So as the chair of the second section,
I'm very glad to welcome all of those of you who have joined us since the operation
began at our second session is rather unhelpfully perhaps called risks and technologies.
But that's a very brief bit of shorthand for the the various different topics that we're trying to cover in this session.
The first is not to go through a few of the highest nuclear risks, which humankind faces at the moment.
And in that respect, we are focussing on, first of all, a European focus with particular reference to Iran,
Israel and Western nations, and then on emerging technologies and their impact on crises.
And then finally, all the other threats which which don't easily fall under those headings.
So let me start with the first surcharging, that's to say the particular high risk areas.
And let me start with our first speaker, who's Ambassador Peter Jenkins,
who is kindly agreed to to make his contribution focus on Iran, Israel and the West Asia.
And he is particularly well qualified to this is a long term British diplomat.
He was made the UK ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.
And there he was particularly concerned with the international nuclear aspects of international peace and security, and that more recently,
he's become more specifically involved in the negotiations with Iran and particularly in the apparent breakdown,
the possible resuscitation of the jackpot.
So without further delay, I will invite him to make his contribution.
He is the keynote speaker of the session. So we are allowing him that.
I think he said we said 25 minutes. So, Peter, please go ahead.
Ah, Christopher, I thought we agreed that I would try not to speak for much more than ten minutes in practise,
I think it may be closer to 15, but I'm afraid people will be disappointed if they expect me to talk for four.
Twenty five. Well, anyway, since since we have five minutes to catch up from the first session, let's let's go with with your proposed timings.
Thank you. Thank you. Let me start by saying a few words about the talks underway in Vienna to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.
At this point, I think prospects for reviving the agreement must be characterised as uncertain.
This for several reasons. It's not clear that the US is ready to lift enough of the sanctions imposed under Trump to satisfy Iran.
Many sanctions imposed under Trump are related nominally to non-nuclear matters.
Iran expects many of these, if not all of them, to be lifted.
The US has shown an inclination to hold back supposedly non-nuclear sanctions to serve as
leverage in subsequent negotiations on other aspects of Iranian behaviour that the US dislikes.
It's not clear that Iran will cease demanding verification of sanctions lifting
before doing what it must do to return to full compliance with the 2015 agreement.
As the US ideal would be for Iran to move first, the very least the US is likely to accept our parallel moves to full compliance.
A formula that allows both sides to save face and caters for an absence of trust on both sides must be found, but that won't be easy.
Iran is currently operating six are two centrifuge cascades, one are full cascade and one is six Cascade,
all of these centrifuges are more efficient than the one centrifuges specified as permissible under the 2015 agreement.
Iran is asking that under a revived agreement, these later models be permitted in place of the IAEA ones,
since many of the latter were destroyed last month by Israeli saboteurs.
It's not clear that the US will agree to this,
even if Iran can demonstrate that the combined output of the new machines would not exceed the combined output of the old ones.
The US is like the US likes to see the 2015 agreement as a way of retarding Iranian mastery of nuclear technology.
On a more positive note,
it does seem possible that if an agreement cannot be reached by the end of this month ahead of a presidential election in Iran on 18 June,
negotiations will resume post-election, whatever the result.
Iran's supreme leader seems to recognise that the 2015 agreement has value the unfreezing of
dollar reserves in various places around the world and the lifting of sanctions on oil exports,
still only a third of potential volumes and a vital source of government revenue are worth having.
Should we in the West also see value in the 2015 agreement?
Yes, it provides for intrusive international monitoring of all nuclear activity in Iran and it restricts fissile material production capabilities.
It offers the prospect of confidence in the absence of undeclared material or facilities in Iran.
It offers probability that diversion of material or equipment to a covert facility would be detected in good time.
Americans like to claim that it closes all pathways to a nuclear weapon that is not strictly true.
The covert pathway is not entirely closed, but from an Iranian perspective, it would entail a high risk of detection.
In fact, the risk of Iran seeking nuclear weapons is currently low, whether or not the 2015 agreement can be revived.
Western intelligence agencies have charged with a high degree of confidence that in 2003,
the supreme leader ordered an end to nuclear weapons research research aimed at the making of five nuclear weapons.
If Mr. Netanyahu can be believed. And that the Revolutionary Guards have been have largely complied with the supreme leader's instruction.
The supreme leader has issued a fatwa against the possession and use of nuclear weapons.
Iran's diplomats have put Iran's reputation within the Non-Aligned Movement on the line by
affirming on numerous occasions that Iran is fully committed to nuclear non-proliferation pledges.
The Iranian determination to retain an enrichment capability they do not truly need for civil purposes is troubling,
but it can be explained as part of a nuclear hedging strategy and the thirst for national prestige.
The Iranian leadership has shown itself to be shrewd and adept at cost benefit judgements.
Settling for a capability and stopping short of crossing the nuclear threshold looks to be a shrewder option than going for a bomb.
That said, there will be other options for mitigating concern about Iranian capabilities and intentions if the 2015 agreement expires.
The friendship of Russia and China in particular is of increasing importance to Iran.
Neither Russia nor China would be content for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
They can be expected to press for Iran to continue to allow intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring and to comply with the NPT.
In addition, agreement to a nuclear weapon free zone in the Gulf might conceivably be a possibility if Saudi
Arabia's current interest in creating a basis for durable coexistence with Iran proves lasting.
A Gulf nuclear weapon free zone would have the added virtue of consolidating Saudi Arabia's NPT commitments,
Saudi Arabia having declared an intention to match Iran's enrichment capability.
Would a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone also be an option?
No, because the Israel is determined to retain its undeclared nuclear arsenal of 80 to 100 warheads.
Iran has been a supporter of a Middle East zone since the time of the Shah,
as are all the Arab states, all the Arab states of the region led by Egypt.
Sadly, what's foreseeable is that Egypt will continue to press for a Middle East zone at NPT conferences and in the United
Nations and the US on behalf of Israel will continue to produce reasons why Egypt's proposals are premature.
What about the use of force to destroy Iranian facilities, would that be a good idea?
Israel is thought to have been eager to attack Iranian facilities from the air on several past occasions alone or in the US company.
But to have been restrained by the US. Such military aggression would be a gross violation of international law.
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors could be amongst the resulting casualties.
And the benefit would be doubtful. Iran's small centrifuge facility at Fordo.
Not industrial in scale, but ideal for weapons grade material production would probably survive because it's buried deep within a mountain.
And Iran would have been given a good excuse to withdraw from the NPT and embark on nuclear weapon acquisition.
Stoppable only through invasion and occupation.
Thank you. That's it, Christopher.