So what I want to do today is to continue some comments about the consequences of migration,
broaden it into a discussion about ethnic minorities and as much as I can about
their demography and see what the future might hold for those populations.
To reprise some of the comments made last time, migration has a number of demographic consequences, some positive and some negative,
obviously it tends to increase the size of the populations of the area in which people are moving.
It decreases the populations. Other things be equal of the populations from which they have moved.
Sometimes it also affects death rates and birth rates. Independently of that, usually in in the last few centuries, death rates,
the movement of people from one part of the world to another is often accompanied by warfare,
sometimes warfare, and extremely violent and protracted kind.
The invasions of the Mongols into China, which created the Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century,
is thought to have led to the loss over decades of about 50 million people from the population of China,
which then may have been of the order of 200 million people who were shifted the entire centre of gravity,
the population of China from the north to the south for quite a long time.
Likewise, in the New World, as I mentioned before,
the arrival of Europeans in increasing numbers led to widespread destruction of the North and South American native populations,
not so much by violence and warfare, although that happened, but much more through the introduction of diseases,
smallpox, tuberculosis and other diseases for which those populations were completely unprepared.
Having been separated from the the old world for many thousands of years, they had no natural immunity.
It also has more subtle effects, Kingsley Davis pointed out in his seminal but neglected paper on On The Theory of Change in response that
migration is an alternative response to to demographic pressures from from the death rates and birth rates,
and that the effect of migration from a country where the population pressure is quite high,
where fertility is quite high may, for example, be to delay the onset of the fertility transition.
This is perhaps most noted in the case of Ireland,
where despite the fact that the birth rate remained well above replacement rate until well into the 20th century,
until the mid 1950s, in fact, considerably higher than anywhere else in Europe.
Nonetheless,
the population of Ireland declined from the eighteen forties to the 1950s to about a half of its previous level because the level of emigration,
but one third of each of every person in each birth cohort cohort emigrated from
Ireland over that period was greater than the very considerable natural increase,
more modest and consequently, population pressure was reduced.
And it is widely believed what would have been an earlier demographic transition of fertility in Ireland was delayed by many, many decades.
Something similar on a more modest scale sort of happened in Puerto Rico because of immigration
to the US and also possibly the emigration of Europeans from the western seaboard of Europe.
The 54 million that I mentioned last week is thought to have delayed the demographic transition except crucially in France,
where you'll recall the fertility transition took place about 100 years earlier than
in the rest of Europe and were uniquely amongst the major western parts of Europe.
There was almost no emigration from France and also little possibility of migration from town to the countryside because France's industrialisation,
despite its technical and scientific progress, was much delayed. I also pointed out that on a much smaller scale,
that migration is probably essential for the survival of very small populations to prevent them falling
into very low population size with increasingly erratic sex ratio for purely statistical reasons,
which may lead to the further reduction in birthrate and their eventual extinction.
Simulations of a sarcastic kind make this a possibility. Quite clear.
Migration balances out the numbers, prevents genetic drift, keeps off effective size and preserves a diversity.
And of course, finally, it increases the cultural diversity of areas by the importation of new populations with new religions and cultures,
new languages and new ways of life. The definition of ethnic groups, I'm sure, is something which we're well familiar with from from other causes.
Another study I won't I won't dwell on this is not a sharp definition, not a sharp criterion,
but it tends to apply apply to groups of people showing distinctive characteristics of a cultural kind of origin language,
sometimes with a biological background, sometimes distinguishable by appearance,
what the Canadians called visible minorities in their ethnic classification and sometimes not maybe indigenous,
maybe arising out of migration, maybe arising out of of conquest in democracies nowadays,
normally self attributed in autocratic societies where there is a case for it is felt
for labelling ethnic minorities normally as a way of keeping people in their place.
Identity is enforced by law,
as in the case of South Africa in times gone past in democracies and free societies where there is a demand by ethnic groups for identity,
this is done usually on an entirely voluntary basis. People say for themselves what ethnic group they belong to, if any.
And interestingly enough, in recent American sentences,
quite a few people have not filled in this this question and therefore depriving themselves, as it were, of an ethnic label.
The demographic interest is primarily in case there are differences, if there are no differences in vital rates,
no differences in birth rates and differences in death rates and differences in rates of migration in or out.
So the relative numbers remain static. The numbers are still interesting, but the demographic interest is rather muted.
If demographic differences emerge in terms of rates, rates of reproduction,
rates of increased rates of decline, then of course this means that the balance of numbers is changing.
And particularly in democracies, the balance of power may be changing in that society and sometimes creating tensions.
And quite a lot of the demographic interest is of this political kind at the present time.
In the past, of course, we have very little information about what the different ethnic groups in diverse societies did in terms of their birth rates.
We only have a rather tenuous grasp about what the birth rate and the death rate of the entire population was like.
And it's not easy to get information about about differences in birth rates for the pre transitional, pre Democratic past.
Occasionally, there are glimmers of light.
For example, the Ottoman Empire, which included a wide variety of different ethnic groups and religions, did have censuses.
And from that as possible, from time to time to infer differences in the birth rate.
And it turns out, for example, perhaps surprisingly, the Christian subjects of the Sultan had a somewhat higher birth rate than Turkish
subjects of the Sultan in pre transitional times in the 19th and 18th centuries.
As these multicultural empires are dismembered by war or collapse from various internal regions, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian, the Russian Empire,
the Austria Hungarian Empire and the German Empire all terminated by the First World War or as they implode for other reasons,
like the Soviet Union in 1991. Then, of course,
what was a single political entity becomes fragmented into lots of smaller political entities and in those entities that are often ethnic minorities.
If those entities become democratic, then that then all sorts of things become salient and important,
which previously perhaps had a lesser importance.
And when it is the case that numbers of people in different regions, which are often, of course, people of different ethnic groups,
or when ethnic groups or regions are recognised explicitly in constitutions, then demographic differences start to become very important indeed.
One example is that of the Lebanon in Lebanon when it was formulated as the state after the First World War, initially under a French suzerainty,
the Constitution provided as a result of the census of 1933 that the president of Lebanon should be a Maronite Christian,
that the prime minister should be a Sunni Muslim, and that the speaker of the House of what we would call House of Commons.
The Parliament was a Shia Muslim.
And that reflected the relative numbers of people, as reflected by the census of 1933, which asked people what religion they belong to.
It was thought to be a fair distribution of power, and that remains to the present day.
In the course of the present, political structure of Lebanon is somewhat shambolic.
No one has dared to hold a census since then in Lebanon because almost certainly the positions would now be reversed.
The birth rate of the Maronite Christians has been for many decades lower than they were the other major groups.
The Lebanon. The birth rate of the Shia Muslims has been the highest and those of the Sunni has been in the middle there, all declining over time.
But the rank order is quite clear. It is quite clear that this this apportionment, this formal constitutional apportionment of power,
according to numbers, would have to be completely reversed.
That would undoubtedly lead to serious dissent and possibly make conflict in Lebanon always just below the surface.
Very, very likely.
Likewise, in Nigeria, there's a similar arrangement whereby the different regions of Nigeria are allotted seats in the in the federal parliament,
according to the numbers revealed by the census that is made holding a rational, effective census in Nigeria, nearly impossible.
Each time that a revision is called for, the numbers jump up enormously beyond any possibility of democratic demographic increase,
because, of course, the region, which has got the most the most numbers, gets the most seats in the parliament.
The region with the most seats in the parliament is able to award itself more federal funds for its support.
This is very explicit in elected election time, very explicit also from time to time.
In that sense, this time there are many other examples, but that's that's one of them.
This notion of ethnic minorities is not just apply, of course, to one kind of group of persons with a with a common kind of origin,
following what I've been saying last last time on Tuesday, it it might follow that most ethnic minorities arise out of some migratory process.
This is by no means the case. Ethnic minorities can be created by boundary changes.
They can be a they can arise out of invasions. And there are a number of different categories of ethnic groupings that some minority,
some some majority visible in the world in the past and in the present.
In some cases, the original inhabitants are replaced or or marginalised by it, by migration.
In Northern Africa, the original populations of Christian origin were well marginalised by the Arab invasions of the 7th century, for example.
Likewise, in Anatolia by but by Turkish invasions in North America, as I mentioned,
the the originally dominant indigenous populations were marginalised and greatly reduced in number by European invasions in Australia.
A similar fate befell the Aboriginals. And in England,
the original population of Celtic origin and language and Christian Christian religion
was submerged in the sixth and seventh centuries culturally by Anglo-Saxon invasions,
such that the remnant populations are only culturally apparent in Wales and Cornwall and in parts of Scotland.
It used to be thought that the Celtic populations of Britannic language and
Christian religion were essentially exterminated by the Anglo-Saxon invaders.
This was this was assumed because of the extraordinary pattern of the of the English language, which was speaking today.
There are about 50000 words in the English language of which not more than 50 are of Celtic origin.
It's in the natural understanding from this population wipe out a complete ethnic cleansing except in those marginal Western areas.
This is almost certainly not true.
Demographic considerations, archaeological considerations, and above all, modern genetic considerations, which many of you will be very well familiar.
I suggest quite the reverse is the case that the greater part of the genetic ancestry of the populations of British Isles are quite ancient and that
what has happened is a complete cultural makeover and not a population turnaround of the magnitude which the language patterns appear to suggest.
So things that some evidence is contrary to to the effects of other evidence.
There are lists here, also various other ways in which people become become can become minority,
sometimes dominant for a while, like the Manchus in China and the whites in South Africa, sometimes more more complex.
Quite often, deliberate attempts to create more and more apparently sustainable,
more apparently viable nation states out of out of the fragmentation of empires have had unexpected, predictable negative results.
This is a map of part of the Ostro Hungarian empire, which existed until 1918, centred on on Vienna, which is.
Can't see it on the map, it must be there. Uh, well, here's here's Bratislava,
where the printers to this this enormous area was carved off of the Treaty of Versailles
by the victorious allied powers with politicians crawling over maps on the wall,
drawing lines on it, saying, well, this this is mostly Hungarian origin, Hungarian.
This is mostly Romanian origin. That ought to be Romania and so on.
Trying to create a democratic nation states in a rather naive hope that this would this would produce lasting peace.
Well, certainly the enormous diversity of the Austrian Hungarian empire was greatly reduced by the
fragmentation of its constituent parts into into a notionally democratic national entities.
But it created more ethnic minority problems.
It didn't solve the war, for example, in what is now Romania, part of which at that time was under Ottoman suzerainty, which, of course, disappeared.
The northern part was heavily populated by ethnic Germans and by Hungarians in Transylvania up here.
That's why it's of green in this map.
The whole of this part of what is now Romania was transferred from Hungary to which used to belong to the new state of Romania.
In doing so, it exchanged a Romanian minority in greater Hungary for Hungarian minority,
as it were, greater Romania, plus an ethnic German minority, also in the same area.
And that's one example of the way in which this attempt to create more homogeneous
states that in fact failed to do so and created lasting problems of tension,
which are still in existence in Romania, although most of the ethnic Germans have now moved back to Germany and as it were, solved.
The problem, for example, was was in in Czechoslovakia.
This this this this is the country of Czechoslovakia,
which the the Versailles and General Mapmaker's created out of the remnants of the Austrian Hungarian empire.
The blue bits where the Czechs lived in the far western part of Czechoslovakia is a land populated by people of German nationality,
German ancestry, German ethnicity. One one might say that, as you recall,
your your history of the Second World War will recall that there was tremendous agitation by the the Nazi inspired leaders.
And then to join the German Reich under Hitler in 1933 and eventually under German pressure, succeeded in doing so,
thereby making Czechoslovakia defenceless because all the mountainous areas with all the frontier forces was here.
And that led to the easy invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and which precipitated the invasion of Poland that followed the the Second World War.
So major problems of ethnic consciousness, ethnic division were created by the invention of these new states,
which were hoped to be a more homogeneous.
And eventually, as you also recall,
Czechoslovakia divided itself in the so-called velvet divorce of nineteen ninety one between the Czech party here and the Slovak party here,
which could have been predicted at the time. I thought lots of examples of that.
Here's another example of of, um, a sort of ethnic mess.
Here's the Balkans with. With Bosnia and Herzegovina, where, of course, the terrible conflicts took place between between Serbs,
Croats and Muslim Bosnians in the 1990s, we have tremendous refugee movements into Germany creating new minorities there.
And here in Serbia, we have the province of Kosovo.
Kosovo used to be populated mostly by Serbs.
It's the site of one of the one of the iconic military events, the battle of of what's called a terrible defeat in about 30,
46, where essentially the Turks took over as part of this part of Serbia.
And eventually the whole lot over the course of time, the higher birthrate of the Kosovars, who are mostly Muslim of Albanian ethnic group,
replaced numerically or displaced numerically the Serbian population and provoked a violent and oppressive reaction by the Serbs,
which was met, as you know,
by air strikes by NATO in the 1990s and eventually the creation of Kosovo as a separate independent state under UN supervision just a few years ago.
Whether that would be viable or not, I don't know, but that that's a quite interesting example of of a state which detached itself or became detached,
became alienated from its parent because of long term differences in the birth rate,
which became salient once once the states began to have democratic ideals and numbers started to get translated into power.
Um. Sometimes it seems to be the case that even oppressive dictatorships,
as the Ottoman Empire was can can keep can keep highly mixed up populations of different ethnic origins in in order,
even by violent means, which then once was the overriding power is removed.
They start to seek for for a national state of their own with endless conflicts over borders and minorities of a kind which I just been describing.
I also mentioned another way in which ethnic minorities is going to be created by arbitrary,
sudden changes in boundaries caused by the collapse of of large empires.
This is the case of the Soviet Union in 1991 when the Soviet Union decided to abolish itself.
And there were, as I mentioned, 24 million people of so-called Russian nationality living in the republics of the Soviet Union,
outside the Russian Federation. And here they are. This is a map of the lands in 1994, three, three years after the separation.
Here is Russia proper. Here, here is what the Russians will the near abroad, those republics of the former Soviet Union,
which are joining the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and so on.
All of them had Russian populations in them, indicated in red, mostly in Kazakhstan and also in Kyrgyzstan and the other Central Asian states.
And these are now in a rather problematic position. Some of the states on the left, as they are,
their birthrates have been typically smaller or lower than those of the native population other than the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz.
But that's not the major issue. The major issue is one of politics and power.
And the extent to which they are expected to integrate by learning Kazakh could be coming,
as it were, Kazakhs and Russians, very difficult and yet unsolved political problem.
Within the Russian Federation itself, there is enormous ethnic diversity,
even though the Russian Federation or Russia's divested itself of its ethnic hinterland,
all these peripheral republics, there are still tremendous variation within Russia itself.
These this is a map of the crude birth rate by geographical region in Russia.
Over here is, um. Moscow, I can't leave Moscow must see that here.
St. Petersburg will will be up here and you can see how much Russia there is to the east of Moscow and St. Petersburg,
which to us seems quite a long way, is already a. The populations here are very, very sparsely spread.
These are these are huge areas with quite small populations. Nonetheless, they are not mostly Russian.
The ethnic Russian population is mostly in the western part here and decreases
in numbers as we go further to the east of the populations down here are very,
very, very predominantly of Muslim religion and Turkic language and ethnic origin over here
that most of McGilligan ethnic origin and not ethnic Russian population size small,
even though area huge. And one of the concerns which the Russian Federation has, which was even more potent in Soviet times for obvious reasons,
was the birth rate is differential, that here we have the lowest birthrate is just a crude birth rate.
It's between six and seven in these green areas,
which are mostly Russian Slavic populations speak the Russian language, Orthodox religion, if any religion at all.
The yellow areas are about birthweight about eight and the red area is a group of about 12, particularly as you see in in the Muslim Turkic areas,
including Chechnya and the other trouble spots which erupt into our news headlines from time to time.
And so the balance is changing even in in in the Russian Federation, although less fast than it was in the Soviet Union before 1991.
And here's a final example of population change.
As a result of a combination of immigration, plus considerably a different birth rates.
Here are the countries of the United States from the US Census of this is two thousand 2000,
showing the proportion of the residents in different counties identifying as Hispanic.
And as you see that, the dark green, some sixty one to one hundred percent.
Well, no. One hundred percent, but that's a majority. Hispanic is dark, dark green, and getting home for the Hispanics is the bit green.
And this is these these areas are increasing in frequency, the dark green ones as well all the time,
because because of the migration of many hundreds of thousands of people from Latin America every year into the US,
plus, of course, the quite considerable TFR differences,
the Hispanic TFR in the US is about two point nine five that of the non Hispanic white population,
about one point eighty five that of other minorities, usually quite low Asians lower them than the European people of European origin, for example.
So all sorts of change happening there, of which more in a moment.
Why do minorities often have not always often have different demographic characteristics?
This is an unsolved problem.
It's a kind of subset, if you like, of demographic transition theory, but rather a rather messy one and a complication to it.
It used to be thought, particularly by sociologists, that the main,
if not the only reasons why one observed differences in birth rates and death rates between marriage
characteristics between different ethnic groups was because of their different socioeconomic status,
because of the socioeconomic characteristics. That's the so called characteristics hypothesis that because certainly most immigrant groups of most
ethnic groups of immigrant origin tends to come from poorer countries in the 20th century anyway,
almost by definition, they occupied a lower place in the labour market.
Their income levels were lower, the education levels were lower.
And this is the nature of things, as you would expect in any kind of demographic transition theory led to higher birth rates,
which would diminish in time as as populations if they were allowed to.
If discrimination and other handicaps didn't prevent them from doing so, they could move up.
The social hierarchy acquired the same kind of characteristics as the majority population.
That being the case, the ethnic differentials in infertility and death rate would disappear and you have a much more
homogeneous population at the end of the day from the point of view of demographic behaviour.
That clearly hasn't happened and a number of other modifications that those motions,
which are specific, more specific to the minority situation, have been developed.
The most notable being the so-called minority status hypothesis, which is a confusing one because it operates in two different directions at once.
The. One way of interpreting a thinking about minority status is that if ethnic minority groups recognise the handicaps which they face,
the hostility which they may face in the majority population,
the lower social prestige which they may enjoy the handicap to the social promotion which they high birthrates may generate,
then they may realising these handicaps take steps to to moderate them and reduce them.
And the obvious example of that is the remarkable behaviour of Jews who moved into the United States
and into Western Europe after the pogroms in Russia in the 1980s onwards in quite large numbers.
Many of them came from small rural towns which were badly educated, had high birthrates and were regarded as being highly alien and undesirable.
But certainly in Western Europe and to some extent in the US as well,
an impoverished population regarded as a problem within a very short space of time,
that demographic transition had accelerated and had overtaken the demographic transition of some of which is going on at the
same time amongst the majority population in Western Europe and the US at the end of the 19th century through the 20th century,
so that Jewish fertility for the most part in these areas has since then and up
to the present day being lower than that of the average for party for that,
because partly for many other reasons, a Jewish social status has improved.
Jewish occupational status is higher than average. Typically in Western countries, income levels are higher than average.
Education levels are often very much higher than average, and the numbers are declining relative to the majority.
As a consequence, this causes concern in Jewish populations, in Jewish organisations both in the West Western Europe and in the US,
as a chief rabbi, Jonathan Sacks said in a book of his which is entitled Shall We Have Grandchildren?
Jewish numbers are declining in those populations, partly because the birth rate is so low,
partly because of assimilation of people drifting out of the Jewish category, being perhaps having some vestigial Jewish identity,
but not identifying themselves as Jewish to synagogue authority authorities, not not taking part in Jewish rituals and therefore being lost,
as it were, the population, at least to the point of view of statistics, if not for the point of view of some kind of residual consciousness.
There are other examples of that. The Jewish example is perhaps the obvious one.
Another manifestation of minority status is exactly the opposite, that individuals populations, rather,
will will will protect their minority status by emphasising the demographic differences,
particularly the high birth rate and particularly the rule against about marriage.
One example of this, I suppose family, all demographers are the Hutterites.
The Hutterites are a minority which has preserved the minority status by by geographical segregation,
by the insistence that those who who who marry out of the group will leave the group by a powerful presence to prevent people doing that,
if possible, that they are given a year of freedom, as you know,
and in youth to try the outside world and see if they can they want it or if they can stand it.
And that's called by some sociologists defensive structuring that patterns of behaviour develop in society,
which tend to preserve the culture, preserve the language, keep out outsiders hostile way, but just just keep them at arm's length.
Another example, curiously enough, comes from the Jewish population itself, from from the Haredi,
the ultra-Orthodox Jews who are notable in places like Stanford, Hill in London and who are numerous and increasing in number in Israel itself,
where where the notion of the strict segregation of roles in the sexes is preserved as it
is in the Hutterites and on to other similar groups where contraception is not practised,
where birth rates are very high, and where interaction with other members of the population is kept as an absolute minimum.
Consequently, the numbers increase rapidly, and this is thought to be one reason why the birth rate of Jews as a whole in the UK is actually going up.
And also the birth rate of Jews in Israel, unusually, is going up because the numbers of the Haredi,
especially in a very hygienic environment like Britain or Israel, are not kept in check by any kind of high mortality or quite the contrary.
And numbers are growing quite fast. And this causes some concern in Jewish Israel because, of course,
under the the the way in which the Jewish constitutionals Jewish politics works in Israel,
the Likud Religious Party has particular privileges which enable large numbers
of the Haredi in Israel to remain out of the workforce until about age 40,
studying rather than working.
And wives earn the money and surviving on very generous government handouts, which increase with family size as a kind of family policy.
So quite an interesting, complex little problem there. Which one of us, one of the human sciences found this last year.
A very excellent thesis about. So.
All sorts of reasons why that ethnic minority differences, some of which may persist and some of which may or may not persist,
which which in them in the 20th century have really become salient because of the rise of democracy,
because of the rise of human rights, because of the the consciousness which arose for reasons beyond my capacity to
explain in the 19th century of of a much more interest in an ethnic ethnic identity,
in old languages, in old customs,
and on which led a large number of of intellectuals to research the various rather submerged ethnic differences which still existed in their country,
and try and revive them and try and take an interest in the Finnish language in Swedish Finland,
in Welsh and Gaelic in Breton, Provençal in France, even sometimes in the 20th century as well, raising languages.
Dracula like from the dead by huge infusions of public money. The last person to speak, Cornish, died about 1850, if I recall correctly.
Nonetheless, Cornish is now alive and well. Street names are being renamed in Cornish.
This is only possible through through government recognition of minority rights.
They've had to be recreated from the grave and the infusion of public money into supporting it.
And you will see that the proliferation of of Welsh roadsigns throughout Wales or the
fact that Rexon is now designations itself to be the first bilingual town in England.
All sorts of a passage to this council continue. Um, well,
this has led to is a great interest in ethnic categorisation that people who are conscious of belonging to to ethnic minority
groups of various kinds of immigrant origin or of of domestic indigenous origin are required to be labelled as that,
partly for reasons of preserving a group identity, partly for reasons of trying to to make sure that they have an appropriate slice of the cake,
and particularly if they regard themselves as being disadvantaged,
they and governments feel that those populations have to be identified in order that
they can be targeted with appropriate funds and protected from discrimination.
Consequently, an enormous expansion of of questions about ethnic minority status or ethnic status routine.
Now to ask people what their ethnic group is, almost anything which happens in this country,
you would have had to have answered questions about your self-described ethnic identity when you applied to join the university.
I believe if you apply for any grant,
you will be asked to identify yourself according to ethnic group and possibly even religion in some local authorities.
If you wish to have planning permission to erect a garden shed, you have to state what ethnic group you belong to.
And these are the categorisations of the England 2011 census.
I don't know if you can read the labels. There are at least three questions which relate to identity.
One, the ethnic group question, which has various subdivisions here white, English,
Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, British or Irish, Gypsy, Irish traveller, etc.
Black, white, mixed, white and black, Caribbean and so on.
Asian, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, African, Caribbean, um, other black and other ethnic group, Arab and, and so on.
Religion sorts of religions. Any other religion right in you will all be well, well aware of the way which some people take this for a ride.
There were I think three hundred thousand Jedi knights in the 2001 census,
um a new a new, rather vague question about how to describe your national identity.
Um, you can write anything you like in that in that box and also asking about birthplace.
Not citizenship, curiously enough. Similar sorts of things in the US, I'm sorry, this reproduce very badly, it probably isn't isn't very legible.
The United States has three or had three, in fact, four birthplace, three completely separate systems of ethnic categorisation,
a consequence of different kinds of political pressures emanating from different kinds of self-identified groups,
which the political system had somehow to accommodate. Even that makes the demographic data very messy.
First of all, you've got the traditional race question that's on here.
First of all, you've got a question on Hispanic origin. People are invited to say where they are or are not of Hispanic origin if they are Mexican,
Puerto Rican, Cuban or other, then they asked what their race is.
Racism is an acceptable category in the US. It's been asked in the census are very, very long time.
And it is independent of Hispanic origin, a person of Hispanic origin can be of any race, including a North American Indian,
but that is perhaps rather unusual for the person's race is also being white, black, African American, Negro, American.
Interesting how terms go in and out of fashion and acceptability. American Indian or Alaskan native.
Right. Which one? Filipino, Asian, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese and so forth.
Or any other race. And it's possible here also to put down what your ancestry is, and it's also possible in two thousand census right down,
more than one ancestry and ancestry became so popular that there were people putting down to three or four different ancestries,
reflecting correctly their perception about about their parentage and parentage.
And all of these are independent. And so the nightmare which the Bureau of the Census has used in formulating
population distributions and especially population projections can only be imagined.
This one one's actually dropped in the 2010 to the considerable consternation of some of the ethnic groups,
because it meant that people who came from from the Middle East who regard themselves as Arab really
had a choice in terms of a race between calling themselves white and calling themselves black.
Not one of these ones would apply at all. A lot a lot of them objected to the notion of trying to call themselves white,
did not differentiate themselves sufficiently from the rest of the population.
They felt that as Arabs, as people from the Middle East or from North Africa, who also were,
as it were expected to call themselves, whites, that in fact they were treated as white by the rest of the population.
They suffered from disadvantages of various kinds, which ought to be recognised in the census by enabling them to answer this question.
But that wasn't that wasn't asked. It was very interesting that these these questions are which are all self-described, you understand,
are often strongly supported by the groups which are thereby identified and are not an imposition on them, although some regard them as an imposition.
Others regard themselves as being very antithetical not to national identity.
In France, for example, all this would be completely illegal.
The French constitution emphasising citizenship and the unity of citizenship, however, not quite corresponding to reality,
that that assumption of equality might be nonetheless takes a very strong stand against identification on religious or ethnic or racial grounds.
Because this is a complete contradiction of the French constitution,
which emphasises the equality of citizens, which is a point of view which perhaps would have some sympathy.
So there's this this pattern is very typical of the Anglo-Saxon countries Australia, Canada, New Zealand, America, United States,
I mean U.K., much less on the continent where we are register based data are based upon upon parental citizenship and birthplace alone.
And ethnic groups only appear in a few censuses, particularly those of Russia and elsewhere.
What actually happens to ethnic data,
these are some data showing the total fertility rate of ethnic minorities in the U.K. constructed very laboriously by
the so-called own child method because data on a categorisation by ethnic group is not requested on the registration.
So it's got to be done by an indirect method. As you see from 1979 on, the TFR of all groups has been going down.
The yellow is Bangladeshi. This is Pakistani. And you can see that in the 1970s, 1970s, 1980s,
the two fathers groups in the UK was rather like what it was in Pakistan and Bangladesh that say five or six,
very much higher than that of the national average. The national average is this heavy line here.
The Indian population, much there to begin with, dropping down just below the national average,
the African population is this one here somewhat above maintain probably by very considerable
increases in the African population from high fertility African countries like Somalia,
where the TFR of Somalis in Britain is about five. But that other Africans in Britain is much lower, the Chinese population, much,
much typically Chinese immigrants into Europe adopt very low fertility patterns,
possibly following what Kerry would call a Jewish road to social mobility.
And they are indeed a very successful group.
So very important realise that by no means all ethnic minority populations have got higher birth rates than the native population.
This is not true in a number of cases. And in all cases the difference is not all that great.
This is just a model of the Chinese TFR in the in the UK showing an asymptote of about one point three.
That is to say that it looks like stabilising at about one point three. This may change.
Part of that is due to postponement and then the postponement comes to an end. It'll go up again, as in other populations which postpone fertility.
Here are some US data, some of these go back to to 1960, from 1960 to 2000, the yellow line is the whole population of the US.
The non Hispanic white population is in this one here, about one point eighty five,
compared with an average of about two point one, which is the overall American level,
that two point one moved up from one point eighty five, very much by the large and growing population of of Hispanic people,
whether TFR is about two point nine five and not changing very much.
As you can see, the black population, of course, not of a recent conclusion at all, showing some convergence down to to the to the national average.
It's not distinguishable in the year 2000. So in some sense, the convergence, others are the other patterns.
So far, not very much convergence at all.
That depends quite a lot upon the balance of migration compared with the number of people of the same ethnic origin born in the country,
which we are concerned with, you can see here from these data which go back to the 1970s,
a consistent difference between the TFR of Pakistanis, according to whether they are born in the UK or born in Pakistan itself,
the the open borders here are two thousand Pakistani women who are who are born.
Now, the phrasing is bad. These are women who are born in Pakistan, residing in the U.K. As you can see, the white bars have the highest TFR.
The pale grey bars are people of Pakistani origin born in the U.K. And you can see that in each case that there's a there's a difference.
Those born of you have consistently, in some cases, much lower birth rates than those born in Pakistan, as you would imagine.
But it's an illustration of of of the kind of assimilation, at least to local levels of fertility, which can be seen there.
That even so in the latest data here, which are quite which are not up to date.
The UK born Pakistani population still has a TFR about two point six, which is a lot higher than the national average.
In the Indian case, the chief has gone down much more, and that has already started to make that ethnic population age,
ethnic populations are by no means always youthful like this Pakistani population is.
In the 2001 one census, the Indian population shows marked signs of population ageing, as you would expect, given the reduction in the in that TFR.
Elsewhere, all sorts of changes are afoot, persistent differences in in birthrates and also in migration leading to to to the diminution
of the proportion of population in some groups and the increase in the fortunes of others.
Here in New Zealand, the people of European origin, the top dark blue light, are obviously heading downwards.
Curiously, the population of Maori origin, not partly because Maori origin is is a very fluid definition.
A lot of people in New Zealand have part Maori, part European origin,
and the numbers who report themselves as being Maori changes somewhat from time to time, depending upon upon the mood of the time, as it were.
Ethnic change in the US is projected by the US Census Bureau is quite dramatic.
The blue line here, a thin one going up sharply, is the Hispanic population.
The red line at the top is the white, non Hispanic population.
And you can see that the two are heading towards convergence, admittedly, at the very long range of the end of the century for the US,
because the census projects that the US white, non Hispanic population will become an overall minority in the US by about two thousand forty two.
And no one seems to be disputing this is almost solely as carved in stone.
There's nothing can stop that happening.
Very interesting new development and something similar, as I mentioned on Tuesday, is happening in European countries as well.
These are defined on a registration basis, on the whole, not an ethnic basis by registration data in various countries which collect this information.
The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and so on. I will skip that.
It has been suggested, therefore, that we're now in the middle of a sort of third demographic transition,
the first demographic transition whereby birth and death rates move from a high position with low population growth
via a version of population growth to to a new balance where birth and death rates are both low and natural.
Increase is moderate to the second transition of which we've all heard this revolution in family and living arrangements and sexual behaviour,
births outside marriage and and possibly a third chance transition where the population composition itself
is altered as a process by the presence of international migration and differential rates of reproduction.
That's me all alter and be vitiated by much more interesting developments to do
with with love and sex to do particularly with love and sex between ethnic groups,
with the production of children of mixed ancestry who may be happy to consider themselves to be of mixed ancestry and who identify
themselves as being of mixed ancestry voluntarily in questions of the census in this country and in the US and elsewhere.
Six hundred and sixty thousand in all in the census of 2001, leading to what Jones, the great geneticist, has described as a brown future.
Here are three very prominent people of mixed origin.
The person on the top left, you may recognise Lewis Hamilton, is the person down below Britain's champion motor racing driver.
And this young lady here was also an explosion, was was a candidate for Miss France who was dismissed from her, her status for some minor peccadillo.
And she might seek asylum from the beastly French in England, but I'm sure she'd be very welcome.
These are these are unions outside one's own group recorded in the labour force in Great Britain, not being up to date.
It's not more than 10 years ago, but the pattern is much to say.
Now, what we've got here is a percentage of people belonging to various different ethnic groups who are in unions,
marital or otherwise, outside, outside their own ethnic group.
And you can see amongst the black Caribbean population, amongst men, men are on the rights of women.
On the left, the proportion is up to 35 percent more amongst men than amongst women.
A high proportion of black Africans, much less amongst Indians, much, much lower amongst Pakistanis and especially Bangladeshis.
Hardly any ethnic intermarriage.
That a very interesting reversal in young Chinese, where a high proportion of Chinese women are in unions with with non Chinese men.
That is the case with Chinese men in respect of non Chinese women.
This looks wrong, but it's repeated over and over again in all the surveys which have been made.
And it's clearly a reality. And as you as you see it, a very high proportion indeed.
And this means, of course, the populations of ethnic origin are becoming increasingly themselves mixed.
This is the part this is the more intelligible graph.
This this is the population of Caribbean origin, some some level of Caribbean origin in England, Wales, 2001, by age nought to four, 10 to 14.
And so the Darbar is a population of Caribbean origin of Caribbean origin.
The Pilbara is the population of Caribbean origin of mixed Caribbean origin mix usually mix Caribbean and white.
And as you can see, as time is going on, the mix part of the Caribbean origin population is becoming predominant over the other.
That has led to the supposition that in due course, the process of ethnic intermarriage fostered some groups slow than others,
will lead to populations of mixed origin, becoming, as it were, the most important ethnic group numerically.
This is a very long range stochastic projection made by their show of showing in the orange line the rise of
the population of of ethnic or ethnic origin on very conservative assumptions over the next hundred years,
very long range of what can happen in 100 years.
But these are very conservative assumptions and it may well be much higher than that and probably will be.
So the question arises, is this something which will affect the whole world?
Is the whole world going to become as mixed as it looks as though Western populations are going to do?
Probably not, partly because some of them are too big for that to happen.
It's not possible for the populations of India and China, which are in any case already mixed, especially in the case of India,
to become mixed through immigration because there aren't enough immigrants in the world and not remotely possible an imaginable level of immigration,
which would make in India as mixed by immigration as UK or Germany or the United States is big.
And so far, the patterns of diversity integration in the Third World are quite modest.
Many of them, of course, are already diverse because of the inclusion of a large number of traditional native persons of different origin.
That's different from what the prospect of most of Third World countries becoming as diverse as Western Europe has done not seems to be rather small.
For the foreseeable future, we may have all sorts of interesting connotations, the point of view of international relations,
power relations and the perception of what national interest actually means in the West,
which is more diverse compared with the rest of the world, which must remain less diverse, especially in the bigger countries.
So on that contentious political point, I will stop. Thank you very much.