Okay. Thank you so much, Isabella. So coming to the final presentation of the day.
Now then, we've been talking about this, these various actors.
But, uh, for the whole day and for the final talk, Daniel's going to talk about probably one of the most important actors,
which is combatants themselves, or if not direct combatants, at least those whose identity is in some way defined by their opposition to an enemy.
And Daniel's going to give us a psychological insight into what the process went by,
which, uh, there might be transformation in that, uh, identity of enmity.
So Daniel Schaefer is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Experimental Psychology here at Oxford.
And before joining Oxford, he was a postdoc at the University of Bristol, also where I was before now.
And, um, he taught at the University of Oslo for a semester as well.
So thanks so much for joining us today. Thank you. Thanks a lot for the professional interaction.
I will be talking about intractable conflicts, which marks the most difficult conflicts to tackle the worst by definition.
And um, especially about focus at first on the escalation of conflict and the psychological mechanisms involved in this escalation.
Second part will be, um, various approaches of reducing these hostilities and finally talking about differences
which are remaining even if we are successful in reducing hatred and hostilities.
So escalation of conflicts. So the mere escalation or mere categorisation to groups and outgroups was psychologically found to elicit,
um, some preference for the groups or so-called in groups.
So typically they are evaluated being more positive than other groups.
We see that in case of many nations and also, um, in sports clubs, sports leagues and um, when it comes to the outgroups,
they are particularly evaluated if there are some group competition about if there are some, um, competing interests.
So looking shortly at the case of political scientists and why, um, conflicts, uh,
actually happening on a large political scale, there are various taxonomies and theories.
One, uh, summary of the taxonomy, um, um, that distinguishes classical interstate wars like between India and Pakistan,
for example, around, um, Kashmir, secession conflicts like in the former Yugoslavia, or ideology conflicts as in Afghanistan,
and so in what society did want to live, to want to live in a democratic state's geographic state or maybe in the socialist state,
the family, factual economic conflicts, these, uh, conflicts around, um, different factions who are competing for power and for resources.
Um, the commonality is that most of time, the conflict parties, um, think that, um, they are right.
And what they are doing, or at least, uh, publicly justifying on model values why they are doing what they are doing.
And psychologically, for subcultures. Interesting.
How much, um, the identities are becoming defined in terms of group identities.
Otherwise war wouldn't be possible in war.
You clearly have one enemy, clearly have, uh, you know, who belong to over it, and otherwise you wouldn't know who to fight.
Um, uh, people are often even sacrificing their personal interests for the group.
So group competition evaluation involving the evaluation of artworks.
Um, so what are the steps which are actually fuelling the escalation?
One important step is when parties with conflicting interests are starting to threaten one another.
So that's field escalation because people, um, are in a situation of fair and massive competition and,
uh, worst case, um, situations that leads to so-called preventive strikes.
Um, um, mutual threats and spirals can, um, pile up to the degree that the parties are just saying,
if you don't do what I want, I will do something which you won't want, like preventive strikes.
And as soon as the thresholds of killings is transgressed.
So we have crossed the Rubicon. So to say that brings the conflict to a totally different level, cause, uh,
people often feel as, uh, um, group members or grown family members actually have been lost.
So it could be seen in the Western world by, um, the attacks in London on the buses.
Um, many different situations. Um, nations had that turning points where the conflict went into a new escalation phase.
And that means, of course, intense threats like threats to your own life, to your economic interests that will save the lives of your family members.
Um, why that is so significant is related to the so-called sanctity of life.
That's one way of putting it. Sacredness of life linked to the reversibility of death.
Because, um, you know, killings, killing off innocents in particular, uh, taboo in practically any society.
And so that it's necessarily the spiral of escalation.
Um, and that's in turn leads to outrage, moral outrage.
Sometimes the desire for revenge. And luckily, um, that cycle, both sides are claiming that they are just defending themselves.
Um, what they are doing is attacking us.
Um, um, they are bad in their character,
but what we are doing is actually trying to find a way to peace by destroying the
sanction potential of their opponents and clearing the path towards negotiations.
And, um, the focus is typically on own victims.
Um, that feeds into this perception that we are the good ones.
We are the bad ones. Um, um, we can see that clearly also in the current, um, conflict between Israel and Hamas.
Um, so that, um, sides which are focusing on the, um, Palestinian side,
pointing out the massive victims that children, hunger, catastrophes, humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip.
Whereas the focus of many Israelis and those who are associated with that sort, um, they are pointing to the fate of the,
um, of the hostages, of the mass rapes and mass atrocities and maiming of hostages, um, of people.
And last October, um, from the vessel perspective, of course, we should feel moral outrage by any of those states,
by any victims, which are, um, victims on the civilian side of massive escalation.
So what also keeps up hostilities on any sides is, um, as what some call collective traumas.
So remembering these events, like not far from the Palestinian side or past wars in Gaza, or on this recent of drones dating back to the 19th century.
Um, Holocaust in Germany, Yom Kippur war.
Um, these are lands which are by um, memorials and by memory days.
Um, part of the public consciousness and which are kept alive and increasing.
Actually these include upward thinking we against them.
So these collaborations also lead to certain emotions.
So it confirms the belief that we are the victims and they are the perpetrators.
Um, these um, emotions which are entails like rage, hatred and fear.
They are the concrete barriers which makes it so difficult for negotiations for us mediators or third parties.
So what are the, um, the traditional conflict resolution approaches?
Many of them are based on the idea that we just have to look at the underlying interests and needs.
So basic principle being when we look at the top, we find there are contradictory positions.
But if we look deeper, we find that some interests are actually shared, that there are common needs.
And based on these needs, we can build actually, um, agreements due to the fact that people share fundamental needs like security and recognition.
And these are non-zero-sum in nature, meaning that we can find an integrative solution where, uh, after ceasefires, after demilitarisation,
the security of one party, this action of taking away security from the other party that's helping us to achieve more security.
And same with recognition. It's also not serious. Um, we can have recognition for everyone if we engage in mutual recognition.
But the more escalated conflict is, the more difficult,
it says to convince people that they actually don't need to continue fighting for they don't
need to threaten the other person anymore because it's perceived as an existential threat.
And nice way of depicting that is so-called outcast class model.
So at the top you can see, um, state of non escalation.
So just the difference in opinion. For example, the difference in values um, is um, there there's broad space for peace building.
But as further the conflict escalates, what's the middle of the hourglass?
The more difficult it gets of, the more narrow the space of actions becomes.
So once we are colliding into a situation of violence, of war, the space becomes very limited.
And there is, um, just violence containment, which can be attempted.
And then that stage is getting into a ceasefire.
When we are moving further across the ceasefire, down to normalisation, um,
then the space increases again for more opportunities towards reconciliation, ideally,
where we have enough space to structure all the cultural peacebuilding that ironically,
lots of our attention is in this area where we can do at least so far less area, uh, far less attention is going into the area of prevention.
And that's just part of the human condition. Our attention is attracted by violence, by action.
Um, um, so the result is that not only media attention staying there, but also large resources are getting that.
So natural resources again to prevention. That's looking at the Greenland war or Afghanistan Iraq war.
Literally billions of dollars are flooding into this area.
And um, whereas in the area of prevention and post-conflict peace building or post violence case building, it's likely to be more effectively stand.
So, um, what are now, um, in more detail, what can we do about these psychological barriers to conflict resolution?
So, interestingly, on a substantial level, um, parties are often more willing for compromise, as we might think.
So this, Paul was done in Israel, different town points and the Palestinian areas like Gaza and the West Bank in 2006 and 2017.
And so we can see two things. On the one hand, the support for two state solution along the, um, roughly along the borders between.
The six States Force. Um. Some ports support a surprisingly high.
So it was in 2006 when 71% of Palestinians, 68 of Israelis, Israelis, and in 2007 still around 50%.
And even before, um, the current war, 50% of people in Gaza said, um,
that they wanted Hamas to stop calling for the destruction of restaurants that accept a permanent two state solution based on the 67 borders.
Um, that's although, um, in theory, many people and sometimes leaders are also supportive for solutions for negotiations.
Um, often they distrust the other parties to such a degree.
If they say it's just not possible, it would be possible with us, but it's not possible.
But um, so there is being fear threat to see, um, existence and take threats, perceiving other group as immoral and evil.
And these emotions can be more important than substantial issues.
So what do we do about that there uh, different approaches.
One approach is more coming from a political direction, strategic thinking, um, that is trying to be rational.
We're trying to internally think about in the group what can be done.
Intergroup contact coming from a psychological perspective, um, bring people together and improve their attitudes to one another.
Mutual concessions, small political changing views by um indicates and goodwill.
So what does that mean? So very quickly we have a closer look at different approaches to strategic thinking in space on the idea.
Well, in these situations, people just are very far apart in their emotions and very far pops and their positions.
And that's why they are not willing to negotiate, at least not yet.
What can be done once the proposal strategic thinking is we promote dialogue with ending the conflict parties, and we support strategic thinking.
Also, potentially as third party mediators,
we try to encourage them also to see the chessboard from the other side in order to understand what the best strategy is to move forward.
And one help us that's in this motivations.
You see the chessboard from the other side just because of the motivation of wanting to win.
Um, there's already something embedded, which is the reminder of perspective taking,
such trying to understand what the best move us requires to understand the perspective of the other.
But the problem of that is, if we only look internally, um, there's no feedback of what the other side actually wants.
It's more based on what we think and what the other side thinks the other side is like.
And so it needs some big feedback from the other side and needs some correction.
And that's where contact can come into play.
So, um, the help of the contact hypothesis or the assumption of the contact hypothesis as that contact improves attitudes towards other things.
And it's lost. Some parents even pose as a kind of miracle track.
So we see sorry, we see, um, disagreements between parties, massive disagreements.
We bring them into contact. That's our magic potion.
And that leads to intergroup harmony. Of course, reality is often more complex and sometimes works better, sometimes does not work so well.
It works quite good when we are engaging with children.
Yes, properly. At that age they are not so fixed and the assumptions about the out of the group yet and also, um, the situation has to be cooperative.
It must not be, um, competitive.
So if it's competitive, if people don't feel well, there is some unpleasant feeling that sometimes snakes think things even worse.
And so it's important there's some element of cooperation, some element of similarity.
But if facts are sometimes small and the reach can be limited, uh, reach can be limited.
Meaning that we are not able to bring all opinions and Russians together in contact.
And we it's also impossible to track shots of all Palestinians of this race.
Um, so it can be only gradual environmental long term,
although it's not help of the negotiators from both sides are brought together at the beginning in a more, uh, friendly environment, widely.
Share similarities. That's the question. Us?
Um, to what degree? They're really willing to not talk immediately about the difficult issues.
But the basic idea is, um, that you bring people together, that they discover similarities.
They might discover commonalities in terms of common humanity, and that's humanity in terms.
It's inclusive of the in-group and the outward. And, um, and that can encourage reducing animosities and supporting the discovery of similarities.
Due to the limited ness of that approach, in terms in terms of numbers we can reach.
It's also important to signal to the wider audience goodwill by mutual concessions.
So that's part of something for mantle. Approach of small concessions can actually change the view of the other.
So if the other makes small concessions which change our perception of the other.
Most of the others like ideally. And that'll turn this old feeling turn and also change our own goals.
So if we don't have the impression anymore that the others are just there to destroy us totally.
Changes also are strategic decisions. So looking at that together, um, the strategic thinking can help to think more rationally.
Um, about the conflict. Options can reduce the emotional barriers towards conflict resolutions by being more reflective,
by being trying to be less guarded by exaggerated fear hatreds and outrage.
Um, but in order to arrive at a more realistic picture of what the others are actually like,
what the real names us contact has place different levels to us at the civil society level, as well as the lead US level,
which sort of concessions are important because they help to, um, signal a real goodwill to a broad variety of people,
and then maybe there's more space for building agreements on shared and trust, shared needs like security recognition needs, shared economic needs.
That's in many conflicts like,
and what's typical of the intractable conflicts us that they have also elements of positions which just simply don't fit together.
So if both parties want to have the same territory and if they want to have the answer territory, whereas, um,
a real disagreement, which is not just a matter of misunderstandings, which is not just a matter of exaggerated fears, interests.
And so what do we do with that? What do we do with disputes about rights and territories, distributions of resources.
And again, procedural framework must be an approach for that incremental approach.
Um, so the purpose, the trick here properly that this, um,
this procedure is perceived by both parties as being just insofar as it's based on moral concerns and in fact,
insofar as it improves the costs, benefits ratio in the eyes of the parties involved.
Um, that's practically what happened in Northern Ireland. So that conflict was also for a long time perceived as being intractable.
And violence was escalated to such a high degree that there was huge pessimism.
And at some point in the 90s, during the Oslo Accords, Northern Ireland was even envious, um, about Israel.
And people involved from Northern Irish conflict were partially looking at the role model of Israel Palestine, which is unthinkable today.
And, um, looking at how well that works there.
And so things turned out a little bit different, which can occasionally happen in history, apparently.
And, um, now people tend to look the other way round.
What went well, Northern Ireland. And they managed with, uh, peace agreement Belfast, Good Friday agreement to have, uh, tasks,
something which is perceived as being just by power sharing, by more participation of the Catholics,
by having a unionist government, including the Irish representatives, and seen as a factor, um,
insofar as that was the sum of our aid, which was very important for the um, Protestant community.
And what was important for the IRA was that there was the prospect of a referendum and saying,
okay, um, the future in a couple of years, we might have a referendum.
And if the majority is in favour of reunification with Ireland, so be it.
And that's what it's made at. Um, that's a better cost benefit ratio for the IRA and the arts.
And what lesson for giving us was that the moment it stays the same.
And as they thought they would have the maturity for the time being, that they were quite happy or it was acceptable.
Um, give them that's what they also got was the end of violence.
So, um, the trick was you could trace it a lot of way to loss.
Um, in terms of irreconcilable issues like referendum about the status, getting some hope for the future.
And that was basically what was done there, saying, okay, we concede that we can't solve everything for now,
but that's why we're having a procedure which is moving you for mentally for that and maybe in the future.
So that's the hope, which was not explicitly out of that, but which I would say also things change.
There will be new generations for which maybe there's questions to which parts not now belongs.
It's not so important anymore. Um, um, plus economic situation is improving.
Um, plus the political framework is changing.
So in summary, um, approaches can be should be parallel and complementary.
Should should not be either or that they properly have to complement one another.
So teaching thinking can help to be more rational and cutting back the emotional barriers and to have contact and help to make,
um, the expectations more realistic, to get to know the other group and to release the hatreds.
Mutual concessions are important as a sign of goodwill, building agreements and shared interests.
It's essential to move forwards and to come to a solution and for the very hard core issues,
creating a procedural framework in which the first and most controversial issues of the future can be,
um, uh, way forward, as was demonstrated in Northern Ireland.
So thank you very much.