1 00:00:00,600 --> 00:00:13,920 I'm going to bring us down from the like, high level, cross world global perspective to focus on a couple of killer countries. 2 00:00:14,370 --> 00:00:20,910 Um, and um, and I'll try to relate this to the, the, 3 00:00:21,010 --> 00:00:32,790 the theme of the conference by asking a question about your actors and changes in, uh, in, in peacemaking and, um, and peacebuilding. 4 00:00:33,690 --> 00:00:33,990 Um. 5 00:00:36,140 --> 00:00:48,200 In doing this, I want to focus on what I consider a two fundamental shortcomings and contributors to, um, contributors to failure in peace processes. 6 00:00:50,000 --> 00:01:00,710 These are, firstly, the tendency in peace processes to be excessively externally constructed and let ownership in a nutshell. 7 00:01:01,790 --> 00:01:09,970 And secondly, the tendency of peace processes to be framed around external understandings, 8 00:01:09,980 --> 00:01:19,910 the conflict and external visions for peace, rather than the understandings and visions, um, of the people whose country it is. 9 00:01:20,690 --> 00:01:37,010 Context. In a nutshell. The case for the importance of local ownership and contextual knowledge has been made before, 10 00:01:37,760 --> 00:01:48,080 and and it's been made in various ways to take three examples that come to mind from me from the past 30 years. 11 00:01:48,470 --> 00:01:56,270 Think back to an 1994 work by James Ferguson called The Anti Politics Machine, 12 00:01:57,830 --> 00:02:05,750 which whose arguments were focussed on development but are applicable, I think, in some ways, to peacemaking. 13 00:02:07,610 --> 00:02:16,940 Ten years, nearly ten years after that project, Mckinty and colleague um wrote a book called Contemporary Peacemaking in 2003, 14 00:02:17,420 --> 00:02:26,090 and getting one quote from that that speaks to the factors I'm mentioning here in that book. 15 00:02:26,090 --> 00:02:30,680 They wrote, some peace processes are largely creatures of the international community. 16 00:02:31,220 --> 00:02:38,570 They reflect the desired outcomes of key states and the international community, rather than the wishes of local communities. 17 00:02:39,890 --> 00:02:46,520 That's something which I've seen and peace process as I've engaged with in the past ten years. 18 00:02:48,830 --> 00:02:56,030 And then a third. Instance of these issues is factors in literature. 19 00:02:56,030 --> 00:03:09,680 Peace literature from the past, uh, two decades is, uh, Severino two says work in 2014 peace land where she wrote about the, you know, 20 00:03:09,710 --> 00:03:20,450 thematic and local knowledge work best in combination thematic meaning the the sometimes being used as the label for the external expertise, 21 00:03:20,450 --> 00:03:24,830 the generic expertise of the of the outsiders internationals. 22 00:03:25,760 --> 00:03:29,120 She wrote thematic and local knowledge work best in combination, 23 00:03:29,720 --> 00:03:35,060 but knowledge hierarchies in the international system mean that local knowledge 24 00:03:36,200 --> 00:03:41,360 tends to be much less valued than generic thematic competency and expertise. 25 00:03:44,030 --> 00:03:54,710 So it's my view that peace processes that I've seen, and I and I, and I can see it in others, I think continue to fall very short on on these counts. 26 00:03:57,380 --> 00:04:03,980 I want to focus on two examples South Sudan and uh, 27 00:04:04,430 --> 00:04:11,780 during the period for the past ten years from 2014 and Yemen in the same period, 2014 through to the present. 28 00:04:12,290 --> 00:04:24,529 I'll focus on these because, um, I spent time working in both countries, in South Sudan with the UN peacekeeping mission in 20 1718, 29 00:04:24,530 --> 00:04:33,850 and from a much longer engagement with the two Sudans, reaching back to academic work on the second civil war in the Darfur conflict and in Yemen. 30 00:04:33,890 --> 00:04:40,730 My engagement has been from working with the uh UN's political mission for Yemen, 31 00:04:40,730 --> 00:04:50,660 the office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, working being based in Sanaa, um, during 2020 and 2022 to 2023. 32 00:04:51,140 --> 00:04:56,630 So being at the um, the from involved in mediation in country. 33 00:05:00,620 --> 00:05:07,040 Firstly South Sudan peacemaking in South Sudan. 34 00:05:10,830 --> 00:05:22,470 2014 to 2018 was a period of peacemaking started following the outbreak of South Sudan's civil war in December 2013. 35 00:05:25,020 --> 00:05:27,749 This was a period 2014 2018, 36 00:05:27,750 --> 00:05:38,910 which was saw a peace process that was very strongly externally led and ultimately ignored uh, South Sudanese initiatives. 37 00:05:39,570 --> 00:05:48,300 And it pushed an external vision and concept for peace, particularly the concept of power sharing as a solution, 38 00:05:49,110 --> 00:05:57,420 um, and power sharing with no firm framework for those sharing of power to cede and leave power. 39 00:05:57,810 --> 00:06:09,090 So the international approach to peacemaking pushed that, and it produced and resulted in keeping alive a very dysfunctional national peace agreement. 40 00:06:11,490 --> 00:06:19,080 What happened exactly? I'll get through some of the details, so don't worry if you don't follow all of them people. 41 00:06:19,440 --> 00:06:24,690 Some of you may may know some of some of South African story of the past decade. 42 00:06:27,270 --> 00:06:35,040 When peacemaking began in response to South Sudan civil war and to an end to end of 2013 early 2014. 43 00:06:35,400 --> 00:06:44,520 It followed initially the path of ceasefire negotiations, reaching ceasefires, ceasefire agreements of limited effectiveness, 44 00:06:45,300 --> 00:06:57,170 and then talks about political agreements, power sharing agreements and in 2015, minute or think. 45 00:06:57,210 --> 00:07:06,720 August 2015, the first peace agreement was reached and it was signed with extraordinary reluctance. 46 00:07:07,260 --> 00:07:18,750 It was signed firstly by the main um opposition signatory Rick Machar, and then a week later by the president of the country, the incumbent president, 47 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:25,470 who signing it appended to his with the signature to his signature, 48 00:07:25,770 --> 00:07:35,490 a 7 or 8 page statement of reservations to the peace agreement and the international machinery to support that peace agreement. 49 00:07:37,680 --> 00:07:47,969 Was opposite went into effect, but a year later, 2016, the agreement collapsed and war resumed. 50 00:07:47,970 --> 00:07:54,630 The power sharing, uh, combination of care and Machar broke down. 51 00:07:56,610 --> 00:08:07,240 And the peacemaking, the international peacemaking response was to restart an initiative, um again led by GATT, 52 00:08:07,320 --> 00:08:14,520 the East African intergovernmental body, which had a history of peacemaking, and it was pulled. 53 00:08:14,520 --> 00:08:19,920 Its initiative then was called the Revitalisation Forum. 54 00:08:21,750 --> 00:08:27,059 There was a and I get on voy, a secretariat supported by Western donor countries, 55 00:08:27,060 --> 00:08:32,910 very much following a model that had been seen been used before in Sudan and in East Africa. 56 00:08:35,250 --> 00:08:44,130 The outcome in 2018 and September 2018, after a lot of pressure from regional states, 57 00:08:44,610 --> 00:08:54,420 was the September 2018 Revitalised Agreement, the revitalised agreement for the resolution of conflict in South Sudan. 58 00:08:57,150 --> 00:09:05,340 Uh hyphen arcs or arcs, as South Sudanese and foreigners took to saying, 59 00:09:05,340 --> 00:09:12,630 and the heavy use of acronyms and abbreviations that has become common and um, in South Sudan. 60 00:09:14,310 --> 00:09:17,459 These are the cover pages of of the two agreements. 61 00:09:17,460 --> 00:09:20,850 The one on the left, hidden behind was the 2015 agreement. 62 00:09:20,850 --> 00:09:30,930 The one on the right was the September 2018 revitalised one with the letter R added to its abbreviation. 63 00:09:32,580 --> 00:09:40,230 Was this a good outcome? It was a really extraordinary outcome and quite questionable. 64 00:09:40,890 --> 00:09:45,450 Power sharing can sound good, but the reality and the success or another matter. 65 00:09:46,200 --> 00:09:54,390 And was it South Sudan? Was it the South Sudanese peoples and South Sudanese civil societies aspiration or choice at all? 66 00:09:56,490 --> 00:10:05,670 This revitalised agreement, it meant the country going from having one president and two vice presidents, 67 00:10:06,090 --> 00:10:10,710 having a structure of government of one president and five vice presidents. 68 00:10:12,000 --> 00:10:19,290 It meant putting back together at the top of power the two men who had fallen out violently twice before. 69 00:10:20,400 --> 00:10:28,290 It meant expanding the parliament by the terms of the agreement, from 400 to 550 members. 70 00:10:28,740 --> 00:10:35,160 For a country of with a population of just 10 million, that parliament having been expanded already once, 71 00:10:35,430 --> 00:10:45,390 twice before the 2015 agreement, which only operated or functioned barely for a year, expanded the parliament from 330 to 400, 72 00:10:45,960 --> 00:10:49,170 while the parliament had been expanded partly to independence, 73 00:10:50,070 --> 00:11:00,390 and this revitalised agreement meant that part of its terms were the elections were postponed again, the transition timetable was reset. 74 00:11:01,860 --> 00:11:12,569 South Sudanese did question this very strongly from senior uh elder ex political figures. 75 00:11:12,570 --> 00:11:25,530 One I remember saying quietly to me in August September 2018, saying it's a joke through two people in the streets ordinary south to. 76 00:11:25,680 --> 00:11:32,550 If you were not to who are not maybe in civil society organisations, but the person in the street who would say, 77 00:11:33,210 --> 00:11:42,960 what country in the world has five vice presidents and has a country of 10 million, has a parliament of 550, but has had no elections. 78 00:11:43,230 --> 00:11:44,460 How is this a solution? 79 00:11:46,470 --> 00:11:55,530 A during the talks that led to this agreement close to the end, remember one opposition leader saying quietly, although he was part of the talks, 80 00:11:55,530 --> 00:12:05,310 but saying as he scratched his head and uh, dealt with the pressure, the mediation pressure to to agree with what was being tabled. 81 00:12:05,760 --> 00:12:13,050 Um, he said that the approach made him think of the saying, often attributed to Einstein, but incorrectly. 82 00:12:13,260 --> 00:12:18,570 But the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. 83 00:12:19,680 --> 00:12:28,260 However, the machinery of international support, an ongoing legitimisation for the agreement was set in place. 84 00:12:30,080 --> 00:12:40,340 Um, it meant that um, the, the, the East African regional body, the troika uh, of Norway, US, UK, 85 00:12:40,350 --> 00:12:50,309 though its confidence was waning and a whole other array of organisations are j match um miss the UN country team and traditionally 86 00:12:50,310 --> 00:12:57,630 funded or overall the internationally funded initiatives for civil society engagement with the revitalised agreement. 87 00:12:58,560 --> 00:13:02,850 They they rolled into they went into practice. 88 00:13:03,990 --> 00:13:12,540 And so implementation of this agreement limped on with accumulating delays and shortcomings. 89 00:13:13,050 --> 00:13:19,200 For example a planned the agreement specified an eight month pre pre interim 90 00:13:19,200 --> 00:13:24,450 period before the new expanded unified power sharing government would be formed. 91 00:13:25,320 --> 00:13:33,730 That eight months had to be expanded, extended to um by an extra six months and then a further three months. 92 00:13:33,750 --> 00:13:43,620 So it was more than doubled before the president and the next president came together to form the new power sharing government. 93 00:13:44,520 --> 00:13:48,090 That was just one of the delays. Many more delays ensued. 94 00:13:48,570 --> 00:13:59,670 And then, um, the the expanded Parliament, for example, was only, um, inaugurated in 2020, two years behind schedule. 95 00:14:00,360 --> 00:14:07,320 And in August 2022, the signatory parties to this peace agreement. 96 00:14:07,830 --> 00:14:15,270 Uh, they agreed to extend the agreement by a further two years because they were so far behind the schedule. 97 00:14:18,100 --> 00:14:26,970 So what did this this very orthodox peace process exclude? 98 00:14:28,470 --> 00:14:38,970 It excluded what I would say is scope for other complementary and peace and positive initiatives to have had more effect, 99 00:14:38,970 --> 00:14:43,770 more influence, rather than ending up being shelved or limited. 100 00:14:45,210 --> 00:14:48,270 Limited to preferred entrants. There were two examples. 101 00:14:48,270 --> 00:14:54,300 There were two South Sudanese peace initiatives, peacemaking and peacebuilding, 102 00:14:54,660 --> 00:15:03,120 that were happening in parallel at the same time as the the 2014 to 2018 revitalisation initiative. 103 00:15:03,780 --> 00:15:16,860 One was here, South Sudan National Dialogue, which was a four year process from 2017 to 2020, was South Sudanese that didn't have an international. 104 00:15:17,370 --> 00:15:24,210 It had a little bit of international donor money, very small amount, but a lot of international scepticism, um, 105 00:15:24,780 --> 00:15:36,330 because international actors had committed themselves to supporting the, the, the orthodox framework, an approach to to making peace. 106 00:15:38,430 --> 00:15:43,140 The national dialogue which to give it zoom into a little bit of its detail. 107 00:15:43,650 --> 00:15:50,130 It conducted grassroots consultations which and then it conducted three regional conferences. 108 00:15:50,790 --> 00:15:56,670 And that culminated in a two week final conference in 2020 and a report. 109 00:15:57,060 --> 00:16:02,490 And and there were reports published and available in South Sudan of all of its consultations. 110 00:16:04,590 --> 00:16:14,310 And that report, which the cover pages on the left here and sample page bottom left, which talks about failure of leadership. 111 00:16:15,480 --> 00:16:24,240 That report didn't pull its punches. And it it was a total contrast with the revitalised agreement among um. 112 00:16:27,610 --> 00:16:32,380 It convey what the people had said in the consultations? 113 00:16:32,590 --> 00:16:37,270 And for all the imperfections of this South Sudanese led national dialogue. 114 00:16:37,270 --> 00:16:44,590 And there were imperfections, as there are usually national dialogues with or without international support in countries. 115 00:16:45,190 --> 00:16:52,180 Um, still, that national dialogue, it had some strikingly impressive or significant uh, 116 00:16:52,690 --> 00:16:58,839 aspects, such as conveying that the people of South Sudan were demanding. 117 00:16:58,840 --> 00:17:06,400 So they demand that both President Timbuktu react. Mitchell must leave politics with the countries to to move forward. 118 00:17:11,250 --> 00:17:18,899 So this was and then the second South Sudanese initiative I mentioned that was happening in parallel with 119 00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:25,620 the International Peacemaking Initiative was a much smaller one by the South Sudan Council of Churches, 120 00:17:26,070 --> 00:17:31,230 which had bought it for many years, had what it called an action plan for peace. 121 00:17:33,120 --> 00:17:40,769 They that but they made efforts to engage with the like and led an international supported mediation. 122 00:17:40,770 --> 00:17:44,220 But were the door was only fractionally open to them. 123 00:17:44,340 --> 00:17:54,760 It was very difficult for them to engage. Including on this example, South Sudan. 124 00:17:55,540 --> 00:17:59,770 Only two notes were a new actors in this example. 125 00:18:00,490 --> 00:18:08,800 Not really. I get the East African body, as I mentioned already had a history of mediation in Sudan and South Sudan. 126 00:18:09,430 --> 00:18:17,530 Um, there were cajoling roles for the presidents and governments of neighbouring countries to South Sudan, 127 00:18:17,890 --> 00:18:24,250 Uganda and Japan under its then new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, and also for Sudan. 128 00:18:24,790 --> 00:18:32,919 Um, but the role in neighbouring countries, such as those playing a role and in mediating a peace process that's also not so new. 129 00:18:32,920 --> 00:18:37,900 And uh, um, Uganda, um, those countries had played some roles in the past. 130 00:18:38,290 --> 00:18:47,410 Ethiopia, for example, was the, uh, the venue for and the host for 19 very important 1972 peace agreement with um. 131 00:18:50,200 --> 00:19:02,890 China was China, the new actor. And then South Sudan's peacemaking story in the 20 tens largely avoided involvement in peacemaking efforts. 132 00:19:03,580 --> 00:19:14,799 It had had some it had engaged a little bit in 2012, when relations between the then newly independent South Sudan and Sudan broke down. 133 00:19:14,800 --> 00:19:21,430 And, uh, and there was a small conflict on the border and a disruption to, uh, oil operations. 134 00:19:22,150 --> 00:19:32,140 Um, but China limited its subsequent involvement in, uh, this peace process on the incidentally, 135 00:19:32,290 --> 00:19:40,659 there's a there's an interesting article on this topic in the latest issue of International Affairs by Lee Patey on China's engagement in um, 136 00:19:40,660 --> 00:19:45,850 in peacekeeping changes in South Sudan's example, no clear changes. 137 00:19:46,060 --> 00:19:55,150 Um, uh, happened in that history, but it would be good to see more, see a change to more effective, more successful peacemaking in the coming years. 138 00:19:55,780 --> 00:20:00,820 It's. Moving to Yemen? 139 00:20:01,120 --> 00:20:03,910 I don't know. I think I've five minutes. 140 00:20:04,780 --> 00:20:16,480 Um, so in Yemen, peacemaking from 2015 or 2014 through to the present has mostly been a UNled UN Security Council supported peace process. 141 00:20:17,590 --> 00:20:24,370 And it has been an approach which has fitted with external political preferences 142 00:20:24,370 --> 00:20:28,450 and positions rather than the realities of the situation in the country. 143 00:20:30,250 --> 00:20:37,750 The approach, I would argue, tried to produce a nation wide agreement but largely was unrealistic. 144 00:20:38,380 --> 00:20:45,010 Exit ignored was that wasn't aligned with the context and also was very externally led, 145 00:20:45,640 --> 00:20:54,850 contributing to a widening gap between the parties, the Yemeni parties, and increasing the space for war to continue. 146 00:20:55,440 --> 00:20:58,450 For healthy hardliners, 147 00:20:58,450 --> 00:21:06,519 conservatives to feel that there was a Western conspiracy against them and for the official internationally recognised government of Yemen, 148 00:21:06,520 --> 00:21:12,790 or sometimes referred to as the exile government, to believe that it had little or nothing to concede. 149 00:21:16,930 --> 00:21:23,030 What happened briefly in Yemen? Unlike in South Sudan, there was no national. 150 00:21:23,030 --> 00:21:29,720 A national peace agreement reached from 2014 through until 2022, when a truce was reached. 151 00:21:31,930 --> 00:21:37,270 2011 to 2014 was a period of Yemen's Arab Spring uprising, 152 00:21:37,720 --> 00:21:51,160 channelled into a November 2011 Gulf Gulf Cooperation Council transition initiative with a new president and and then a national dialogue in 20 1314. 153 00:21:54,910 --> 00:22:02,970 But then events were. Derailed by twin in 2014, 154 00:22:02,980 --> 00:22:14,860 what was almost a counter coup by the ousted president and allied to these forces until they turned against him several years later. 155 00:22:16,270 --> 00:22:25,870 And in 2015, Saudi Arabia launched its military intervention, a coalition called Operation Decisive Storm, 156 00:22:26,230 --> 00:22:32,660 in principle aiming to restore the exiled government of Um Ahmadi. 157 00:22:35,050 --> 00:22:41,980 And that was the situation from 2015 through to 2022, with an international concept and vision for peace process, 158 00:22:41,980 --> 00:22:47,380 which was largely based on Security Council resolution in 2015, 159 00:22:48,040 --> 00:22:53,290 and a view and an aim that the officially internationally recognised government 160 00:22:53,620 --> 00:22:58,480 of Yemen was the government that should be restored to return to power, 161 00:23:00,070 --> 00:23:02,740 and that the Houthis were just the militia. 162 00:23:05,230 --> 00:23:16,120 That dominant concept and vision for peace process continued through that time, despite the fact that was this. 163 00:23:16,120 --> 00:23:24,189 These two maps are just to show that the the blue highlighted areas where there's not what needs to be known as northern Yemen, 164 00:23:24,190 --> 00:23:31,899 and that was the zone of has been the zone of through the summer of control from 2015 through to the present. 165 00:23:31,900 --> 00:23:37,990 The map on the left shows the area of control and 20s as it was in 2017, 166 00:23:37,990 --> 00:23:43,960 and the one on the right shows as it was in 2022, very little changed militarily. 167 00:23:44,440 --> 00:23:50,080 The Saudi led coalition campaign did not produce a change. 168 00:23:53,260 --> 00:23:59,890 And during this so under this framework and this approach to peacemaking. 169 00:24:02,760 --> 00:24:11,790 International mediation led by the UN was essentially unable to convene sustained talks, leading to large agreements. 170 00:24:13,050 --> 00:24:22,020 The only outputs products were several rounds of talks held in Kuwait in 2016 and then 171 00:24:22,020 --> 00:24:29,730 in 2018 as an agreement signed in Stockholm for a local ceasefire and redeployment. 172 00:24:32,040 --> 00:24:38,430 And then between 2019 and 2021, there were no talks, though there were several draft agreements. 173 00:24:38,730 --> 00:24:45,810 This is a little selection of them. On the bottom right is from the very short Stockholm Agreement. 174 00:24:46,110 --> 00:24:51,990 There were three additional pages to it. Um, so that was an actual signed agreement. 175 00:24:52,530 --> 00:24:58,859 The top two pages were from a draft comprehensive transitional agreement. 176 00:24:58,860 --> 00:25:06,989 But during this very in this that was prepared in 2019 entirely outside the country, that was never tabled. 177 00:25:06,990 --> 00:25:09,390 And um, so it was nothing that was signed, 178 00:25:09,870 --> 00:25:20,189 but it's illustrative or emblematic of a peace process where a lot of effort is being made from outside and papers are being produced, 179 00:25:20,190 --> 00:25:24,120 but they're not being produced by the people who's whose conflict it is. 180 00:25:24,810 --> 00:25:37,050 The third example, bottom left, was a draft joint declaration that was again being prepared by international mediation in 2020 2021, 181 00:25:37,290 --> 00:25:41,220 but was not really a product of of into Yemeni talks. 182 00:25:43,770 --> 00:25:52,830 And the change came in 2022 only with Saudis efforts to extract itself and from the war, when, uh, 183 00:25:53,310 --> 00:26:00,810 a formal truce agreement was signed and that truce agreement was not on paper, it's very short agreement. 184 00:26:01,230 --> 00:26:04,950 Ironically, it's not doesn't take the format of these. 185 00:26:04,950 --> 00:26:09,450 It's not written down. Uh, it was essentially verbal. 186 00:26:14,320 --> 00:26:22,930 So that's a picture of peacemaking in Yemen over 2014 through to 2022 is when a short truce was agreed, 187 00:26:22,930 --> 00:26:28,720 which has was renewed for over and survived for six months and then carried on and. 188 00:26:31,660 --> 00:26:36,160 What are the outcomes and consequences of that kind of or of that process? 189 00:26:37,840 --> 00:26:39,340 That peacemaking approach? 190 00:26:40,810 --> 00:26:48,430 The Houthis have been able to entrench themselves in power, the government that they have led with their political movement. 191 00:26:48,430 --> 00:26:53,560 And Sala has been able to deepen and pursue an ideological program. 192 00:26:56,820 --> 00:27:02,380 De-escalation and peace in the country have essentially been delayed and have become harder. 193 00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:07,950 The gap between the government and Sunak not recognised internationally, mostly, 194 00:27:08,430 --> 00:27:16,830 and the government that is mostly internationally recognised, that is based mostly out of the outside the country, partly in Camden. 195 00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:28,230 Um, the gap between them has grown, partly because of the of been possible for it to grow because of the inappropriate or um, 196 00:27:28,530 --> 00:27:30,450 approach to peacemaking during it. 197 00:27:30,480 --> 00:27:42,000 Um, why we also have that approach because political preferences among some states, regional, Arab and Western, encourage that approach. 198 00:27:42,300 --> 00:27:47,700 Also because another factor that can be forgotten is international engagement, 199 00:27:47,700 --> 00:27:55,170 which tends in terms of staff for diplomatic or aid organisations or political missions, 200 00:27:55,680 --> 00:28:02,790 tend to be what in the literature sometimes been referred to as bunker ized, like behind high walls. 201 00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:07,229 It's difficult for them to engage with people whose country in conflict. 202 00:28:07,230 --> 00:28:16,700 It is. So yemini, I'd argue, is it is it has been an example where the peace process fell short on both counts. 203 00:28:16,710 --> 00:28:24,750 Ownership. The process wasn't Yemeni led and shaped, not by the key parties and the Yemeni stakeholders and on contacts. 204 00:28:24,750 --> 00:28:30,720 The process wasn't adequately shaped to and uh to and by the context. 205 00:28:35,850 --> 00:28:45,120 Of include. Coming back to uh, the subject of um the conference and. 206 00:28:47,370 --> 00:28:54,299 I've argued that's two important reasons why some peace processes are unsuccessful are firstly, 207 00:28:54,300 --> 00:28:57,750 when a peace process is too externally led and orchestrated, 208 00:28:58,230 --> 00:29:06,990 and secondly, when the understandings and concepts that are dominant in the peace process come from outside rather than the country itself. 209 00:29:10,640 --> 00:29:19,160 What can be done to minimise those shortcomings, which is I in the beginning, aren't really new shortcomings. 210 00:29:19,250 --> 00:29:25,010 The problem of ownership and recognising the real situation, the projects. 211 00:29:25,520 --> 00:29:28,010 What can be done to minimise those shortcomings? 212 00:29:28,760 --> 00:29:35,180 Um, what changes are needed to prevent those shortcomings affecting future peace processes and efforts? 213 00:29:37,130 --> 00:29:46,850 International actors that seek to contribute to peace processes need to put more value on detailed knowledge about a country. 214 00:29:47,420 --> 00:29:53,720 They need to be more cautious and humble about their external role in a peace process. 215 00:29:54,380 --> 00:30:00,350 And they aim, and they need to aim more to facilitate processes rather than orchestrate. 216 00:30:01,130 --> 00:30:04,880 We put the groups and people whose country it is at the front of the process. 217 00:30:05,930 --> 00:30:15,080 They the people whose praise his country. It is you whose every day peace it is or they're trying to strengthen. 218 00:30:15,500 --> 00:30:23,030 They are the key actors, neither necessarily neither new nor old and for civil society. 219 00:30:23,050 --> 00:30:34,160 But change it. What changes needed there the they need to find ways to assert their voice and their views and their place in peacemaking, 220 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:40,040 especially when the international international actors are setting the terms of a peace process. 221 00:30:43,390 --> 00:30:56,530 The progressive reforming policy shift in international aid towards localising and decolonising aid is perhaps an example for peacemaking to note. 222 00:30:59,950 --> 00:31:08,950 There's no progressive and reform and policy shift in international politics yet to counter the ebbing in internationalism, 223 00:31:08,950 --> 00:31:16,900 multilateralism and democratisation on the rise and authoritarianism and conflictual multi polarity. 224 00:31:17,470 --> 00:31:29,230 But if and when efforts are made to renew and reinvigorate that planet's positive internationalism and multilateralism, it would be good luck include, 225 00:31:29,650 --> 00:31:38,410 if that support locally and contextually led peacemaking and peacebuilding more than it has done in the past 20 years. 226 00:31:39,370 --> 00:31:39,730 Thank you.