

C21st Challenges to Peace: Theory, Pedagogy, Policy & Practice in Peace Work

Transcript

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Okay, I just want to say real quick, yes, my name is Gerode Miller. I'm from the University of Aberdeen. I'm a professor in Peace and Conflict Studies. And I want to thank the funders of this project, the Leverhulme Trust and the Royal Society of Edinburgh, but also the various people who, I mean, 155, 156 interviews this project is based on. It's a research project. I'm not a practitioner. I'm an academic, very much an academic. I'm not even a pracademic. But One of the things that we'll certainly kind of focus on here is the motivation, right? So in other words, I'm an academic, but I think that we're really lacking an impact as academics. And this project was really motivated in some ways by an attempt to have more of an impact for the field. So real quick agenda, I'll talk about my motivation and the methodology for the project. And then I'm going to talk about past and future challenges. to peace, but really, I mean, we're talking here to the field of peace building or peace studies or peace and security, broadly speaking, efforts, what I'm calling peace work, efforts to build peace and maintain peace. Then we'll get in the, we'll get a bit more into where those challenges are emerging, right? So issues of polycrisis, issues of legitimacy of the field, and then we'll get to responses, right? So solid, what's needed, what needs to change for this field to have more impact or to have more influence, to have more of a voice? The last bullet point is literally not even a slot, right? It's simply a point that we're desperately needing a new vision, we're desperately needing leadership, and we're desperately needing some kind of political will to support peace. As somebody mentioned earlier, or maybe I just read it in something I was reading at breakfast. But there seems to be a turn away from the idea of peace as a priority at all. And this, in essence, is a political question, right? It's also a social question for all of us. So the motivation. So like I said, I'm a professor in peace and conflict studies. I teach within the sociology department. I mainly publish in international relations journals. Most of what I talk about and the kind of work that I've historically done is ethnography in rural Sierra Leone, and I talk a lot about culture. So my work isn't disciplined in any sense, and it's inherently interdisciplinary. And that's one of the things that motivates this project, right? Conflict, issues of security and peace and justice are not disciplined, right? These are inherently transdisciplinary, interdisciplinary, I would certainly say anti-disciplinary problems. And so they demand transdisciplinary or interdisciplinary or anti-disciplinary answers and approaches and concepts. So my work has, like I said, a lot of it's been ethnographic.

So most of my projects do my PhD and then the years after my PhD were ethnographic studies of the local experiences of transitional justice and peace building and development projects in rural Sierra Leone. There's lots of stuff written about that. You can find it all. A number of books about ethnographic research, lots of articles about this work. But really this project was motivated by the fact that none of that did anything. So in 2017, I think, Roger McGinty and a few of his colleagues were writing a book of fieldwork experiences and what you would have done differently if you knew what now, what would you have done differently? And in reflecting on all of my work at that point, I was more than a decade. including the PhD work, I was more than a decade into this field. And the reality is northern, rural Sierra Leone had not been impacted in any sense, in any way, got better, not at all, as a result of my work. And what at that point was already a flourishing academic career. I could publish lots of papers, couple of 1000 citations, 0 impact, right? Affected nothing. So in essence, I was seeing kind of successes in some ways, very successful academic, not at Oxford, but you know, I'm doing okay. but real miserable failure in any sense of changing the world. And as somebody who's in peace and conflict studies, that's kind of part of the point, right? You should be contributing somehow. So, and I, what this project actually started with the notion of ambition and ambivalence, right? The field as a whole. So I was, in some ways, I was reflecting on this in my own personal capacity, but it's also, I think, true for the field that we do have this great ambition to be something bigger than an academic field, to be something bigger than a than an academic project, to be something bigger than the theory, right? The theory and the data is supposed to contribute in some way to the world. But the ambivalence is, really, since kind of the early 2000s, a lot of scholarship has shown we're not achieving that, right? So peace work is how I'm framing this, right? Peace work, not peace building, not peace and conflict studies, not peacemaking, not mediation, not transitional justice. I'm talking about peace work. And this is a phrase, you can find references to peace work all the way back to the 1880s, but generally it's not really used, right? You can find hundreds of thousands of citations about peace building or peacemaking or peacekeeping, but there's only a couple of thousand about peace work. And that's because it's such an overlap, you know, it's an overarching umbrella kind of term for any work that is attempted. to build or maintain or sustain or develop a piece. So I'm using the term in particular because I'm trying to get this overview of the field, right? So we're specifically looking at piece work. And what I would say is that as a broad field then, peace work has gone through lots of changes, right? Peace work before World War I was different than between the interwar years, was different than after World War II, was different again after the end of the Cold War, and has been certainly different since 9-11, right? Peace work as a kind of an industry, as a field, shifts and changes and evolves in response to things, right? Like the Women, Peace and Security agenda, right? That is a new evolution. We in theory, you could say, recognized the problem, came up with a solution, tried to implement that solution, and it greatly influenced the field, right? As in new programs, new projects, new research,

new theories regarding gender and intersectionality and peace and conflict, et cetera. We've, in essence, responded or attempted to respond to new challenges. But the problem, I think, is that there's for change creates all kinds of problems, right? The growth of the field itself means that we become fragmented, we become distanced from each other. I was just reflecting earlier, this project started partially about this distance between my own work or academic work and practice or impact. But really, the more I've looked at it, we're also just academics aren't talking to each other, right? We're all chasing kind of different ideas, different plans, different elements of the field. And there's no forum or consistency. There's nowhere where it all comes together into one thing, right? So in essence, the field is evolving, the field is changing, but what does that result in, right? Oh, I guess I was behind by a slide. Sorry about that. So the methods, okay, the project was originally very simple. The project started in 2018, 2019 with a grant from the Leverhulme Trust, one of those personal research fellowship things that are very nice, very worth getting. And it was in essence 60 interviews, right? So it was designed to be 24 interviews with academics, leading academics, 24 interviews with international peace-building professionals. So in other words, people at, they were all in that phase, based at working for one of the kind of six biggest peace-building organizations. I'm sure you can guess who many of those are. Not the people, but the organizations. And there were local 6, 12 representatives of 12 different local peace-building organizations in Nigeria. I thought at the time it would be good to do work in Nigeria. That was a bad idea. I'll go back to Sierra Leone next time. But that was 60 interviews. before the pandemic. Pandemic happened. Everything got put aside. I was head of the department at the time. Research got, in essence, completely put aside. After the pandemic, this was all very dated. I was asking people about past and future challenges to peace before Ukraine, before Gaza, before the pandemic itself, before AI, before climate change became such a big deal, right? So as soon as I was not head of the department and tried to return to this state, I realized I have to go back to these same people or some of those same people and other people. So the second phase of the project, just this I did this last year, 2024, 2025, has been interviews with 96 additional people. Now, some of those are the same academics, academic leaders, and some are new. Some of those are same practitioners, some are new. I didn't do the local practitioners this time, but what I reached out to was more different groups, gatekeeper groups, right? So a lot of people in the first phase were like, we can't control this. You need to talk to funders, right? Funders are where the problems are. Academics would say, well, yeah, this stuff gets published, but really it's determined what journals want to see, right? So there's eight different journal editors involved this time, right? Those are the gatekeepers. And the other thing was new peace workers. So a lot of people said, we don't have the answers for this. You need to talk to engineers who are working on apps. So 6 different people in the kind of peace tech, peace engineering group or business. There's 6 different people, I think it might be 5, who are in like business for peace and finance for peace. Six different people who work in the climate,

environmental kind of issues and peace, and six different people who work in the arts for peace, right? So in essence, these are what I call new peace workers, although new is seriously questionable here, right? But in the alternative areas that are not really peace and public studies, but are kind of working towards peace as well. Right, second part of the agenda, what do they actually find out? Well, the future challenges are kind of what you'd expect. So I was asking everyone, a bit about themselves and their institution. Then I was asking them to reflect back on past challenges, which we'll get to in a minute. And then I was asking them to reflect forward, what are the biggest challenges we're going to be looking at in the same kind of time period, you know, say 20 or 25 years. And then at the end, I asked them, how should we be preparing to deal with those challenges? The future challenges are kind of what you'd expect. They're the big sexy issues we're all talking about right now. Climate change, weakened global rule of law, populism, decreasing emphasis on peace, the crisis of liberal democracy, rise of China. These are just the top ones, right? So there's like 50, 60 codes here. But in essence, this is what everyone is thinking and concerned about right now. Those percentages are the interviews. So in other words, not the number of times they were mentioned, But, sixty-eight percent of people interviewed, this is just the academics and the practitioners, sixty-six percent, sorry, sixty-eight percent said climate change. It was like the first thing people would think of, and it makes perfect sense. It is a terrible problem. Price of liberal democracy, 46% at some point described this or articulated this, right? The one that's not kind of topical is the complexity, right? At some point, almost everyone would articulate that these things are actually intertwined. They're not separate problems, right? That these are complexly interrelated issues, right? People will be talking about populism, and then they would talk about mass mobilization, and then they would talk about climate change, and then they would, right? So in essence, it was kind of all rolled together, that people kind of realize at some point, well, all of these things are really actually all related and knitted together. The past challenges are very different, right? The past challenges people would articulate were about like funding, something that's already come up today, right? The lack of funding in particular, but also the reliance on institutional actors, the problematic model for funding, the short-termism of funding, et cetera, all these, there were 13 sub-codes under funding, right? Lots of problems with funding. The biggest one, though, the most commonly mentioned one, was the fact that nobody understands what peace is. So both practitioners and academics had this problem of like, you know, we can't get money because the general population doesn't know what it is. That's why we're overly reliant on institutional funders. But even the institutional funders, because the governments, because the population isn't putting pressure on them to support peace, they don't feel the necessity to support peace. So what we have to do is figure out a way to communicate what peace is and what peace building is, right? So we have all these issues, lack of cooperation, lack of substantive impact. These are boring. These are cool. These are sexy. Published article about these. People don't really care. Not we

don't care, but these are sidelined in some ways, right? These are bureaucratic, administrative, boring, right? The past and the future challenges, right? Past challenges seem smaller, right? People are reflecting on their experiences. What I think came out of it was that Obviously, the future challenges are things people haven't tried to address yet. They haven't had the experience of addressing them yet. And so they're projecting forward and going, AI and robotics and drone swarms. When they reflect backwards, they're thinking about terrorism or they're thinking about identity conflicts or they're thinking about the former Yugoslavia. But what they're recognizing is the challenge was we weren't able to solve it because, right? That's why they get into the kind of administrative, bureaucratic, mundane kind of challenges. But as I'll get to, that also shows that those kind of challenges have undermined our ability to address those bigger issues, right? The cool, sexy stuff doesn't get addressed. So what I wanted to talk about here a bit is this issue of what we're calling, everybody knows this word now, polycrisis, right? It's a cool word over the last couple of years. But in essence, it's this notion that we're in a time now of much more difficulty. So the next few slides present some of the quotes. Like I said, 156 interviews, there's like 1.6 million words in this project, right? So it's a loss. These are just, I'm not going to read these. You can read them if you want. They're just exemplary kind of words from the people that I talk to about these issues, right? But there was certainly the notion, as this quote, these two quotes indicate, of we had a simpler time. in the 90s or immediately after the post-Cold War, we kind of thought what we were doing and we had these linear notions of if we just build democracy, if we just kind of open markets and then we'll have peace. If we get two groups together and they're in dialogue groups and then they'll learn about each other and relationships will build and that will build peace. We had a kind of a simpler notion of what the challenges were and therefore simpler conceptions of what the solutions might be. In the more recent phase or time, people were articulating this is just no longer what we're dealing with, right? Sometimes, People wouldn't use the term complexity. People wouldn't really be using, I've written about complexity and complexity theory and feedback loops and all this kind of stuff. So that's a particular niche in the field, which is growing. You know, everyone will have heard, you know, adaptive peacebuilding and Cedric de Koning and all this kind of stuff. The complexity narrative is getting out there, but often people would be implying complexity. There's far more actors, there's far more challenges, right? But they wouldn't be using the language of complexity theory, but they were kind of using complex as like a label, right? For just, it's just more difficult. There's just more stuff. stuff going on. Sometimes, though, they would be explicit about this, right? And they would use the language of complexity theory to articulate this, right? There's non-linear, you know, we used to have this notion of kind of very linear relationships. Now we have non-linear relationships or, you know, the cascading and compounding effects of one thing affecting another thing, affecting another thing, affecting another thing, right? So people, some people in the field were certainly explicitly articulating this as complex challenges, right? And of

course, the centrality of the climate crisis. So I've already articulated, you've seen on this slide earlier, 68% of people identified the climate crisis and climate change or environmental catastrophe or whatever is coming our way as the key challenge of the next 20, 25, 30 years. But that was one of the reasons it was brought up so much was that it was seen as a linchpin for all these other things. right? It was seen as driving mass mobilization, which is seen as driving polarization, right? Or it was seen as creating divisions and divides in countries where some would benefit and some would lose the access to water, access to food, right? Or many things like inequality were seen as then affecting how people would experience climate change, right? As in the Global North won't be affected as much, right? Or rich people can isolate themselves from the effects, right? So there was a centrality of climate change in all the narratives regarding this complexity. And what this is really driving is, or where this is kind of going, and we will return actually to something that the last presenter stated right at the end of her presentation, but there's a real problem with the legitimacy of the peace model in relationship to the complexity of the challenges, right? So the model of peace that we are working on, the model of peace that I would say is still actually what governments, funders, the development banks work on, is still the liberal peace, right? There is still the assumption that democracy and open markets and development and investment and growing GDPs and courts and all this kind of stuff that comes with the liberal peace is the answer, right? We've seen hints of that already in the other presentations.

Development and investment is necessary. And I'm not saying it isn't, but That is also, that's what the liberal piece is. Or that, and I'm not, again, I'm not against this, but that gender and inclusivity and inclusion of women and voice for women, it has to be part of the answer. That is also part of the liberal piece, right? These are inherently related to each other. We, in the field, we critique the liberal peace, but the liberal peace is also implicit in what we're doing, right? And unfortunately, because of the complexity of the problems we're facing, the liberal peace model has really become de-legit. demised, right? It's not worked, right? It's not provided the expected benefits, the peace dividend, the support and the financial and rights and all the stuff that is claimed to provide has not emerged, has not happened for most post-conflict countries, for a lot of post-conflict countries. As a result of that, the delegitimization of the peace model Those who were promoting it, those who engaged in it, those who funded it, have also become delegitimized. Part of that we're doing to ourselves by cutting all the funding and re-militarizing. Oh, so you didn't believe in any of that ever? Okay, right. But Ukraine and Gaza have utterly got at this, right? Before, in the first phase of these interviews in 2018, 2019, there was some of this narrative. Funding is very difficult. The actors aren't showing their commitment, et cetera. But after, in the second phase, I mean, it's this huge rise. Not everybody, but so many people were just like, Gaza has just done it. Not just Gaza by itself, which obviously indicates all the hypocrisy, but Gaza tied with Ukraine, as in, yes, Russia is evil, but Israel's okay. Right? Yes, Russia is killing people, and we will so we will support and arm Ukraine. but not Gaza, right? This has just, this

has been so deleterious to any notion that there was any consistency to the normativity of the kind of dominant piece actors, the West, that I'm not sure that they're coming back from it, right? So many actors in the Global South have just no belief anymore that European countries or North American countries are normative actors, right? It's going to be a huge problem, right? And part of the reason, like I said, is the chronic underfunding. I'm sorry, I've got a slide for that. Someone, just the chronic underfunding. Underfunding, and we've touched on it a few times already during the day, people have hinted at it, is chronic, right? I mean, it's hard, the numbers are absurd, right? So CIPRI reported last year 2.7 trillion was spent on militaries. 2.7 trillion was spent on militaries, right? The Global Peace Index for the year before, I didn't get the 2024 numbers, but 2023, 50, it was actually 49.6 billion, 2.7 trillion, 49.6 billion was spent on peace building and peacemaking together, right? I know 49.6 billion sounds like a whole lot of money. I'd like that. Do a lot of research on that. But in relation to 2.7 trillion and spread over 100 different countries, it's nothing. It's one 200th of the money that's spent on military, right? One 200th, right? We also have the situation where NGOs, of course, we have to kind of promote, you know, maybe overly describe the benefits or the the expanse of our work. NGOs do this all the time. We're working in the DRC and we have a team doing this and dialogue groups here and there and the other. But when you really get into it, then the response is kind of, well, I mean, it's an office of four people and we've got a few 100,000 to do that project. We're describing it like we're doing all this kind of stuff, but relatively to all the problems, it's just not going to do anything. And we kind of know that, right? It's their job to emphasize how much they can achieve, because that's how you get more money. But in reality, what they're doing and how it's dispersed across countries creates no effect, right? Not no effect. We all know there's personal effect, there's relationships that are built, but overall, not enough effect. And this chronic funding is just getting worse, right? I mean, everyone in the 20s, these, both of these quotes are from the 2019 interviews from practitioners. Both of these quotes are from practitioners in the most recent wave of interviews. And there's, I mean, I mean, people who I was re-interviewing, I'd say, well, what's changed in the last six years? And they're like, oh my god, everything's got worse. Just everything. The funding is drying up, disappearing. Institutions are either closing or they're just kind of surviving or they're merging with others. people would articulate like we've already caught X amount of staff. It's just kind of cataclysmic for the field, right? We don't really know where it'll go, but there's absolutely no question that we're seeing increasing financial pressure. And what results is, I think, what's really interesting and the kind of dynamics that it creates, anybody working for a petitioner will probably know this, right? You're so... kind of, it's all enforced to a point where you're getting short-term funding that requires evaluation. You're implementing a project that you probably know isn't really going to have a great effect, but you have to narrativize it as if it's going to have a great effect because you want the next tranche of funding. And so it rigidifies and conservatizes, you know, people were describing kind of like, I've worked with projects

where they know in the first six months it's not going to work, but it's a three-year project, so they have to implement it. And it's in essence, any kind of, if there's no money, any kind of creativity straight away goes out the door, right? Any kind of responsiveness, any adaptiveness, any ability to kind of merge and shift and change what you're trying to do in the field goes out the door, right? So we have short-term and projectized NGO work, right? Civil society work. Project ties, what I'd never heard before 2018, 2019, but apparently all the NGO people talk about projectization all the time. And it's in essence attempting to fit all kinds of things into a project, right? Your work has to be projectized. You can't have long-term strategic visions. You can't be working over a 10 or 12 year timeline because the project is 18 months. right? Or a project is even just a year, 12 months. And there might be follow-up funding, but in order to get the follow-up funding, you have to do exactly what they say as they say it, or at least tell the story that way. And so that they'll give you the next transfer funding. So it all, in essence, produces this conservativized process that results in this, right? And I don't want, I don't mean this to completely delegitimize civil society work. And I think most civil, this is, these are the words of practitioners. These are the, this is what the practitioners are saying, right? that it's in essence kind of bureaucracy over substance. Right? But that's nobody's fault, really. The system is making it that way. The funding mechanisms are making it that that's kind of all that's possible. right? I mean, we see the exact same thing in British universities, right? I don't know, something like 1/3 of British universities are in deficit spending this year. So everyone's just trying to survive. So you just do the minimum. You don't know what will happen next year anyway. You could be fired or you could lose a program or they'll shut it down because they've only got six students instead of 25 students. So you make a little long-term plans, right? If there's no money, there's no space to be creative, right? And so it becomes almost inherently bureaucracy over substance. This is what is undermining massively the model. So undermining the model of peace, liberal peace, then it's undermining the actors that supported that liberal peace as in the UN, the US, Europe, right? All those actors that supported the liberal peace, that talked the language of liberal peace. And eventually the problem is it's undermining the legitimacy of peace as a concept. right? Where we are returning to a kind of a process where peace is just force. Peace is might makes right. I'll get into this in a bit more, right? This is, these are one interview from an academic and one from a practitioner that are articulating exactly this problem, right? That we're in essence kind of returning to a place where we're in an era of peace through force, right? We're circling back to autocracy, right? We're in essence going, we're regressing. to an earlier kind of form of governance, right? The rule of law, kind of a world system for order is breaking down. So again, I want to just throw out this notion that kind of like the past challenges are smaller, but the past challenges are critical. Funding issues, branding issues, coordination issues, communication across the field and between practitioners and academics is key. It's been the failure to address the bureaucratic, mundane, field-building kind of things that has led to our inability to

address those past challenges and eventually then led to the kind of delegitimization of the field, right? Because we haven't been able to then act as any kind of forceful influence on these broader dynamics. And there's some things come out of this, right? So in that last section, as I said, of the interviews, I asked people, well, what should we be doing now? Okay, these are the big future challenges. I'm teaching an MSC in peace and conflict studies. What skills should I be giving people to be, you know, fruitful peace workers for the next 40 years? These people are younger than me for obvious reasons. They'll have longer careers than me or, you know, into the future anyway. And there were some things that were very practical, right? So 93 quotes over 51 interviews. 51 is more than 50% of interviews from the practitioners and the academics.

Preparation to engage, exposure to other cultures, experiential learning, internships. There was lots of kind of stuff about practice. There's just this huge gap between the academic learning, the academic theory, even kind of learning analysis and methods and practice, right? And people recognize that and think that's something we desperately have to overcome. The other thing was, this is not one more thing. So these two slides are just two of six different categories of things people advised. I'm just focusing on these two. One was connecting to practice. The other was more interdisciplinarity, right? And this is kind of connected to this issue of the complexity, the polycrisis element of this, right? The polarization and fake news and the failure of kind of world global system is connected to climate change, is connected to food security, is connected to the rise of, right? Like all of these things are so intertwined. Now that we need just different ways of thinking about these things, right? The kind of, I have all my PhD, well, my university PhD work was all in the States. Peace and Conflict Studies is much, much, much more interdisciplinary in the States. The UK is like dominated by kind of critical IR theory. And I've been blown away by that ever since I got here, right? It's very much an international relations topic. I teach in the sociology department. I said, oh, I want the title to be Peace and Conflict Studies. They were like, what? But that's IR. They're going to like steal you away. They're going to shove you in that raft, blah, blah. It's all kinds of like internecine departmental warfare about what my title would be. I'm like, well, why would peace and atomic studies be IR? Like that's just implied in the UK, right? Because it's not as interdisciplinary as we would all like it to be or need it to be. And too many disciplines are wholly left out. especially when we're talking here about what I would consider kind of radically interdisciplinary, right? It's different, it's like, let's include some sociologists and a psychologist and somebody from law, okay, but what about technology and engineering, right? What about biology and chemistry and stuff from climate change, right? We just, we are not talking across these lines, right? We're just, we're certainly not doing enough of it. But, so those are two of the six categories of stuff that people explicitly said we have to be doing more of to prepare people to face these challenges, right? more connections across practice and theory, and more kind of interdisciplinary thinking and work and engagement. But I do think, I really want, I don't even think we can address those unless we have more

policies for supporting peace, right? And this is where it comes to the political will, and it comes to funding, and it comes to committing to peace as a concept as opposed to peace through violence, peace through force, peace through might. We simply have to have a situation. There will be no addressing these grand global challenges other than through winner take all, unless we have positive peace as a very explicit goal, right? And peace-focused actors engaging and active and having a voice. We have in essence excluded ourselves from the debate somehow. We have, in failing to address past challenges, in failing to prepare ourselves to have an impact and to have a voice and to convince people of what peace is and what it should look like, we have kind of ceded that territory to what we can see now, security actors and a security narrative and a securitization narrative, right? So unless we have the policies to support creative peace, programming, creative peace education, creative peace and gender initiatives, a creative peace civil society, we're simply not going to be able to have a voice. So this is, I think, the last slide. Best to check that, you know, second last slide. The foundations are where it's at, right? I mean, I do think it's very important to be chasing all these stories. We have to have people who are working on gender and peace. We have to have people who are working on climate and peace. We have to have people who are working on business and peace. But if we don't have some kind of foundation that can bring those things together, that can unite them into a narrative that can have a forceful influence on how policymakers and politicians and now The global oligarchy of tech billionaires wants to govern the world, then we are just going to be excluded, right? We are going to be too disparate, too fractionalized, too easy to pick off. because we're not in essence having one voice or we can't in the moment respond with one voice, even if it's never really one voice, right? Academia, practice, kind of practice needs to have lots of voices, but it needs to contribute to a loud scream when we need to be able to put it together, right? And the way we're fractionalized doesn't allow us to do that. There aren't even people to do that. Whereas other than Gutierrez, the UN, who's been screaming into a void for two years, We just don't have any leadership. And that's where it comes down to, right? So the very last slide. The primary question is, where is the vision for what peace should be? What is the united vision for what peace should be, right? Who is going to set that agenda? Who is going to frame that vision? Who is going to scream into something other than a void, right? To be the loud voice for what peace needs to be? And where will the support come from? There is, I understand, quite a few people now from talking to the gatekeepers in the funding kind of sector, business for peace, finance for peace, et cetera. There is the notion that capital will provide the finance. The other notion is that development banks will provide the finance. I think both of those are really naive. I mean, really naive. There's been, if capital was going to do it because it was implicit that investment would create peace, would create more money, it would have happened. That's how markets are supposed to function, right? The information should already have told capital that there's benefits to building peace. Instead, the information seems to be communicating to capital that there's benefits to

inequality and war and borders and walls, right? Maybe that's just then we have to tell a different narrative to capital. Maybe. I'm not so sure that's true, right? And maybe capital is shifted anyway. I did want to, and capital is becoming not really capital is in markets anymore. That's the nature of oligopoly, right? That's the nature of monopoly. That's the nature of having a tiny cabal of people having like 50% of the wealth on the earth, right? It's no longer an open market. That's not how markets work. Markets have to have low barriers to entry and then things can shift around and then people will follow where the money might come from. What we have is more of like a rentier system, right? And I'm not sure that that's going to work to allow capital to respond to any kind of mechanism that would promote peace. And the last thing I wanted to articulate is this issue that, sorry, a colleague right before me articulated with this issue of truth. We may have just finished writing an article that's, you know, coming out of all this. The first article is coming out of all this. And what I realized near the end was that we used to equate peace with justice and justice with truth. So any narratives that peace requires justice, justice before peace, etc., they were all based on the assumption that there was a truth. But the worry in a post-truth era, in a fake news era, is that a post-truth peace is whatever the most powerful decided is. There will be no justice in a post-truth peace because there is no truth. Who's the victim and who's the perpetrator is meaningless. It's whatever the people controlling the media say it is. If that's kind of the era we're leaning towards, I mean, peace won't be any kind of peace that any of us would want to see, right? Peace will be something dominated by those who control the narrative. So on a very positive note, thank you very much.