Thank you, Tim. Thank you very much for having me. I stand here somewhat trepidatious and certainly humble because I'm not an expert on Ukraine.
I haven't been to Ukraine and I'm humbled before the fact there are actually Ukrainians here.
And I believe passionately in my politics that the determination of what happens to a country should be in the hands of the people themselves.
And that is what my talk is, in fact, about. But let me start by setting the scene on where we are today in terms of a prospective peace process.
The consensus among military and diplomatic pundits is that the conflict will grind on through this year and into next,
with no decisive military victory for either side.
According to the pundits, much will depend on the success or failure of Ukraine's expected spring offensive.
But no one seems to think it likely that either Ukraine or Russia will achieve their overall war aims.
The first of removing the aggressor from all Ukrainian sovereign territory.
The second, the defeat and the destruction of the so-called fascist regime in Kiev.
According to the recently leaked US intelligence documents, the US does not expect peace negotiations in 2023,
even if Ukraine secures significant territorial gains and unsustainable losses on the Russian side.
According to the leaked US assessment, neither side is likely to secure significant advantage over the other.
There is also seeming expert consensus that both sides are running out of ammunition in a battle of logistics and reduced resources.
Perhaps this will provide an impetus to negotiate, but the nasty fact remains that Russia occupies some 20% of Ukrainian territory.
Ukraine's economy is in ruins and the country has lost perhaps 100,000 casualties.
Ukraine's military capabilities are sustained by outside countries, a situation that cannot endure indefinitely,
particularly as ammunition stocks are run down and material production is vastly exceeded by expenditure.
It is less clear, but Russia too may not be able to sustain the current level of conflict or casualties.
Although Putin's rhetoric suggests that he is ready for a long war.
But intelligence assessments aside,
we can see a lot from the statements of the parties where neither side is indicating anything approaching readiness to discuss peace terms,
though neither side rules it out. No war will end until both parties want it to or are pressurised into wanting to.
Examining Zelensky's ten point peace plan and the Russians indications that they want, quote,
recognition, unquote, of new, quote, territorial realities, unquote, i.e., Russian occupation.
It's clear that there is a gulf between the parties on what would constitute an acceptable peace.
There are, moreover, many indications that Russia would be content with half a peace,
a ceasefire or armistice that would preserve a frozen conflict, a status quo that it perpetuated in Georgia,
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria and Moldova, and to a degree in Syria and of course,
in Ukraine itself since 2014 when it first occupied Crimea and large portions of eastern Ukraine.
Foreign Minister Lavrov has said as much in terms this might be acceptable,
acceptable to Russia, it would not be to Ukraine or its major ally, the US.
As the US Secretary of State has recently confirmed.
Similarly, continued long term, low level conflict as Ukraine has endured since 2014 may also be an acceptable result for Russia,
leaving Ukraine in a perpetually weakened and destabilised condition with a significant proportion of its territory under foreign occupation.
Like it or not, these possibilities remain, however, very plausible medium term outcomes.
In either case, Ukraine would be hobbled, unable to rebuild its economy or advance towards its goals of EU or NATO membership,
and thus to secure a more prosperous future. Given the likelihood of sustained military stalemate, yet enormous costs and casualties on both sides,
it is foreseeable that others will increase the pressure for a peace deal.
Speculation about a peace deal tends to focus on what kind of territorial division might be agreed.
I do not want to guess what the terms of any peace might be, but this focus on territory alone,
which is all too typical amongst those negotiating peace deals,
is too reductive and ignores many elements that will need to be considered if any negotiation
and thus resulting deal is to be comprehensive and therefore effective and enduring.
One key aspect is who is actually going to be at the table?
This framework. Work begins to dictate what the outcome might be.
At the core of any negotiation, of course, will be Russia and Ukraine themselves, but no one pretends that others will not be closely involved,
namely the US and NATO on Ukraine's side and China on Russia's, even if it is not directly supplying weapons to China.
China, sorry, weapons to Russia. China's so-called peace plan or two clearly indicates its partisanship in this conflict.
These proximate groupings might be involved in offering guarantees for any resulting agreement, given the lack of trust between the parties.
Perhaps others, such as others of the so-called BRICS, will be loosely involved.
Although the likes of India and Brazil have hitherto only been peripherally engaged, it's in neither interests or predilections to take sides.
Turkey will doubtless demand a role that would be better without the cynical and repressive Erdogan in charge.
Perhaps the UN will be involved, but Putin is unlikely to allow a substantive role,
given that Secretary-General Gutierrez has so clearly condemned Russia's aggression and thereby shown himself to be not neutral,
but instead rightly positioned himself as the defender of the UN Charter.
But if there is to be a cessation of hostilities somewhere, someone will need to monitor it and report.
But to whom? A UN Security Council ruled by a divided permanent five where one warring party holds a veto.
Perhaps on a messy, messy, tendentious, multinational affair will monitor any peace.
Instead, any agreement between the parties, perhaps based on territorial compromise,
will need to be framed within a broader understanding of the regional and institutional context.
Ukraine has repeatedly expressed its wish for NATO membership, and NATO's, for its part, has indicated its eventual willingness for that.
But this is likely to be the reddest of red lines for Putin.
If so, and in turn, Ukraine will then reasonably require substantial guarantees of its security from other states,
NATO's or a group of militarily credible countries led above all by the US.
More plausible and still highly valuable to Ukraine is EU membership, although more likely than NATO's membership,
it is much harder to achieve as it involves much more than mere willingness on both sides the EU and Ukraine,
but also the alignment of Ukraine's laws and procedures with the so-called acquis,
the voluminous body of practice and regulation of every sector of the economy required of all Member States, including new ones.
This will be a long road. A longer road still is a longer road.
Still is the one towards a new European security structure which might replace the
antagonistic postures of NATO and Russia with something more collaborative and inclusive.
But this must await a new democratic Russia, which looks like a long wait.
Indeed, there are other elements of any agreement which will have to be somehow addressed.
What happens to Ukraine's nuclear power facilities? How will they be secured if near to any territorial dividing line?
Or worse, if they remain in occupied territory? What about grain exports?
A major interest, of course, to outside countries, too.
How will these be facilitated and guaranteed? What happens to Ukraine's millions of refugees, including from currently occupied areas?
And not least what of war crimes? How are these to be accounted for and justice delivered?
Then there is compensation and reparations for the massive damage that has been inflicted on Ukraine.
But in all this international discussion, there are groups of people who must not be ignored.
I have spent many years working on conflicts around the world,
and it's clear to me that if you ignore the needs of those most affected by dispute and war, you will not have sustainable peace.
The seeds of future conflict and instability will remain.
I spent four and a half years on the UN Security Council discussing everywhere from Iraq to Palestine and Western
Sahara and the one group of people you could almost guarantee you would not be in the room were the people,
of course, from the place we were discussing.
It's impossible to imagine a sustainable peace in Yemen without accounting for the wishes for self-determination of the people of South Yemen,
for instance.
They should not be a dispensation for a collective peace in Syria without accounting for the wishes of the Kurds in northeast Syria for autonomy.
Likewise, there will be no sustainable peace in Kosovo until there is an adequate mechanism to address the
human rights and political wishes of Serbs in northern Kosovo and other enclaves of Kosovo.
Inclusion in this case, in Ukraine's case, requires consideration and in.
Ideally consultation, if not inclusion of those living in in occupied territories in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
The Tatars are a significant minority who have been oppressed during the years of Russian occupation.
Their hostility to Russia and occupation is clear.
Likewise, perhaps the 25% or so of the population who identify as Ukrainian.
But this is the easiest of guesses. There is more, moreover, no evidence that the majority of the population wishes to live under Russian sovereignty.
Even if they're Russian, even if their mother tongue might be Russian, the wishes of this population should be taken into account.
A black or white determination in any peace deal of Russian or less likely Ukrainian
sovereignty clearly would not do justice to the ethnic and political diversity of the region.
Although such an outcome, alas, is all too likely in the Donbass.
In 2014, the pro-Russian unrest that followed the Maidan revolution and the declaration of the Donetsk and Lugansk
independent republics led directly to armed conflict between the separatists and Ukrainian government forces,
which in turn triggered the inclusion of Russian forces into Ukrainian territory.
It is, of course, a complicated historical picture which I cannot in a short time do justice to.
But these events with the direct anti-Semitic antecedents of the conflict that we see today, today.
Popular sentiment in the Donbass region is a mystery.
Referendums under occupation, which pointed towards separation of the Eastern territories, are neither legitimate nor meaningfully indicative,
especially when a large proportion of the population, mostly the pro-Ukrainian portion, has been displaced.
There is almost no reporting, at least in the West, from these areas during the current conflict.
The most recent census identifying the ethnicity of the population of Donetsk and Lugansk took place
over 20 years ago and before the massive displacements that the Russian occupation and ethnicity is,
in any case, a poor indicator of true political preference.
The wishes of the local population are a cipher. Any peace deal will will require a re examination of the Minsk agreements,
which included a degree of autonomy for the Donbass regions within the united Ukraine, within its sovereign borders.
But a prerequisite will be some kind of democratic process so that the true wishes of the affected population,
including the many displaced during the years of occupation, can be determined.
It is wrong to determine the status of any territory without consultation of the people concerned.
This is an error all too often made in the rush to conclude a peace deal.
The continued tensions in Bosnia and Kosovo are in part a result of territorial parcelling out that was performed as a result of peace.
Deals with the democratic wishes of the local populations was set to one side in favour of a crude, ethnically based territorial division.
But without such, there will be no long term stability.
The failure to implement the Minsk agreements with one precursor to the current conflict, though nothing can excuse Putin's shameless aggression.
These populations in eastern Ukraine and Crimea are and are invisible in the current discourse around the war and possible peace.
They should not remain so. How should they be included?
Regrettably, subject populations do not in this world yet have the same status as state governments.
States seeking others like themselves. Preference and a firm.
Other states legitimising the very world that gave rise to monsters like Vladimir Putin.
So. So it will be states sitting at the table regardless of the views of their populations.
At least one is democratic. Though Kiev cannot claim to represent the wishes of populations from eastern Ukraine.
But outsiders like how should insist that the different minorities who whose
futures are at play should be consulted if not represented in these talks.
We should also insist that some mechanism needs to be agreed so that their voices are allowed to determine their future.
What would such a mechanism be? Obviously it needs to be a democratic process of some kind.
Equally obviously, elections or referendums are not going to be possible in situations of conflict or the immediate post-conflict conflict period.
Populations are displaced and under severe political and economic stress.
Exercises in democracy must await more stable times.
But this does not mean they are impossible. It's conceivable to imagine a peace agreement which contains provisions for the democratic
consultation of populations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine on their future status.
Unfortunately, with the current status quo of the. These populations will likely remain under Russian occupation.
Russia is extremely unlikely to allow refugees to return if they are Ukrainian and is
extremely unlikely to allow a meaningful and fair vote on the future status of these regions.
Instead, outside states such as the EU should propose that more creative ideas are on the table for the future of Ukraine overall.
Is a federal or confederal state out of the question? Surely this would be a harder proposition for Russia to claim.
The Russian speaking populations were marginalised, undermining Putin's sole argument for continued occupation.
It would also provide a framework for lasting political stability in Ukraine.
In contrast, the sort of territorial carving up that pundits talk about as a potential solution or compromise
between Ukraine and Russia would not solve these deeper issues of self-determination,
political choice and belonging. Ukraine claims all the territory that Russia has occupied since 2014, but to do so credibly,
it must offer some answer to what will happen to those who do not wish to remain Ukrainian, of whom there is undoubtedly a significant population.
It is striking that in Zelensky's otherwise impressively detailed ten point peace plan, there is no mention of this aspect,
which is certainly one political conflict controversy that any peace settlement will have to address.
Zelensky is no doubt aware of this. It does not fit easily into his demand for the complete restitution of Ukrainian territory.
But privately there must be some consideration in Kiev of what kind of compromise, such as limited autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk or confederation.
Ukraine might be prepared to accept, if indeed it does secure control of all of Ukraine's sovereign territory.
Perhaps this is already being discussed privately among the supporters of Ukraine, but I fear this is not the case.
While the discourse of territorial division and the all or nothing rhetoric of both sides continues to dominate.
It is arguably time to start introducing these important elements into the discussion of what a peace agreement might consist of.
Right now, according to polls, Ukrainians are understandably committed to the narrative of complete control of all of Ukraine's territory.
But some nuance in this debate will be necessary if an agreed and enduring peace, rather than a temporary and unstable ceasefire, is to be possible.
Above all, we need to support the principle in this conflict.
As for all that the most affected, those with the most at stake should be included in the discussion of the future.
If we attend to their requirements, we are more likely to achieve a lasting and sustainable deal.
But more than that, it is the right thing to do. No decision about us without us.
Thank you.