But the topics I've chosen to pick out as not perhaps haven't been covered as fully as one might have wanted in this conference.
Well, proliferation space and terrorism. And I'll just give a few slides on each of those.
First of all, proliferation. I just that's fistful of definitions.
And I think it's fairly obvious. And the proliferation of the numbers which we've seen represented also by that nice back
that seems to have presented for us out of the 190 member states of the United Nations,
only a small number are not in principle committed to non-proliferation.
And the ones that are not, in a sense that non-proliferation committed are the new first of all, the nuclear weapon states defined in the NPT.
Secondly, nuclear armed states, which everybody knows have nuclear weapons,
even if they haven't formally announced it, and that's Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea.
And then a larger but ill defined number of countries which have either have taken or have been accused
of taking steps towards developing a national nuclear weapon capability and in in alphabetical order.
But no indication of what their present status that is included Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
Kazakhstan and other other two countries in the former Soviet Union, Libya and South Africa, Sweden and Taiwan.
And in most cases by now,
most of those countries have agreed to discontinue their nuclear weapons programme and have transferred all their nuclear materials elsewhere.
For example, Kazakhstan, along with the Ukraine, which have repatriated that their nuclear weapons to Russia.
And there's a further Kaspi of what is being called a nuclear breakout capability, which for these countries,
which might be able to produce one or more weapons quickly and with little warning.
And on the whole, people have not want to talk about this in the hopes that the problem will go away.
But one that is currently alive is Japan, because the has a large stockpile of separating plutonium created by its civil nuclear programme.
And of all of those, I invite you to consult Wikipedia if you want to see that the status of those various assertions.
Now, what are the antiproliferation measures? And, of course, the most obvious one and the most dramatic one is the NPT itself,
which the 191 signatures and only Israel in the idea, Israel, North Korea,
Pakistan and South Sudan have, for one reason or another, chose not to sign it,
that it's always been aware, but by signatories, the it has its weaknesses.
And so so the NPT or community were very grateful when the International Atomic Energy
Association of Working with the NPT signatories publication of the Additional Protocol,
which is a model document which was before the IAEA were inviting nations to to sign alongside the NPT itself,
that because it greatly increased the the the NPT requirements for information and access,
primarily by the IAEA inspectorate, that to establish the states for using nuclear materials solely for peaceful purposes.
And this was just some of the additional protocol.
But this nevertheless, hundred and fifty of them then not all have ratified that.
And and even that similar signatory state has value.
For example, Iran signed but has not yet ratified its AP, but did choose to implement it from 2003 to 2006.
And that's an indication of the willingness of the non signatories to to be inspected in a much more powerful and.
It's about it, and it's only recently that the NPT has been under severe threat and has been primarily because of the non-nuclear weapon,
the signatories who've been expressing their disillusionment with the failure of the nuclear reactor,
the states to make progress in implementing their commitment under Article six of the NPT to,
quote, pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards their settlement.
And that is that almost everybody would agree a very legitimate charge.
And it progressively led to some countries and some a lot of individuals seeking an alternative or
complementary approach to the NPT in the form of the UN Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons,
the PNW.
And that is actually entered into force because under its article 15 actually required 40 members to to have to approve it before it went into force.
And the weakness of the TPN W is that it has been neutered speakers has not been signed by any of the the NPT specified that
nuclear states or by a number of other that de facto nuclear states and therefore possessed of the countries that matter,
have not agreed to move rapidly towards the objective of PNW, which is moving towards the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
One other thing which I mentioned with my nuclear industry hat on is that there's one other community which works on the control of nuclear weapons,
which are those which were set up to control the flow of export to sensitive nuclear materials and
equipment between the states and particularly between nuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons states.
And this is the zanger committee of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And both of those are quite large international bodies with 30 or 40 members.
And they set the rules about in great detail about what materials and and systems
may be exported from nuclear weapon countries to non-nuclear different countries.
And and this this would be greatly supported by further activities along the
same line with the endorsement of a succession of US presidents of the US.
And this further further endorsements have achieved strong national government support worldwide.
So there's some good news about that. That's on the non-proliferation front then nuclear activities in space.
And that's very well covered already in the past is to say more about that.
The whole business of weapons, heavy international legislation against the weaponization of space is still today,
early stage, principally because it raised such issues of ethical and technological nature, which are yet unsolved.
And I cite the Google Earth, international law, nuclear weapons and space.
And lastly, that this has been mentioned in several previous presentations is nuclear terrorism and.
I don't want to go into the details of this fight, but to say that it happened is that until fairly recently,
the nuclear community regarded that as the subject,
that they did not wish to publish anything or and certainly admit to it very carefully before publication.
So I take some liberty, pride in the fact that I believe that I was the first to publish a serious scholarly article on nuclear terrorism,
which I published in 2005, that I took in, that I got the permission of my employer, the Atomic Energy Authority, not to publish.
And they knew that I had taken great care not to sack Indian nuclear information, which was not already in the public domain.
And since then, the technology procedures to detect preparations for nuclear terrorism have greatly improved.
And I expressed the final hope that any potential terrorist related would would design to find better uses for his or her time.
So that's all I want to say. And set to wind up this session because when.