, no, this sort of presentation as a purely domestic Islamist association. The first one takes us to this rejection of the moderation idea, no, or the understanding of what moderation is. The last The idea I wanted to highlight is the fact that Justice and Spirituality is the biggest opposition movement in Morocco. As Michael was saying, it's not only the biggest Islamist actor, but also the biggest opposition member. It has approximately vaguely between 100,000 members and 300,000 members. That's quite difficult to measure now because of the half clandestine or realized nature of the movement. So it's, I don't

know, I'm always, I always hear that it's a sort of mantra that scholars repeat from one paper to the other, but it is true that their participation in demonstrations, it's really like a, like the sort of point of inflation, like you can't really see the strength that they bring when they're participating. So despite the number that we can attest to the real strength that this movement has on the streets. If finishing with the introductions, I wanted to comment briefly on the inclusion moderation theory. I've sort of divided this theory on 3 trends. Now, the first one is what we properly could call inclusion moderation theory. It was nuanced a couple of after emerging a couple of years later and it was like even a strong twist after the Arab Spring. So the first studies on the MINA region in the moderation theory date back to the beginning of the 2000s. But I would say it's quite embedded on the transitology movement, on the transitology studies, studies on democratic transitions in the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, which were quite optimistic on the results of this democratic transitions. Now there is this idea first that the emergence of civil society will forcefully lead to democracy, to democratic regimes. There is a second idea that has to do with this inclusion moderation theory, which basically defends that the inclusion of anti-establishment actors, which would be in this case, the inclusion of Islamist actors, will on the one hand moderate these actors, on the other hand democratize the regimes, because the regime was forced to include divergent voices and in that sense it sort of tainted its red lines. So that's basically the, like, if we have to summarize it in one or two sentences, that's basically the idea of inclusion moderation theory. As on the other hand, no, and quite based on the experience of Algeria and all this attempt at democratizing and opening elections in the 90s and the subsequent civil war that you experience. The second idea would be in contrast with inclusion moderation theory, exclusion radicalization theory would argue that if you exclude Islamist actors, they will tend to radicalize and they will tend to radicalize by taking up weapons and beginning a series of attacks. That's the main idea, which has been a second trend, which will be this idea of the moderation for exclusion, looked at cases in which Islamist actors had moderated prior to their inclusion into the system. Now, there is this idea by Wickham, Wickham focuses on the Al-Wassad party in Egypt in the 1990s, and he studies how they could say the excess of repression force the political party to moderate because it would end up defending, or this party would end up protesting against the authoritarianism of the regime, and by protesting it would sort of tame their opinions, sort of. adapt and take more pro-democratic or anti-authoritarian principles. And then there is this second idea, defended like to include one I was saying in 2013, which is the idea that radicalizing Islamist actors end up so far away from society that they lose support and they are forced to moderate without inclusion to gain once again the support of these the support of the population. They have a study on Nahda, a political party in the 2000s in Tunisia. Now, the interesting thing, so the Arab Spring is going to sort of bring A twist to this inclusion and moderation theory. Both trends that I've that I've highlighted reflect top-down strategies. No relative depends on the regime to decide if they want to either include or not Islamist actors.

What the Arab Spring showed was that there could be also bottom-up inclusion processes. They're wrong with that to the streets and will force their ready need to accept them. So we have here like a third perspective, but this perspective is going to be like way more nuanced to know. So it attempts at understanding also the inner dynamics of Islamist actors. Now the learning mechanisms that they have, the... inner tensions and the decision making processes within these actors to understand why they decide or not decide to participate. So it's in this sort of third trend that my book is framed or on which the book relies. So before entering into or well, Entering into the 4th premise, which might be the, I think, the most important one. No, my idea, and I almost read aloud the cover of the book, the idea is that just sense spirituality stands. as an opposition actor has not changed throughout time. Following the Arab Spring, it's true that it will solve this sort of politicization process in the sense that it will participate in the Arab Spring, it will collaborate with secular and left-wing forces, et cetera, et cetera. But that does not mean that it has been included in the system. It rejects inclusion, it rejects participation. the sort of anti-establishment claims against the regime that they have to not change. So it remains a political outsider. It refuses to recognize the political and religious authority of the king, and basically it opts for staying in the streets rather than participating in the ballot in the ballot post, not rather than participating in the electoral procedure. So, in that sense, what I argue in the book is that justice and spirituality, it's an example of a politicization without inclusion it's a politicization process without really being included into the system. So, by politicization, what I mean... It's the stronger focus on the political dimension, and I sort of subdivided it in four elements that I wanted to present. The first one is that there's going to be a change in the organizational model of a justice and spirituality, gaining in weight of the political branch of the movement. And this is interesting. sort of go back to this to this presentation of justice and spirituality, I could add that it presents one specificity and it's that it works almost as a brotherhood. It's based on a Sufism rather than Salafism. It has a very strong, a very strong master and discipline and disciple relation. It's quite hierarchical, but it also creates quite a lot of links and interaction at the bottom, between the RAC and file members. It sort of exceeds this idea of the political entry into the more spiritual personal dimension through the... Like the celebration or the organization of a Sufi spiritual, spiritual events and dynamics, no, and that has, like, that has not... disappeared, but it's true that it has gained quite a lot of, like the political branch, which is called the political circle, has gained quite a lot of autonomy throughout the years now, which is like this sort of example of how to politicize your structure. There is a second, I would say, a shift in the search of alliances in the networking strategy of the movement from a relying on the networks of other Islamist actors or other religious actors to more, as I was saying, political, secular, opposition actors. There is the adoption of a framed strategy which addresses increasingly secular political issues, would be the third one. And the 4th idea is that there is a shift in its space of mobilization, no one, a greater focus on the streets rather

than, say, the mosques or say the private spiritual activities that they were pushing for in the past. So now I wanted to bring three, like sort of three main conclusions or three main ideas to explain this process of politicization and why it takes place. No, so the first one is the idea that the politicization is a reaction to changes in political opportunities and the closing of the political and religious arena. This for me is the most important one. I'll focus, like dedicate most of my time to speaking about this one and then we'll touch a little bit upon the second and third conclusion. No, so this idea first means that you have to look at the structure and the opportunities that it brings for Islamist for the opposition's actions. No, it doesn't matter if it's Islamist associations or not. No, it basically relies on the idea that inclusion does not always need to be like this sort of invitation by the regime. But what they're doing actually is closing and forcing, closing spaces for action and forcing in that sense Islamist actors to moderate, to be included, or to take positions with regards of the shifts in the structure. So it's also basically focuses on the exclusion of the spaces controlled by the regime. So I was saying this touches upon the political, but also upon the religious arena. And to explain this, I wanted to focus on two events that take place at the beginning of the 2000s. Now, the first one is the reform of the Moroccan family code, which is going to polarize society, create quite a lot of tensions and a big division amongst both society and political and religious actors between these sort of secular forces defending the reform of the Moroccan family code and these religious forces and actors defending or trying to trying to block this promotion and this passing of a new a new family code under a range of arguments on the inviolability of the family code. And the second one, which is going to come and intersect, no, and okay, come right in the middle of these tensions are going to be a series of terrorist attacks that are going to live in the city of Casablanca in May 2003. where several buildings are going to be bombed. And that's very interesting because it's going to tear down one of the main notions of Morocco, which is the idea of the Moroccan exceptionalism. The Moroccan exceptionalism basically said that because the king was the commander of the faithful, it was immune to terrorism. It had like a certain control over the religious arena. And that's really going to be challenged by these terrorist attacks. Like ultimately what the attacks are going to do are actually going to like expedite the political tensions. So an anti-terrorist law will be passed in 2003. The family code will be passed very influenced by the sort of repressive scene. that will be sold from the terrorist attacks in 2004. So what we see in both moments, which interests me, is that religious actors are going to rely on themselves and are going to collaborate among themselves to try to stop and defend. On the first one, to try to stop the Moroccan family called, on the second one, to defend themselves from a really big, strong, repressive campaign that's going to be launched by the Moroccan redeeming. King Mohammed Six will speak about the end of leniency. No, and it's like, okay, we have to close now with the spaces, and that's going to result in quite a lot of arrests on Islamist activists, if you want to put it that way, or basically everyone that sort of looked like a possible Islamist. No, so on the first hand, what we have is the

creation of what's going to be called the National Committee for the Protection of the Moroccan Family. On the second one, they'll form a second network, which is going to be called the Islamic Block. But the interesting thing for me is that the, like the cleavage, the reason uniting all of these, both blocks, it's going to be the religious nature of the actors. So we're actually going to find, we're going to find the justice and spirituality, we're going to find the PJD, but we're going to find also the ulema of Morocco, which are aligned with the king, but will protest against this issue of religious nature. And also, so the uniting force is going to be like this sort of religious, religious frame. So I will comment on this sort of third event in one second. So there are a couple of ideas or conclusions that I think that can be found from this. from these events. The main idea, the first idea, is that they're going to dismantle the pluralistic nature of Morocco's religious arena. As I was saying, following 1999 and the accession to the throne of King Mohammed VI, there's going to be like this sort of small religious opening as well. Now, several Islamist actors are going to be legalized or at least recognized and enabled to participate within the political life or the political and religious life. Now we have the movement for the Ummah. We have a civilizational alternative. We had this idea of Shahi Yassin. Shah Yassin's house arrest now ceasing and him being able to sort of take back over the leadership of the movement as well. We have the inclusion of the PJD now since 1998, and that's going to change in 2003, the PJD. which was already incorporated, it's going to be like more strongly tamed and moderated and becomes in that sense sort of paradigmatic case of inclusion moderation fearing in the time. Salafism is going to be really repressed and just some spirituality is going to become isolated in the religious scenario. What this shows is that contrary to this assumption, this quote of water that I was including, the book, what it argues is that the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion also extends. It's not something only political, but it also extends to the religious arena. And also going back to this sort of quote and question on Waterbury, we could say, yes, Islamist actors are able to challenge the king on the political because they rely on religious resources, but ultimately, the king has control over this arena. So it decides when this arena opens and it decides when it's constrained. And by constraining, it sort of pushes and sort of eliminates some of these resources that these Islamist actors have. Now, in this sense, I wanted to extend this idea of the control of the inclusion and exclusion dynamics of the religious sphere. to a concept that I find fascinating. It's a concept, it's the structures of contestation, which was developed by Professor Ellen Last in 2005 on a book with the same name. And in this book, what she does is actually to study the dynamics between opposition and regimes and how these dynamics allow for a greater liberalization processes or not. And she identifies Morocco with a divided structure of contestation. A divided structure of contestation, basically what argues is that half of the political opposition in Morocco is included and the other half is excluded, or it is divided. It's a structure, a divided structure of contestation. And that prevents collaboration between both of them because they include the included opposition want be willing to collaborate with the

excluded one in fear that they might be expelled from the included arena, not from the institutions. So it's a sort of way of deactivating opposition dynamics. The argument, what we see here during this period is that just as we can extend no inclusion and exclusion dynamics into the religious arena, we could extend as well this idea of the divided structure of contestation into the religious arena as well. So it works both on the political and the religious one. And this takes me to this idea of the third event, prominent event that I wanted to highlight, which takes place in 2006. It's going to be like this sort of proactive initiative launched by Justice and Spirituality. For me, from all of the study that I've done, I think it is the most interesting initiative, or most relevant initiative that they have, because it's really going to influence the strategic evolution of the movement. Now, so in this sort of period of isolation that I was mentioning following 2003, what they are going to do is to launch a campaign. And it's important because if you look at 2003 and the reform of the Mudawan of the family code, those are reactive strategies, which is usually the case with just sense spirituality. Something happens and they react to it and then they sort of develop their strategy. 2006 is, 2005, 2006 is the only time where nothing happens and they decide to launch a strategy which would be like this sort of proactive have defensive strategy to break on their isolation. And so what they do is to publish a series of prophetic visions that allegedly their members have had in which they could see Shaykhia seen with the prophet. And in these visions, there was an announcement that some big event was going to happen in 2006. So it's understand as a sort of claim and call for revolution in 2006. In the meantime, 2005 is quite a tense period because Nadia Yassin, which is the Shah Yassin's daughter, has sort of called for a republic in Morocco in an interview, which is somewhat misquoted, but it's going to create quite a lot of tension surrounding the movement. And I will speak about a bit more later. And then in 2006, at the time that this sort of big event was supposed to have to happen, they launched a campaign of open doors that they call it, which means basically that they sort of go more public than they were. They opened their houses, they opened their headquarters and invite society to enter. So it's like a very public, a very public campaign, which is going to be understood as a sort of effort for this big event that had been announced in 2005 to come to arrive. The, well, 22 interesting things or two relevant things. The first one is that it's like the campaign is going to be absolutely repressed by the regime. In 2006, there are going to be thousands of members arrested by the Moroccan regime, and that's going to sort of dismantle the campaigns and the strategy. Most importantly, I feel that the Visions campaign was saying that they are the same religious actors with whom they have been collaborating, you know, at the beginning of 2009 of the 21st century. And that's, these Islamist actors are going to reject the campaign. They're going to doubt its origins. They're going to criticize it from being part of this sort of Sufi doctrine, not really supported by the Koran. Without entering much into this sort of proper religious symbolism, idiosyncrasy, the ideas that they are going to reject the campaign and they're going to leave them alone. So, and that sort of shows part of this idea of the divided structure. Now, we were

mentioning the PJD, which is already included, we were mentioning the ulema, which is already included in the system, aligned with the palace. No, so it was okay to collaborate when the family code was being challenged, but we don't want to do anything with you now that you're like on your own challenging the regime. And I find it interesting because my argument will be that that's going to be a shift in the strategy of justice and spirituality. From that moment onwards, it will focus more on the political arena because it considers that there is the religious arena has been extinguished. You know, we've tried to rely on our religious allies. They've rejected us, no, they have shown us or given us the back or shown us the back, so we're going to shift our network and our search for allies. The last idea that I wanted to highlight. It's this idea that the contraction, the disappearing of the religious space, it's going to force a politicization of all of the religious actors. First of all, because they're forced to position themselves politically with regards to the family code and with regards to terrorism and their support of the regime. So they stop being just religious actors and they become also political actors that have to position themselves. Second one is because the political arena is going to disappear in that the religious arena is going to disappear in that sense they're going to be forced to enter into the political realm. So basically my idea is that that's what happens in 2011 now with the Arab Spring. What we witness is an exhaustion of the religious arena. And a turn, as I was saying at the beginning, towards more political actions and actors. They look for cross-ideological alliances, they rely on interplay with the 20th February movement, which is going to be this popular, mostly secular movement that's going to emerge in the in the uprisings. And especially in this sense, now going back to the idea of the cleavages, what they are going to do is to show that the relevant cleavage right now, in order to form alliances, is your support or opposition of the regime. So religion is not important anymore. It's either you're with us or you're with. with the king, with the regime. Also, it's either pro-palace or opposition. And that's a huge, huge shift in the strategy of justice and spirituality. The third idea is that in order to do so, they're going to adapt their political framework, their political claims and ideas. But I will touch up on this on the third of the ideas that I want to present. So more briefly, because I think that the second and third conclusion actually derived from this first idea that I was presenting, the second idea is that politicization is sort of internal dynamics. In the meantime, when this is happening, there are going to be quite a lot of tensions with the women's section. during the reform of the family code and the relevance that the women's section is actually going to gain. So there's going to be a rejection by some part, by people called the old guard of the movement on the rights on women defended by these women's women's section. And this women's section is going to be led and guided by Nadia Yassin, the daughter of Syed Yassin, which is going to emerge as a sort of unofficial spokeswoman of the association. No, that's going to create quite a lot of tensions now in 2005 and 2006, as I was saying, 2005, and Nadia Yassin, she's going to do a tour. Macros, the United States, and one of these interviews she's going to talk about the republicanism or possible

republicanism of justice and spirituality in the rejection of the king. So she's going to be prosecuted and that's going to give her quite a lot of relevance knowing in these years. Nothing will ever like will end up happening to her like in this prosecution, but she's going to gain quite a lot of like she's going to be on the spotlight quite a lot. The second idea in this same 2005, 2006 is that there's going to be a tension between the old guard and the sort of second generation members on their role that justice and spirituality needs to have, with the old guard defending the religious branch and the religious dimension of justice and spirituality and this second generation defending the more political role. And I feel that this is interesting because, ultimately, if we look at it, when we see it's a fight for the succession, and what's going to happen with a justice and spirituality when Sergio Sin is not there, no Sergio Sin will end up the season in 2012, but he was already sick in 2005 and 2006. Also, so people is beginning to think about the future in that sense, there are sort of internal clashes on what's going to happen. I think that the disease of Sheikh Yassin is going to accelerate the politicization process now. There is going to be a change in the organization after his disease. He was the spiritual guide, which was this sort of both political and religious role. The spiritual guide is going to be preserved for Sheikh Yassin. So, they're going to create like this sort of a dual executive within the or dual a secretary generals within the party, dividing between the religious and the political and the political elements. So, we have like this Fatalah Harsalam on the political side, and we have Mohammed Abadi on the religious branch, and Nadia Yassin is going to completely disappear following his father's passing she's going to lose. say this sort of battle for the succession, and she's going to disappear, she's going to become a translator of her father's thought and books, and she's not going to play a political role anymore. And lastly, third idea, because I don't want to overextend myself, is that, of course, politicization is a result of learning mechanisms. And there are quite a lot of learning mechanisms that I could highlight. We could argue that Everything that I've presented until now, it's a learning mechanism of the idea of how to learn from the experience of this sort of exhaustion of the religious arena, of their attempts at continuing with this religious networking, et cetera. But I wanted to focus especially on the idea of their political collaboration. So I think it's quite interesting because it allows us to see the framing of justice and spirituality in recent times. So I'd say that there is going to be a rapprochement with a, like a traditional historical rapprochement with the political figures. Now we have a sort of the establishment of personal relations in the 90s and intellectual effort in the 2000s and 2008 there's going to be a book published involving different opposition actors. And that sense they're going to sort of sharpen their political contribution. But 2011 with the uprising would be like this sort of inflex point now in the political proposal that they have, and they're going to present this idea of the civil state, so then this civil state, it's the idea of a sort of dialogue without red lines between the or among the opposition actors in a transition period from authoritarianism to something. No, it's a bit abstract, but it's going to be way less abstract than anything that they have presented prior to

this. And I read you directly the presentation, the definition that they do of a civil state. They talk about once they've established a democratic momentum, once a democratic momentum has been achieved. The civil state is founded on national consensus, a democratic constitution, the sovereignty of the people, and respect for both political majorities and minorities with a foundation in civic rights, which means that there's actually quite a strong, explicit positioning. But it's true that they leave it for the decision of the majority once the time comes. which has been always interpreted as them knowing that they have the support of the majority, so we'll see which role Islam plays in this civil state by doing a sort of referendum and counting on the people and counting in that sense of the sort of Muslim unity of the people, basically. And then most interestingly, they're going to present a second, a political document in 2024, which like I was just finishing the book, but I feel obliged to include at least something on it. It's interesting because it's sort of a more formal formulation of the previous civil state that they have presented. So on the one hand, from the organizational perspective or the organization perspective, they're going to formalize the autonomy of the political branch, and also they've completely separated, more or less, or this recognized the autonomy of the religious and the political branch. And they're going to present a very interestingly 777 measures to write a democratic constitution. So it's actually a very long political document. It reads almost as a political parties manifesto, you know, we could say. And we've seen that, they talk about a democratic constitution, their recognition of human rights, political and religious pluralism, popular sovereignty, and the need for accountability. So, it's actually quite detailed. They still recognize 3 important red lines. You know, the first one is the rejection of authoritarianism and the magazine, you know, this sort of Moroccan, say, authoritarianism and the Moroccan regime. The second one is the questioning of the king, which they feel that clashes with the idea of popular sovereignty. It's not something that they say explicitly, but there is like a big debate, like abstract debate on what the role of the king should be. And the third one is their defense of the prophetic path of Shaykh Yassin. So there is still a very strong place for religion within this political system that they are presenting. So to finish and to extend myself, basically taking on these four ideas, now we could sum it up by saying first that there is a restructuring of how this organic creation, this idea first the creation of the political circle in 1998, the structural changes that it's going to, that the justice and spiritual is going to live in, let's say, 2012, following the death of Shah Yassin, the political document presented. There is the second idea of the shifts in the networking strategy. Now, there's actually currently going on quite a formal collaboration with the democratic way, which is a radical left or far left-wing political party. So there's survival of the experience of the Arab uprising of 2011 and a constant collaboration in this already 15 years that have followed the Arab Spring. There is an adaptation of its framing strategy, you know, the civil state and the political document that I was mentioning. And there is a greater focus on street-based actions. I was thinking, although I don't have time to develop here, but we can develop it if not in the

Q&A. For example, this formation of the Moroccan Front for supporting Palestine and all the initiatives that they've launched against the normalization of relations, against the normalization of Morocco's relations with Israel. So overall, just to finish the main idea, I think that the book delves on the complex political space existing in Morocco, where religious and political actors interwave, where parliamentary and non-parliamentary or excluded and included actors interwave as well. So we have quite a complicated dynamic in that sense going on. And basically what this book is trying to do is to shed some light on these dynamics between included, excluded, opposition, religious and political arenas. So I'm going to leave it here. Thank you very much, everyone.