Well, I want to talk today about about migration,
it tends to be rather a neglected area in demography for reasons which I'll describe and expand on later on,
it is becoming really very important as the major factor in population dynamics in rich countries.
And this is something relatively new and to which demographers perhaps haven't properly adapted themselves yet.
So what I want to talk about is migration in the broader context of demographic thought and demographic analysis,
the importance of migration or the non importance of migration in population change and various other things.
The difficulties of migration theory, which are great.
You may think that fertility on migration is confused and indecisive.
Wait till you hear about migration theory and then you will think that fertility analysis is really quite straightforward.
I want to also descriptively about the process and diversity of migration in the modern world and the volume of migration.
Just to give us an idea about its magnitude, its trend, where it comes from,
where it might be going in the future to talk about also its consequences,
demographic, economic and ethnic, which is an awful lot to get through in 50 minutes.
So I better get cracking without further ado, one of the first difficulties I'm sorry to begin with difficulties,
but it's important to have to give some health warnings about migration.
One of the great difficulties is the data on the whole and generally speaking, the developed world.
Anyway, data on births and deaths are pretty good.
Very, very high coverage,
ninety nine point seven percent coverage of births and deaths usually connected with all sorts of fairly reliable information about about data,
location, age, mother. Circumstances of that kind with migration is different.
And that's because migration is so much a more complicated business.
It's not just the the convenient ones for all biological beginning points and end points of getting born and dying, which everyone really does wants.
Well, with one or two exceptions, perhaps over migration, it's quite different to migration.
You do it many times. It happens at enormous volume.
There are over 100 million passenger movements into and out of the UK every year
over which some proportion are migrants in the demographic sense of the word.
But the great majority are not sifting out the ones of demographic interests, those who are coming for a long time,
intending to stay for a long time, those who are leaving for a long time and seem to be away for a long time is very difficult.
And this is true of all countries in the world.
And of course, people also fundamentally only get born and die for other specific reasons for migration.
There's a whole range of reasons why people move from all sorts of different places and different places where they go to as well.
So it's a much more heterogeneous process than the firm by the beginning and end points of birth and death,
which demographers tend to feel rather more at home. So first of all, some some moans about data, as you see here.
First of all, as I tried to expand briefly a few seconds ago, it is rather a fuzzy category, ill defined variable,
but present an enormous volume, the data on migration, although attempts are being made to harmonise them via the European Union,
via various international conferences organised by the United Nations and other bodies,
the definition of migration and the way that it's counted soon depends very much upon national legal procedures.
Migration in and out of a country in the long term is a process which most countries governed by means of laws with varying degrees,
of course, of reliability and precision.
Those laws differ between countries because countries have different views about the place of migration in their national life,
in their economy and all the rest.
Some try to restrict it, some try to encourage it, at least in respect of particular kinds of streams and particular kinds of people.
This generates lots and lots and lots of different international national rather laws about who may enter,
who, who may leave, even under what circumstances they may stay. Harmonising these data has not been easy.
It is getting better, but it's still very far from being perfect.
I mentioned that the the process of migration were were very few people enter or leave a whole lot of reasons for for labour as asylum seekers,
as spouses, as children, as dependents of students, all sorts of reasons for leaving and coming.
And these are not necessarily correlated with each other. Two particular examples.
The first thing is when you see migration data presented to you in neat tables by Eurostat or some other body,
these migration data are usually not actually migration data at all.
They are not, for the most part, people being counted in or counting out as they enter or leave the borders of the country concerned.
For the most part, they are derived from population registers of the kind which are common in continental Europe and and do not exist in Britain.
And the migration is derived from a comparison of the register of foreigners in one year and the register of foreigners in the
other year in the belief and assumption that those who enter the country legally will register on the foreigners register,
those who leave will register. The difference is going to be net migration.
There are also direct accounts of those coming in, those being given legal leave to enter.
The trouble is that most countries don't restrict immigration. The communist countries did until 1989.
Certain other authoritarian dictatorships forbid their citizens leave.
Most free democratic countries do not forbid anyone to leave except criminals.
And therefore county in this is done accurately according to laws about admission and settlement.
Counting out tends to be very much more feeble. So therefore we have gross inflows based on counts.
We have net flows based upon comparison of registered data and of course for demographic purposes, it's often the net flows,
the difference between people coming in and people going out,
which has the effect of on population, size, population, age, structure and also on the economy.
Is that what you're most interested in and that which we tend to have, at least of all?
Secondly, if one's looking not the flow of migrants,
that the so-called stock I don't like using that no name is wrong suggests that one to engage in the grocery trade.
But that is that is the term of art in migration.
The stock of migrants is the number of people of migrant origin, born overseas, living in a country a particular time estimating that which of course,
is also important as well as the flow is difficult because of the process of naturalisation.
Generally speaking, countries are interested in counting foreigners rather than immigrants in terms of their population.
That is to say that those who are non-citizens compared with those who are citizens, irrespective of where they were born in the past, naturalisation,
the accusations of citizenship by migrants tended to be a rather slow process and
was a consequence of having been settled peacefully in a country for many years.
Having adapted to that country, speaking its language, understanding its laws and so on are not a very easy process,
particularly in the German speaking countries where the sanguinis was the principle and where it was possibly born in that country of foreign parents,
but not be a citizen because the Suli, the right of citizenship arising out of birthplace, did not apply.
That is changing. But it has meant that there been some some that some alteration about the
relationship between migration on the one hand and foreign citizenship on the other.
More recently, naturalisation. The granting of citizenship has been used as a kind of not, as it were,
as a reward for integration, as a means to integration has been greatly accelerated.
What this tends to mean is that in some countries, the pace of naturalisation has been so great.
That is about the same as the pace of migration. So even though the number of migrants entering the country each year may be very great,
the total stock of foreigners remains constant because so many of the migrants are naturalised very rapidly.
You may feel this is a perfectly right and proper thing to do,
but it does mean there's a growing mismatch between estimates of the number of of a foreign population,
foreign origin, population based upon citizenship on the one hand, and estimates of that based upon migration on the other.
Here's a not untypical case from the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, which has a population register, like so many continental countries,
it's possible to work out from the register where people were born and where their parents were born.
Those who say, well, they are immigrants or the children of immigrants as well as whether they are citizens or not.
The orange line at the bottom is the data normally cited when you look up Eurostat fault for foreign population,
and that's often taken to be the same as immigrant population.
As you see, the foreign population in the Netherlands has been hovering around 600000 ever since about 1992 or so and is not showing any upward trend.
If you look at the number of people born abroad, which is first, which is the red line, you will see,
in fact, it's been increasing constantly, but lots and lots of them have been naturalised.
The foreign population in the Netherlands is about one point six million, not 600000.
If you look at the foreign origin population, that is to say, the population,
which which the Dutch categorised on the basis of of the background of parents as well as the immigrants, then this is the total here.
It's about three point four million, and that's out of a population of 70 million people.
So it's a very substantial proportion of the total, about 20 percent.
And this is not an indication of the number of people of foreign birth or foreign origin in the Netherlands or in Sweden or in France or in Britain.
Very important to realise that the Syrians of migration has varied hugely over the course of time.
In the beginning, we have all migrants, migrants in the short term and migrants in the long term, because, of course, until about 10000 years ago,
all our ancestors were hunters and gatherers who had no fixed abode, fixed broad territory for sure, over which they would tend to wander,
no settled home because hunters and gatherers, with very, very few exceptions, as you will know very well from anthropology,
tend to exhaust the resources of the local area within a week or two weeks or a month,
then move on somewhere else within a very, very wide area, eventually coming back to that first place.
Once, once game, once routes, once berries have had a chance of regenerate in one, two or many years later on.
So migration is an essential survival strategy, not only for all human populations over the greater part of our existence,
but also, of course, as a survival strategy for most animal populations.
Animals migrate about.
Sometimes the migrations are well known in animals from point of view of moving to Africa for the for the winter, as Swifts and swallows do.
Otherwise, it's much more localised, but it is normal.
Migration is a normal state of affairs for early humans and for and for animals and other slightly different kind of migration,
which has been of enormous importance, is a kind of once for all colonisation, invasion, migration,
whereby the world is populated by human beings, starting, as we all know, out of Africa in two waves,
one of whom erectus, one of whom are a lot, as it were, and then succeeded by other kinds of colonisation later on,
which I will which I will point to large scale movements of people of all kinds of ones for all kind well,
intermittently characteristic of human history, and dominated it to some extent, right until the 15th century,
something which is now more or less not seen anywhere in the world,
but this so-called folklore of underarm period which extended up to the 15th century,
if you include the Mongols and the Turks, was powerful in changing cultures.
And also the origins of population were huge areas of the world.
And if you like, it continued into the 19th century. If you include in that the enormous migrations of Europeans out of Europe, into the Americas,
into the activities and elsewhere, which still continues, which was which is primary in the 18th and 19th centuries.
And what this leads to, of course, is globalisation, globalisation of people, globalisation of diseases,
perhaps eventually through different processes, globalisation of culture as well.
But globalisation is a very, very ancient process been going on for for 30000 years.
It is not something which is new. Oh, just an example of some of our early migrant ancestors.
This is the only, I promise you, a picture of a naked lady actually showing the entire course of lectures.
Here are some recent, more recent migrants that the Bushmen of Botswana, the Kunsan now, alas, forced to settle down and wear trousers.
But this is a picture of them in the natural hunting habitat with their family,
while the pathetic bows which are equipped with thank goodness for them with poison tips, as I'm sure you will know this,
is that the conventional diagram of this great colonisation of the world population out of Africa starting perhaps 100000 years ago,
extending to various different parts of the world at different points in time.
The estimates of the of the time period by which this happened are, of course, subject to modern research and revision.
This is now thought to be rather older than thirteen thousand years.
That older than 20000 years are some evidence, this uncertainty about what went on in Australia, but clearly earlier than in the Americas.
And before then, there were no Homo sapiens in those areas at all is a completely new pattern of settlement with huge consequences,
as we all know, for for population ecology and all the rest.
This still, if I can add a footnote, this still leaves traces in the genes.
You will know, I'm sure, from from Christine Capelli and others that that is still possible to trace the evidence for these settlements of Europe
restudy over time by looking at the gene frequency distributions of contemporary modern living human populations.
These gene frequencies are of no social importance of any kind, but they do give a shadow of the past,
showing how a population of Europe extended itself in this north westerly direction, starting from from the Middle Eastern Anatolia.
It's even possible if you if you look at the material in sufficient detail to reconstruct the map of Europe solely using this evidence.
On the left, you see the a diagram of the the first two principal components of a of the analysis of a great deal of genetical data gathered.
Lots and lots and lots of different human populations in Europe, they're all labelled, you probably can't see this is it for Italy.
This says yes for Spain, this says Hungary that says IIF Ireland, that's where the individual came from, from which the sample was taken.
And this is where they're located on these two principal components solely on the basis of statistical evidence of the gene distribution.
As you can see, it does somewhat replicate the maths. This is the same colour coding of the map itself of here in Spain in purple.
This is where most of the Spaniards end up. Here is Ireland in red and this is where most of the Irish end up and so on.
So it's a very considerable interest from a genetic point of view, even though it doesn't have any social significance at all.
Once upon a time, there was a European Union which extended over, as you see, much more than the present European Union,
although if Europhiles have their way, then the European Union will, of course,
include Turkey and the southern the northern shores of Africa and so on.
And that is an example of something which was not so much created by migration, but by military conquest and control,
but which was disrupted by the migration processes that I'm about to talk about in the course of this lecture,
because this is the Roman Empire, around about 120 A.D. This is the Roman Empire.
About 300 years later, the eastern part often neglected, still going strong and going strong,
although and diminished form for another thousand years based on Constantinople,
the western Roman Empire, fractured, fragmented, then under the control of other non Roman authorities,
deriving from populations like the Oscar aghost, the Visigoths, the Vandals and the Lombards, the fracks,
the two tons of various others carving up Europe in this way, not replacing or destroying the original populations,
although the numbers did indeed go down, but certainly changing their culture, radically changing their population mix.
And that certainly wasn't the end of the story.
If I were to start on that story, it would go on for a long time because this character caricaturing myself and something like 10,
66 and all that, a lot of history at this time was indeed successive waves of people who are called barbarians.
Sometimes, it seems to me with some justice.
One is that visible is one small, even smaller footnote we will excuse this doesn't wipe out local differences.
This is a map to maps put together by Longly and his colleagues at University College
London showing the distribution of Surname's Look up your own surnames on longlines.
What a website and see where people live with your surname are geographically concentrated.
This is a geographical concentration of a surname which happens to be derived from a unique place name in Lancashire.
That place name is Ramsbottom now.
First point here is a Ramsbottom as a place name has nothing to do with Rams and the Bottoms Rams is the old fashioned word.
For a while, Garlick still occasionally used bottom is a word of Norse origin, meaning?
So Ramsbottom means Valley of the wild garlic, not something more comic.
Anyway, this is where most of the Ramsbottom were in 1881.
And this is a surname originating probably, certainly in the early Middle Ages and possibly earlier on than that.
These are the Ramsbottom, even in 1998.
These are the most powerful concentrations that you would find them all over the place, but still remarkably concentrated,
although diffusing despite one and a half millennia or certainly one millennium of that place,
name originating in one small spot somewhere around that.
So not everything gets wiped out by the process of migration in history.
There was a time much about 30 years ago when democracy didn't pay much attention to migration,
the illustrious journal Population Studies under the managed guardianship of the illustrious Eugene grabbing on the Hill,
refused to take papers on migration, the sort of an unsuitable subject for demography, best left to geographers and other such folk.
This has all changed, not the least because, of course, of the enormous importance of migration as its pattern has changed.
This neglected two things.
First of all, it neglected the very important paper by Kingsley Davis and followed up by others, which pointed out that migration,
as I was trying to suggest right at the beginning, was a very important element of flexible response to demographic change.
In other words, that if population started to grow in some way, which was which was causing difficulties,
then there were three options not to not only could you die as a consequence of the population pressure,
not only could you reduce your birth rate, which of course was the normal pattern assumed to be the case in the demographic transition,
but also you could migrate and people often did migrate.
And this is part of a repertoire of responses which tends to be neglected for various reasons in demographic thought and still is, I think.
Migration was relatively minor once the the great movement of peoples was over
by the 16th century between settler states at peace with each other in Europe,
and that's one reason why it tended not to be not to be studied very much.
What really mattered that the big actors were birthrates and death rates,
particularly birth rates, particularly the contrast with the two in the demographic transition,
the demographic transition,
enormous rates of population growth are rising because of the prior decline of the death rate compared with the birth rate.
Migration did take place almost out of Europe, not into Europe, and therefore it tends to be ignored.
However, what the demographic transition in Europe did was in generating large numbers of much larger numbers of people than previously had existed.
It facilitated outflows to the rest of the world. These outflows, of course, it started in 1992, but accelerated to enormous levels.
By the end of the 18th of the 19th century, about 54 million Europeans are believed to have left Europe between 1850 and 1914 to live elsewhere.
A lot of them in the Americas, but also in other parts of the world as well.
Now, of course, for every migration flow, as always, account of some of those people came back.
We don't know how many, maybe as many as a third of those who came back.
Some have gone back again. It wasn't absolutely fixed. Business migration is hence partly its difficulty.
Nonetheless, an enormous outflow, which may have been rather ignored in terms of demographic analysis and interest until recent times,
have had a huge impact, of course, on the populations into which of those Europeans moved.
Typically populations in North and South America, a much simpler culture or much less resilient culture, highly vulnerable to European diseases,
vulnerable to European military prowess in Australia, in the North and South America, enormous population losses.
The matter is still controversial and somewhat heated,
but it's thought that the population of the Americas was reduced to maybe 10 percent of its previous level amongst the indigenous population,
even though the European population was expanded very rapidly.
So not to be ignored if you were living in that part of the world.
As far as theory is concerned,
I didn't know where to start because there's a lot of it about and it would take really a couple of lectures even even to touch scratch the surface.
Probably much migration theory is quite properly devised by economists using economic considerations
and assuming that economic pressures and economic advantages are the primary motivation of migration,
which may well not be the case, I think it is not the case despite its importance.
Essentially, the idea is that insofar as there is free movement or easy movement from one population to another,
that migration will take place if wages in the receiving country are higher than wages in this country.
If the. There is an abundance of capital in the receiving country and a shortage of capital in the sending country,
and that migration will will will take place between the two until these things are accelerated,
where the availability of capital and the level of wages are about the same in both places under those circumstances.
Net migration, anyway, will cease and population flows will come to an end and population change, therefore will come to an end.
Well, that sort of works,
but it there are so many exceptions to it that it's it's not a very reliable guide to predicting migration or to analysing it.
One has to think of a number of other things that the way in which labour
markets can become segmented between jobs for immigrants and jobs for natives,
the way in which migration can be a household financed business.
The costs of migration are not negligible very often,
but migration is regarded in poor countries as a kind of investment into which the whole family and other members can perhaps,
or even villages would invest money into a migrant in the expectation that we'll will send back
remittances from the very much higher wages which you can see in the richer countries to which is moving.
For example, on top of that, given that most large scale migration over the last several decades has been from poor countries, the rich ones.
And given that most of those poor countries are countries of families, cultural kinship is important.
Family size, large of household, such a complex that there is naturally a tendency once once individuals have moved from one country,
no one from poor country to a rich one from a more families country to a more
individualised country for that person to to seek to bring their relatives across,
to marry someone of origin in that country and therefore of dependable culture and not of the different alien culture in which they move and so on.
That generates very large volumes of continual network based chain migration, cumulative causation,
as Doug Massey calls, who was one of the great theories of of of migration theory,
which can which in theory can go on and on and on and on with more people arriving,
generating more flows and more people arriving and generating more flows.
It does eventually, as it seems, comes to an end, but certainly hasn't come to an end so far.
And over the last few decades, most movement into European countries has been arising out of out of dependence spouses,
new new spouses and existing spouses, children and all the rest.
Not so much the level of migration that was earlier on.
And all that continues that has been added to this enormous impetus from from a chain migration arising out of family and kin connexions.
There are also other important factors which we have to keep into into consideration.
One of the reasons, of course, why these disparities arise in the first place is because of the historically unequal pace of development and
economic growth in different parts of the world and with population growth in different parts of the world.
If all the world had grown rich, more or less at the same time, if the demographic transition had not taken place,
first of all in the West and later on outside Europe and the Western countries,
then these migration flows would have been would have been very much more modest.
And there have been of the kind that one sees all the time between countries of roughly
equivalent demographic characteristics and roughly equivalent economic status.
Geographical proximity matters a lot as well. It's not just a question of you can't vanish the effects of distance.
Thus, in earlier times anyway, most European migrants into Britain came from Ireland.
Most European migrants into Sweden came from Finland,
which is next door and was indeed part of Sweden at one time, just as Ireland was part of the UK at one time.
These political and social connexions are very important. That's why looking rather further afield,
migrants into into into France in recent years have tended to come from French colonies
in Africa and from the neighbouring countries on the northern shore of of North Africa,
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, which were once French colonies. You can think of many other examples.
I'm sure state policy must not be ignored. Migration does not take place in a policy vacuum.
There are all countries, almost all countries maintain controls on migration and some maintain controls on immigration as well as the.
These are of varying effectiveness and change from time to time and rather an erratic way according to the unpredictable outcome of elections.
For example, in Britain recently in nineteen ninety seven,
the question of migration hardly featured in the in the general election 1997 and what Mr Blair departure within two or three years,
the Blair government to radically change the migration policy away from being restrictive one into being a much more permissive one,
believing that economic growth and social change were beneficial would happen if migration
could be expanded with the consequence of a very considerable increase in flows,
which was not forecast or expected expected by anyone. And the reversal in 2010, of course, has brought the coalition government to power,
which seeks to control that migration more than was the case in the past, with what success we will see in due course.
Also very important for the post-war revolutions in transport and information and in rights,
transport and information which created the possibility, previously non-existent,
of people moving from from South Asia, from remote parts of Africa, from all over the world into Europe,
which is previously cut off effectively by the cost of transport and the weakness of information.
On top of that, of course, the enormous increase in consideration for human rights arising out of the horrors of the Second World War,
which binds together countries by the through the European Court of Human Rights, which you heard about in our papers today,
to to to undertake to respect the right of the family and various other rights of migrants,
which is greatly restricted the powers of most European countries in what they can do with their own domestic migration policy.
Here are some of the examples of diversity in migration. This is a graph from the OECD.
It's 2003 is all up to date, but it shows you how diverse things can be here.
They have broken up gross migration flows.
This inflow only not net flow into three major components.
In pale blue are asylum seekers and refugees. In deep blue is family reunification and new as far as migration and pale.
Are people entering for purposes of work. And you see that in Australia, Switzerland that time,
UK workers were predominant in France to the United States, Sweden, Denmark, essentially family was dominant.
In fact, in Sweden in 2003, only three percent of persons entering Sweden lawfully did so for purposes of work.
Almost all the rest were either seeking asylum or as family members of one kind or another.
Huge variation over time. And this is just one example from France.
It's impossible to present all the data from all the countries, not not least because it is not, is it not produced in comparable fashion?
This is just some data from France, very much simplified in 2005,
showing the proportion of people entering France again, this gross migration inflow only.
We don't know what the pattern or balance would be for for the net flow of coming into France from the European economic area.
That's the EU plus Switzerland, Norway and lots of other countries.
And this is from outside Europe. Only three percent of those entering France from Iowa were students, but.
Thirty seven percent were workers.
That's the single biggest category apart from other which includes retired people and all sorts of other categories.
Quite different for those entry from Europe. A quarter of those were students.
Only five percent were workers, half were family. And and so you see this enormous contrast with about 80 percent of the inflow
coming from outside Europe and 20 percent coming from from inside Europe. That's not not untypical.
I think it's fair to say what goes on in the rest of Europe.
I just happen to have these data for France.
This shows the some of the underlying possibilities for for future flows you see here, the most developed countries are in are in red.
This is the United Nations projection from 1950 up to 2050, almost in global terms, almost no change.
This is the least developed countries, the poorest countries where where problems of poverty are at their most acute,
starting off in really quite modest levels.
The 1950s are mostly African countries, but also others now up to approaching two billion and of course, likely to be.
These are the ones where the demographic transition is least advanced and therefore the numbers are going to increase most rapidly.
As you said, there's no sign of any tailing off in the rate of growth here, whereas in this is the world, in the in the less developed world,
excluding those, there's a stabilisation going on as we see the reduction in the birth rate in China and India and various other countries.
The economic disparities which which helped to drive migration are certainly
great and are or certainly were increasing at least up to the end of this graph.
This line here is the GDP per head in US dollars for various European countries as France, Italy, Spain and Germany.
In this group here, down here is Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt showing growth, but not catching up at all with what's going on.
That is despite improvements and progress. And here is a more focussed example of the difference, difference in pattern of growth,
the red line here is a population of the North African countries which which send migrants to France and Italy particularly,
but also elsewhere, showing that they were about the same size as those in southern Europe.
That's the blue line in 1990 and according to the United Nations, are likely to diverge in this very remarkable fashion.
The scale starts at 130. So it's not this is not zero. That's 100 million.
Something similar with Turkey on the scale are 20 million at the bottom is not zero.
In 1950, France, Italy and the U.K. had twice the population of Turkey.
By 2050, almost certainly because of population momentum.
They will have half the population of Turkey and Turkey will overtaken Germany on its way down, which which has which is sandwich,
which has some bearing upon the negotiations to allow Turkey to join the European Union,
which in due course, of course, would be a free movement of labour. What proportion of the world's population are immigrants?
It has gone up, but not by all that much. The global proportion as estimated by the United Nations, and you can imagine the problems of doing that.
So don't put too much weight on it. Is this flat line in purple with the little squares.
And as you can see, it's been going up.
It started off at about two percent or just over two percent in 1960 is now gone up to just about three percent.
That, of course, represents quite a large increase in the total number of people.
This represents getting on for about 170 million people.
Nonetheless, as a proportion of the world's population, it's important to realise it is not great and is only increasing modestly.
Surprisingly, perhaps, the pattern of population proportion in Latin America and in Asia that are migrants has not been increasing very much.
This is Latin America. This is Asia. These data are probably the least reliable of those on this graph.
Nonetheless, that's what the data tell us insofar as there are any data the increase has been in North America,
which is here, which, you know, and also in Europe, the European graph is exaggerated.
And once again, I've got to revert to this tiresome topic of the unreliability of migration data,
this big jump which has been smoothed by the graphing programme.
This big jump here is not an unusually large upsurge of migrants into Europe.
Instead, it arises out of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In 1991, there were 25 million people living in the non Russian republics of the Soviet Union who had so-called Russian nationality.
This is an official category in Soviet terms, which which is a kind of official ethnic origin label.
And those individuals had Russian nationality. Suddenly, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, they became foreigners.
They became foreigners instead of citizens in Afghanistan, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, 25 million in all.
Some went back, some did not. But those were then counted as foreign.
And that's that's why the graph jumps up. In fact, had the Soviet Union not collapsed, one might assume the graph would be like this going up,
but not with this enormous increase of a sudden kind. This is an example of long, long term migration just to show how erratic migration can be.
This is the trend of migration to the Asian states. Again, this is inflow.
There are no net migration data from the US. Going back to 1820 is one of the longest sequences of reasonably reliable data.
Got, as you probably realise, increasing considerably.
The erratic way as time went on. Also realised the United States had a very restrictive policy on migration after 1922,
not wishing to see the proportion of people of different origins change beyond the census that the census of I think nineteen hundred.
And that brought it down to a level which very gradually recovered until the passage
of legislation in the 1960s facilitated this major increase to the present level,
which is about one million, roughly speaking, one million net gross inflow of legal migrants to the US with several hundred thousand illegal migrants.
Also this huge spike here. Yes, I'm sorry, another tedious example of misleading data.
This arises from the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
whereby very large numbers of persons who had entered illegally were legalised and they were then counted as immigrants in that year,
even though they've been in the US for many years previously. So this spike is fake and refer to migration back here, which is not counted.
We'll see something like that later on. This is net migration into the UK from 1963, the first time that data are available up to 2009,
the present level of net 240000, a quarter of a million extra people added per year as a result of international migration.
And this is that divided by citizens. These are.
UK citizens below, in in blue and in green, almost invariably negative, continuing the pattern of emigration from the UK,
it's been going on ever since the 17th century or earlier, and the foreign citizens in red and in and in orange.
I'm sure a very considerable increase, up to about 300000 net inflow per year and this divide and the need to have it in two
different colours is because there's a discontinuity in migration statistics in 1991,
which means that we don't exactly parallel or other comparable.
And this is just to show that the the net immigration into the EU 15 is roughly the same magnitude as the gross inflow into the US.
The EU 15 here is in blue and black. The person accepted the settlement in the US, the gross inflow is in red.
EU, of course, has a bigger population in the U.S. Nonetheless, it's not the case that the US is way ahead of Europe in terms of migration flows.
It isn't and probably won't be in the future. Also important to realise that migration can go down as well after reverse,
the usual financial services health warning, this is migration into Germany from 1954 up to 2007,
enormous inflow around about 1990 arising out of partly out of the collapse of communism and the rise of the inflows of persons of German origin.
Alcivar into into Germany arising out of the German basic law.
Also huge numbers of persons fleeing from the collapse of Yugoslavia around that time.
That's one of the reasons why this is peaked at that time.
Legal changes and the return of some kind of peace, Yugoslavia allowed that decline and migration to Germany has in some years actually been negative.
This is zero. And here it is down down below zero in two thousand seven.
This is overall migration, net migration in Europe in 1997, 2008,
you can see in red the decline in migration to Germany, which I just described in the previous slide.
The orange is is that to the UK showing the increase of from the 1990s up to the present time, which I mentioned.
These, of course, are overall numbers looked at in percent, the pattern somewhat different.
The levels of inflows into Switzerland and the Netherlands, for example, are very high in some countries higher than in Britain.
Nonetheless, the growth figures are so the overall terms of in terms of people are not percent are, as far as we know, like that.
I left these two out of that graph because otherwise they are distorted to scale.
These are extraordinary levels of migration into Spain and Italy from 1997 onwards.
In the past, Spain and Italy sent migrants to other European countries.
Spain and Italy were on the the poorer fringe, especially in southern Italy of the the European industrial heartland.
Lots of migrants went from from Spain and Italy, also Greece and Portugal into Germany,
the Netherlands and France in the 1960s and 70s in order to work at the end of of.
That period of time,
the economy in those countries have grown so much that many of them went back and said that this great outflow of workers from those countries,
from the poor periphery into the richer core stopped and was reversed.
They were countries immigration, all that turned around in the 1990s.
They become countries of immigration, particularly immigration from North Africa,
much of it uncontrolled, informal, irregular or illegal, depending on which adjective you prefer.
Eventually, these huge inflows were recognised progressively through amnesties initially,
which is why the the more people were counted, the numbers went up.
So this is Spain and Italy, and most of this huge increase, up to 600000,
is a result of people who have who previously not counted as having been in the country,
being recognised naturalised, put into the data and therefore pushing up the numbers.
This is enormous.
Well, it's since gone down quite considerably, but that's a that's a whole order of magnitude different from the inflows into the rest of Europe,
almost as much as that moving into the US for a few years. What are the consequences?
Very considerable, I'll skip that graph because I'm running out of time.
First of all, nowadays, compared with the number of births, net migration is very large indeed is no longer statistically weak.
Sister of demographic change. It is the paramount Egypt in population dynamics.
What matters here are the solid numbers in the right hand column. You can ignore this.
This shows the number of the number of net migration into that country in respect to the number of births.
And there were 44 percent more migrants into Spain in 2007 than there were births.
This is not it with the natural increase is comparing it with births.
So more people are moving into Spain via migration, that they were born into Spain,
about the same number in Switzerland and Italy, large numbers in Norway and Belgium, rather small numbers elsewhere.
So a very important component of a population growth in population addition in those countries,
in some countries facilitating further increase in numbers,
in other countries slowing down or stopping or reversing population decline, which there are low birth rates would otherwise have generated in the UK.
Migration is projected by the Office of National Statistics, a very, very powerful effect upon population size.
Here we are in 2000 and about 63 million people.
This blue line is the central projection that they are their basic idea about what's
going to happen as a consequence of TFR remaining at one point eight for migration,
assumed to be net 180000 per year, and mortality declining in some gradual fashion,
increasing, as you see, to about 77 million by this century and eighty six million by 2030.
While 2081 is an awful long time in demography of the one certain thing is that this will not happen in detail.
But this is the implication of what will happen if the population continues in that pattern.
And of course, we know now that that migration of the last few years has not been 180000.
80000 is not in this one. It's been about 240000. That happens to be roughly the high migration estimate of of the UN.
And this is what the population trajectory would be were migration to remain in net terms
at the present level at TFR Tramaine at one point eight four and one point ninety five,
in fact, even higher than that. I'm sure this will not come to pass,
but it does show rather powerfully what the implications of migration are and how important migration is compared to the natural increase.
This is the the natural change projections showing what would happen if there were no migration in or out.
Some increase, as you see, thanks to population momentum, then returning to the present level by about two thousand sixty one or all the rest of the
increase is the direct and indirect consequences of international migration as projected.
Same thing in Sweden. Age structure, this is a diagram from the EU showing in percentage terms,
the age distribution of migrants into the EU, into the EU compared with the settled population into the EU.
It is not a diagram showing the relative size of the population and the relative shapes of the population is very important to realise.
These are the migrants, this is the settled population.
And you can see that it looks as though migration will will rejuvenate population because it is not, for the most part, involved older people.
Migrants are moving in roughly at sort of peak working age that this is this is age 25 here.
And therefore, that should be a very considerable benefit to the potential workforce and also should be a brake on population ageing.
Well, it certainly is a brake on population ageing.
And there was about 15 years ago a tremendous interest in the possibility of encouraging migration in order to stop population ageing,
so-called replacement migration, which was provoked by a very interesting publication of Native Nations in in the 2000.
You can't actually solve population ageing by migration is very important to realise,
and that is now taken take it for granted in all learnt publications,
even though journalists and politicians occasionally bring the idea up from time to time.
This is what would happen to the UK potential support ratio at different levels of migration.
The black line is what would happen to it at the what was then the level of migration of 95000 back in 1998.
I think it was this is what would happen with a million migrants per year.
As you see, it greatly increased. It greatly improves the support ratio, the ratio of people of working age to people of retirement age for a while.
But eventually it goes down and will eventually reach quite low levels.
This is inevitable. And as to any population at any level of migration,
and this is the level of migration which you require in order to keep that line at the four point two level,
which we saw before in terms of in terms of the consequences of migration,
you need increasing numbers of migration to take the UK population up to 100, 120 million by the century.
Three hundred and six million by the end of the century and so on, upwards into the stratosphere.
It moderates ageing. It can't solve it. Nothing can solve it.
The economic arguments for for large scale migration have been well rehearsed over the last 15 years.
I have spent too much time on other topics to be able to deal with these.
Even in the simplest outline. Essentially, the case for it is for an increase in gross domestic product, which undoubtedly does,
because that's a function of population that it brings a tax benefit over, which is bigger than the welfare cost that is required for labour needs.
And it does the natives no harm in terms of employment or standard of living.
Some of these things are true. Some, I think are not true.
Generally speaking, a lots of stories appear to show the fiscal effect is rather small and maybe negative.
The balance between the tax benefit of migration and the welfare costs of migration that.
The result depends very much on where the migrants come from, migrants from poor countries,
from poor countries on the whole, generate a deficit of migrants from rich countries, on the whole generate a surplus.
And the balance depends upon the balance of migration and various other things between those two major categories of person.
I've put some some examples here which you might want to follow up later on legal migration, the case, I think, is stronger.
There are many frictional processes and shortages which which make people find labour
migration attractive or even essential for filling unfilled vacancies that can't be denied.
Nonetheless, at the end of the day, we still find that unemployment is higher amongst first and second generation migrants.
In most European countries, labour force participation rates are lower, particularly amongst women, amongst such persons.
And that has got to be to remember the controversy rumbles on and the literature on it is very great.
And so I'm like, so am I reading this? Have got have got references to that.
There's a strategic problem in the sense that easy access to Labour, which naturally any sensible self respecting employee will want,
will want to encourage irrespective of origins, may not be very good for the for the conditions of life of poorer,
badly educated people in the receiving countries. This is one of the great centres of controversy at the present time.
And if there is a constant supply of labour,
then the awkward need to make semi unemployable young people in in the rich countries have had a very bad education.
We have a very bad work ethic to make them into potential workers. It can be ignored because you can you don't need them.
You can get them from overseas. And that is, I think, a kind of moral hazard or political hazard of too easy access to labour from from for employers,
other beneficial for them and for the migrants. It may be finally continued migration from one population rather naturally at the end of the day,
particularly if receiving population has below replacement levels of fertility will replace one population with another.
This is very difficult to avoid. This is what is happening at the present time.
This is a projection of the long term ethnic change in the UK and a different migration scenarios
showing the decline of the projection of the of the population of the so-called white British origin.
This is this, as you know, is is one of these rather unpleasant,
awkward categorisations of people which people are invited to label themselves with in the
census and in a wide variety of other national government and local government enquiries.
And this this shows the trend downwards.
This is the trend upwards in a number of different projections made by various European statistical offices showing the percentage of people
of foreign origin in European countries going up from between 8000 and 18 percent at the present time in various European countries,
up to 20 or 30 percent by mid century. Assuming, like the previous projection, that migration rates remain as they are so very considerable,
ethnic change likely to take place has already indeed happening.
Happened where 25 percent of births in Britain, Germany and France are two persons born abroad.
So some conclusions. And so to have not lived up to my expectation of ending it at five to migration is a very, very heterogeneous process.
This makes very difficult. It makes data difficult and puts in a slightly different category from births, deaths.
Now, the primary driver of population change in developed countries and is is stopping
population decline in some countries and greatly accelerating in others.
Like Britain, like the US, like like like Sweden. Some countries still have very modest levels of migration, despite being very rich in the world.
Japan, for example, has been resistant to migration, although many say that it needs it has very low birthrate and its increasing
labour shortages and the economic consequences are mixed and controversial.
Its demographic consequences are that it can moderate but certainly can't solve any more than kind of high fertility population ageing.
But it does continue at the present time will lead to a very substantial transformation of population in terms of origin of a permanent kind.
Thank you.