1 00:00:01,890 --> 00:00:10,680 But the topics I've chosen to pick out as not perhaps haven't been covered as fully as one might have wanted in this conference. 2 00:00:10,680 --> 00:00:17,230 Well, proliferation space and terrorism. And I'll just give a few slides on each of those. 3 00:00:17,230 --> 00:00:22,260 First of all, proliferation. I just that's fistful of definitions. 4 00:00:22,260 --> 00:00:38,180 And I think it's fairly obvious. And the proliferation of the numbers which we've seen represented also by that nice back 5 00:00:38,180 --> 00:00:47,160 that seems to have presented for us out of the 190 member states of the United Nations, 6 00:00:47,160 --> 00:00:57,060 only a small number are not in principle committed to non-proliferation. 7 00:00:57,060 --> 00:01:13,200 And the ones that are not, in a sense that non-proliferation committed are the new first of all, the nuclear weapon states defined in the NPT. 8 00:01:13,200 --> 00:01:19,110 Secondly, nuclear armed states, which everybody knows have nuclear weapons, 9 00:01:19,110 --> 00:01:26,310 even if they haven't formally announced it, and that's Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. 10 00:01:26,310 --> 00:01:33,630 And then a larger but ill defined number of countries which have either have taken or have been accused 11 00:01:33,630 --> 00:01:43,770 of taking steps towards developing a national nuclear weapon capability and in in alphabetical order. 12 00:01:43,770 --> 00:01:49,590 But no indication of what their present status that is included Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 13 00:01:49,590 --> 00:01:59,430 Kazakhstan and other other two countries in the former Soviet Union, Libya and South Africa, Sweden and Taiwan. 14 00:01:59,430 --> 00:02:01,830 And in most cases by now, 15 00:02:01,830 --> 00:02:10,950 most of those countries have agreed to discontinue their nuclear weapons programme and have transferred all their nuclear materials elsewhere. 16 00:02:10,950 --> 00:02:19,890 For example, Kazakhstan, along with the Ukraine, which have repatriated that their nuclear weapons to Russia. 17 00:02:19,890 --> 00:02:27,090 And there's a further Kaspi of what is being called a nuclear breakout capability, which for these countries, 18 00:02:27,090 --> 00:02:32,790 which might be able to produce one or more weapons quickly and with little warning. 19 00:02:32,790 --> 00:02:40,320 And on the whole, people have not want to talk about this in the hopes that the problem will go away. 20 00:02:40,320 --> 00:02:51,900 But one that is currently alive is Japan, because the has a large stockpile of separating plutonium created by its civil nuclear programme. 21 00:02:51,900 --> 00:03:02,260 And of all of those, I invite you to consult Wikipedia if you want to see that the status of those various assertions. 22 00:03:02,260 --> 00:03:11,160 Now, what are the antiproliferation measures? And, of course, the most obvious one and the most dramatic one is the NPT itself, 23 00:03:11,160 --> 00:03:18,540 which the 191 signatures and only Israel in the idea, Israel, North Korea, 24 00:03:18,540 --> 00:03:24,010 Pakistan and South Sudan have, for one reason or another, chose not to sign it, 25 00:03:24,010 --> 00:03:30,870 that it's always been aware, but by signatories, the it has its weaknesses. 26 00:03:30,870 --> 00:03:38,370 And so so the NPT or community were very grateful when the International Atomic Energy 27 00:03:38,370 --> 00:03:46,080 Association of Working with the NPT signatories publication of the Additional Protocol, 28 00:03:46,080 --> 00:03:58,830 which is a model document which was before the IAEA were inviting nations to to sign alongside the NPT itself, 29 00:03:58,830 --> 00:04:09,510 that because it greatly increased the the the NPT requirements for information and access, 30 00:04:09,510 --> 00:04:18,750 primarily by the IAEA inspectorate, that to establish the states for using nuclear materials solely for peaceful purposes. 31 00:04:18,750 --> 00:04:23,400 And this was just some of the additional protocol. 32 00:04:23,400 --> 00:04:29,400 But this nevertheless, hundred and fifty of them then not all have ratified that. 33 00:04:29,400 --> 00:04:38,400 And and even that similar signatory state has value. 34 00:04:38,400 --> 00:04:49,290 For example, Iran signed but has not yet ratified its AP, but did choose to implement it from 2003 to 2006. 35 00:04:49,290 --> 00:04:59,970 And that's an indication of the willingness of the non signatories to to be inspected in a much more powerful and. 36 00:04:59,970 --> 00:05:13,680 It's about it, and it's only recently that the NPT has been under severe threat and has been primarily because of the non-nuclear weapon, 37 00:05:13,680 --> 00:05:18,480 the signatories who've been expressing their disillusionment with the failure of the nuclear reactor, 38 00:05:18,480 --> 00:05:25,410 the states to make progress in implementing their commitment under Article six of the NPT to, 39 00:05:25,410 --> 00:05:32,910 quote, pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards their settlement. 40 00:05:32,910 --> 00:05:39,150 And that is that almost everybody would agree a very legitimate charge. 41 00:05:39,150 --> 00:05:47,820 And it progressively led to some countries and some a lot of individuals seeking an alternative or 42 00:05:47,820 --> 00:05:55,290 complementary approach to the NPT in the form of the UN Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, 43 00:05:55,290 --> 00:05:57,570 the PNW. 44 00:05:57,570 --> 00:06:11,220 And that is actually entered into force because under its article 15 actually required 40 members to to have to approve it before it went into force. 45 00:06:11,220 --> 00:06:27,030 And the weakness of the TPN W is that it has been neutered speakers has not been signed by any of the the NPT specified that 46 00:06:27,030 --> 00:06:38,970 nuclear states or by a number of other that de facto nuclear states and therefore possessed of the countries that matter, 47 00:06:38,970 --> 00:06:56,860 have not agreed to move rapidly towards the objective of PNW, which is moving towards the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 48 00:06:56,860 --> 00:07:11,860 One other thing which I mentioned with my nuclear industry hat on is that there's one other community which works on the control of nuclear weapons, 49 00:07:11,860 --> 00:07:19,690 which are those which were set up to control the flow of export to sensitive nuclear materials and 50 00:07:19,690 --> 00:07:26,290 equipment between the states and particularly between nuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons states. 51 00:07:26,290 --> 00:07:35,470 And this is the zanger committee of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And both of those are quite large international bodies with 30 or 40 members. 52 00:07:35,470 --> 00:07:43,660 And they set the rules about in great detail about what materials and and systems 53 00:07:43,660 --> 00:07:50,140 may be exported from nuclear weapon countries to non-nuclear different countries. 54 00:07:50,140 --> 00:07:58,690 And and this this would be greatly supported by further activities along the 55 00:07:58,690 --> 00:08:05,650 same line with the endorsement of a succession of US presidents of the US. 56 00:08:05,650 --> 00:08:15,040 And this further further endorsements have achieved strong national government support worldwide. 57 00:08:15,040 --> 00:08:23,500 So there's some good news about that. That's on the non-proliferation front then nuclear activities in space. 58 00:08:23,500 --> 00:08:30,430 And that's very well covered already in the past is to say more about that. 59 00:08:30,430 --> 00:08:39,910 The whole business of weapons, heavy international legislation against the weaponization of space is still today, 60 00:08:39,910 --> 00:08:48,290 early stage, principally because it raised such issues of ethical and technological nature, which are yet unsolved. 61 00:08:48,290 --> 00:08:54,310 And I cite the Google Earth, international law, nuclear weapons and space. 62 00:08:54,310 --> 00:09:05,200 And lastly, that this has been mentioned in several previous presentations is nuclear terrorism and. 63 00:09:05,200 --> 00:09:15,730 I don't want to go into the details of this fight, but to say that it happened is that until fairly recently, 64 00:09:15,730 --> 00:09:20,020 the nuclear community regarded that as the subject, 65 00:09:20,020 --> 00:09:29,290 that they did not wish to publish anything or and certainly admit to it very carefully before publication. 66 00:09:29,290 --> 00:09:38,650 So I take some liberty, pride in the fact that I believe that I was the first to publish a serious scholarly article on nuclear terrorism, 67 00:09:38,650 --> 00:09:49,310 which I published in 2005, that I took in, that I got the permission of my employer, the Atomic Energy Authority, not to publish. 68 00:09:49,310 --> 00:09:59,120 And they knew that I had taken great care not to sack Indian nuclear information, which was not already in the public domain. 69 00:09:59,120 --> 00:10:11,510 And since then, the technology procedures to detect preparations for nuclear terrorism have greatly improved. 70 00:10:11,510 --> 00:10:21,100 And I expressed the final hope that any potential terrorist related would would design to find better uses for his or her time. 71 00:10:21,100 --> 00:10:27,304 So that's all I want to say. And set to wind up this session because when.