1 00:00:00,500 --> 00:00:09,220 Thanks fail. So I think that introduction to the Ugandan context summarises the angst that drove my research. 2 00:00:09,220 --> 00:00:14,050 And it was really within the context of our common frustration about the debates 3 00:00:14,050 --> 00:00:19,600 and perhaps a very narrow framework that the debates were operating on, 4 00:00:19,600 --> 00:00:28,120 which was how is it that the ICC was going to affect peace in Uganda with the ICC going to lead to peace with the ICC, 5 00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:35,790 going to derail possibilities for peace? And there was a lot of speculation happening on all sides of this conversation. 6 00:00:35,790 --> 00:00:40,890 And so my initial research was motivated by that observation. 7 00:00:40,890 --> 00:00:46,280 But because I have I have thought about this for a while and I could say so many things. 8 00:00:46,280 --> 00:00:50,300 What I decided to do was to narrow it down to a written piece of work, 9 00:00:50,300 --> 00:00:57,080 and that might make fieldwork easier in terms of reaching me and making me keep quiet. 10 00:00:57,080 --> 00:01:06,360 After a certain period of time for that, I can I can be sure to cover some of the most important elements within the allots. 11 00:01:06,360 --> 00:01:10,660 He allotted fifteen to twenty minutes timeframe. 12 00:01:10,660 --> 00:01:20,920 And I think what you will realise is that some of the debates that animated the Ugandan case are very much present currently in the Sudan situation 13 00:01:20,920 --> 00:01:31,660 with regard to the referral of of various Atabay issuing of various arrest warrants in the Sudanese case and the conversations about peace, 14 00:01:31,660 --> 00:01:37,930 justice for the ICC and what's coming in. What what can explain various peace processes, really. 15 00:01:37,930 --> 00:01:43,360 Those debates are still alive. And so that is the context of my work. 16 00:01:43,360 --> 00:01:48,570 And also, just to add that quite a bit of the paper is the presentation of the first quite preliminary. 17 00:01:48,570 --> 00:01:55,270 So if you have any reflections, thoughts, some horse additions that you think I should think about at the end of it, 18 00:01:55,270 --> 00:02:01,480 I'd love to hear what what you'd have to say, because I very much appreciate feedback. 19 00:02:01,480 --> 00:02:12,880 And then, as Phil also mentioned, it's very much based on interviews with the athletes and stakeholders in the conflict as a way of trying to 20 00:02:12,880 --> 00:02:20,620 go beyond the discourse that was taking place at the level of international organisations and the media. 21 00:02:20,620 --> 00:02:27,180 So the question that I'm really trying to answer is, how did the ICC affect this process? 22 00:02:27,180 --> 00:02:30,910 If I call and I will do so in three steps. 23 00:02:30,910 --> 00:02:35,140 The first step would be a very quick zoom through the history of Uganda. 24 00:02:35,140 --> 00:02:42,280 And then I will talk about the conflict, the involvement of the ICC and the subsequent peace process. 25 00:02:42,280 --> 00:02:49,600 The second step will be to give two common explanations that are given for the Juba, his process, 26 00:02:49,600 --> 00:02:56,980 and one of those explanations privileges shifts in military and political considerations on the ground. 27 00:02:56,980 --> 00:03:09,320 And the second explanation, privileges, explanations of privileges, arguments about principles, norms and international institutions. 28 00:03:09,320 --> 00:03:15,980 And then the third section of the paper will propose that a fuller explanation might 29 00:03:15,980 --> 00:03:22,340 be acquired through adding a crucial but often overlooked an element of an agency. 30 00:03:22,340 --> 00:03:27,620 And watch my evidence seems to point to is a conclusion that Juba, the dispute, 31 00:03:27,620 --> 00:03:33,020 the peace process was one of the by-products of elite agents appropriating 32 00:03:33,020 --> 00:03:38,030 International Criminal Court in pursuit of a range of non justice political goals. 33 00:03:38,030 --> 00:03:41,420 So that gives you a quick overview of what it is that I'm going to tell you. 34 00:03:41,420 --> 00:03:49,160 So Section one, the historical overview within the context of a turbulent post independence history in Uganda, 35 00:03:49,160 --> 00:03:56,650 the conflict between the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army was triggered in 1986 by the NRA. 36 00:03:56,650 --> 00:03:59,810 And I raised the National Resistance Army of the current president. 37 00:03:59,810 --> 00:04:06,110 Was that any when the NRA overthrew the then government of the Uganda National Liberation Army 38 00:04:06,110 --> 00:04:13,190 and that government that was overthrown was composed mostly of soldiers from northern Uganda, 39 00:04:13,190 --> 00:04:16,370 70s armies subsequently occupied northern Uganda. 40 00:04:16,370 --> 00:04:25,490 This area actually land where a former overthrown army came from in order to confront the supposed popular base for the U.N. a u. 41 00:04:25,490 --> 00:04:32,600 N n a. And in the process of repress and perpetrated widespread atrocities against the 42 00:04:32,600 --> 00:04:37,910 population resentment's to the occupation that led to a series of rebellion, 43 00:04:37,910 --> 00:04:41,390 most notably the Holy Spirit movement of Alice Laquinta. 44 00:04:41,390 --> 00:04:48,920 And while her rebellion was eventually defeated, Corney and what eventually came to be called the Lord's Resistance Army, 45 00:04:48,920 --> 00:04:58,070 the NRA had taken the mantle of spiritual discourse of Cleanseas to violence, and that is really what the NRA has been popularly known for. 46 00:04:58,070 --> 00:05:03,380 So the war then resulted in a high exposure of brutality for most of the population. 47 00:05:03,380 --> 00:05:08,270 In northern Uganda, perhaps as many as 66000 children were abducted. 48 00:05:08,270 --> 00:05:12,350 Now, those numbers vary depending on who you're talking to and what their agenda might be. 49 00:05:12,350 --> 00:05:17,480 But the bottom line is that a lot of abductions took place. 50 00:05:17,480 --> 00:05:18,770 And in the media, 51 00:05:18,770 --> 00:05:29,390 Kony and the NRA were portrayed by the government of Uganda as a ragtag army that was perpetually on the verge of being defeated by the Ugandan army, 52 00:05:29,390 --> 00:05:36,140 which is also called the UPDF. So if I throw out that acronym, hopefully will not confuse you too much. 53 00:05:36,140 --> 00:05:45,590 And this this this RIFs army was also thought of as a pointlessly violent group without a discernible political goal. 54 00:05:45,590 --> 00:05:52,060 Now, a range of scholars have been gone on to a point out what might be considered to be political goals of the NRA. 55 00:05:52,060 --> 00:05:59,270 What's the common narrative nonetheless is one that very much privileges that a political understanding of the Lord's Resistance Army. 56 00:05:59,270 --> 00:06:04,730 And at the same time, the common narrative also marginalises the other aspects of abuses, 57 00:06:04,730 --> 00:06:08,780 which include how it is that they UPDF, that is the Ugandan army, 58 00:06:08,780 --> 00:06:12,740 were also complicit in a range of human rights abuses in northern Uganda, 59 00:06:12,740 --> 00:06:21,550 most notably the internment of 80 to 90 percent of the actual population in internally displaced people comes. 60 00:06:21,550 --> 00:06:28,780 So the ICC became effective in July 2000 and to end by 16th of December 2003, 61 00:06:28,780 --> 00:06:34,030 the governments of Uganda had asked the ICC to intervene to address the war crimes committed by the 62 00:06:34,030 --> 00:06:40,720 NRA and effectively became the first the first state referral to the International Criminal Court. 63 00:06:40,720 --> 00:06:46,390 What this did was to spark a controversy on the wisdom of seeking legal solutions 64 00:06:46,390 --> 00:06:52,450 to political problems with varying levels of nuance and agreement on alternatives. 65 00:06:52,450 --> 00:06:58,360 The basic debate questioned whether the ICC should proceed with a prosecution 66 00:06:58,360 --> 00:07:03,460 because it was appropriate or because it would lead to the desired consequences. 67 00:07:03,460 --> 00:07:11,040 So why should we allow the ICC to intervene? And what are the kinds of consequences of intervention? 68 00:07:11,040 --> 00:07:17,320 Malkasian. But the unexpected seems to happen because in May of 2006, 69 00:07:17,320 --> 00:07:25,900 a secret process mediated by the government of southern Sudan took a public turn with the appearance of the appearance of images of Kony in the media. 70 00:07:25,900 --> 00:07:31,270 For the first time and this was in a in a widely watched BBC interview. 71 00:07:31,270 --> 00:07:38,440 And in this particular interview, Kony was calling for peace and he was talking about the way in which he does not target civilians. 72 00:07:38,440 --> 00:07:45,720 He only targets people who are affiliated with that with 77 percent of the army or the seven force. 73 00:07:45,720 --> 00:07:52,150 The Juba peace process begun mediated by the government of South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar. 74 00:07:52,150 --> 00:07:55,930 A series of agreements were signed over a two year period, 75 00:07:55,930 --> 00:08:03,370 including an agenda item three that detailed the process by which the ICC would be marginalised and 76 00:08:03,370 --> 00:08:10,810 accountability pursued in Uganda through both formal and informal possible without the explicit. 77 00:08:10,810 --> 00:08:18,460 By March of 2008, there was a signed a code on just about everything that the NRA had sought to get agreement on. 78 00:08:18,460 --> 00:08:27,160 What remained with the signing of a symbolic final peace agreement on April 10th of 2008 and end in March 2008. 79 00:08:27,160 --> 00:08:31,120 This is when Phil and I were having this workshop in Uganda and they were absolutely fascinating. 80 00:08:31,120 --> 00:08:36,700 And we can discuss those in the question and answer session by April 10th of 2000 and eight. 81 00:08:36,700 --> 00:08:42,520 That was the first time that Kony was expected to show up in order to sign this final peace agreement. 82 00:08:42,520 --> 00:08:47,090 He did not show up, citing fear of arrest. 83 00:08:47,090 --> 00:08:53,560 And soon it was evident that he would not sign at all unless the ICC arrest warrants were suspended. 84 00:08:53,560 --> 00:08:57,940 The peace process was considered as terminated by the 14th of December 2008, 85 00:08:57,940 --> 00:09:05,830 when the Ugandan army launched Operation Lightning Thunder against the Lord's Resistance Army in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 86 00:09:05,830 --> 00:09:10,110 So given that background, how can we explain that you. 87 00:09:10,110 --> 00:09:15,730 But this process. Now, here I go to the two explanations that I mentioned earlier. 88 00:09:15,730 --> 00:09:22,150 The first common explanation of Juba rests on shifts in the political and military framework, 89 00:09:22,150 --> 00:09:34,560 and it asserts that the ICC have little independent impact on the peace process outside the ships in post-Cold War military considerations. 90 00:09:34,560 --> 00:09:44,850 The explanations in this camp to begin with, the understanding that Juba was the 10th peace process in Uganda since 1994, depending on how you count. 91 00:09:44,850 --> 00:09:47,690 But most most common counts begin with. 92 00:09:47,690 --> 00:09:56,520 They'd begun by one process of 1994, 1995 and proceed through a whole range of interventions that are attempted by both civil society, 93 00:09:56,520 --> 00:10:03,930 the church and various establishments, including international organisations, until the Bego Mitchell process, which was still ongoing. 94 00:10:03,930 --> 00:10:13,040 By the time of the arrest, warrants for the Lord's Resistance Army were being issued by the ICC. 95 00:10:13,040 --> 00:10:22,850 So given that there were all this peace processes that were ongoing, people in this camp of explanations would argue that the ICC was not unimportant. 96 00:10:22,850 --> 00:10:30,200 In fact, according to the the LRAD legal adviser, he mentioned that the ICC would have made this people, 97 00:10:30,200 --> 00:10:37,460 meaning the NRA high commands even more obstinate because there would not have known that there was any way to get around the ICC. 98 00:10:37,460 --> 00:10:41,810 So that view that the ICC would have marginalised the possibilities of negotiation. 99 00:10:41,810 --> 00:10:50,090 Instead, what they do is offer two explanations for Juba. The first explanation they offer is on domestic military balance. 100 00:10:50,090 --> 00:10:56,990 According to the UPDF spokesperson, initially the LRAD had advantage over the UPDF and this is what they say. 101 00:10:56,990 --> 00:11:04,520 I quote, They were operating in a terrain more familiar to them than us, and the rebels were much younger than many of our troops, he said. 102 00:11:04,520 --> 00:11:13,490 And then in another interview, the secretary to the president attributed the military's new advantage to what he called the president's stubbornness. 103 00:11:13,490 --> 00:11:21,590 And I quote, President Museveni had been husband's stubborn when the West and everybody was calling on a cut down in defence spending. 104 00:11:21,590 --> 00:11:29,510 He was insisting that the army had to be better equipped and that once the army was better equipped, we were going to have different results. 105 00:11:29,510 --> 00:11:36,170 What happened was that 70 did not respond to the calls that he keep military spending below one point nine percent, 106 00:11:36,170 --> 00:11:45,950 actually below two percent at one point five percent. And instead, by 2002, 2003, military spending was up to 21 percent, according to some accounts. 107 00:11:45,950 --> 00:11:50,750 It is this shift in the military capacity of the government of Uganda that this 108 00:11:50,750 --> 00:11:55,870 group of explanations would give credit for pushing the peace process underway. 109 00:11:55,870 --> 00:12:03,530 So the NRA was militarily defeated. And so it makes sense that they would negotiate excuse me, that they would negotiate. 110 00:12:03,530 --> 00:12:10,370 The second strand of arguments against him privileging the the military political explanations focus on geopolitics. 111 00:12:10,370 --> 00:12:15,290 And as we know, the Ugandan army was involved in a long proxy war with Sudan, 112 00:12:15,290 --> 00:12:21,710 Uganda supporting the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the SLA, and in retaliation, Sudan supporting the NRA. 113 00:12:21,710 --> 00:12:25,130 Now, there is the question as to who supported whose rebels. 114 00:12:25,130 --> 00:12:33,290 First is one that is contentious. But the ultimate outcome is that there was a proxy war between Uganda and Sudan. 115 00:12:33,290 --> 00:12:39,050 In 2005, the Khartoum government signed a comprehensive peace agreement with espionage, 116 00:12:39,050 --> 00:12:43,430 an event that was seen from the military perspective of Uganda as a success in the 117 00:12:43,430 --> 00:12:48,440 Ugandan military strategy of supporting the SPL in southern Sudan and then the NRA, 118 00:12:48,440 --> 00:12:51,980 which had then been used by Khartoum to attack the SPL. 119 00:12:51,980 --> 00:12:59,720 It became, in theory, defunct. In the case of that negotiated agreement between the north and the south. 120 00:12:59,720 --> 00:13:05,060 Further, the LRAD is location in southern Sudan in light of this comprehensive peace agreement. 121 00:13:05,060 --> 00:13:10,580 Their location was no longer safe because it is now under the control over their former enemies. 122 00:13:10,580 --> 00:13:20,390 In this view, the meeting between Salva Kiir and Joseph Kony at the beginning of the Juba process where Kony was given by Kiir three choices, 123 00:13:20,390 --> 00:13:29,680 which is negotiate leaves Sudan or be militarily pursued, stemmed from this security consideration in the subregion. 124 00:13:29,680 --> 00:13:34,120 This was summarised by quotes that I obtained from a member of the cessation of hostilities 125 00:13:34,120 --> 00:13:38,380 monitoring team who was looking at who was monitoring whether the Dubai peace process. 126 00:13:38,380 --> 00:13:42,370 And he said the balance of forces had changed. The NRA had no chance. 127 00:13:42,370 --> 00:13:48,370 When Machar approached them to stop or come to the negotiating table, they had no alternative. 128 00:13:48,370 --> 00:13:55,060 And so in this explanation, the context was absolutely instrumental to the Juba peace process. 129 00:13:55,060 --> 00:14:01,330 And the third explanation I want to give, it's too much, too much airtime is focussed on donor pressure. 130 00:14:01,330 --> 00:14:09,040 And this talks from the October 2000 and fourth visit by the then head of the UN, Ochoa. 131 00:14:09,040 --> 00:14:19,120 The office of the U.S. or the UN Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Egeland. 132 00:14:19,120 --> 00:14:25,210 And then he said that Uganda was the world's the world's biggest neglected crisis. 133 00:14:25,210 --> 00:14:31,930 And that suddenly put the issue of Uganda on on on very many donors radar screen. 134 00:14:31,930 --> 00:14:40,030 And since May seven, he was very keen to remedy his view or he is that his role as a donor guarding it is important 135 00:14:40,030 --> 00:14:45,850 for him to correct that image and therefore he put in place a process for peace negotiations. 136 00:14:45,850 --> 00:14:49,110 So, in summary, the interaction between the UPDF military strength, 137 00:14:49,110 --> 00:14:54,610 the reduced Sudanese support for the NRA and Beechnut international pressure also serves to dislodge 138 00:14:54,610 --> 00:15:00,100 the L'Abri from South and Sudan and push them into the DRC and facilitate the peace process. 139 00:15:00,100 --> 00:15:02,520 Shortcomings of these explanations are quite a few. 140 00:15:02,520 --> 00:15:10,000 For instance, we cannot understand from this explanation why it is that the LRB are very explicitly afraid of the ICC. 141 00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:14,290 Nor can we understand the content of the peace talks because the peace talks spend an 142 00:15:14,290 --> 00:15:19,810 overwhelming amount of time concerned with issues of peace and justice and accountability. 143 00:15:19,810 --> 00:15:26,050 How you respond to this particular normative concerns that happen to be part of the spirit of the times. 144 00:15:26,050 --> 00:15:31,280 And so obviously we can't understand why the LRAD refused to sign the final peace agreement, 145 00:15:31,280 --> 00:15:38,650 citing the ICC unless we actually say that ISIS is important, in which case we would have to move to a different set of explanations. 146 00:15:38,650 --> 00:15:44,920 So then the second explanations of Juba are those that look at the ICC in terms of in terms of what I mentioned earlier, 147 00:15:44,920 --> 00:15:52,820 international ideas, norms and institutions. One mechanism through which the court is expected to influence states behaviour is 148 00:15:52,820 --> 00:15:58,340 described by some scholars in international relations as normative socialisation. 149 00:15:58,340 --> 00:16:00,520 And this is a process by which states arrive. 150 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:10,910 But I quote, collective understanding about appropriate behaviour, which in turn leads to a change in identity, interests and behaviour. 151 00:16:10,910 --> 00:16:16,720 Well, identity and interests, but behaviour being informed by the international norms. 152 00:16:16,720 --> 00:16:23,720 The road to socialisation includes a variety of strategies that work in what a number of scholars have called a spiral model, 153 00:16:23,720 --> 00:16:31,010 including domestic pressure, moralisation argumentation, persuasion and institutionalisation. 154 00:16:31,010 --> 00:16:39,700 To what extent, then, was normative socialisation instrumental in explaining what happened in Juba? 155 00:16:39,700 --> 00:16:47,490 For the ISIS, his role in Juba socialisation is seen to work through, put it through both persuasion and coercion, 156 00:16:47,490 --> 00:16:51,510 explanations based on persuasion, credit, what they call soft power. 157 00:16:51,510 --> 00:16:56,190 That term by nigh but soft power of the ICC. 158 00:16:56,190 --> 00:16:59,460 According to Nye, soft power operates through persuasion, 159 00:16:59,460 --> 00:17:05,010 persuading and attracting others into shaping their preferences rather than through coercion. 160 00:17:05,010 --> 00:17:09,780 The idea of soft power has gained currency beyond the sphere of influence of the state and 161 00:17:09,780 --> 00:17:16,560 has been used to describe strategies by people and leaders and institutions and so on. 162 00:17:16,560 --> 00:17:24,180 Bourke-White also cites a similar explanation when he talks about the ICC as having the capacity to reshape the 163 00:17:24,180 --> 00:17:34,070 culture of the target target states and even the identities of criminal perpetrators through Naum internalisation. 164 00:17:34,070 --> 00:17:38,420 There is some evidence for normative socialisation. First, 165 00:17:38,420 --> 00:17:47,390 the NRA appears to understand the implications of international justice and acknowledged the parameters of acceptable behaviour with regard to war. 166 00:17:47,390 --> 00:17:55,610 For instance, the BBC interview that I cited earlier where Kony appeared for the first time in over two decades in public view, 167 00:17:55,610 --> 00:18:00,830 Kony rejected the suggestion that he had targeted actually civilians. 168 00:18:00,830 --> 00:18:05,720 The NRA negotiators on their part when they had public consultations and there was one I attended 169 00:18:05,720 --> 00:18:16,400 in December of 2000 and seven one of the they started the public consultation with an apology. 170 00:18:16,400 --> 00:18:21,500 And I'll read you what one gentleman called Gemzar Beta, who was one of the lead negotiator, said. 171 00:18:21,500 --> 00:18:27,350 He said The NRA and the high command are sorry for what happened in this country and they ask for forgiveness. 172 00:18:27,350 --> 00:18:32,360 Equally, the NRA also has forgiven all those collaborators who are working with the government. 173 00:18:32,360 --> 00:18:37,340 They have forgiven everybody. So I stand here to say, let us make this a new beginning. 174 00:18:37,340 --> 00:18:42,110 We have a responsibility to those people of the north and not east Uganda. 175 00:18:42,110 --> 00:18:47,480 So there is an extent to which they seem to be bowing to international pressure and particularly the concern for victims, 176 00:18:47,480 --> 00:18:53,960 which is very much part and parcel of the of the of the norms that are propounded by the ICC. 177 00:18:53,960 --> 00:19:01,580 Through the signing of the accountability agreements that I've described earlier, the NRA proposed to push themselves under domestic justice, 178 00:19:01,580 --> 00:19:07,280 giving every appearance of responding to the international pressure against impunity. 179 00:19:07,280 --> 00:19:14,980 And this is very well captured by one of the 11 negotiators when you said nobody believed that the Ellory would accept to even agree, 180 00:19:14,980 --> 00:19:19,250 except to agree that it is good that they committed crimes in Uganda. 181 00:19:19,250 --> 00:19:25,630 But they have been able to say so. They have. I know. 182 00:19:25,630 --> 00:19:31,700 I know. OK. So there is that. There is. There is those are the explanations based on persuasion. 183 00:19:31,700 --> 00:19:37,040 But there is a range of explanations that give the ICC credit and they're based on on coercion. 184 00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:41,690 And this, for example, is what's a common cause. The looming presence of the ICC, 185 00:19:41,690 --> 00:19:47,720 which is supposed to be to give the looming presence of the ICC will motivates actors 186 00:19:47,720 --> 00:19:51,800 to behave in particular ways because they're afraid of what the ICC might do, 187 00:19:51,800 --> 00:19:57,980 arrest them. And so the argument there is that the ICC affected the LRO into their consideration, 188 00:19:57,980 --> 00:20:01,580 irrational of huckstering of the ICC into their considerations and the cost benefit 189 00:20:01,580 --> 00:20:07,880 analysis weighed on them that in the in favour of a negotiated settlement. 190 00:20:07,880 --> 00:20:14,690 Now and obviously during the actual peace process, the influence of the ICC is very strong because the contents, 191 00:20:14,690 --> 00:20:21,440 as I have mentioned earlier, is very much a content of justice and accountability, and the discourse of victims is very strong. 192 00:20:21,440 --> 00:20:28,880 Now, why is this explanation insufficient? Because, again, it's the way in which we think about socialisation in theory, 193 00:20:28,880 --> 00:20:33,560 is that it has to if there is a very strong element of demand from below, 194 00:20:33,560 --> 00:20:37,580 the population are demanding justice and they are linking with international norms, 195 00:20:37,580 --> 00:20:42,830 intrapreneurs of various natures who then collectively put pressure on the state in the case of Uganda. 196 00:20:42,830 --> 00:20:47,460 You do not have that what you have the demand of the excessive intervention from the executive. 197 00:20:47,460 --> 00:20:52,190 It is the president who actually referred the case of Uganda to the International Criminal Court. 198 00:20:52,190 --> 00:20:57,710 So we cannot uncritically say that the case of Uganda was a case of normative socialisation. 199 00:20:57,710 --> 00:21:08,180 Again, neither can we understand in complete compliance what happens when the government of Museveni says all we are willing to work with the ICC, 200 00:21:08,180 --> 00:21:12,350 but then decide if Kony behaves himself. We will equally behave himself. 201 00:21:12,350 --> 00:21:19,760 We will waive the ICC as though the ICC was really not an issue that that that was of fundamental importance. 202 00:21:19,760 --> 00:21:25,490 So the complete in compliance is something else that the existing theories cannot help us understand. 203 00:21:25,490 --> 00:21:29,720 And what I argue is that we need to. Sorry. One more thing on the incomplete. 204 00:21:29,720 --> 00:21:39,980 Compliance is that we need to remember that in the beginning of the peace process, the the Ugandan army killed one of the wanted men called Rucker. 205 00:21:39,980 --> 00:21:44,630 And then it also allowed to pass through the territory that they were controlling. 206 00:21:44,630 --> 00:21:47,790 Another L'Abri commander called Dominic on when, in other words, 207 00:21:47,790 --> 00:21:56,150 they had they did not see the need to comply with the ICC as important as the domestic process that they had started of the peace process. 208 00:21:56,150 --> 00:22:03,020 So one can ask, to what extent was the ICC really the driving force in the observations that we see? 209 00:22:03,020 --> 00:22:08,720 The third section, which I am unable to get into in great detail, but which is is perhaps the most interesting. 210 00:22:08,720 --> 00:22:12,200 But I'll get into it. I'll get into it during the question and answer. 211 00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:13,880 I'll just really quickly summarise it. 212 00:22:13,880 --> 00:22:23,900 What the section is going to be doing is understand seek to understand the the role of the ICC in Juba from the perspective of Elitch agents. 213 00:22:23,900 --> 00:22:31,190 And this my explanation starts from the premise that states and the state and its act and make choices on how to 214 00:22:31,190 --> 00:22:38,160 use tools available to them in the pursuit of a variety of political goals in a process similar to what's good, 215 00:22:38,160 --> 00:22:43,940 Goodman and Jinkx called Acculturation, or Subotic in her work in former Yugoslavia, has called Norm Highjacking. 216 00:22:43,940 --> 00:22:52,220 What we find is that evidence in Uganda points to the idea of unappropriated ICC, where the norm of justice was in circulation, 217 00:22:52,220 --> 00:22:58,070 but for ends other than those for which the norm founders and promoters intended. 218 00:22:58,070 --> 00:23:01,850 In particular, what I was going to argue in this section is that in the first instance, 219 00:23:01,850 --> 00:23:08,660 the ICC was instrumentalise in order to politicise the conflict in the north and essentially to externalise the costs, 220 00:23:08,660 --> 00:23:16,310 political costs of the war, the war with Sudan. However, the unexpected proposal for peace talks by the government of southern Sudan. 221 00:23:16,310 --> 00:23:22,070 What the politics back into the process of governance of the governments of Uganda consideration. 222 00:23:22,070 --> 00:23:29,090 And at this point, the ICC was appropriated for the second time to serve as a stick to push forward the peace process. 223 00:23:29,090 --> 00:23:30,030 And at this point, 224 00:23:30,030 --> 00:23:36,470 with the interests that were driving the Ugandan government where that one is needed to get some brownie points with the population in the north. 225 00:23:36,470 --> 00:23:43,210 Number two, the ICC was becoming slightly dangerous because everybody was making noise about the Ugandan army being investigated. 226 00:23:43,210 --> 00:23:49,010 And number three, it actually seemed that the LRAD were afraid of the ICC and therefore they could add that 227 00:23:49,010 --> 00:23:53,490 this combination of factors could be used to push forward our beneficial peace settlement. 228 00:23:53,490 --> 00:24:01,776 And so the Juba peace process was therefore a by-product of this exercise in the elite appropriation, all international norms.